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Post-hybridity and Non-synthetic Temporality

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INTRODUCTION

The term hybridity, one of the most popular concepts in international, ethnic, migrant, cultural and civilizational studies of the 21st century, is losing its critical potential, both because no one is not hybrid anymore and because awareness of hybridity might encourage violence. For the pedagogical and epistemological sake, we believe it is necessary to acknowledge the irony of “hybrid violence,” cosmopolitan as well indigenous, in order to move beyond. The cosmopolitan hegemonic power claims to represent the highest form of hybridity, qua globalization, and vows to protect globalization by targeting both failing states and terrorist forces. In this conceptual striking back, a neo-conservative form of governance in the cosmopolitan centre comfortably claims hybridity while an indigenous, hybrid product of the Cold War’s making acquires nationalist and/or religious fundamentalism. Hybrid actors at both levels can apparently seek dominance in their own peculiar way and abandon the option of tolerance expected of a hybrid actor, cosmopolitan as well as postcolonial.

Before hybridity becomes an indicator of cosmopolitanism, hybridity used to denote the unfortunate incapacity of a postcolonial actor to escape scrutiny of the established canon. (Delanty, 2006; Sajed, 2010; Ong, 1998; Neilson, 1999). A hybrid actor recognizes but evades his or her own inferiority. (Fanon, 1986; Paolini, et al., 1999; Cabán, 1998) However, hybridity has later turned into a subversive celebration of unavailing indoctrination of any orthodox or canon. It is the evidence of sited subjectivity or agency, whose unique genealogy cannot be entirely subsumed by simulating the sanctioned orthodox. Much later, it appears that hybridity’s own suppressive potential emerges in its political call for such sited subjectivity that generates sited hegemony. However, it is the Bush Doctrine’s insinuated appropriation of hybridity as a feature of globalization that fully exposes the unanticipated irony of ‘hybrid fundamentalism’ in both terrorism and the new conservative.

It has already been a classroom cliché that all are hybrid in one sense or another to
the extent that recognition of hybridity adds little to understanding the human choice and behaviour. (Hutnyk, 2000: 36) Coming to the politics of identity and exclusion, the presumable difference between the ways an alleged hybrid actor and an accused orthodox actor behave toward their selected targets can be insignificant at best. At any level of human gathering, self-acknowledged hybrid identity can justify both dominance and tolerance, depending on the context, the resource, and the choice. (Kraidy, 2004) The undecidable conditions allude to the suppressive potential of agents of hybridity that is in need of more research, theoretical as well as empirical, in addition to its already applauded potential for emancipation. The question is therefore not about how one has been synthetic of one’s own sited cultures and the encountered/assimilated hybrid civilizations. Rather, it is about what afterwards. (Arxer, 2008) To understand the cycles of hybrid dominance and hybrid tolerance and preserve the analytical as well as emancipative potential of hybridity, we will propose the perspective of post-hybridity.

In an immediate sense it seems to be unnecessary, redundant and contradictory to put the prefix ‘post’ before hybridity, precisely because the term itself has already been carrying what ‘post’ might mean. In the fields of theorising, practicing, and teaching IR, ‘post’ meant particular recognition of resistance against totalisation. It also contained a will for the critical. Being critical, from theoretical treatment to daily classes, has been the essence of being ‘post’, and indeed, being intellectual. The sense of ‘amateur’ has been required against academic and political professionalism (Said) On the other hand, what the claim for post-hybridity shows here is a kind of limitation of hybridity and an fact of ‘post’ itself. This is related to epistemological, ontological and methodological difficulty with its theorization, practice and pedagogy. Therefore the paper already conveys self-defeating aspect within, while the point to see nevertheless is that an idea of ‘post’ in post-hybridity may still worth hearing. One aim for this paper is to clarify what is at stake to talk about hybridity, and to present what it would be like, if there is anything as post-hybridity. It brings forth a temporal perspective to supplement the overly spatial sensibility registered in the quest for a synthetic kind of sitedness in post-Western international relations theory, reflects upon the danger of hybridity that is reduced to the desire of conquest, and releases hybridity’s burden of emancipation in two cyclical modes of historiography. Moreover, the paper functions as a gentle warning for using hybridity both in intellectual discussion and especially in classrooms, by maintaining that at the very moment of using hybridity we may already establish particular hegemonic understanding about the self, the other, and the world.
In short, post-hybridity is emerging because hybridity starts losing its analytical and critical power. Instead, hybridity even generates the pressure on the national or other group actor to present itself as a synthetic identity in order to win acknowledgement in a largely capitalist, multi-cultural world. (Jameson, 1991) Or it may be said that the very limitation for critical engagement has been inherent to the politics of hybridity since the start. One possible point to see is the subtle linkage between hybridity, synthetic identity and a particular kind of cosmopolitanism. Importantly, this paper does not aim to dismiss hybridity itself, nor does it suggest that post-hybridity is a completely different species. Both are commonly against the possibility of ‘purity’; not starting from rigid ‘self’ nor seeing the external ‘other’; they are focusing on the very process of when self is creating the self and the other; they are performative by displacing such an ontological and epistemological Archimedean point.

And yet, post-hybridity is still different, in its assumption of multilayer, changeable, random and most importantly, non-synthetic and yet cyclical historiography. All may and must be changed and become someone else in order to practice self-actualization, because all are partial at any given time. Post-hybridity’s ontology in the temporal sense is historically more comprehensive than hybridity’s in the spatial sense and is open-ended. Space, in the contemporary quest for post-Western international relations, incurs synthesizing endeavour to undergird the emergence of non-Western sites.¹ Post-hybridity, by contrast, may even be home to a reversed metamorphosis, while its direction is not single arrowed. Its motto is ‘Everything is (already) hybrid, and everyone will be someone else in the future.’

