
A European security role in Korea?

Dr. Sebastian Harnisch

Ass. Professor for International Relations

University of Trier

<http://www.politik.uni-trier.de/mitarbeiter/harnisch/index.php>


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European Security interests on the Peninsula

1. Prevent the spread of DPRK WMD technology/systems to other regions
 1. Indian Subcontinent: Pakistan
 2. Middle East: Iran, Syria, Libya, Egypt, Yemen, UAE? (Iraq, Saudi Arabia)
2. Prevent Nuclear Chain reaction in Northeast Asia
3. Prevent the destabilization of the Nonproliferation Regime
4. Security, stability and prosperity for the Korean People
 1. Military crisis or conflict has broad potentially enormous human, political, economical and financial costs
 2. Military crisis will involve interests of key regional powers and shape their relationship (US-PRC; ROK-Japan; PRC-Japan)

The Constitutiveness of a Security Role



Role expectations towards EU

Internal

External

General characteristics

- Limited geographic scope
- Civilian Power Role

Korean Peninsula characteristics

- 1994 Asia Strategy
- 1995 Member states caution on KEDO
- 1996/97 Commission initiative on KEDO
- 1996-2003 EP concerns about export of nuclear technology and budgetary concerns

General characteristics

- Strong role complementarity with US/NATO
- Economic global power – fragile regional political power


Korean Peninsula characteristics

- Strong US/Japanese push for EU-KEDO contribution
- 1995 DPRK quest for humanitarian/ economical aid
- 1998 ROKG expectation of EU support for „Sunshine Policy“
- 2000 Kim Dae Jung’s personal appeal for DPRK recognition
- 2001 KDJ Personal appeal for EU Support of DPRK dialogue

The EU's security role in KEDO

- 10/94: Geneva Agreement: 2 LWR and Pol./Econ. “normalization” in exchange for end of DPRK nuclear development
- 12/95 EU-Madrid summit decision on Joint Action on KEDO
- 02/96 FM-Council: 2 Mio. ECU and 1997-2000 on for 5 years KEDO contribution (total € 50 mio) depending on KEDO Board membership
- 07/97 Common EU position on KEDO
- 09/97 EURATOM becomes KEDO Board Member
- 09/98 EU considers KEDO role after DPRK missile launch
- 11/02 EU agrees to suspension of HFO delivery
- 11/03 EU agrees to temporary suspension of KEDO process
- 12/04 Suspension of KEDO activities in DPRK

EU Assistance to the DPRK 1995-2002



EU and Member States' Political Relations with DPRK

EU

- 12/98 EU-DPRK dialogue (1st round)
- 11/99 EU-DPRK dialogue (2nd round)
- 11/00 EU-DPRK dialogue (3rd round)
- 05/01 EU establishes diplomatic relations with DPRK
- 10/01 EU-DPRK dialogue (4rd round)
- 02/02 EU adopts DPRK Country Strategy Paper
- 04/02 EU adopts National Indicative Program (DPRK)
- 12/03 EU Mission to DPRK

Member states

- Italy (04.01. 2000); UK (12.12. 2000); Netherlands (15.01. 2001); Belgium (23.01. 2001); Spain (07.02. 2001); Germany (1.03. 2001); Luxembourg (06.03. 2001); Greece (08.03. 2001)

Current Crisis Situation

Developments:

- Oct 02: DPRK admits to Kelly enrichment program
- Dec 02: DPRK removes security seals from the IAEA-safeguarded facility
- Jan 03: DPRK withdraws from NPT
- Feb 03: DPRK announces reactivation of 5 MW nuclear reactor
- April 03: US-DPRK-China talks: DPRK hints possession of nuclear weapons
- July 03: DPRK announces completion of reprocessing of canned nuclear fuel rods

Analysis: Clearly deteriorating situation!

- Continuing DPRK transfer of WMD technology
- DPRK closest ever to sizeable military significant nuclear weapons capacity
- Stalemate in diplomatic realm
 - Both, US and DPRK have a double-pronged strategy: hedging diplomatic willingness with military efforts
 - Despite vigorous PRC and TCOG efforts, no stable diplomatic process thus far
 - Outside powers blocked either by domestic considerations (ROK/Japan) or lacking potential (EU)

2003 Crisis Situation: EU and member state responses

Developments:

- 01-04/03: EU condemns DPRK withdrawal, supports IAEA resolutions but rejects UN Security Council engagement
- 05/03: EU member states (Portugal, Spain, Italy, UK, France, Germany (Poland) participate in US-led „Proliferation Security Initiative“ (PSI)
- 10/03: EU continues humanitarian aid
- 11/03: EU agrees to KEDO temporary suspension (following ROK position)
- 12/03: EU (after month of stalemate) sends mission to DPRK

Analysis:

- No clear and cohesive security strategy vis-à-vis DPRK
- Priority for Iran and transatlantic relationship
- EU policy shaped by ROK/US position mix

Role expectations towards EU 12/2003

Internal

External

- Bigger „European“ role in security and non-proliferation affairs => learning the „Iraq lesson“
 - Solana doctrine
 - Basic Principles/Action Plan
 - PSI-Participation
 - Iran Mission
 - Push from EP/Policy community for bigger EU security role in Korea
- ROK and DPRK (to a much lesser extent) pushing for bigger EU security role as buffer for US policy
 - US unlikely to grant „temporary leadership to EU“ as in Iranian case
 - Improved PRC-US relations may facilitate a regular 6-Party-Process
 - Upcoming elections in ROK and US plus positive development in Iraq/Iran may facilitate bigger expectations vis-à-vis EU

Conclusions: Europe could do much better but we won't!

- The role of a „vigorous supporter“ of engagement
 - Build upon and extend the EU's economic/humanitarian stabilization of NK
 - Address question of fate of KEDO nuclear equipment in Kumho – facilitate transfer of „peaceful energy“ supply (wind energy)
 - Ensure bilaterally a missile test (and export) moratorium for 2004 – create local/subregional regional power grid refurbishment projects
 - Lay groundwork for legalization of UN-based interdiction efforts against specified WMD exports – engage the PRC

The role of an „initiator and facilitator“ of engagement

1. Build upon and extend the EU's economic/humanitarian stabilization of NK
2. Initiate a process of deepening and widening the KEDO process
 1. Modernize DPRK power grid; reinvigorate DPRK energy market (Russia)
 2. Facilitate a temporary transfer of (ROK) electricity to DPRK
 3. Establish URENCO-System for one LWR in Kumho
3. Accept a big role in the implementation and verification process of a „bold nuclear swap agreement“ (Ukraine-model) in the future
 1. Establish a substantial UN/IAEA Implementation task force with EU participation (PRC/US leadership)
 2. Initiate a „Consortium for DPRK MTCR-Compliance“ (EU/Japan Leadership)
 3. Propose a EU „Substitution Force“ in exchange for USFK contingent (US leadership)