Measuring democracy and autocracy

Manfred G. Schmidt

Universität Heidelberg – IPW

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This chapter portrays major measures of democracy and autocracy from R.A. Dahl’s path breaking “Polyarchy” and the Polity IV Project to the Freedom House political rights and civil liberties ratings and more recent indices such as the Status Index of the Bertelsmann Transformation Index, the Effective Democracy Index and the Combined Index of Democracy. However, more specialized datasets on democracies or autocracies alone will not be included in this article.

1. Towards measuring democracies and autocracies

It is not a simple undertaking to come up with precise measurements for democracies and their non-democratic counterparts, the autocracies. For a long time, Aristotle’s definition of the different systems of government with their varying number of rulers and the quality of their rule was considered the standard by which regimes were measured. Aristotle (1996) categorized democracy as an egocentric version of rule by the many, in contrast to rule of the demos in favour of the common good and in further contrast to rule by the few, such as in aristocracies or oligarchies, and to rule by one, as in the case of a monarchy or a tyranny. Later, indicators at a higher level of measurement were put into play to classify systems of government
such as the percent of the adult population which participated in national elections (Nohlen/Stöver 2010).

The universal franchise and the participation of the citizenry in elections to vote the political leadership in and out of office constitute only one dimension of democracy, though; democracy also includes opportunities for unimpeded public contestation in interest articulation, interest aggregation and decision-making. Robert Dahl measured both of these dimensions – participation and contestation or opposition – for 114 countries in his ground-breaking work *Polyarchy* (Dahl 1971). He defined participation as “eligibility to participate in elections”, which he measured by the “percent of adult citizens eligible to vote”, using a three-part scale: less than 20%, 20–90% and over 90% (Dahl 1971, 232-234). It was a more complex undertaking, though, to measure the second dimension, the “‘degree of opportunity for public contestation’ or political opposition” (ibid. 235). In order to accomplish this, a long list of variables were selected from the *Cross Polity Survey* (Banks/Textor 1971) as indicators of the most important conditions for public contestation: the right to freely form organizations, freedom of expression and of the press, access to independent sources of information, free and fair elections, and institutions that guarantee responsive government policies (Dahl 1971: 235-237). Using these criteria, Dahl identified 26 democracies in the late 1960s, defining democracies as “fully inclusive polyarchies” (ibid. 248), by which he meant developed but not perfectly democratic regimes. To this he added three countries with more electoral restrictions – Chile, Switzerland and the USA – and six “near-polyarchies”, including Turkey and Venezuela (ibid. 248).

Dahl’s *Polyarchy* is a major contribution to the measurement of democracy (and also indirectly to the measurement of autocracies). Since then, a wealth of studies have continued to further develop the measurement of democratic and autocratic regimes. Examples of these studies include the contributions in Inkeles (1990) and Vanhanen
(2003), who, following Dahl’s *Polyarchy*, developed an index of democratization for 170 states from the 19th to the early 21st centuries. Vanhanen, though, reduced the dimension of “participation” to the percentage of active voters in a population. Moreover, he used a single indicator for Dahl’s complex dimension of contestation, which he measured by subtracting from 100 the percentage of votes received or seats held by the strongest party in a national parliamentary election (Vanhanen 2003: 59-67 for further details; see also Table 1).

Of the various measurements of democracy, only those that are especially productive for the comparative analysis of systems of democratic and autocratic government – according to the criteria of validity, reliability, differentiation, availability of cross-sectional and longitudinal data, and applicability to measuring democracy and autocracy – will be given a more thorough introduction in this chapter (Schmidt 2010: 370-398). More specialized datasets on democracies or autocracies alone, for instance the Democracy Barometer (Bühlmann et al. 2012) on the one hand and Cheibub et al. (2010) and Hadenius et al. (2012) on the other, will not be included in this article.

