

Lecture November 25
Asymmetry: The Taiwan Experiences

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North Korean Leader Kim Chun Un executed his uncle, Jang Song-thaek, for treason on December 13, 2013. The execution was conducted in the most theatrical fashion and seemingly designed for the entire world to see. Jang was a top-ranking pro-China veteran, who believed in the Chinese style of reform. A year ago, Jang collaborated with the Chinese Leader Hu Jintao and facilitated the construction of two special economic zones with assistance from China, which was highly commended by the Chinese media. The execution indicated not only the independence of North Korea (NK) from China, but also the disregard for the relationship with China (Pollack, 2014). China has been the only stable ally of NK in the latter's chronic confrontation with the US and struggle with economic troubles since the sovereignty of Kim Il-sung, the grandfather of Kim. Moreover, the expansion of the nuclear weapons of NK could guarantee the perpetual hostility of the US. From the perspective of international relations (IR) theory, the disclosure of Kim's disregard for China under these circumstances makes no sense (Chung and Choi, 2013).

A relatively weak party confronting a strong neighbor in an asymmetric relationship defies theory and has never been the subject of theoretical discussion. IR theory, which focuses on the Balance of Power (BoP), holds that Kim's options in dealing with the US is either bandwagoning, which he defied, or balancing against the US with China's support, which he risked losing. If Kim considers China as a potential threat, his China policy is neither bandwagoning nor balancing. Although the interest in Chinese tributary and hierarchical systems increased, the focus is directed mostly on the systemic structure or great powers, rather than small ones (Kang, 2003-4; Callahan, 2008; Yan, 2011). The confrontation policy of Taiwan toward China is an example of an asymmetric relationship (Ross, 2006; Christian, 2002), although literature has consistently considered the US as the major (real) actor behind Taiwan in a triangular frame (Ross, 2002; Gilley, 2010). However, the confrontational position taken by Lee Teng-hui and his successor Chen Shui-bian is theoretically unexplained (Corcuff, 2012). This confrontational stance is intriguing because the US was unsupportive of the confrontational policy. The relationship between Vietnam and China is another example of an asymmetric relationship (Womack, 2006). In this case however, the incorporated perspective of the weak party is historical rather than theoretical and generates contextual rather than general models of asymmetric relationships.

Nevertheless, a study has attempted to explain the China policy on Myanmar according to the Balance of Relationship (BoR) theory. BoR posits that Southeast Asian countries do not adhere to BoP, which puts forward bandwagoning and balancing as alternative approaches to China (Huang, 2015). Hedging is not always relevant as countries such as Vietnam or Myanmar can adopt a confrontational approach in coping with China (Vuving, 2006; Butterfield, 1996; Zhu, 2011; Fan, 2010). Similarly, Taiwan, whose internal cleavage discredits the assumption of a unitary actor, requires a calculative policy for hedging (Chu, 2011; Wu, 2011). Instead, BoR relies on the relational stability with China that entails no specific power threat to maintain a peaceful relationship that transcends ideological contrast, border dispute, bloc confrontation, and ethnic complexity. This definition is applicable to Myanmar. BoR seems effective in ensuring that self-restraint is practiced by the strong party, which the constructivist argument has determined as essential in building an international regime (Adler, 2008). Self-restraint keeps the strong party from resorting to force in securing a manageable bilateral relationship that is embedded in mutually congruent practice and stability. Based on this case, it is not surprising that the blunt impudence of NK in dealing with Chinese affairs engenders a compromise from China that equally or increasingly cherishes relational security. The following discussion pursues BoR as the theory that could properly explain how a small state makes sense of its confrontational policy toward a strong party in a bilateral relationship.

The paper partially explains, in general terms, how a weak party can possess the sense of efficacy to confront a strong counterpart in an asymmetric relationship. In line with the mainstream international relations that primarily attend to maintaining BoP, asymmetry in this paper refers to the lack of BoP between two interacting states or the inability to achieve the balance. Confrontational policy is defined as the expressed taking of a position by a party via rhetoric and action that is consciously understood by both parties as a means to oppose the position of the other. This definition renders the social relationship perception significant to understanding confrontation as a challenge through power play. The process is tantamount to a policy in which a weak party engages in independent hard balancing with no chance of long-term success. The theory of hedging assumes that hard balancing occurs through the indirect form of military buildup for the sake of deterring (Hiep, 2013: 351–6), instead of confronting. Therefore, the theory of hedging fails to explain the adoption of confrontation by a weak party.

The paper begins by explaining how achieving relational security through confrontation must be both rational and practical, with a sensibility toward and a transcendence over the differences between positions in a relationship to justify BoR.

A case study is subsequently presented to offer suggestions on how Taiwan can rely on asserting a proper relationship with China to cope with China's inclination to use force in resolving the unification issue. Taiwan is selected because at present, a society-based psychological analysis of the bilateral relationship is possible as evidenced by a social survey that reveals the psychological mechanisms that the Taiwanese constituency adopts to attain BoR with China. The survey in Taiwan investigated whether or not the respondents are confident that peace with China can be maintained under various conditions instead of requiring them to answer questions derived from hypothetical cases of confrontation. The questions focused on whether or not respondents think they can attain peace or effectively maintain peace by adopting a confrontational policy or electing a party inclined to a confrontational policy. Their answers served as proxies for confrontational behavior in general.

The survey discussion provides a generalizable clue to an occasional confrontational policy that weak parties adhere to by identifying psychological mechanisms rather than power mechanisms that allow or prevent confrontation. The survey yielded three efficacy variables in formulating the BoR attitudes of the Taiwanese constituency toward China, which could have universal implications. These variables are *prospect*, *determination*, and *legitimacy*. *Prospect* is related to the relevance of an expected outcome of change, either in time or in the ruling party, to the sense of controlling an appropriate relationship. *Determination* is concerned with the relevance of one's psychological readiness for confrontation to control a proper relationship. *Legitimacy* is associated with the relevance of consolidating popular opinion to the sense of controlling a proper relationship.

