Research Centre for Environmental Economics (RCEE)
Research Center for Environmental Economics
Forschungszentrum für Umweltökonomik (FZU)
The Research Center for Environmental Economics (Forschungszentrum für Umweltökonomie, FZU) brings together a dynamic group of economists who all work on solving pressing problems situated at intersection of the natural environment and the economy. We use theory, empirical, and experimental methods for better understanding the challenges of sustainable resource management and to provide relevant policy recommendations. Use this webpage as a platform to stay tuned in on our work or to explore the various projects we are involved in, many of them interdisciplinary.
A core output of the CELARIT project funded by the German Research Foundation has just been published in the journal Climatic Change: Establishing causation in climate litigation: admissibility and reliability, by lead author Tobias Pfrommer and contributing author Timo Goeschl, with additional authors from the CELARIT team.
The paper „Illuminating divergence in perceptions in natural resource management: A case for the investigation of the heterogeneity in mental models” by Karlijn van den Broek has just been published in the Journal of Dynamic Decision Making.
The paper "From social information to social norms. Evidence from two experiments" by Timo Goeschl, Sara Kettner, Hannes Lohse and Christiane Schwieren has been published by Games in its special issue on social norms.
Michael Tanner, an environmental economist with the Charles Darwin Foundation on the Galapagos Islands, has been selected as Alexander von Humbold International Climate Protection Fellow at the RCEE. Michael will join us in spring 2019 to conduct research on the economics of climate change adaptation.
Timo Goeschl is on research leave at Harvard University.
FZU-ZEW EnvEcon MONTHLY BROWNBAG
The next FZU-ZEW Environmental Economics Monthly Brownbag Seminar is coming up
next Tuesday, April 16th, 12:30 to 14:00 hours
at Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW), Heinz-Koenig-Hall (L7,1, 68161 Mannheim).
Title: Strategic Delegation and Centralized Climate Policies
Presenter: Wolfgang Habla (U Mannheim and ZEW)
We analyse a typical principal-agent relationship in the context of international environmental agreements. First, the principals delegate the authority to negotiate an agreement to an agent each, who acts on their behalf. Second, the appointed agents bargain over the total level of emissions and the allocation of permits. In the last stage, emission permits are traded. Solving by backwards induction and using the Nash-Bargaining Solution, we find that despite the strategic considerations in the choice of the delegates, global emissions are lower under cooperation in comparison to non-cooperative policies. Furthermore, for cooperation to be mutually beneficial for both principals, their countries need to be sufficiently symmetric.
Everyone is welcome to attend.
Upcoming seminar dates: May 21st, June 18th