2. Democracy and autocracy measures for the 19th, 20th and 21st centuries

Most of the measurements of democracy that have been developed since the 1970s record more precisely than their predecessors the extent to which political institutions control the executive by means of separation of powers, checks and balances, and fundamental rights that are not subject to political negotiation. Consequently, these measurements of democracy are more sensitive to one of the central pillars of modern constitutional democracies: the institutional limitations on the executive’s power to shape political decision-making processes. One example is the Polity IV Project’s scales of democracy and autocracy, which record democratic
and non-democratic regime types around the world from the early 19th to the 21st centuries (Marshall/Gurr/Jaggers 2014). According to Polity IV, democracy is characterised by three key items: 1) institutions and processes that allow citizens to effectively express their political preferences and to combine these preferences into a package of alternatives from which they can choose, 2) institutional constraints on the executive and 3) guaranteed civil rights and liberties for all citizens of the state. If all of these conditions are met, the regime in question is classified as an institutionalized democracy (Marshall/Jaggers/Gurr 2014: 14). When the degree of democracy of a regime type is being measured, though, only the first and second key items are included in the calculations; the third key item, civil rights and liberties, is not used (ibid.: 14).

The Polity IV Project measures systems of government in three steps. In the first step, an indicator of democracy (“Democracy”) comes into play; this is followed by an indicator of autocracy in the second step (“Autocracy”). In the third step, both indicators are combined to give an aggregate value (“Polity”).

The indicators of democracy and autocracy are each based on an 11-point scale that ranges from 0 (no democracy or no autocracy) to 10 (maximal democracy or maximal autocracy). Democracy is measured by means of four indicators that are weighted and added together: 1) the degree of competitiveness of political participation (coded using a 3-point scale that ranges from competitive to non-competitive); 2) the openness of recruiting office-holders; 3) the degree of competitiveness of executive recruitment (where the difference between electing the office-holder and authoritarian selection is decisive); and 4) limitations on the executive (using a scale that ranges from powerful institutional constraints on executive power – which Polity IV ascribes to the US and Germany – to the executive being allowed a great deal of flexibility – as in the case of France during the presidency of Charles de Gaulle).

When autocracy is being measured, a fifth indicator, the regulation of political participation (differentiated according to whether fragmented or restricted), is added
to the four democracy indicators. According to Polity IV, autocracies are largely characterised by non-competitive, repressively regulated political participation, by undemocratic, non-competitive recruitment of the political leadership and by an executive with a great deal of leeway for action.

Polity IV measures the degree of democracy and degree of autocracy separately and combines the two measurements into one indicator, “Polity”, that is supposed to represent the regime type in all its democratic and non-democratic facets. “Polity” is calculated by subtracting the autocracy score from the democracy score. The final score can therefore range from -10 to +10. -10 indicates a regime that does not have a single democratic quality but has a top score on the autocracy scale, such as China or North Korea. +10, on the other hand, is used to characterise a regime that has no autocratic qualities but has the highest score on the democracy scale (“full democracy”), such as most of the Western European and North American countries. Values between +6 and +9 signify (simple) democracy. Autocracies are characterised by scores between -6 and -10, for example Qatar and Saudi Arabia. The remaining values indicate open or closed “anocracies”, i.e. incoherent autocratic–democratic mixes, for example the Russian Federation.

In 2013, Polity IV counted 35 “full democracies” and 59 further simple democracies (i.e. having a Polity score between +6 and +9). Thus, 57 per cent of all countries were more or less democratic in 2013. That is comparatively many, as a historical comparison shows. In 1875, only 8 countries were democratic (i.e. having a Polity score of at least +6): Belgium, Costa Rica, France, Greece, Columbia, New Zealand, Switzerland and the USA. In 1950, the number was up to 24, or 30 per cent of all countries. And in 1989, on the eve of the fall of the Iron Curtain, there were 36 democracies. All of the other states were either pure autocracies – in 2013, for instance, they numbered 20 – or intermediate forms with incoherent scores of democracy and autocracy, the so-called “open anocracies” or “closed anocracies” (in 2013, there were 50 in all).
Judging by the numbers and relative frequencies, democracy has gained in importance, yet years of democratic expansion were followed by phases of stagnation and contraction. Examples of the latter include the triumphal march of fascism across Italy in the 1920s and the collapse of democracy in Germany, Austria and Spain in the 1930s. In addition, a number of European democracies were occupied by the German army during the Second World War. Even after the end of the war, democracy suffered several setbacks; Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and East Germany fell under the Soviet sphere of influence. Furthermore, a number of democracies collapsed during the 1950s and 1960s, especially in the Third World. Even during the third wave of democratization (Huntington 1991) starting in the early 1970s, there were some democracies that collapsed, such as Argentina (1976-1982), Chile (1973-1987) and Lebanon (since 1975) (Marshall/Gurr/Jaggers 2014).