Asymmetry and the BoR Approach to Conflict Resolution

Relational security is a kind of "felt security" (Sroufe and Waters, 1977) that deviates from the impression that security depends on power. Relational security refers to a state of mind that requires the readiness to adopt confrontation at times, regardless of the available power. Relationally secure actors perceive an environment that is comfortable and supportive of their pursuit of interests; they also recognize minimal threat from the pursuit of interests by other actors (Sleeboos, Ellemers, & de Gilder 2006; Devine 1995). Relational security is primarily meaningful from a long-term perspective. A short-lived expedient relationship for an immediate concern can backfire and inadvertently hurt the relationship in the long run because a less friendly environment can follow the ruined trust. On the other hand, a relationally secure national actor possesses an acknowledged and accepted role in the international order. The relational security of a national actor is different from the national security embedded in military and economic power. The image of being a

trustworthy actor observing the norms of its expected role is essential in maintaining relational security (Levinger, 1983). This image provides the actor with the duty to protect its role, as well as the associated relationships, through forgiveness or punishment, (Younger, Piferi, Jobe, and Lasler, 2004) even though the actor possesses limited power to fulfill its duty.

In the context of BoR, relational security is the psychological condition in which no perceived threat to an acceptable relationship, which is primarily bilateral, warrants any unilateral move to either reproduce the existing action or reform (restore and renovate) a decaying one. The cooptation of relational security at the national level makes the approach of BoR a peculiar approach to conflict resolution. BoR has its origin in the nascent advocacy for the Chinese School of International Relations. Such advocacy specifically enlists the term "guanxi" to conceive of relational security as ontological necessity. (Qin 2009a) According to this ontological sensibility, China's self-fulfillment is complete only when all-round reciprocal mutuality is achieved with all different others. The quest for mutuality makes self-restraint an intrinsic component in any rational exchange. (Qin, 2009a; 2009b; 2011)

While BoR appears to be a form of classic wisdom in East Asian international relations, (Kang 2007, Shih 1990) it emerges in a much wider geo-cultural variety everywhere, as in the tradition of sociological literature on network theory (Archer, 1996; Eliasoph and Lichterman, 2003; Vaisey and Lizardo 2010), that nations cannot survive without coupling their existence to one another's in certain mutually agreed and practiced relationships. Accordingly, the Chinese-School consciousness of BoR may as well join the recent "relational turn" in international studies (Hafner-Burton, Kahler, Montgomery 2009; Slaughter 2009; Anderson and Neumann 2012) except that this turn takes place in the Chinese cultural context. In fact, a general theory of an asymmetric relationship under BoR is believed to explain both Chinese foreign policy and US foreign policy. (Huang and Shih 2014)

Relationally secure nations are capable of reducing uncertainty and threat that nations in anarchy are believed to face. Anarchy compels nations to resort to self-help mainly through military and economic strength. Relational security is a rational alternative to self-help because a stable, generally reciprocal relationship is significantly less expensive or stressful. Reciprocal relationships that promote exchanges and conventions lead to dispute among institutional liberalism theorists with regard to the necessity of using BoP. However, institutional liberalism is flawed because it requires a consistent position in a multilateral setting, and thus, prevents the

formulation of various compromises according to their peculiar bilateral contexts.¹ Thus, the question whether such institutions can be maintained without relying on a central authority remains. BoR is a plausible answer.

BoR is a system wherein national actors rely on the metaphors drawn upon their respective cultural resources to imagine a greater or relational self, which encompasses both parties in a bilateral relationship. (Brewer, 2008; Elias, 1978; Scheff, 1997) This leads to restraint from both sides, which prevents the emergence of anarchy that threatens the existence of the greater self and, concomitantly, those presumably integrated little selves. Such system reflects the necessity for national actors to compensate for the incapacity of power politics to cope with everything. Moreover, BoR is a skill that enhances the credibility of one's self-restraint, which deters abuse from the other side. Therefore, occasional renouncement of self-restraint is an essential BoR tactic similar to performing self-restraint. Forgiveness and punishment are important mechanisms of maintaining relationships (Fu, Watkins, & Hui, 2004). Renouncing self-restraint balances the unfaithful policy of the other side toward the greater self and restores relational security under which the threat of uncertainty is minimized.

A proper relationship is unlike any relationship, as it constitutes an intrinsic component of the relational self that renders power politics awkward. Relational security rests upon proper relationship, which is mutually interchangeable with military and economic security that incurs no threats under the stable and proper relationship. International relations can remain smooth with the proper relationship even if the balance of power strongly tilts to one side. Proper relationship is composed of mutually congruent role expectations. The sign of the other side, which can indicate renouncement of self-restraint defies the role expectation of its duty and subsequently threatens the stability of the proper relationship. Therefore, monitoring, reinforcing, and rewarding the expected self-restraint are the first steps to protect military and economic security. Self-restraint, obliged by relational selfhood, is the mechanism involved in maintaining a stable relationship. Relational security is ultimately contingent upon the internal conditions of both sides.