The paper is primarily a pedagogical reminder of, and a remedy to, the problem of the term hybridity for the teachers and students of international relations. It starts with a short overview of what is happening in International Relations theory, namely a non- or post-Western movement. The starting point of post-hybridity comes from the one contradiction that any attempts out of a synthesized site to overcome the West already belong to the Western in the intellectual sense. The discussion continues with a major typology of post-hybridity – the Kyoto School and the Balance of Relationship cycles. Here both the dialectical and the cyclical modes of existence are becoming central, and as long as they concern their changeability in the temporal sense they would suggest cyclical historical consideration.

¹ These possible sites that can reproduce existent and generate new borders include, for example, India, the Caribbean, Eurasia, the Andes, China, Japan and Southeast Asia. (Tickner and Blaney, 2013)
SYNTHETIC HYBRIDITY IN IR

(i) Emergence of Sited Hybridity

Hybridity is a term originally never used in the discipline of International Relations (IR) – it emerged only after scholars begun to realize that the whole academic project is holding a character of a colonial discourse. Quite interestingly, IR has been engaged with the matter of colonization in a unique and limited manner, either as the matter of Mandate (e.g. Wright 1936), trusteeship (e.g. Bain 2004) or of the decolonization and ‘the Revolt against the West’ (Bull 1984). Major additions are historical exploration, how the European world regarded it had tamed its ‘other’ (Bull and Watson 1984; Watson 1992/2009) or how its counterpart had reacted (Zhang 1989; Suzuki 2009; Mishra 2012). Note that so far there is little space for hybridity; after all the mainstream IR has been talking about a horizontal community of ‘the self’ as constituting the international order or a vertical process of ‘othering’ as the imperial order (and its reaction) (Keene 2002), but hardly anything ‘in-between’ has existed until recently.

Recent introduction of the post-colonial approach has brought IR to witness what is called the ‘post-Western’ standpoint. Unlike ‘non-Western’ IR (e.g. Acharya and Buzan 2009), or the claims for national reconceptualization of own worldviews, it is clearly aware of being ‘in-between’. The sense of ‘unhomeliness’ (Bhabha, 1994), together with the idea of ‘provincialization’ (Chakrabarty 2000/2007) became the major strategy for their engagement (e.g. Shani 2007, 2008; Vasilaki 2012), while further countermeasure is on the way (e.g. Ling 2013). Here what all expertise may share is not only critical reassessment of IR, but also its re-formulation from the point of in-between. They assume that such a hybrid position is never stable, nor should it be. Continuous criticism is in tandem with the notion of ‘identity as iteration’ (Bhabha 1994: 12).

One challenge with such post-Western IR is, however, coming from its very foundation – where they are. Importantly the idea of hybridity may entail ‘in-between’ ness both in the spatial and temporal sense. But an error may occur when (mis)interpreting it exclusively as the first. Forgetting hybridity as temporarily may lead to the notion that being hybrid is not an cite, but the cite, for critical engagement, going against understanding its ‘identity as iteration’. If one sees hybridity as a project, philosophical as well as empirical, against the process of a pure, fixed, totalizing identity and theorization, and yet if one takes hybridity only in the spatial sense, there
may remain the same pitfall ‘ending up reproducing the very hegemony they set out to critique’ (Shani 2008: 723). What can be derived from this is the irony that even hegemony, now cosmopolitan, has to be hybrid or, at times, vice versa. It may convert attempts of non- or post-Western IR into a pursuit towards intellectual dominance based on sited-hybrivity.

Another hurdle is how to re-locate the postcolonial actors’ own critical practice with less, if not without, Western-centeredness. Intellectually speaking, a practice with hybridity does not go far beyond Western values. It still belongs to a particular ethos and praxis of the critical. The problem with it is not that criticism is coming from the West, but that its mode of practice is considerably influenced by modern enlightenment thought (Gay 1977). Regarded as the ‘struggle against the absolute state’ (Eagleton 1984/2005: 9), criticism has been ‘the continuation of politics by other means’ (Eagleton 2003/2004: 29). As a counterpart of absoluteness, the idea of plurality has been seen as another normative pillar. The critical has been linked with ‘the political’ in an organic manner, constituting an antagonistic field (Mouffe 1993/2005), and aiming at bringing ‘the political’ back (Edkins 1999). The point is that a quite similar story can be applied to post-colonial thought as well as post-Western IR. Especially in the latter ‘democratization’ of the discipline has been pursued (Chen 2011: 3), and the idea of hybridity has been a major strategy. To participate in the democratization of IR, a claimed site and a synthetic hybridity to represent it are the strategic prerequisites2. Nevertheless, once we accept the first point of challenge and see hybridity as the strategic representation of a spatial site, any activity of post-Western IR may square a fundamental deadlock that post-Western is always already somewhat Western.

