Research Centre for Environmental Economics (RCEE)

Research Center for Environmental Economics

Forschungszentrum für Umweltökonomik (FZU)



The Research Center for Environmental Economics (Forschungszentrum für Umweltökonomie, FZU) brings together a dynamic group of economists who all work on solving pressing problems situated at intersection of the natural environment and the economy. We use theory, empirical, and experimental methods for better understanding the challenges of sustainable resource management and to provide relevant policy recommendations. Use this webpage as a platform to stay tuned in on our work or to explore the various projects we are involved in, many of them interdisciplinary.




The paper "Public in-kind relief and private self-insurance" by Timo Goeschl and Shunsuke Managi has been accepted for publication by the journal Economics of Disasters and Climate Change.

The paper “Voluntary action for climate change mitigation does not exhibit locational preferences” (previously titled “Does Mitigation Begin At Home?) by Timo Goeschl and Johannes Diederich has been accepted for publication by the Journal of Environmental Economics and Management.

Florian Diekert’s paper (joint with T. Schweder) “Disentangling Effects of Policy Reform and Environmental Changes in the Norwegian Coastal Fishery for Cod” has just been published in Land Economics.



Dr. Lisa Björk and Dr. Karlijn van den Broek have joined the Research Center as postdoctoral researchers. This team, combining environmental psychology (Karlijn) and environmental economics (Lisa), is developing the MULTITIP  project on managing complex lake ecosystems, which has received seed funding from the Federal Ministry for Education and Research BMBF.



The next FZU-ZEW EnvEcon Monthly Brownbag will take place Tuesday, April 17th , 12:30 to 14:00 hours at the ZEW, room Hamburg, L7,1 69161 Mannheim.


Presenter: Frederick van der Ploeg (University of Oxford)

Abstract: This paper analyses optimal corrective taxation and optimal income redistribution. The Pigouvian pollution tax is higher if pollution damages disproportionally hurt the poor due to equity weighting of pollution damages. Moreover, under general utility functions, optimal pollution taxes should be set below the Pigouvian tax if the poor spend a disproportionate fraction of their income on polluting goods. However, if preferences for commodities are of the Gorman (1961) polar form, optimal pollution taxes should follow the first-best rule for the Pigouvian corrective tax even if the government wants to redistribute income and the poor spend a disproportional part of their income on polluting goods. The often-used quasi-linear, CES and Stone-Geary utility functions all belong to the Gorman polar class. If preferences are Gorman polar, and if pollution taxes are not optimized, Pareto-improving green tax reforms exist that move the pollution tax closer to the Pigouvian tax. Simulations demonstrate that optimal corrective taxes should be Pigouvian if the demand for polluting goods is derived from a LES demand system, but deviate from the Pigouvian taxes if demand for polluting goods demand is derived from a PIGLOG demand system.



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Latest Revision: 2018-04-27
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