BoR is particularly relevant in explaining cases where the internal conditions across weak countries lead to a quest for a new relationship as carried out by renouncing the self-restraint that supports the continuation of the existing relationship. The internal conditions of the strong or weak party become irrelevant under BoP. By contrast, even the internal conditions of the weak party under BoR can be

¹This explains why China appears adamant in facing the entire ASEAN with regard to maritime disputes, but willing to shelve the sovereignty issue in bilateral settings. The multilateralism of China allows only the reiteration of the sovereignty claims of China (Rolfe, 2003; Chiu, 2011).

consequential. The sense of efficacy of the weak party can be enhanced under BoR because revenge, punishment, and rebellion generate the sense of dominance and control in the weak party rather than military security (Yoshimura, 2007; Baumeister, 1997). The internal determination suggests that the weak party provides the strong party an incentive to appease the former to improve the long-term relationship. Therefore, whether or not the weak party believes that the strong party will protect the peaceful relationship between them explains the former's adoption of the confrontational policy.

Womack (2006) painstakingly traced the bilateral relationship within the longer than 2,000 years of engagement between Vietnam and China to demonstrate how historical conventions, shared cultural values, mutual understanding, and skill for improvising have carried an asymmetric relationship through all kinds of upheavals. Sino-Vietnamese relationships have created two positive and one negative lessons. First, a central or higher authority can be unnecessary to the credibility of a relationship. Second, the relatively small Vietnamese side of the asymmetric relationship has not been disadvantaged or compliant in general. Third, the BoR strategy is not necessarily stable in practice, which Womack (2006) demonstrated by showing the increasingly volatile relationship in the context of the modern times. The belief and expectation that a bilaterally stable relationship is less expensive in the long run and preferred over the potentially more anarchical BoP remain attractive.

The BoR adaptation that emerged in accordance with the shift of the internal politics of identity toward Taiwan's independence from the administration of Lee Teng-hui is another example (Jacobs, 2012; Hughes, 2011). Contrary to the BoR that seeks reciprocal stability, confrontational BoR purports to revise a relationship perceived as outdated. Pointing to both the obvious disadvantage of BoP in Taiwan and its national interest of optimizing the progressive economic opportunity, rational choices highlight a less confrontational policy than those adopted by Lee and his successor Chen Shui-bian (Chow, 2012). Chen employed the extreme measure of compelling the US to publicly denounce its provocative pro-independence policy. Ironically, China is deemed sensitive to the preservation of the image of a greater Chinese self; such that, China provided numerous economic concessions to Taiwan since the inauguration of Ma Ying-jeou, who decided to cease the pursuit of independence. Note that the pampering proceeded despite the reiteration of Ma that reunification is by no means a cornerstone of his policy.

Huang (2015) analyzed the approach of Myanmar, which represents another BoR style adhered to by a weak party. Myanmar rarely resorts to confrontation. Mutual compromise is the BoR method implemented in the Myanmar and China issue. The lack of any formal alliance between Myanmar and China failed to cause noticeable

mutual distrust over their presumably antagonistic ideological stands or dissimilar regimes. The generally amicable relationship survived the tumultuous US-Myanmar relationship, in which China's role in Myanmar is generally regarded as a discordant aspect. The US adapted to the political change in Myanmar in 2012 by ceasing its threat to impose sanctions. The widely anticipated negative reaction from China on the effect of the political change on its interest failed to materialize (Berger, 2013; Sun, 2013; Swanström, 2012). The relationship between China and Myanmar remained strong and transcended the ups and downs brought about by the US policy on Myanmar.

China can also be the weak party that relies on the BoR strategy, as Shih and Chang (2012) demonstrated through four case studies of the Qing Dynasty foreign policy. The dynasty never succeeded in forging a stable relationship with Western powers, despite its BoR strategy that was clearly aimed at creating a long-term relationship. The dynasty sought the correct relationship, but failed to achieve such, which has left an arguably permanent mark of national shame on future generations. Callahan (2012) contended that national shame became a deep-rooted, major theme in the foreign policy of China, although these shameful events occurred more than a century ago. Ultimately, the seemingly unavailing BoR strategy during the Qing Dynasty proved to be long term, such that any past or present judgment of its rationality can only be a temporary hindsight. China continues to regard national shame as a major theme in defining relationships with other nations.

The weak party in these asymmetric relationships struggles to achieve a stable relationship without succumbing to the will of the strong party. Although the failure of the Qing dynasty was conceived as a result of stupidity and irrationality, the event bred a spirit of resistance. This spirit is believed to have carried China through WWII, the Korean War, and other incidents of confrontation with superpowers in the subsequent decades (Gries, 2004). Moreover, the BoR strategy appears irrational to a BoP thinker because the BoR policy renounces immediate interests to achieve intangible long-term proper relationship. The immediate interest renounced at the moment the weak party challenges the strong party is national security. In case the weak party complies, the immediate interests renounced are material interest and respect. Loss of these interests can invite further encroachments. Thus, the two options of the BoR strategy that emerge for the weak party in an asymmetric relationship that should be considered are:

1. The weak party should resort to confrontation because the strong party must be informed how determined the former is. Identifying this will either restore an aborted pattern of interaction or start a new round of interaction. This

option is tantamount to the strong party calling for self-restraint to reconfirm the relationship.

2. The weak party should rely on compromise because letting the strong party know how serious it is in maintaining the current pattern of interaction is useful. This option is tantamount to adopting a self-restraint approach by the weak side.

The logic of BoR and BoP differs in two significant ways. First, the major concern in deciding a BoR strategy is the perceived threat to the proper relationship, in which relative national power is not the foundation. If the threat is deemed significant, even the weak party should show its determination to destroy and subsequently restore the relationship. A failed challenge that results in the continuous incorrect short-term relationship is a statement of position that can leave the future generations with a reference they can use in restructuring the relationship along the once mutually agreeable line. On the other hand, compromise remains worthy if the threat is not significant. The effect of the strong party will be temporary because of the enhanced trust in the relationship.