In such a situation, it is certainly ironic to see the emergence of hybrid fundamentalism. Indeed what may be commonly shared among hybridity, post-hybridity and non/post-Western IR is the rejection of purity qua fundamentalism. Ontologically speaking, post-hybridity may mean, in the long run, no synthetic subjectivity to own a site or no site to synthesize subjectivity. Epistemologically it attends to the changing times of the world, self and other. Finally, as a methodology it may suggest dialectic conversion, even rupture, instead of genealogy, as a different mode of critical

2 In this sense, sited-hybrivity can be well linked to Gayatri Spivak’s famous argument of ‘strategic essentialism’. And the point to note here is that the meaning of ‘essentialism’ may even go beyond one particular identity – it may indeed de hybrid. Taking hybridity as a step for criticism has also seen in Fanon’s literature, while what has been lack is the consideration of, precisely, ‘post’ hybridity, or what comes after hybridity. See Spivak (1993/2009: 3-7) for her idea about strategic essentialism.
engagement that may transcend sited ‘critics’.

(ii) Dangers of Post/hybrity

The claim of hybridity is at the same time a claim to opposing purity such as Rabindranath Tagore’s claim, on behalf of India, to the position of civilizational bridge between East and West. (Lennon, 2003: 221) In an age when the majority of IR scholars are consciously hybrid and almost all national actors are empirically hybrid at different degrees, post-hybrity is the inevitable result. Post-hybrity generates the political pressure in all actors to eagerly claim hybridity. Post-hybrity’s opposition to purity requires either imagination of an object of purity and/or isolation from the object’s post-hybrid conditions. For example, former Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui once justified his pro-Taiwan independence campaign by alleging that Taiwan was no longer part of feudal China and imposing a curb on his countrymen from investing in China. (Cheung, 1988: 118-120) To Lee’s misfortune, a statement of hybridity is difficult to sustain when purity is no longer existent. To make hybridity a foundation of non-Chinese subjectivity seems the only choice. (Corcuff, 2012: 56-58) China’s adoption of the one-country-two-system formula to reunite with Hong Kong was a deliberate exercise of hybridity made of socialism and capitalism on the one hand, and Chinese and British on the other. The last case suggests that recombination does no damage to the degree of hybridity. This innocence of being always hybrid breeds the first danger of post-hybrity as the green light to exercise conquest of any kind.

Conquest of a presumably hybrid target is not for its purification since the conquering subject is already hybrid. In fact, all the postcolonial nations owe their post-coloniality to the historical forces of colonialism, who brought the modern civilizations to the indigenous society. Immigrants who chase after the modern lifestyle in order to rise from a subaltern identity transform hosting societies likewise into hybrid societies, albeit portrayed in the much prestigious term ‘cosmopolitan.’ The colonial scope is usually more hybrid than any particular postcolonial identity and even takes hybridity as an ideal. (Andrews, 2012) Worse, victimization of a self-claimed hybrid target in whatever way is the fault of the less-hybrid, whose resistance to cosmopolitan absorption wins it the notorious label of fundamentalism. This has been the fate of Middle Eastern states that defied the American intervention arriving in the name of global governance that transcends and synthesizes hybrid conditions in the most magnificent scope.
What can be observed behind those cases can be an implicit linkage among various notions of purity, sited-identity and cosmopolitanism, and perhaps more importantly, their dialectic dynamics. Cosmopolitanism itself originally assumed on, and aimed at overcoming member’s purity, making them tie together. Such ‘cosmopolitan culture’ has once become a site against parochial nationality through proposing denationalized citizenship (e.g. Sassen 2006: chapter 6). Here cosmopolitanism was a counterpart against a particular type of sited-identity; nationality, while the problem is that such cosmopolitan culture itself becomes a very site of identity. The point to see is not nationality anymore; rather citizenship. Bluntly speaking current theorization about citizenship puts less emphasis on territoriality, which nation-states often embody. And yet they do still value another kind of space which cities may best represent. Thus, basically no cosmopolitan culture is without city culture. Two implications follow. One is that hybridity becomes a vital factor for cosmopolitanism while the latter becomes the site for the former. The other is that as long as globalization involves a particular process of urbanization of the world we cannot, in principle, escape from the dynamics of becoming hybrid. Everything may become hybrid because it requires cosmopolitan culture or the culture of global cities, and we are fixated with a culture of space.

The other danger is accordingly internal conquest. Post-hybridity, which assumes difference between one another, expects each to be hybrid in their own peculiar way. Sameness, or even similarity, with another national actor could discredit a claim to hybridity since hybridity can no longer be conveniently defined by opposition to purity, real or imagined. Both Confucian Vietnam and Confucian Korea breed scholarship that painstakingly pursues all the trivial variations from Chinese Confucianism in order to present an indigenously synthetic cultural legacy. The second danger of post-hybridity rests in the tendency to protect the image of hybridity amongst local leaders who point fingers at some others for being traitors of indigenous identity. Traitors are those who connect with presumably alien cultures and civilizations to undermine synthetic identity and risk loss of sited distinction.

Internal conquest takes place everywhere in the world even though the spread of hybridity should have deprived any attempt at conquest of the morale to do so. After all, no conquest can be complete or even effective in setting up the future direction of the conquered population. Nevertheless, internal conquest gains momentum wherever a site,

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3 For a comparison between these specially separate Confucianisms, see Richey (2013).
allegedly one of a kind, acquires a synthetic identity. This makes, for example, both Inner Mongolians in China not Mongolian in the eyes of contemporary Mongolian citizens and the Han Chinese in China a different race than the Han Chinese in Taiwan in the eyes of pro-Taiwan independence activists. (Bulag, 2004: 109; Brown, 2004) Both Mongolian and Taiwanese civilizations are celebrated to be nobly hybrid and yet synthetic in their own way.

