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Forschungszentrum für Umweltökonomik (FZU)

Research Center for Environmental Economics

Forschungszentrum für Umweltökonomik (FZU)

Envecon

Das Forschungszentrum für Umweltökonomik (FZU) am Alfred-Weber-Institut dient als gemeinsame Plattform für Ökonomen, die alle an der Schnittstelle von natürlicher Umwelt und Wirtschaft forschen. Wir nutzen theoretische, empirische und experimentelle Methoden, um die Herausforderungen nachhaltigen Umgangs mit der Umwelt besser zu verstehen und Lösungsvorschläge zu erarbeiten. Diese Webseiten bieten aktuelle Informationen zu unseren Aktivitäten und zu den verschiedenen, auch interdisziplinären, Projekten, die wir hier durchführen.

 

Aktuelles

Stellenangebot Studentische Hilfskraft

NEUE VERÖFFENTLICHUNGEN

The paper “Cold Case: The Forensic Economics of Energy Efficiency Labeling for Refrigeration Appliances” by Timo Goeschl has just been accepted for publication in Energy Economics.

van den Broek, K. L., Walker, I., & Klöckner, C. A. (2019). Drivers of energy saving behaviour: The relative influence of intentional, normative, situational and habitual processes. Energy Policy, 132, 811-819.

The paper 'Leveling Up? - An Inter-Neighborhood Experiment on Parochialism and the Efficiency of Multi-Level Public Goods Provision' (with C. Gallier, M. Kesternich, J. Lohse, C. Reif and D. Römer) has been published by the Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 164 (August 2019), 500-517.

van den Broek K. L. Stakeholders' perceptions of the socio-economic and environmental challenges at Lake Victoria. Lakes & Reserv. 2019;00:1–7. https://doi.org/10.1111/lre.12275

Van den Broek, K.L. (2019). Household energy literacy: A critical review and a conceptual typology. Energy Research & Social Science, 57, 101256. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2019.101256

Schaap, R. & Richter, A., (2019), Overcapitalization and social norms of cooperation in a small-scale fishery, Ecological Economics, Volume 166, 106438, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2019.106438

STAFF NEWS

Mikaële Charpentier joined the Research Center for Environmental Economics as administrative support staff on October 1st. Previously, Mikaële worked for Airbus, where she was project manager and operative leader (language).

 

Sina Klein joined the RCEE as a postdoctoral researcher in October. Sina is a cognitive psychologist by training and joined us from the University of Landau where she completed her PhD a couple of months ago.

 

Alice Solda is a new postdoctoral researcher at the RCEE. A behavioral/experimental economist by training, Alice joined us in September from the University of Lyon/Queensland Univ. of Technology where she recently earned her PhD.

 

Luisa Lorè, from the University of Rome ‘Tor Vergata’, spent September 2019 at the RCEE as a visiting researcher. The purpose of Luisa’s visit was to contribute to our field experiments on the economics of food waste.

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Environmental Economics Brownbag Seminar
 

Nächster Vortrag:

15.10.2019 Presenters: Marcel Oestreich (Brock University) and Alice Solda (Heidelberg University)
Ort: FZU, Seminarraum 215

Titel: The role of inter-firm information on the effectiveness of competitive audit mechanism

 

Abstract:

We unify in a theoretical framework with endogenous emissions and emission reports several recent advances on competitive audit mechanisms for the enforcement of environmental taxes. While random auditing assigns the same audit probability to each regulated firm, competitive audit mechanisms assign a lower audit probability to the firms with higher self-reported emissions relative to others. The resulting strategic interdependences between the firms can yield audit leverage for the environmental protection agency. When firms have no information about each others' emissions, competitive auditing induces higher reported emissions and the same level of actual emissions as compared to random auditing. These two results are isomorph to the main findings by Gilpatric et al. (2011) and Cason et al. (2016) respectively. When firms have perfect information about each others' emissions, competitive auditing induces the socially optimal level of emission, while this is not feasible under the random audit mechanism. This result is isomorph to the main finding by Oestreich (2017). Our experimental design also allows us to extend the model to the case where firms have limited information about each others' emissions.

 

 

Seitenbearbeiter: office
Letzte Änderung: 14.10.2019
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