Second, BoR and BoP are different in terms of their treatment of domestic values. BoP relies on a logic predominantly determined through external means. The domestic value is relevant only when it has implications on power maneuvering. In contrast, the sensibility of BoR toward relationship is related to the relevance of domestic value. Once domestic value is infringed, the trust required for a stable relationship or the transcendence based on stability is ruined. The belief in a stable relationship provides a sense of security because it shields the differences in domestic ruling from threats.² BoP does not contend with domestic value and may even use the attack on domestic value as power leverage. However, BoR must discern the domestic value carefully to avoid inappropriate intervention.

The degree to which the weak party perceives that it can by itself influence the strong party via confrontation, is a good measurement of the efficacy of achieving a long-term proper relationship. The approach to enhance the efficacy must be contingent on the historical and cultural contexts. For example, NK can rely on family history, such as the close comradeship of the first-generation leaders of the Chinese Communist Party, in asserting its defiant proposition (You, 2001). The incapacity to prevent Kim's provocation from escalating will be extremely embarrassing to Chinese leaders. Similarly, a territorial dispute with a neighboring Third World, small country will be extremely inappropriate for China, particularly if the country is a socialist or a

²For the theoretical rationale for shielding domestic values from international infringement, see Zhao, 2006; for an example of policy analysis in this regard, see Cheng-Chwee, 2008.

non-aligned member, such as Vietnam. A worse scenario can be produced because of a political dispute with the pro-independence Taiwan as it might delegitimize the unification that Chinese leaders conceive as their highest relational security measure.

The judgment and discretion of the leaders are the resources and mechanisms of the weak party. The strong efficacy of a proper relationship reflects a more confident use of BoR. Generally, the threats that typically compel the weak party to take a confrontational approach as a powerful warning to the strong party are infringements on territorial integrity, ruling ideology, or political institution. The weak party has the option, for the sake of maintaining or creating a proper relationship, to use a drastic threat to compel the strong party to devote serious attention to the need of the weak counterpart and repair the relationship accordingly. Defining the gravity of the threat is an art that requires judgment and skill. Thus, the strong party is as much in a position to decide as the weak party.

The inevitability of human decision in managing proper relationships suggests that a proper relationship is a relationship comprising mutually congruent role expectations, which do not vary with changing power balances or national interests. The separate domain of BoR, vis-à-vis BoP, allows the weak party to request from the strong party a change in the proper relationship with the expectation that the latter can accept the change. The process through which the weak party can manipulate BoR to demand a change makes the study of BoR attractive. Nevertheless, a general theory, which possesses and employs empirical and practical evidence from actual use to support the relevance of BoR in managing asymmetric relationships, remains essential. This research uses a survey that enables the observation of the domestic value operations and the confrontational tendency of the weak party in an asymmetric relationship, which is the case for the Taiwanese constituency in facing China.

BoR Efficacy in Taiwanese Attitudes toward China

BoR contrasts sharply with BoP to the extent that conflict is not a contingency of power politics. Rather, the threat to resort to conflict is a method of conflict resolution available to all nations regardless of their power. BoR thus seeks subjective rather than objective explanations to situations in which a strong state tolerates and adapts to the challenges posed by its counterpart in an asymmetric relationship. However, specific variables must be identified to explain, at least partially, how the weak party forms judgments. After all, resorting to confrontation can be improper under specific conditions. The China policy of Taiwan is a typical case of an asymmetric relationship faced with the challenge of losing balance. Historically, the balance of relationship between China and Taiwan emerged at the end of the Chinese Civil War.

The Civil War between China and Taiwan ensued as the defeated Kuomintang established an exile regime in Taipei. The legitimacy of both regimes originated from their shared, alleged commitment to reunite China. This served as the foundation of the proper relationship between China and Taiwan, which enabled them to rule their respective domains. Without the shared goal of reunification, both would lose legitimacy. Accordingly, their mutual expectations of each other were renegades of China.

The extreme asymmetry of power that privileged China was balanced by the US support for the Kuomintang. US enforced the containment policy from the 1950s to the 1960s. However, the predominance of the US superpower did not deter either side from engaging in military clashes in defiance of the containment policy. Clashes, which reflected the ongoing Civil War, were necessary for both sides to maintain the image of one China. Gradually, the coupling of the balance of power between China and the US, as well as the BoR between China and Taiwan diminished when the Sino-US rapprochement in the early 1970s shook the BoP that used to keep Taiwan in a military balance. Taiwan maintained self-restraint via its pretentious claim over Mainland China to keep the other pillar of the relationship balance intact. This BoR deteriorated as Taiwan moved toward the option of independence in the 1990s as symbolized by the election of the pro-independence President Lee Teng-hui.

Taiwan's adaption to its internal conditions and the challenge of the asymmetric relationship can be a harbinger for the general asymmetric relationship because of the following:³ 1) the asymmetry of power between the two sides is evident; 2) Taiwan possesses an absolutely contrary policy position regarding its desire for independence from the People's Republic of China (PRC); 3) a consistent record of purchase of arms from the US ensures the capability of Taiwan to deter actions from China; 4) the shared Chinese culture and Han ethnicity between the two sides allow China to appeal to Chinese nationalism; and 5) the prevalence of the peace issue as a top campaign agendum in Taiwan after Martial Law was lifted in 1987 (Bush, 2013; Wei, 2012; Cheng, 1993). Both sides alternated between compromise and confrontation for more than three decades since the adoption of the national peace goal by the post-Cultural Revolution leadership, in lieu of armed unification (Sheng, 2002).