Theoretically, conquests do not always result in dominance or exploitation. Cosmopolitanism is supposedly a tolerant and on-going mechanism to constantly embrace yet another different component via soft conquest, soft intervention or soft governance. (Schelkle, 2007; Koremenos, 2001; Brandsen, Boogers, and Tops, 2006) In the same vein, a sited claim of distinctive hybridity can take the Tagorian metaphor of bridge so that the free access to the two imagined purer sides is considered essential to synthesizing sited subjectivity. Practically, though, cosmopolitanism and military campaigns often arise from the same colonial leadership at different times or on different issues, while isolation and openness compose the two postcolonial modes of self-synthesizing over different times or issues. Pre-WWII Japan’s approach to Taiwan attests to the former cycles of cosmopolitan assimilation and military annihilation, (Leo, 2001) and contemporary Singapore’s approach to China testifies to the latter cycles of closure and access. (Klingler-Vidra 2012) Figure (I) portrays two different modes of evolution. Under hybridity, all components combined into a unique synthetic subject, which evolves from Time 1 to Time 2 in the genealogy of the same synthetic subject despite new components added and/or old components adapting. The subject defines the way to combine civilizational identities under hybridity. In contrast, under post-hybridity, the process is dialectical with only one particular identity taking the lead each time. The identity discourse defines the non-synthetic subject under post-hybridity.

Figure (I): Synthetic vs. Non-synthetic Hybridity

Hybridity
A+B+C…(Time 1) → A+B+C… → (Time 2)…

Post-hybridity A, b, c… (Time 1) → B, a, c… (Time 2) →…

As all are hybrid, sited or territorial hybridity composed of at least two purer civilizational components at the same time loses behavioural relevance to a certain
extent because actors are no longer undecidable between two inconsistent sets of standards represented exclusively by place. In short, one cannot simply sit between the United States and China because the values and self-understandings of the two places are not internally consistent or even expressible without serious distortion. Korea, for example as place, may still represent Confucianism, and yet it can represent Buddhism and Christianity, too. On the other hand, Confucianism, Buddhism and Christianity can all use Korea (or China, Japan, and Taiwan) in turn as models so Korea (or others) becomes temporally divided. Hybridity not territorially embedded is unfamiliar to the literature. Rather, saying Korea is hybrid of these religions is much more familiar than saying these religions are hybrid of Korea, China, Japan and Taiwan so as to change sitedness into style that comes and goes. Mutual mingling and learning breed inconsistent standards at any selected site indeed, but these processes exist not merely in place, but also in time.

A Multi-layered set of identities of this temporal nature moves the control away from the sited (sovereign as well as non-sovereign) subjectivity, which the literature on hybridity has tried philosophically praising and empirically demonstrating. Under the conditions of post-hybridity, the territorially irrelevant call or urge of a particular mode of self-identification answered by indigenous leadership decides what reigns for the time being. The same Korean intellectuals, for example, could take pride on the recognition of their English-written scholarship by their American colleagues in one moment, but denounce liberalistic suspicion toward nationalism in the next moment in order to promote Korean unification as the utmost life goal of all Koreans. Multi-layered values and identities do not oblige a synthetic solution to all acquired and internalized values and identities. Rather, they may surface and submerge dialectically without a scientifically decidable pattern.

MULTILAYERED, CHANGEABLE AND RANDOM

The biggest inquiry will be to what extent post-hybridity may be different from hybridity. To repeat, at times, they could still be in consistence with each other in major assumptions: they could both be process-oriented, which ‘intervenes’ into the very moment of theorization of the world; both could de-centralize, displace and make conceptions of the world, self and other ‘unhomed’; and they could deride the empirical possibility of any dominance by any canons (even though they still take a distance from the modern enlightenment heir of criticism). Having said that, the factors that makes
post-hybridity epistemologically different are threefold, namely its multilayeredness, changeability and randomness. They are all counterparts of major tenets of hybridity which are subjectivity, uncertainty and difference. At the deeper level more fundamental differences exist in between the spatial and temporal ontology. They do share one thing that ontology changes; but while hybridity may focus more on spatial change, presumably via a sited subjectivity, post-hybridity is interested in its temporal change that requires no synthetic subjectivity.

Next, multilayeredness may describe coexisting strings in our identity. Its starting point is the recognition that no identity is a tabula rasa in the geographical and/or cultural sense. It therefore suggests that our identity can be a discontinuous construct. Such identity formation is rather close to the matter of context and choice, the way one wants to act upon the context. Multilayeredness suggests that our identity, and very existence, belong to more than one mode of social ontology, and in this sense it is similar to its predecessor, plurality. What differentiates multilayeredness from plurality, nevertheless, is the rejection of synthesis premised upon a sited subjectivity. In the international context this is sometimes connected to nationalism which constitutes the affiliation of the self to a particular political community. The theme of plurality requests all to subscribe to a higher level of identity. In Taiwan, for example, this means not asking where one comes from in order to be treated equally as ‘new Taiwanese’. (Fan, 2011: Conclusion)

The problem with plurality is, despite the very claim for plurality, it is oriented towards civic nationalism, which is reproduced to the effect of synthetic subjectivity that cannot reflect the multilayeredness and open-endedness of non-synthetic dialectics. Perhaps a similar difficulty can be identified in the current mode of cosmopolitan citizenship, not because of its cosmopolitan character but because of its reduction to citizenship. And multilayeredness, composed of a contemporary thesis and many anti-theses, is here proposed to avoid the pressure for sited synthesis. It attends to the non-synthetic process that does not assume any subjectivity to represent a site in the long run. The non-synthetic multilayerednes enables one to anticipate changes of the thesis or appreciates the return of a lost anti-thesis despite that it may have disappeared for a long period of time. Any anti-thesis can be triggered. It is rather closer to the choice of an alternative answer to the call for a different identity need. As need may be set by social context, particular segments prevail at a particular time in a particular

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4 Shih once examined this idea through multifaceted cases of being ‘China’. See Shih (2013).