The designers of the democracy and autocracy scales did pioneer work with their measures that reach all the way back to the early 19th century. They smoothed the way for comparative research on regime structures, their prerequisites and their consequences. This is a notable accomplishment worthy of praise. That being said, the Polity IV measurements of democracy and autocracy are not without their problems. The indicators deal with the constitutional reality only in part and with the existence and realization of civil rights and liberties not at all. The basic idea of measuring the constraints on the executive needs to have a more complex measurement added, for instance a measurement on the model of the index of counter-majoritarian institutions (Schmidt 2010: 332, table 8) or on the model of the veto player theory (Tsebelis 2002). In addition, the Polity Project’s measurements of democracy and autocracy are rather executive-heavy. For one thing, the difference between suffrage for the few and suffrage for all adult citizens is not taken fully into consideration in these measurements. This is also true of the treatment of the relative sizes of electorates and of the voters' ability to have a say in voting the political
leadership in and out of office. This has resulted in serious errors. Here is one example: According to Polity IV, the USA has been a respectable institutionalized democracy since 1810. But that is a historical misrepresentation, since in the early 19th century only a small proportion of adults in the United States were eligible to vote. And in the early 1830s, when Alexis de Tocqueville visited America, which he described in *De la Démocratie en Amérique* (1830 and 1935), America was still miles away from being a non-defective democracy. For example, slaves were barred from political participation until the abolition of slavery. Even after the introduction of the universal franchise, though, political participation rights, particularly those of African Americans, were cut back on a large scale.

3. Political rights and civil liberties: The Freedom House ratings

The reports published by Freedom House, a non-profit organization in Washington, D.C., contain useful measurements of democracy and autocracy. Freedom House has provided yearly measurements since 1971 on the state of political rights and civil liberties in every contemporary sovereign state. The political rights rating and the civil liberties rating are used to chronicle this information. A state is said to grant its citizens political rights if it allows them to form political parties that have significantly different agendas and whose leaders compete to acquire or maintain positions of political leadership in open, competitive and organised elections. Civil liberties are said to exist in a country if it respects and promotes citizens' civil rights and liberties, their right of free association and their property rights.

The political rights and civil liberties ratings each range from 1 to 7. The value '1' represents full rights or fully developed civil liberties, and '7' represents the complete absence of political rights or civil liberties. The two scores are then combined to give a freedom rating. This rating ranges from 2 to 14, where 2 indicates secure, comprehensive political rights and comprehensive civil liberties. This value (or a
neighbouring value) signals lively political participation and highly developed civil liberties in the sense of the constitutional liberal democracies of Europe and North America. The value of 14, on the other hand, signals the complete absence of these rights and opportunities for participation; examples include Saudi Arabia and North Korea.

Freedom House groups its observations into “free”, “partly free” and “not free” states, according to whether the average of the Political Rights and Civil Liberties scores lies between 1 and 2.5 (“free”), between 3 and 5.0 (“partly free”) or between 5.5 and 7 (“not free”). In 2013, for instance, Freedom House ranked 88 countries as “free”. This represents 45 per cent of all countries and 40 per cent of the global population. In contrast, 59 countries, or approximately 30 per cent of all countries, were rated that year as “partly free”, and 48 countries (25 per cent) as “not free”.

The political rights and the civil liberties ratings measure the right of association and civil rights and liberties. They can also be taken as proxies for constitutional democracies and indirectly as proxies for autocracies. Here, democracy is taken to mean a political system in which the people freely select leaders to make decisions on their behalf from among competing groups and individuals who have not been put forth by the government. This is a close borrowing of Joseph Schumpeter’s definition of democracy. But in contrast to Schumpeter, Freedom House combines competition for political leadership positions and participation with the civil rights and liberties of a liberal democracy.