Taiwan has been gradually resorting to a pro-independence platform since the early 1990s. The climax of the confrontation was reached during the term of Chen (2000–2008), who defied the advice of the US and escalated the pro-independence agenda. Consequently, China was compelled to accept the change in the internal value

³Although China still refuses to recognize Taiwan as an independent state, the analysis of asymmetric relationship between them as international relations applies nonetheless to China-Taiwan relations in light of the fact that Taiwan possesses an independent policymaking system that is recognized by China as legitimate.

of Taiwan (i.e., averting unification) to maintain a harmonious relationship with Taiwan. China's approach was to work through the US. Chen failed to win the support of the US and thus, his successor had to adjust, resulting in the withdrawal from the pro-independence pursuit. Chen and his supporters project a sense of efficacy regardless of the lack of power of Taiwan or the discouragement of US to execute a political campaign that a BoP veteran believes, in hindsight, had slight chances of success (Mearsheimer, 2014). Nevertheless, China arranged a series of economic concessions for Taiwan after Chen stepped down. In other words, China displayed a strong will to keep a low profile and settle for a generally peaceful policy. Chen must have also anticipated China's unwillingness to confront him. He was correct and successful to that extent. The interaction between the two sides can allude to the weaker-party strategy in an asymmetric relationship in general.

The 21st Century Foundation in Taiwan randomly selected 1,000 households based on the official population to serve as respondents in a face-to-face interview during the fall of 2013.⁴ Ten questions focused on the Taiwan-China asymmetric relationship and the BoR efficacy on Taiwan's side. The questions assumed the existence of proper relationship between Taiwan and China from Taiwan's perspective, which is a vaguely defined peaceful autonomy from the PRC's governing influence. The above-mentioned BoR efficacy refers to the sense of control over the long term, presumably peaceful prospect of the Taiwan-China relationship. The survey questions explored five potential psychological mechanisms, namely, willingness to fight (D1/D4), commitment to building national defense (D2/ D8), confidence in the pro-independence party (D3/D5), confidence in public opinion (D7/D9), and attitudes toward time (D6/D10). The questions were intended to generate the sense of efficacy among Taiwanese constituency regarding maintaining a proper relationship with reunification-seeking China. The proper relationship between Taiwan and China from the former's perspective, assumed by the survey questions, is a vaguely defined peaceful autonomy from the governing influence of the PRC.

Table 1. Relationship Efficacy of Taiwan's China Policy*

No.	Questions	Cases	Pros	++	+	Cons	-	--
D1	If the government conscripts people to have war with China in order to achieve	900	50.6	7.3	43.4	49.4	42.4	7.0

⁴The survey data used in this paper were provided by the 21st Century Foundation. The request to access the data set were addressed to Mr. Yuchen Kao at Kaoyuchen@gmail.com. Some conditions may be applicable.

* ++: strongly agree; +: agree; -: disagree; --: strongly disagree

	independence, people have the right to deny conscription.							
D4	If China resorts to armed unification and the government gives up fighting, the people should continue to fight by all means.	890	54.8	10.1	44.7	45.2	40.3	4.9
D7	If a majority of Taiwanese expressively supports independence, China will renounce the use of force as a means of unification.	884	19.9	1.0	18.9	80.1	68.2	11.9
D9	If a majority of Taiwanese expressively supports unification, China will renounce the use of force as a means of unification.	855	44.9	3.9	41.0	55.1	49.9	5.3
D2	Even if arms purchase will cause tension with China Taiwan should still proceed with purchase.	911	68.1	8.9	59.2	31.9	30.1	1.7
D8	If arms purchase requires a higher tax, people should still support.	924	33.5	1.9	31.6	66.5	55.6	10.9
D3	If the ruling party is the DPP, China will not force unification.	843	27.8	1.6	26.2	72.2	66.0	6.1
D5	If it is the DPP who carries out openness to and exchange with China, people should feel safer.	856	37.3	3.3	34.0	62.7	56.2	6.5
D6	The longer the current situation lasts, the more bargaining chips Taiwan will have with China.	818	33.9	2.2	31.7	66.1	59.4	6.7
D10	Taiwan will become independent eventually, even though China opposes.	853	46.3	4.8	41.4	53.7	47.7	6.1

Source: Generating all four tables in this paper, the survey which is composed of interviews with 1,000 households randomly selected from the official population statistics is sponsored by the 21th Century Foundation in Taiwan in Fall, 2013.

Determining how the sense of control over peace is related to the confrontational pro-independence policy in Taiwan can assist in discovering the psychological mechanism of the weak party who chooses to confront the strong party. These five

psychological mechanisms suggest the readiness of the Taiwanese respondents in terms of confrontation with China. They attend particularly to the interaction between independence and peace as two values and study which is more important, whether or not the values can be made compatible, and how these can be made compatible. The results suggest that, first, independence is apparently more imperative than peace when juxtaposed against each other, indicating a confrontational tendency; second, there is nonetheless a small portion of the population that believes peace and independence can be compatible; and third, all three potential mechanisms that may lead to the belief that independence and peace can be compatible do not receive high opinion. The three mechanisms are electing a party inclined toward confrontation, articulating the popular will at the poll, and awaiting a brighter future to come.

“Willingness to fight” specifically requests the respondents to evaluate how far they are willing to go in order to assert a new relationship with China. The statistics shows that a high proportion of the population is psychologically prepared to wage a war for the cause of independence. “Commitment to national defense” measures how far people are willing to go to physically get ready for a confrontation with China. It compares the constraints of two interest calculi - tax payment and a good relationship with China - and shows that tax payment is a much higher constraint than good relationship with China. “Confidence in the pro-independence party” asks the respondents to assess whether or not a ruling party inclined for confrontation can exert better control over China’s Taiwan policy. “Confidence in public opinion” asks the respondents to judge whether or not the popular will in Taiwan can deter China from resorting to military means. Finally, “attitudes toward time” measures indirectly the level of confidence and comfort of the respondents toward waiting as a method of achieving peaceful independence.