5 Even the latest and a sophisticated account for ‘multiple worlds’ is not an exception of this pitfall. See Ling (2013), pp.13-22.
context. This segment is either given, inflicted, acquired, or voluntarily chosen by a subject.

Changeability rather than uncertainty is a ground to remain cognizant of multilayeredness so that all anti-theses can potentially be enacted and more anti-theses can be developed over time. Its principle all are capable of changing and becoming someone else. In real life, actors are flexible in inversion of their position into an anti-thesis. In the world of hybridity, social formation of the subject may take place via either the infliction or the totalization by one character over the other, but the discourse of hybridity sees uncertainty rather than anti-thesis. It is partly the reason why such synthesizing pictures often stress the fact that there are always two stories to tell (Hollis and Smith 1990) from the same identity discourse, but what changeability may suggest is that the switch between the thesis and an anti-thesis can be conscious, every once a while, abrupt and shameless. Changeability partly presumes the multi-layered character of the subject, where role or relationship as well as their context become important factors. Lee Tenghui turning himself from a communist to a Christian, or a follower of Chinese unification to a leader of Taiwan independence, for example, was more than just uncertainty. It was a change.

What may be the link between multilayeredness and changeability is the third tenet of randomness. This describes how, at times, changes in multilayeredness may occur, and it is contrasted with orderly change. One aspect of such randomness is ascribed to the social context itself. As long as multilayeredness is based on social relationships and the environment is changing, the mechanism of change cannot be predetermined. Cyclical practices of different theses are the duty of the subjects to fulfil their social roles as the time changes. The duty is therefore not about how different the subject is from the other. Rather, it is about how the subject copes with time and its context. Moreover, because the subject is expected to hold multi-layered identities, the change always involves choice. For individual subjects a choice in actuality makes the pattern of evolution rotate randomly in a much longer historical perspective among coexisting theses and their anti-theses. Growth, nuclear weapons, national unification, regime stability, and family history, etc., for example, inspire random cycles in Pyongyang. (Kim 2011: 26-27) Each cycle emerges out of a discernable rationale at its time.

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6 A case for such changeability through ‘the balance of relationship’ or ‘the balance of role’ has already been presented through the case of Urban Chinese. See Shih (2013), p.88.
This kind of post-hybrid changeability informs the non-synthetic dialectics of a site, a person, or a history--a peacemaker turns to a war criminal, a revolutionary to a colluder, or an isolationist stage to an expansionist stage. In contrast, a successfully synthesized hybrid site is simultaneously a peacemaker and a war criminal, depending on who is doing the interpretation. Genealogy is the basic method of cultural sociology to track how one hybrid condition evolves with a traceable string, (Mukerji, 2007) hence uncertain and yet sited subjectivity. Accordingly, hybridity proceeds with the participants and observers providing contradictive meanings to the same practice; however, changeability is what characterizes the post-hybrid subject exercising cycles of plausible canons one after another because the reigning one fails to achieve success. Democratic Taishao turned to imperialist Showa in the aftermath of the Washington Conference because it was perceived to have subjected Japan to the US dominance. (Nish 2002: 26) Genealogy between different canons is unnecessary in this particular change as democracy and imperialist were parallels rather than a hybrid. Randomness is only constrained by the trigger, the judgment and the choice.

Together with these points, the idea of post-hybridity projects an attitude to think ontology not only in a spatial, but also in a temporal way. Here, thinking ontology in a social and temporal manner means to consider one’s own presence not in a fixed sense but as always changing. To be fair, hybridity is not discarding social ontology in a temporal sense (Bhabha 1994: 6), but it may still be reasonable to say that in post-colonial literatures social ontology has been interpreted in the matter of belonging, which has had a tendency to see identity in terms of ‘where’ rather ‘when’. In this point post-hybridity is closer to the Derridean idea of différance, which states that the present and the presence is always already a mixture of temporally different existences, resulting from the past. Thus in terms of identity, differences can only emerge as such from previous identities of the self. Genealogy is thus the proper method to explain the evolution of sited hybridity. However, multilayeredness and random changeability make post-hybridity a process of dialectics and rupture. It is historical as post-hybridity is still process-oriented. And yet it is not the same as ordinary historiography as the possibility is never completely open. This can be called ‘cyclical historiography’, which will be discussed more in next section.

TWO MODES OF CYCLICAL HISTORIOGRAPHY

This can be pointed out by the fact that post-colonial literature necessarily requires words which indicates our existence in any spatial sense – such as ‘site’, ‘displace’, ‘home (and the world)’, ‘unhome’, ‘space’, and so forth.
In the light of prevailing concerns for sited subjectivity in the discourse of hybridity, post-hybridity in a sense deconstructs such sited subjectivity via its cyclical sensibilities. Cycles combine multilayeredness and changeability and cycles oriented toward future history additionally incorporate randomness. One major tenet of post-hybridity is its notion that the possibility of random change, despite its claim for multilayeredness, is not unlimited. It is always social, and the social is not usually presupposing unlimited vista or boundary-less space. Therefore a possible change can somewhat be anticipated, but a rising question is how.

