Die Belt-and-Road-Initiative der Volksrepublik China: auf den Spuren des steinigen Weges einer aufstrebenden Macht

Vortrag & Diskussion

Hochschule Ostfalia, Wolfenbüttel

Das Argument

1. Chinas BR-Initiative für drei neue Seidenstraßen (zu Land & zu Wasser & Digital) wird oft als Teil eines langfristigen Plans zur Etablierung einer globalen Hegemonie interpretiert.
2. Diese Interpretation ist empirisch und theoretisch nicht überzeugend:
    1. Theoretisch: VRC macht sich abhängiger von lokalen Entwicklungen; die Infrastruktur-maßnahmen sind eher ungeeignet für politische Hegemonie.
    2. Empirisch: Belt & Road-Initiative fördert viele verlustreiche Projekte; zahlreiche BRI-Projekte erzeugen lokale Gegenwehr; BRI-Projekte sind nicht unumstritten.
3. Europäische Reaktion ist deutlich skeptischer geworden: einzelne Projekte sind erfolgreich (Hafen von Piräus), aber Interesse in Mittel- und Osteuropa an BRI hat erkennbar nachgelassen.
4. Das chinesische Einflusspotential in der EU/Europas u.a. Regionen ist aufgrund des schwelenden Hegemonialkonflikts mit den USA begrenzt. Eine prinzipientreue, aber gelassene Politik ggü. China ist daher die beste Gewähr für die Zukunft.

BRI: Kritische Stimmen aus USA / VK





BRI: Kritische Stimmen aus Süd- und Südostasien





Die Belt-and-Road-Iniative: Struktur, Akteure & Motivationen

Schritt 1

BRI: ein globales Infrastrukturnetzwerk, 2013-2020



Seidenstraßeninitiative: Belt & Road-Initiative (2013-2021)

Charakteristika

- BRI umfasst mittlerweile mehr als 100 Staaten in Asien, Mittleren Osten, Afrika, Lateinamerika und Europa.
- Sie erfasst damit über 70% der globalen Bevölkerung und ca. 55 % des globalen BIP.
- BRI ist konzipiert, um durch den Aufbau von Infrastruktur (Schienen, Häfen, Flughäfen, Breitbandkabeln etc.) den Handel und Kommunikation Chinas mit Partnern zu stärken und mittels Finanz- und Handelsabkommen, die Stellung der VR als zentraler Handels-, Investitions und Währungsakteur auszubauen.
- Ca. 1.000-2.000 Projekte werden dazu gezählt.
- VR hat ca. 40 Mrd US$ in BRI-Fond und etw.100 Mrd. durch Entwicklungsbanken eingestellt.
- Die BRI ergänzt Internet Plus and China 2025 Initiative im 13. Fünf-Jahresplan (2016-2020)

BRI: die chinesische Debatte

- Xue Li, Head Dept. of Int. Strategy, Inst. World Economics/Politics, CASS: “If you put it everywhere, it becomes nothing.”
- Prof. Shi Yinhong, Renmin University: “The state of affairs can be described as ‘China: unilateral fervour; others: little, if any, enthusiasm.’”
- Prof. Zhang Junhua, Shanghai Jiaotong Univ.: “China’s neomercantilism lacks sensitivity when addressing some issues in host countries, particularly regarding culture, environment and ethnicity. Beijing’s authoritarian approach may also impede effective cooperation with democratic countries”
- Qiu Lin, media celebrity: „Why waste money abroad?“…‘If our government has surplus funds, why not implement a Marshall Plan in underdeveloped regions within China, the western and other interior provinces (2009).

Anzahl & Volumen von chines. Projekten im Rahmen der BRI, 2013-2020



Quelle: CRS 2021

BRI verlangt stabile Staaten: Chinas internationale Meditation



Source: https://www.merics.org/en/china-mapping/china-conflict-mediator

Der China-Pakistan Wirtschaftskorridor (CPEC): das Flagschiff-Projekt (in Schwierigkeiten)

- CPEC hat sich von einem Transportkorridor in 2013 (10-20 Bio US$) zur einer umfassenden Entwicklungsinitiative in 2017 mit dem Fokus auf Energie (62 Mrd. US$, oder 90% des Gesamtvolumen verbreitert.
- Motivation der VR Regierung:
  1. Wirtschaftliche Entwicklung um Krisenregion von Xinjiang zu stabilisieren (Anti-Terrorismus)
  2. Stabilisierung des militärischen verbündeten Pakistan als Gegengewicht zur strategischem rivalen Indien in Südasien.
  3. Nutzung von Pakistans intransparenten öffentl. Ausschriebungsweisen zur Vorteilsnahme durch chines. Unternehmen.