The constituency is divided with respect to the issue of willingness to fight. If initiating a pro-independence war and resisting a pro-unification conquest are considered as two different processes, then D1 and D4 produce four kinds of conception of rights on peace and war. Half of the constituency (50%) accepts the rights of fellow citizens “to deny” conscription if the government initiates a pro-independence war with China, which is aimed at setting the relationship right. Moreover, 26% of 50% of the constituency will fight to resist in case China decides to invade. The rest (24%) will not fight if the government surrenders when invasion occurs; thus, alluding to the rights to peace, rather than independence. Slightly more than half (55%) states they will continue to fight even when the government gives up resistance in case of invasion. Of the 55%, 29% is willing to stand up for the rights to sovereign independence in world politics. This emphasizes the willingness to fight China, proactively or not, for the sake of independence. Noticeably, 21% of the

constituency prefers to adhere to the rights to submission; they would choose to follow whatever the government implements and will not even defend in case of invasion, if such action is pursued by the government.

Table 2. Rights Conceptions on War and Peace

		D4 If China resorts to armed unification and the government gives up fighting, the people should continue to fight by all means.		subtotal
		Pros	Cons	
D1 If the government conscripts people to have war with China in order to achieve independence, people have the right to deny conscription.	Pros	224 26% Rights to Territory	203 24% Rights to Peace	427 50%
	Cons	247 29% Rights to Independence	175 21% Rights to Submission	422 50%
subtotal		471 55%	378 45%	849 100%
Pearson Chi Square : 3.168 p-value : 0.075 Confidence level 90%,				

Source: See Table 1.

On the other hand, the survey presents an ambivalent, if not unfavorable, picture of the BoR efficacy in relation to achieving a proper relationship with China. The contrast between D2 and D8 suggests an irony: people are willing to purchase arms, but are unwilling to pay more taxes for the purchase. National defense is an ambivalent instrument to articulate the demand for independence from China. Other vehicles that show stronger positions do not enhance the sense of efficacy among the Taiwanese constituency. For example, the results of D3 and D5 illustrate that people do not believe in electing the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party as a measure to reduce the pressure from China. Similarly, the results of D7 and D9 point

out that a strong voice via the ballot, whether it favors independence or reunification, cannot change the inclination of China to force reunification. The low BoR efficacy is not ameliorated when the time factor is added. Thus, in reference to the results of D6 and D10, time is not on Taiwan’s side.

Factor analysis of the 10 questions yielded three factors—*prospect*, *determination*, and *legitimacy*. *Prospect* shows a good fit among five variables, suggesting that time (i.e., the future), party (the pro-independence Democratic Progress Party), and willingness to resist invasion are positively related. To a lesser degree, the variable of democratic independence is also positively associated, emphasizing the prospect for independence as a salient issue. Thus, the prospect for independence of the Taiwanese people is generally divided into optimistic or pessimistic. From the psychological perspective, trust in the capability of the pro-independence party to control the exchanges and negotiation with China, the expectation of the independence of Taiwan, and the willingness to resist invasion belong to one idea. People reveal their level of efficacy through the expressed level with which they can enhance or lose control over the pursuit of independence. Table I shows that more people believe in low efficacy to the extent that the pro-independence party is deemed to have a slight impact on China, time is not on the side of Taiwan, and the people are unwilling to fight against invasion. In other words, people lack the BoR efficacy in a low prospect for independence.

Table 3. Factors Analysis of Peace Efficacy Survey

	Factors		
	Prospect	Determination	Legitimacy
D5 If it is the DPP who carries out openness to and exchange with China, people should feel safer.	.709	-.017	.044
D10 Taiwan will become independent eventually, even though China opposes.	.660	.060	.015
D3 If the ruling party is the DPP, China will not force unification.	.655	-.213	.060
D4 If China resorts to armed unification and the government gives up fighting, the people should continue to fight by all means.	.554	.363	-.219
D6 The longer the current situation lasts, the more bargaining chips Taiwan will	.544	.132	.050

have with China.			
D8 If arms purchase requires a higher tax, people should still support.	.064	.704	.113
D1 If the government conscripts people to have war with China in order to achieve independence, people have the right to deny conscription.	.140	-.639	-.089
D2 Even if arms purchase will cause tension with China Taiwan should still proceed with purchase.	.257	.611	-.308
D9 If a majority of Taiwanese expressively supports unification, China will renounce the use of force as a means of unification.	-.102	.053	.789
D7 If a majority of Taiwanese expressively supports independence, China will renounce the use of force as a means of unification.	.432	.008	.659
Extraction method : Principal Component Analysis Rotation method: Varimax with Kaiser normalization a. Rotation converged in 5 iterations			

Source: See Table 1.

Determination indicates a strong relationship between the willingness to fight to assert the pro-independence position and the inclination to purchase arms with or without tax increase. This factor includes a positive association between the willingness to initiate a pro-independence war and the support for military preparation; thus, highlighting the determination to make the relationship proper through the unilateral effort of Taiwan. Practically, the approval of an enhanced defense budget reveals the willingness to support a pro-independence war. In other words, the lack of support for the defense budget reflects the unwillingness to wage a pro-independence war. While *prospect* requires assessment of the intentions of China, *determination* is mainly an internally shaped psychological propensity, which may not be affected by the power of China. The BoR prevails over the BoP in the mind of the people to the extent that the strength of *determination* is internally shaped regardless of the superior

power of China. The proper relationship appears to be a stronger incentive to provide guidance to the policy.

Legitimacy is the ironic combination of pro-independence and pro-unification public opinions that can serve as a vehicle of the BoR efficacy to initiate confrontation with China. The support via polling for either independence or reunification is positively associated in terms of the effect on the attitude of China toward the proper relationship with Taiwan. This factor is associated with the willingness to invest in defense via tax increase in a slightly negative manner. The support for a particular relationship with China via public polling is certainly a strong statement of the democratic legitimacy of such relationship. However, factor analysis shows that the articulation of a specific position does not enable people to gain or lose their sense of control. Rather, the polling itself contributes or damages the sense of efficacy of the people. Therefore, they will possess the sense of efficacy to affect the proper relationship with China as long as they have confidence in democratic legitimacy. If the people lack such confidence, their BoR efficacy will be low and the support for a tax increase to upgrade national defense will increase.