In this section we would propose two types of historical change, namely (i) The Kyoto School Cycle (hereafter KS) and (ii) The Balance of Relationship Cycle (hereafter BoR). First to note is that they are still being used against modern enlightenment discourse involving self/other as its basis. Secondly, both carry cyclical notions of historiography. And finally, they may explain how possible random change may occur in multilayeredness. They are different in grasping how social ontology can change in space and in time. For KS, the change takes place at the moment of a judged failure, e.g. loss of popularity, economic depression, occurrence of assassination, etc., while for BoR, the change is fully anticipated at the moment whenever a different context is perceived arriving.

Contrary to hybridity, which is philosophically considered beautiful in postmodern conditions, post-hybridity is not beautiful philosophically or empirically. The trigger to make a change comes from internal as well external sources. The dangers of post-hybridity reside primarily in the desire for conquest. It can arise internally from imagined sitedness to gather, as a cosmopolitan centre does, another exotic model to enhance the universality of the centre. The US’ intervention in the Middle East is the archetype of cosmopolitan centre seeking dominance over sites of different civilizations via an allegedly multi-cultural institutional frame. (Cheng, 2012: 7) Alternatively, internally imagined sitedness can sever, as an independent subaltern does, trans-border connection to protect a distinctive hybrid identity. Singapore’s pursuit of a non-Chinese identity via a national English curriculum represents a quintessential case of self-reconstruction. (Stroud and Wee, 2011 )

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8 In IR it can be said as ‘Westphalian’ in L.H.M. Ling’s sense. See Ling (2002) part I and (2013) chapters 1 and 2. And as its core there exist nationalism which represent international personality.
The externally triggered action transcends the sited distinction and presses actors constantly in response to the call for performance against standards that are externally prepared, e.g. human rights, economic growth, nationalism, peace, and so on. Actors search for relevant cultural resources and develop action strategy by context. Sites lose significance as actors are reduced to a medium between the encountered contexts and the greater range of civilizational resources. Nations are merely agents of cycles as China’s coping with Myanmar, North Korea, Vietnam and the Philippines dissolve the nation into different modes of relationship each embedded in a series of bilateral historical trajectories. Subjectivity is no longer premised upon the ability to re-appropriate civilizational mingling for the use of national self-actualization. Subjectivity belongs to a role player of the time that shifts between civilizational contexts to establish a workable identity. From a historical perspective, almost all national actors demonstrate the intellectual capacity for dialectical change in accordance with the demand of the time.

(i) The Kyoto School (KS) Cycle

The first type of the KS cycle is the process that explains why repressed and forgotten possibilities are always ready to return with external cue, clue, trigger, or internal need, that experiences denial. All are presumably stored in the place of nothingness to re-enter the time upon request, making different canons co-existing rather than synthesizing. As its name suggests its origin can be traced back to the Kyoto School of Philosophy, more precisely Nishida Kitaro’s idea of ‘nothingness’ against ‘being’, although this is very close to existing ideas of hybridity, différance, and deconstruction. As in Derrida’s account of Pharmakon the possibilities are usually hidden and suppressed while when functioned they eventually invert the order of the things. The KS goes further by suggesting that any inverted order can return because all claims about sites are stored in nothingness and readily can be recalled to answer the demands of the time at any temporary site.

Neither uncertainty nor genealogy can explain the change from one canon to another since they are ultimately equal in the place of nothingness, although a hierarchy of preferences and despises always exists at a given time and at a particular site. The

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9 Recent scholarly works have done intensive examinations on Nishida and the Kyoto School’s thought in relevance with IR theory. Major works include Goto-Jones (2005); Goto-Jones et al. (2007); and Shimizu (2011).
discovered subjectivity of a site is necessarily spurious. It is rather the subjectivity that exists in nothingness that can synthesize a liberal and a war criminal, for example, collapsing all the time and the space to make synthesis at any alleged site irrelevant in historical long cycles. An earlier liberal turning into a later war criminal requires no justification in the KS cycle. They are the thesis and the anti-thesis and there are always new anti-theses coming for the future likewise coexisting in nothingness, necessitating an increasing degree of randomness as the cycles continue.

One quick example for the KS cycle can be derived from the ‘conversion (Tenkou, or 転向)’ and the ‘counter-conversion (Sai-tenkou, or 再転向)’ among Japanese intellectuals during the interwar and wartime periods. Here ‘conversion’ refers to the change of thought in an intellectual, usually from liberal to imperial direction to support the wartime regime. Major explorations of these issues have usually focused either on personal history of such double transformation or on overall consideration of the phenomena itself, while common thread can be found to see counter-/conversion as mere change and its backrush. The point to see here is that for some counter-conversion is not the same as reverse-conversion. More importantly, the conversion was not permanent and they experienced another counter-conversion after the war. This suggests that uncertainty between binary ideas is not a sufficient concept to explain this situation. The KS’ place of nothingness navigates the non-synthetic dialectics between the liberal and the contrary nationalist identities in the same nation, as in Japan of the past two centuries, that had launched the Europeanization campaign, through the anti-White expansion drive in Asia, liberalist modernization, and then pro-American, anti-Chinese nationalism. (Goto-Jones, 2010) On the other hand what (counter-/reverse-) conversion would could also tell us is that even such multi-layered changes can be rotating around the very same problem, thereby presenting a history that privileges dialectics over reason or truth.