Freedom House uses extensive questionnaires to measure political rights and civil liberties. The types of questions used and their wording have changed over time, for the better. Critics have failed to properly take this into account, though, as in the case of the work by Munck and Verkuilen (2002), who criticize the Freedom House ratings for their shortcomings. Today, the political rights rating is based on 10
questions. Three questions aim to assess the procedural quality of elections, four questions quantify the extent of political pluralism and the chances of participation for various groups – the population as a whole, the opposition and minorities – and the final three questions are directed at the functioning of government, with special consideration paid to transparency, leadership ability and susceptibility to corruption.

The civil liberties rating, on the other hand, is based on 15 questions. The aim of these is to assess the extent of a) freedom of expression and belief, b) associational and organisational rights, c) rule of law, including the independence of the judiciary, and 4) guarantees of personal autonomy and individual rights (such as freedom of movement, property rights and legal protections against exploitation).

Freedom House also differentiates between “electoral democracies” and “liberal democracies” in its reports. Although liberal democracies are characterised by participation, independent decision-making and the ability of the people or their representatives to vote the political leadership in or out of office, their hallmark is extensively developed, untrammelled civil liberties, which electoral democracies lack. This form of democracy limits itself to the features of participation, reasonably independent decision-making, and regular elections, including the population voting its rulers into or (less frequently) out of office.

The freedom index published by Freedom House, which results from the addition, or alternatively the average, of the political rights and civil liberties ratings, is reflective of a concept of democracy that overlaps a great deal with the idea of the constitutional state. For this reason, this freedom index traces the contours of constitutional democracies more precisely than many other indices of democracy. A low score on the freedom index indicates that a democracy has strong constitutional underpinnings, while a relatively high score signals that democracy is under only
weak constitutional constraints, indicating that it is a structurally defective democracy (for more on this, see section 4.1).

Despite their strengths, the Freedom House ratings require revision in some places. The categorisation of the countries surveyed is often based on reliable data, but sometimes it rests on intuitive observation and judgement. The USA has received rather mild ratings despite Guantanamo and targeted killings on the orders of the government. Israel, too, receives remarkably mild civil liberties scores, despite its familiarity with state-sanctioned killings and its actions as an occupying force in Palestinian areas. In addition, the concepts used in the political rights and civil liberties checklists have not always been clearly operationalised. Moreover, the calculations and weighting of the observed results are not always clearly laid out. This has raised doubts as to the reliability of the Freedom House ratings. On the other hand, specific questions about the construction of the political rights and civil liberties ratings have led to major improvements in the quality of the measurements. The depth of the Freedom House dataset deserves more recognition than its critics have given it credit for; only Polity IV and Vanhanen (2003) provide a more comprehensive set of cross-sectional and longitudinal data for the comparison of democracies and autocracies.

4. “Status of democracy” and governance-based indices of democratic and autocratic regimes

4.1 Democracy and autocracy in the Bertelmann Transformation Index

The measurements of democracy introduced so far have opened up new areas of research. Nevertheless, there are still gaps. For example, their indicators have a blind
spot where “domain democracies” are concerned. These are the defective democracies (Croissant/Merkel 2004) in which large sectors of society are controlled by groups whose power has not been democratically legitimized, such as the military or guerrilla movements. Other types of defective democracies are the “exclusive”, the “illiberal” and the “delegative” democracies. “Exclusive” democracies exclude a substantial portion of adult citizens from voting; illiberal democracies are plagued by serious civil rights shortcomings, and “delegative democracies” are characterized by highly concentrated, supermajoritarian varieties of presidential government (Merkel 2013: 223).

Defective democracies are by no means rare. Today, they make up over 50 per cent of all democracies, on average, but with major regional differences. The majority of them are to be found in the post-Soviet countries that arose from the break-up of the Soviet Union, in the Middle East and in North Africa, as well as in Francophone Africa. And while the percentage of defective democracies in Anglophone Africa and Latin America is rather high, the percentage in continental, central and southeastern Europe is extremely low (Croissant/Merkel 2004).

Defective democracies are also an object of study of the Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI), which has been published every two years since 2003 and which deals with the transitions to democracy and a market economy (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2014). One part of the BTI, in particular, is suitable for the measurement of democracies and autocracies: the Status Index. This index of the status of democracy is based on five components that are measured using data acquired from expert surveys: stateness, political participation, rule of law, stability and legitimacy of democratic institutions, and political and social integration.