BoR Efficacy and IR Theory

For the weak nation, the ability to control its international relations attests to the level of efficacy to pursue national interests. Under BoP, the level of efficacy almost entirely depends upon the ability to forge alliances. However, the sense of efficacy of the weak nation is inevitably constrained by the necessity of demonstrating its value to the potential allies, which are strong nations. In comparison, the BoR system provides opportunities for the weak nation to achieve a higher level of efficacy by maneuvering its relationship with the strong nation, especially in their bilateral relationship. However, the level of efficacy is not automatically enhanced. Mechanisms have to be put in place to enable the weak nation to assert its wish to protect or change the relationship. The sense of efficacy to achieve a particular mode of relationship is also the sense of efficacy to maintain peace because any military confrontation in the short run is apparently unfavorable to the weak party. Institutional or intellectual devices have to be available for the weak party to signal its use or renouncement of self-restraint. In the case of Taiwan, these devices can include identity strategy, national defense, party politics, polling, and patience with time. In short, the BoR efficacy of Taiwan in relation to China refers to the sense of control over peace via certain institutional and intellectual mechanisms while asserting a confrontational policy for independence.

The typical strategy offered by BoP theory for the weak party adheres to the following alternatives: balancing by building alliance with a third party, bandwagoning with the strong party, and hedging (from a revised BoP point of view) (Heip, 2013: 335–8). Both balancing and bandwagoning rely on the calculation of power and therefore, these cannot explain the unilateral confrontational approach taken by the weak party of the asymmetric relationship. Hedging is an alternative to BoP because it allows a mix of balancing and bandwagoning based on a longer-term assessment. However, the rationale for hedging is incompatible with the confrontational approach acceptable to the BoR strategy. For the BoR strategy, confrontation initiated by the weak party is a move to assure a long-term relationship that provides stability and reciprocity. Therefore, the strong party must be convinced that the new long-term relationship is beneficial to both sides and proper. However, hedging does not consider the strong party. As a result, the unilateral and independent confrontation launched by the weak party, such as Vietnam, which may appear unintelligent because of the lack of power or a powerful ally as prescribed by the hedging strategy, can be a necessary sacrifice to ensure future cooperation in line with the BoR strategy (Ninh, 1998).

The three factors, *prospect*, *determination* and *legitimacy*, allude to the psychological mechanisms of how a weak party challenges the wishes of a strong party. However, individual questions show only limited disposition for confrontation, except for a significant portion of the population that believes in resorting to violence for independence and investment in military build-up. Nevertheless, the factor analysis reveals the psychological mechanisms that generate a sense of BoR efficacy. The survey generated a total of three factors, namely, *determination* (D1, D2, and D8), *prospect* (D3, D4, D5, D6, and D7), and *legitimacy* (D9 and D10). *Determination* suggests an internally generated drive for independence that can be powerful enough to transform confrontation into a desirable option. This drive is neither a function of power politics nor interest calculation. The psychology of *prospect* is based on confidence, and the level of confidence is mediated by the pro-independence party and the expectation for the future. On the lower end of *prospect*, self-protection through electing the pro-independence party or possessing confidence in the future is ineffective. The level of efficacy attained by having or not having positive prospects necessarily leads to the tendency to adopt a confrontational approach.

The BoR efficacy, indicated by *prospect* and *determination*, distinguishes relational security from hedging that is exclusive to the national security of the party that seeks to avoid confrontation. Relational security is an interest of both the strong and weak party. After all, no strong party desires a partner that will be difficult to cope with in the long run and which accordingly would accommodate resistance to a

certain extent (Path, 2012). The level of resistance that can be considered proper depends on the judgment over the long-term effect on the relational security of the strong party. The strong party's quest for relational security explains the rationality of the weak party in taking a confrontational approach.

Prospect may relate to the concerns of power politics because it involves a calculus of future BoP between Taiwan and China (D6). In general, this future power calculus is independent of the existing level of power, but contingent upon *determination* (Deyer, 2000; 1999; Thacik, 2008). Interestingly, by definition, *prospect* and *determination* appear to describe two separate psychological processes; thus, suggesting that the inclination to resort to drastic means is statistically unrelated to the assessment of the future. It is possible for someone possessing a pessimistic outlook to show the determination to take non-peaceful means or another possessing weak determination to feel optimistic about achieving proper relationship via pro-independence party leadership.

The higher level of unrelatedness of *legitimacy* to *prospect* and *determination* has been shown statistically. *Legitimacy* offers an additional dimension, which examines the rationale of the confrontational approach. *Legitimacy* suggests that the weak party can expect tolerance from the strong party if the legitimacy efficacy is present among the constituency (Hugh, 2013; Rigger, 2011; 1999). Nonetheless, *legitimacy* is a mode of resistance if the sole purpose of holding democratic elections or polls is to acquire the legitimacy required in articulating a position, the popular support of which is not well conveyed on other dimensions such as strong determination and optimistic prospect. The level of confidence in legitimacy and in one's determination or one's prospect belongs to different psychological processes. In essence, another separate mechanism is offered to adjust the confrontational policy intended for the strong party.