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10 One typical example is Tokutomi Sohō (Vinh, 2013).
11 Fuller consideration will be given by Josuke Ikeda ‘Before the Victory, After the Defeat: Hybridity and the “Conversion” Question in Modern Japanese IR Scholarship, 1930-1945’ Paper to be presented at the International Studies Association Annual Convention, 27th March 2014, Toronto, Canada.
12 Famous examples can be found in a number of chapters compiled in the collaborative research on Tenkou（転向, conversion）, which was taken during 1950s, by Shisou no Kagaku Kenkyu-kai（思想の科学研究会, Study Group on the Science of Thought）. For further account see Shisou no Kagaku Kenkyukai (1959-1962).
For instance, for Miki Kiyoshi, a critical (both in his value and his attitude) member of the Kyoto School, yet who joined the semi-governmental think tank *Showa Kenkyukai* (昭和研究会, or Showa Research Association) and prepared the foundation of *Toua Kyoudoutai* (東亜共同体, or East Asian Community), it is quite difficult to disentangle the multi-layered and seemingly contradictory character of his thought, with the result of sorting out either, say, colonial or post-colonial. This poses one fact that precisely ‘in-between’ his colonial and post-colonial attitudes there remained one concern about the identity and very ontology of his country. Through that in-betweenness Japan can be interpreted not only as hybrid, but also as hegemonic precisely because of its hybrid character. What he stood for reflected a judgment on the success or the failure of his identity strategy at the moment. He thus consecutively tolerated and disdained Asia’s backwardness. The abovementioned quick analysis therefore may imply that KS may indicate possibilities for dialectical change as well as the hybridity of hegemony.

**(ii) The Balance of Relationship (BoR) Cycle**

The second type of the BoR cycle comes from Confucianism, (Qin, 2011) which historiography is by all means cyclical. (Lancashire, 1965: 86) Unlike the first, it embodies the quest for a fit in an encountered context via the drawing of a governable relationship. The BoR looks for ways to secure a correct long-term relationship by making compromises and imposing sanctions, regardless of the immediate loss of national interest thus incurred. It does not aim at transforming the culturally different other. Instead, the purpose is self-reform in order to win recognition and peace. The BoR is opposed to intervention in general. It nonetheless resorts to confrontation at the sight of a wrong relationship lest it should aggravate in the long run. The BoR almost guarantees that international relations proceed in cycles because a governable relationship requires constant negotiation and adaptation in addition to relying on extant cultural resources, hence changeability and randomness.

The long-term governable solution is usually not available for a post-colonial society at the time of colonial arrival and the immediate solution is always to learn from the apparently much stronger intruder. The self-reform inevitably generates the familiar struggles between indigenous and modern forces. The resulting trajectory is ostensibly

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14 In this point Miki can be contrasted by Tosaka Jun, a Marxist member of the Kyoto School who had been critical towards Nishida, and indeed been coherent in his radical standpoint.
toward modernity but postcolonial modernity is by all means a hybridity of indigenous and colonial values. (Barolow, 1997; Katzenstein, 2012) Patriotism may mean becoming Western at one point, but remaining, sometimes via reinventing, indigenous at another point. In any case, the undecidable shift between modernity and indigeneity continues to constrain the contents of modernization. The standards of success are so changeable, however, that governability lacks a fixed reference to allow stable international relationships.

The adoption of a reform strategy rarely works well long enough to take root in the postcolonial society. The strategy which calls for a certain international relationship cannot remain stable accordingly. The end of the Cold War, for instance, has quickly facilitated reversion of all inimical relationships, including the once lethal US-Vietnam relationship, to reflect the change of standard. What is the cultural mechanism that makes such reversion not only possible but even oblivious of the immediate past? In fact, leading national leaders in postcolonial societies suffer, or enjoy, inconsistency over the never ending course of national reform. The ordeal is the seeming unavailability of any governable international relationship, making it necessary for them to rely on bilateral relationships. Who they are coping with at a particular time, together with the context, alludes to the proper system of relationship that works exclusively for the two sides.

The BoR treats such efforts of relational coupling each in its own light. It appeals to two seemingly irrational tactics to secure relational stability. One is to compromise on one’s sited subjectivity for the time being in order to win trust, through enhanced self-restraint, and the concomitant Western knowledge and technology from the cosmopolitan powers. The question is how much compromise one should tolerate. The other is to destroy the relationship, through renounced self-restraint, in order to restore a respectful place for one’s own nation. The question is how effective such a destructive attitude can win respect in the longer run. The debate between the Chinese liberals and new-Left escalates, for example, as if no in-between solution exists, but shifts between them are not uncommon. (Zhang, 2001) Japanese modern thinkers likewise are famous for their devoted shifting from one extreme to another as discussed in the aforementioned Kyoto School historiography.

While the Christian West conceives of the shift of ruling parties as a sign of democracy, it rarely attends to the shift of philosophical stand of a living person.
Consistency is the value by which both the political party and the national leader should abide under the Christian circumstance. On the contrary, shifting toward an opposite political and philosophical stand causes no permanent damage to the relationship in a postcolonial society. If the nation cannot acquire a respectful position in the world, via mimicry, eventually the colonial power whose system the postcolonial endeavour to acquire loses credit. International relationships are no longer about balance of power. Rather, they are about choosing the proper teacher and therefore intrinsically related to the domestic politics of reform. National reform, domestic politics, and international relationships together make the cycle of compromise and destruction at the same time the cycle of civilizational identities. For example, contemporary Taiwan is torn between incompatible relationships with China, the US and Japan concerning which should be the principal reference. (Corcuff, 2012) This is not unlike Republican China was caught between Japan and Europe when choosing the proper model of development. (Jeans, 1997: 27)

What is the proper relationship to secure by the post-colonial leaders is contingent upon the degree of recognition granted to the post-colonial nation in a particular context or at a particular time. Balancing the lack of recognition with enhanced self-restraint is opposite to balancing it with renounced self-restraint. The former tactics seeks to embrace the colonial power with a longer and more patient relationship, but the latter hopes for a renewed relationship by destroying the wrongly developed one. The question of which tactics to choose is political and discrentional. Sensitivity toward relational security ruins the possibility of devising universal rules of international society according to the Chinese experiences. It also deconstructs the imperative of hybridity into cyclical practices of the seemingly governable systems each at a different time.