Quelle: https://merics.org/de/analyse/die-bri-pakistan-chinas-vorzeigeprojekt

Die chinesische BRI & internationale Reaktionen

Schritt 2

Erklärung für unintendierte Effekte der Seidenstrasseninitiave



1. Interne Erwartungslücke: Konflikt zwischen innerstaatl. Inter.

2. Externe Erwartungslücke: Konflikt mit Erwartungen der BRI-Partner

3. Internat. Erwartungslücke: Konflikt mit weiteren externen Partnern

BRI ist in den ersten 5 Jahren von innerstaatlichen Interessengruppen (lokale Regierungen, staatl. Unternehmen mit Überkapazitäten und BRI-Beratungsinduistrie) dominiert worden



Ergebnis: Innerstaatl. Entwicklungsbanken, lok. Reg., Staatsunternehmen mit Überkapazitäten sowie Beratungsunternehmen fördern Hochrisiko-Investitionsprojekte

Mark Akpaninyie: China's 'Debt Diplomacy' Is a Misnomer. Call It 'Crony Diplomacy.', March 12, 2019, the Diplomat

Little evidence actually suggests that Beijing coordinates a unified strategy to lure the developing world into unsustainable debt.

Instead of a state-led strategy, Chinese firms — motivated by profit and abetted by a toxic combination of bureaucratic disorganization, incompetence, and negligence at the state level — have exploited poor nations, which are dependent on cheap, and sometimes bad, loans. These companies, knowingly or unknowingly, persuade countries to pursue projects where benefits to the firms far outpace the benefits of the host nation. …

This practice does not trap recipient countries into taking on unsustainable debt. Instead, it allows Chinese companies to profit from often crooked deals building much-needed infrastructure in some of the world's poorest countries, exploiting the undersupply of financing and these countries' appetite for infrastructure projects.

Chinesische Investitionsflüsse nach Mittel-Osteuropa haben die Erwartungen der dortigen Regierungen enttäuscht

- Finanzielle Erwartungen in MOE sind nur teilw. Erfüllt worden (75% des BRI-Investments in vier Kernstaaten: VK, IT, F, Dtld).
- MOE-Staaten haben deshalb Erwartungen auf Mittelfristigen Finanz- u. Budgetrahmen der EU gerichtet (2021-2027).
- Einige BRI Projekte, insbes. in Ungarn/Serbien stehen unter Korruptionsverdacht
- US-China Handels- und %G-Kontroverse wirkt auf BRI-Politiken der MOE-Staaten



Quelle: Mercator Institute for China Studies 2019: 11

Chinas Public Diplomacy-Anstrengungen in der Tschechischen Republik I

type of relation	"carrots"	"sticks"
Government-to-government	Xi Jinping's visit to Prague (2016), Strategic Partnership (2016), Prague-Beijing sister-city agreement (2019), expectation of investment	protests agains the reception of the Dalai Lama by members of the Czech government (2016), protests against renunciation of Prague-Beijing sister-city agreement (2019)
Diplomat-to-diplomat	cultivation of ties (extra meetings within 16+1 format)	freezing of communication following handling of Huawai's case (2018/2019)
People-to-people	establishment of Confucius Institutes, media content cooperation (outlet acquisition, cooperation in supplements), sponsoring Chinese New Year celebrations, international broadcast	denial of panda
Government-to-people	increase in government scholarships	diaspora "abuse" during Xi's visit (2016)

Source: Karaskova 2019

Chinas Public Diplomacy-Anstrengungen in der Tschechischen Republik II: öffentl. Wahrnehmungen & öffentl. Meinung





Chinas Public Diplomacy-Anstrengungen in der Tschechischen Republik III: öffentl. Wahrnehmungen & öffentl. Meinung