Aside from the factor analysis and back to the variable matrix, results presented in Table 2 imply that the resistant mentality should be understood from the position of the right that points to unconditional peace. Nearly half of the population will not defend Taiwan or join the pro-independence war initiative. Particularly, 21% of the constituency alleges the right to peace and will refuse military conscription under any excuse. This right to consciousness could be subversive even though at first sight, the will to resist invading power is not registered amongst them (Shih, 2004). The right to peace can be continuously applied to yet another invading power because loyalty is no longer a virtue, rendering the earlier surrender obsolete. In fact, insistence that peace should not be renounced for any reason, not even for the pro-independence identity, takes a conscious and non-conforming choice amidst the politically correct pro-independence pursuit. This idea can also become a basis for resistance or

subversion against whichever power that seemingly would want to take over for the time being.

Finally, a cluster analysis is available. In Table 4, dividing Taiwanese respondents into five categories according to their reactions to questions that encapsulate the influence of the three factors is statistically proper. Each category showed a peculiar manner of determining whether the three factors are convincing or not. No factor is universally convincing to the five groups, indicating the psychological limitation of the Taiwanese constituency to unite on any single strategic orientation that will assert the difference of Taiwan from China via confrontation. Nonetheless, *legitimacy* has registered significance in at least three groups, giving it the potential of becoming a leading factor in facing the imagined China threat. The last group holds an absolutely optimistic attitude with regard to the confrontation with China. Ironically, if the fifth group enlists the three factors to support resistance, the other four groups will be alienated. Consequently, alienation caused by any of the three factors will lead to their withdrawal. As a result, the aggressive fifth group will be left on its own. On the other hand, more political support may arise in support the pro-independence stance if the last group learns from the experience and focuses on legitimacy.

Table 4. Cluster Analysis of the Factors of Prospect, Determination, and Legitimacy

	Clusters				
	1	2	3	4	5
Prospect	-1.18971	-1.00673	-1.99811	3.15974	2.65793
Determination	3.26743	-3.04177	-1.31731	-1.93070	2.80144
Legitimacy	-3.80399	-2.86320	2.10100	.99904	2.15015

Source: See Table 1.

Conclusion

It may appear that the execution of Jang by Kim, which eliminated a symbol of Chinese reform and relationship, challenged the relationship with China. However, the BoR analysis indicates that the real thorny issue between China and NK is the latter's nuclear weapon and tests, which alarmed the US and its Japanese and South Korean allies. Moreover, the issue challenges the image of China as a responsible power, and renders China as a threat. What the nuclear issue represents in the North

Korea-China relationship is the quest for formal independence in the Taiwan-China relationship. Using the case of Jang to resist China is beyond rationality. In fact, Kim immediately sought understanding from China after the execution. Otherwise, the resistance of NK to China on the nuclear issue would have lost relational power because the relationship would have already been de-legitimated by the case of Jang.

The challenge of the weak party has to be focused to convey the seriousness and determination, which is what NK has been doing. The concept of Juche (subjectivity) has been the major self-reminder for NK to ensure distinction from China, although NK has never brought the idea to the level of their bilateral relationship. The recalcitrance of NK is based on the nuclear issue. NK has displayed high BoR efficacy on the determination vector more than once to the extreme disappointment of China. However, China acquiesced despite the rhetoric of disapproval in keeping with the stance of the United Nations. NK is unlikely to have any strong BoR efficacy with China on the prospect vector, but it can be relevant on the legitimacy vector. The popular support for the nuclear program in NK is not the issue, but the family history of Kim, which intertwined with the rise of the first-generation leaders of the PRC (Kim, 1994: Ch. 1). This aspect of history makes the survival of the regime of Kim in NK a moral burden for China, which has been turned into a moral hazard by the late Kim Jung-il and his son Chun-un.

Taiwan, North Korea, and Vietnam have similarly adopted the confrontational approach toward China. Vietnam is the only country that has encountered China's retaliation. Nevertheless, both Vietnam and China understand the importance of their bilateral relationship and, historically, both have yielded in one way or another to the other side in order to restore their relationship. Nevertheless, the current maritime dispute between Vietnam and China may escalate in the short run as both seem determined to confine the dispute as an entirely isolated agendum so that the bilateral relationship on other dimensions can proceed with their own momentum. On the Chinese side, the use of stick and carrot toward its Southeast Asian neighbors has no BoP implication. There is no territorial ambition, nor any strategic plan to subjugate the neighbors into an economic colony. Myanmar could even serve as a model of how much China could compromise and benefit.

All these neighbors are different. Each relationship has its own historical trajectory and normative conventions. However, the way the weak party manages the relationship with the strong party is comparable. This research generates three factors that allude to the psychological mechanisms via which the weak party may acquire a sufficient sense of efficacy to confront China. The actual substance of the *determination*, *prospect*, and *legitimacy* of one state is necessarily different from those of the other state. *Prospect* advises the researcher to seek the institutional and

intellectual mechanisms that enable the local constituency to establish confidence in their capability to convince China away from the use of force when they assert a change in proper relationship or restore the existing one violated by China.

Determination looks for ways to enhance the readiness to fight China. Purchase of arms is only one option. Troop movement is another. The provocation of enmity with the US or Japan is yet another. *Legitimacy* points to the use of features that China could not resist recognizing, such as polling, family history, shared ideology, Third World status, and so on.

Efficacy does not lead to reality. Policy propensity, based on enhanced efficacy, does not produce the capacity to create the desired result. Efficacy explains why the weak party in an asymmetric relationship can challenge the strong party despite the lack of capacity for balancing or bandwagoning. Efficacy makes BoR a plausible theory, as the challenges of the weak party primarily tackle relational security that is meant to benefit both parties in the long run. *Prospect, determination, and legitimacy* explain the psychological mechanisms of efficacy generation. Other factors may be discovered through other case studies. The stabilized asymmetric relationship is in itself a value for both parties; the weak party can always attempt a confrontational policy. At what point this will happen is contingent on judgment and sense of efficacy.

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