(iii) Internally vs. Externally Triggered Cycling

Both KS and BoR conceive of sited subjectivity as part of a long cycle. They share the same reservation toward the emancipative potential of hybridity due to its ubiquitous presence and consequential pressure on the subaltern to pursue distinctive representations. These representations invariably appeal to an allegedly unique genealogy in which contemporary categories of identities, liberal, national, religious, ethnic, modern, plural, and so on, each have their entry into the current synthesis. On the contrary, cyclical historiography is sensitive to the incapacity of a cosmopolitan or a
post-colonial subject to synthesize. The undecidable hunches of theirs to switch identity programs make cycles unavoidable. Cosmopolitan, national and postcolonial actors are similarly partial and occupied by larger and/or smaller ideological and civilizational forces that trespass the boundary of all sites.

Synthetic subjectivity makes the dialectical method unnecessary. It is always the same subject engaging its environment. The KS cycle relies on one reigning canon and a few candidates waiting for the abortion of the incumbent canon in due course. The BoR cycle is externally triggered, with the subject consciously watching the switching of the context or the emergence of another bilateral relationship. Figure (II) portrays the comparison between hybridity, KS post-hybridity, and BoR post-hybridity. From Time 1 to Time 2 and Time 3, subjectivity under hybridity does not change much except new components joining and old components adapting. Under KS post-hybridity, only canon A reigns at one time but all others—b, c, and others—are constantly ready to be selected, and elevated as B or C whenever necessary, in the following cycle and composes the dialectical condition of multilayeredness. Under BoR post-hybridity, no subjectivity requires representation except that the encountered relationship A incurs the pretended role A to fit it and b or c may emerge to incur role B and role C. What differentiates the BoR from the KS cycles is its dynamics – if tilted toward randomness it will be the former; if toward dialectic, the latter.

Figure (II): Internally vs. Externally Triggered Cycles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time 1</th>
<th>Time 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hybridity</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A+B+C</td>
<td>A+B+C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A+b+c</td>
<td>a+B+c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>KS Post-hybridity</strong></td>
<td><strong>BoR Post-hybridity</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A+b+c…</td>
<td>B+a+c…</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A, B, C…: Recognized canons making the identity discourse
a, b, c,…: Unrecognized canons ready to emerge into the cycle

- Claimed sitedness as solid line
- Relational coupling with the context as dot line

The KS and the BoR are different in their empirical agendas because KS’ subjects are principally unconscious practitioners of shifting identities while BoR’s subjects are conscious politicians of identities. The KS agenda studies how and which devotees of specific identities rise and fall and, perhaps, inspire future followers again in another dialectical turn. The particular devotees are not ready to shift unless apparent failure is recognized or even though such failure is perceived. Ultimately, the shift from one identity to another is inevitable via the devotees’ own choice or someone else’s on their behalf. In other words, the KS practitioners are conscious synthesizers at any particular time and yet subconscious traitors to their own decision in the subsequent cycle. Both conquest and self-reform are patterns of KS post-hybridity. The empirical study for a KS agenda is to infer from long cycles of history which programs are available in the civilizational repertoire of the subjects, what are the familiar mechanisms of dialectics, and when they would adopt conquest as a means of synthesis.

The BoR’s empirical agenda copes with subjects who are consciously ready to shift and even actively seek clues of a more detailed differentiation of relationships in order to more comprehensively preserve relational security. The BoR subjects are deliberately subversive to universal rules or synthetic representations. Context and the characteristics of the counterpart are the key to deciding what relationship is proper and which compromise and sanction is proper in dealing with the cooperative or the uncooperative other side. The empirical duty of BoR agenda is to study how actors decide which relational rule to use in a specific context, how they decide there is a shift in context, and what the function of power is in restoring a perceived beginning of an incorrect relationship.

The KS devotees apparently lack patience as a destiny seemingly demands them to synthesize resources and effectively achieve it at any particular time. On the contrary, the BoR politicians manoeuvre and live on inconsistency. Challenges to a short-term relationship need not incur immediate alarm since there is no destiny ahead, so there is
usually time for further observation, exploration, and signaling to restore a possibly disturbed relationship. Symbolic restoration via ritual, announcement, or gift giving could resolve short-term problems. Self-restraint is usually the better approach in the initial stage. On the other hand, sanctions can be ruthless because it is not necessary to worry too much about the animosity produced in the immediate run if later pampering will restore the governable relationship in the long run.

CONCLUSION

Post-hybridity warns against the loss of critical and analytical usefulness of hybridity. One function of post-hybridity is to show how, in a world of all being hybrid, conquest nevertheless proceeds upon the quest for sited subjectivity. Second, post-hybridity adds a temporal dimension to the analysis of hybrid conditions to enable an understanding of how and why a wholeheartedly claimed sited subjectivity can be merely a temporary phenomenon. Third, post-hybridity points to the methodology of genealogy as a reason for preoccupation with sited subjectivity and suggests adding dialectics to the study of hybridity as a remedy. Finally, post-hybridity deconstructs hybridity’s obsession with difference and subjectivity by analysing how subjects can be sheer media between contexts and acquired civilizational resources instead of self-actualizing agents.

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