Prof. Christoph Vanberg, Ph.D.



Bergheimer Str. 58
69115 Heidelberg
Office: 01.002

Tel. +49 6221 54 2912
Fax +49 6221 54 3592

E-Mail: vanberg [at]


Sprechstunde im Semester: Freitags, 11-12 Uhr (Voranmeldung über:

There will be no office hours on June 14- 21.



Political Economics
Behavioral Economics
Experimental Economics



Legislative bargaining with heterogeneous disagreement values: theory and experiments (with L. Miller and M. Montero), Games and Economic Behavior, 107 (2018), 60-92.

Who never tells a lie? Experimental Economics, 20 (2017),448-459 (working paper version)

The dynamics of coalition formation - a multilateral bargaining experiment with free timing of moves (with J. Tremewan), Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 130 (2016), 33-46.

Experimental Evidence that Quorum Rules Discourage Turnout and Promote Election Boycotts (with L. Conraria and P. Magalhaes), Experimental Economics, 19 (2016), 886-909.

Group size and decision rules in legislative bargaining (with L. Miller), European Journal of Political Economy, 37 (2015): 288-302.

An experimental study on the incentives of the probabilistic serial mechanism (with M. Kurino and D. Hugh-Jones), Games and Economic Behavior, 87 (2014), 367-380.

Adaptive Preferences, Normative Individualism, and Individual Liberty: Comment, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 170 (2014), 43-48.

Playing hard to get: an economic rationale for crowding out of intrinsically motivated behavior (with W. Schnedler), European Economic Review, 68 (2014), 106-115.

Decision costs in legislative bargaining: An experimental analysis (with Luis Miller), Public Choice, 155 (2013), 373-394.

Voting on a sharing norm in a dictator game, Journal of Economic Psychology, 31 (2010), 285-292.

Why do people keep their promises? An experimental test of two explanations, Econometrica, 76 (2008), 1467-1480.

“One Man, One Dollar?” Campaign contribution limits, equal influence, and political communication, Journal of Public Economics, 92 (2008), 514-531.


Legislative bargaining with joint production: An experimental study (with Anna Merkel)


A short note on the rationality of the false consensus effect


Effects of decision rules in an unstructured multilateral bargaining experiment (with James Tremewan)

Legislative bargaining with costly communication (with Anna Merkel)






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