1. Czech public opinion has remained predominantly sceptical towards China for the past 15 years
2. China‘s favorability rating hovers around 33%, despite considerable financial investment and media attention.
3. China‘s BRI engagement is popular with President Zeman, but reservation persist with PM Babis and electorate



China Favorability Largely Unchanged from 2007

	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	07–13 Change
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	
U.S.	42	39	50	49	51	40	37	–5
Canada	52	--	53	--	--	--	43	–9
Spain	39	31	40	47	55	49	48	+9
Poland	39	33	43	46	51	50	43	+4
Russia	60	60	58	60	63	62	62	+2
Italy	27	--	--	--	--	30	28	+1
Britain	49	47	52	46	59	49	48	–1
Czech Rep.	35	--	--	--	--	33	34	–1
France	47	28	41	41	51	40	42	–5
Germany	34	26	29	30	34	29	28	–6
Greece	--	--	--	--	--	56	59	--
Lebanon	46	50	53	56	59	59	56	+10
Turkey	25	24	16	20	18	22	27	+2
Palest. ter.	46	--	43	--	62	--	47	+1
Jordan	46	44	50	53	44	47	40	–6
Israel	45	--	56	--	49	--	38	–7
Egypt	65	59	52	52	57	52	45	–20
Tunisia	--	--	--	--	--	69	63	--
Indonesia	65	58	59	58	67	--	70	+5
Pakistan	79	76	84	85	82	85	81	+2
Malaysia	83	--	--	--	--	--	81	–2
S. Korea	52	48	41	38	--	--	46	–6
Japan	29	14	26	26	34	15	5	–24
Australia	--	52	--	--	--	--	58	--
Philippines	--	--	--	--	--	--	48	--
Argentina	32	34	42	45	--	--	54	+22
Mexico	43	38	39	39	39	40	45	+2
Chile	62	--	--	--	--	--	62	0
Venezuela	--	--	--	--	--	--	71	--
Brazil	--	--	--	52	49	50	65	--
Bolivia	--	--	--	--	--	--	58	--
El Salvador	--	--	--	--	--	--	52	--
Uganda	45	--	--	--	--	--	59	+14
Kenya	81	--	73	86	71	--	78	–3
Ghana	75	--	--	--	--	--	67	–8
Senegal	--	--	--	--	--	--	77	--
Nigeria	--	--	--	76	--	--	76	--
S. Africa	--	37	--	--	--	--	48	--

PEW RESEARCH CENTER Q9c.

Source: Eurobraometer 2018: 79

Source: Pew Research 2013

Reaktionen der EU & Mitgliedstaaten: zunehmende Skepsis ggü. BRI

- August 2017: AM Gabriel: „sondern wir müssen natürlich auch von China verlangen, dass sie bitte eine-Ein-Europa-Politik betreiben und uns nicht veruschen zu spalten (2017).
- Juli 2018: Gem. Brief von 27 Eu-Botschaftern übt Kritik an BRI
- September 2018: Europäische Kommission lanciert eigene Infrastruktur-Initiative für Zentralasien „ Connecting Asia and Europe“
- April 2018: EU-Kommission veröffentlicht „EU-China Strategic Outlook“ indem VR China auch als „systemischer Rivale“ bezeichnet wird.
- November 2019:
  - EU-Kom-Präsid von der Leyen: „Europa muss die Sprache der Macht lernen“ (auch ggü. China
  - Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer: „Man darf gegenüber China nicht naiv sein“

(…) China is, simultaneously, in different policy areas, a cooperation partner with whom the EU has closely aligned objectives, a negotiating partner with whom the EU needs to find a balance of interests, an economic competitor in the pursuit of technological leadership, and a systemic rival promoting alternative models of governance. This requires a flexible and pragmatic whole-of-EU approach enabling a principled defence of interests and values. The tools and modalities of EU engagement with China should also be differentiated depending on the issues and policies at stake. The EU should use linkages across different policy areas and sectors in order to exert more leverage in pursuit of its objectives.