The indicators of stateness are used to evaluate whether the national structures of the state are intact and whether there is a division between church and state. In the case
of political participation, the main questions address whether citizens determine their political leadership through free elections and the extent to which they have other political rights, such as freedom of expression and freedom of association. The criteria for rule of law indicate the extent to which the state authorities place checks and balances on each other and the extent to which civil rights and liberties are guaranteed. The stability and legitimacy of democratic institutions are measured using questions about their effectiveness and efficiency and about their acceptability. The last component, political and social integration, is measured using questions about four thematic areas: first, stability, social entrenchment and the party system’s ability to articulate its interests; second, the existence of an effective system of interest groups acting as intermediaries; third, the degree of conformance to democratic norms; and fourth, the status of civic self-organization and the creation of social capital (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2014, 8-9, 126-127).

According to BTI data from 2013, the most successful transitions are taking place in Uruguay, Estonia, Taiwan, the Czech Republic and Poland, as well as in 15 other states. All of the other democracies surveyed in the BTI (which do not include the established constitutional democracies, such as Britain, France and Germany) are either simple defective democracies – 41 of them, including the Ukraine – or highly defective, totalling 14 and including Tunisia. In addition to democracies, the BTI data cover autocracies. According to the BTI published in 2014, 21 states were labelled as “moderate autocracies” (including Singapore and the Russian Federation) and 33 states were categorised as “hard-line autocracies”, including China, Saudi Arabia and North Korea.

In contrast to the other measurements of democracy, the Bertelsmann Transformation Index excludes the established democracies in Europe and America. This shortcoming could easily be rectified: the Status Index could be transformed
into an ordinal scale and supplemented with measurements for the established democracies that are already on an ordinal scale (see table 1).

4.2 New measures of democracy: democratic rights plus rule of law plus quality of governance

Some of the newer measurements of democracy include part of the governance data from the World Bank (Kaufmann et al. 2013) and multiply them (or part of them) with the Freedom House political rights and civil liberties ratings. This multiplication is used to establish conditionality: only when political rights and civil liberties as well as high-quality governance are present can a country be considered a full democracy. This is the foundation for the construction of varying types of indices of effective democracy. One version links democratic rights with indicators of rule of law and a corruption index (Alexander/Inglehart/Welzel 2012). This index of effective democracy (EDI) is calculated by multiplying the Freedom House freedom rating with the average of the World Bank rule of law index and its control of corruption index (ibid. 45-46). The index resulting from these calculations is described by its authors as “the most reliable and valid index of democracy that is currently available” (ibid. 41).

Another index, the Combined Index of Democracy (KID), is based on a combination of democratic rights, rule of law and political stability (Lauth 2013). This index’s understanding of democracy includes freedom and equality, as well as political and legal controls, and rests on the assumption, that the monopoly of power on the part of the state is a prerequisite of democracy. The exact measurement of the combined index of democracy is based on the Polity IV democracy and autocracy scales, the Freedom House freedom index and the World Bank rule of law and political stability indicators. The measured values are combined into a scale from 0 to 10, in which 0
indicates complete autocracy and 10 fully developed democracy. Values from 0 to 5 reflect various degrees of autocracy, values from 5 to 7 stand for defective democracies, and the range from 7 to 10 represents non-defective democracies (see Table 1).

5. Advantages and limitations of the measurements of democracy and autocracy

The comparative measures of democracy and autocracy are highly correlated. That is also true of the indicators of democracy and autocracy in the early 21st century, which are compiled in Table 1; the magnitude of the correlation coefficient ranges from +/-0.7 to +/-0.9 (calculated using the Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient formula). There is a large degree of correspondence between the measurements of the western European and North American constitutional states. Most of the indicators characterize them as a homogenous core group of the world’s leading democracies. The one exception is Vanhanen’s index of democratization, which is especially responsive to party-system fragmentation and to voter turnout, both of which vary from one country to another.

Despite correlating significantly, the measurements of the degree of democracy and autocracy for individual countries diverge to a sometimes considerable extent. This mainly applies to the hybrid – partly autocratic, partly democratic – regimes. The Russian Federation, for example, received Freedom House ratings of 6 and 5 in 2013 and is therefore classified as highly autocratic. Polity IV, on the other hand, gave Russia a score that year of 4 on a scale ranging from +10 to -10, while the Status Index classified Russia as moderately autocratic. If Vanhanen’s index is brought into the mix, the findings become even more heterogeneous. According to this index, the Russian Federation, at least in 2001, clearly outstripped future members of the European Union, such as Romania, with a democratization score of 28.0 versus 20.5.
The indicators of democracy and autocracy described above have opened new vistas for research. This deserves acknowledgement, even if these indicators have some weaknesses. While they are able to record the differences in the degree of democracy and of autocracy, other criteria are necessary in order to identify specific types of democracy and autocracy. Good candidates for this include, for example, Lijphart’s differentiation between majoritarian and consensus democracies, and the typologies of autocracy by Cheibub et al. (2010) and Hadenius et al. (2012). Cheibub et al. (2010) distinguish primarily between royal, military and civilian dictatorships. Hadenius et al. (2012), on the other hand, differentiates six types of autocracy: monarchy, military regime, one-party regime, multi-party autocracy and no-party autocracy, plus a category “other”.

One of the weaknesses of a number of measurements of democracy and autocracy is pseudo-exactness. The interval scaled indicators of democracy and the indices of democracy that make use of the World Bank governance indicators, in particular, are plagued by a particularly large problem of pseudo-exactness. Consider these examples: Is Denmark, with a democratization index of 44.2, according to Vanhanen (2003), really 8.7 points more democratic than Germany? Wouldn’t a simpler scale level such as that of the Freedom House ratings be more acceptable? There, both countries are ranked equal. And can China’s rule of law score of 4.55 (as measured by the World Bank rule of law index for the years from 1996 to 2012) really be exactly 0.87 points higher than the Ecuador’s rule of law score (3.68) (Lauth 2013)?

The ratings of democracy discussed up to this point do not actually capture the quality of participation, but rather only its quantity. But even that occurs in an incomplete way because most of these ratings except Vanhanen (2003) disregard direct democratic arrangements or opportunities for participation at the sub-national level. In addition to the properties of the democracy and autocracy ratings that are in
need of correction, there are two other problems: Up to now, they have shown absolutely no response to the democratic deficits that result from delegating rights of sovereignty to international or transnational organisations, as in the case of the European Union’s structural democratic deficit (Schmid 2010, 399-411). Moreover, the measurements of rule of law did not respond at all to the threats to fundamental rights that have arisen as a result of the excessive use of security-motivated, computer-based data gathering and surveillance, even in established democracies.

Despite their weaknesses, though, the more recently introduced measurements of democracy and autocracy have provided some illuminating insights. They record the degree of democracy and autocracy in different regime types more thoroughly and more systematically than the older indicators. The precise measurement of a regime type also serves as a safeguard against illusions about the prevalence of democracy. A reading of most of the ratings of democracy shows that, both before and after the historical turning point of the years 1989/90, only a minority of the world’s population has lived or does live in developed and entrenched democracies (see Table 1).
Table 1: Measurements of democracy and autocracy for selected sovereign states from the 19th to the 21st centuries

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Notes on Table 1:

- Russian Federation: Values for 1950 refer to the Soviet Union.
- Column 4: Democratization Index (Vanhanen (2003: 141ff.). Maximum: 100 (fully developed democracy), minimum: 0 (full autocracy).
- Column 7: Status Index, as augmented by the author, based on Bertelsmann Stiftung 2014: 25. Ordinal scale measurements of the established democracies were added (by which is meant states with values of 1 or 2 on the Freedom House political rights and civil liberties ratings, provided that these states have not been classified as defective democracies on the Status Index). The newly added states have received a status of “democracy” and receive a rating of 0. A rating of 1 means “democracy in the process of consolidation”; 2 means “defective democracy”; 3 stands for “strongly defective democracy”; 4 for “moderate autocracy”; and 5 for “hard-line autocracy”.

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Column 8: The Combined Index of Democracy (KID3D Index) is calculated by taking the third root of the product of the World Bank rule of law indicator, the Polity IV democracy indicator and the sum of the Freedom House political rights and civil liberties ratings. 0 to 5: autocracy; 5.0 to 7: defective democracy; 7-10: non-defective democracy (Lauth 2013). The simple KID Index is the square root of the product of KID3D and the World Bank political instability index (Lauth 2013).
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