Chinas internationales Image verändert sich (im Westen)

Increasingly negative evaluations of China

*% who have an **unfavorable** view of China*

Most unfavorable Least unfavorable

	'02	'05	'06	'07	'08	'09	'10	'11	'12	'13	'14	'15	'16	'17	'18	'19	Spring '20	Summer '20	'19-'20 change
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	
Australia	-	-	-	-	40	-	-	-	-	35	-	33	39	**32**	47	57	-	81	▲**24**
UK	-	16	**14**	27	36	29	35	26	35	31	38	37	44	37	35	55	-	74	▲**19**
Sweden	-	-	-	**40**	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	59	49	52	70	-	85	▲**15**
Netherlands	-	**34**	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	43	42	45	58	-	73	▲**15**
Germany	-	37	**33**	54	68	63	61	59	67	64	64	60	60	53	54	56	-	71	▲**15**
U.S.	-	35	**29**	39	42	38	36	36	40	52	55	54	55	47	47	60	66	73	▲**13**
South Korea	**31**	-	-	42	49	54	56	-	-	50	42	37	-	61	60	63	-	75	▲**12**
Spain	-	**21**	38	43	56	41	38	39	46	47	55	50	56	43	48	53	-	63	▲**10**
France	-	42	**41**	51	**72**	60	59	49	60	58	53	49	61	52	54	62	-	70	▲**8**
Canada	-	**27**	-	37	-	36	-	-	-	45	-	48	40	40	45	67	-	73	▲**6**
Italy	-	-	-	61	-	-	-	-	64	62	**70**	**57**	61	59	60	**57**	-	62	+5
Japan	**42**	-	71	67	84	69	69	61	84	**93**	91	89	86	83	78	85	-	86	+1
Belgium	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	71	-
Denmark	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	75	-

Note: Statistically significant differences shown in **bold**. In Italy, 2020 survey was conducted by telephone; prior surveys were conducted face-to-face.
Source: Summer 2020 Global Attitudes Survey. Q8b.
"Unfavorable Views of China Reach Historic Highs in Many Countries"

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Few trust Xi's actions in global arena

% who have ___ in Chinese President Xi Jinping to do the right thing regarding world affairs



Note: Those who did not answer are not shown.
Source: Summer 2020 Global Attitudes survey. Q15b.
"Unfavorable Views of China Reach Historic Highs in Many Countries"

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Quelle: Silver et al. 2020

Fazit & Ausblick

1. Die chinesische Seidenstraßeninitiative sollte aufmerksam aber mit Sachverstand und Augenmaß beobachtet werden.
    1. Es ist nicht hilfreich für die Politik, wenn Wissenschaft (mglw. aus Eigeninteresse) alarmistische Analysen vorlegt, weil Politik immer die Abwägung unterschiedlicher Risiken beinhalten muss.
    2. Es ist nicht hilfreich für die Wissenschaft, wenn alarmistische Analysen (langfristig) ihre Glaubwürdigkeit/Reputation untergraben.
2. Die europäischen Reaktionen waren bislang insofern angemessen, als dass sie kooperative (zB Zusammenarbeit in der Asiatischen Investitionsinvestmentbank, AIIB) mit kompetitiven Elementen (eigene Infrastrukturinitiative für Asien) verbindet.
3. Weder die EU noch andere BRI-Kooperationsstaaten können ein Interesse daran haben, dass die strukturellen Defizite der chinesischen Wirtschaft & Politik (Oligopole, Korruption, mangelnde Umwelt-, Rechts-, und Sozialstandards) durch die BRI zur Basis für internationalen Handel- und Investitionen gemacht werden.
4. Die VR China bleibt also eine „systemische Herausforderung“. Sie ist aber kein machtpolitischer Gegner und sollte auch nicht durch alarmistische Analysen dazu gemacht werden.

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BRI & Europa

Quelle: https://www.handelsblatt.com/today/politics/china-first-eu-ambassadors-band-together-against-silk-road/23581860.html?ticket=ST-12120990-Tgop7gIBSAerhanvfjVf-ap2

EU countries that have endorsed China's Belt and Road Initiative
Signers*
Non-signers
SWEDEN
FINLAND
ESTONIA
LATVIA
LITHUANIA
DENMARK
NETHERLANDS
IRELAND
UK
GERMANY
POLAND
CZECH REPUBLIC
SLOVAKIA
BELGIUM
LUXEMBOURG
AUSTRIA
HUNGARY
FRANCE
ITALY
ROMANIA
SLOVENIA
CROATIA
BULGARIA
PORTUGAL
SPAIN
GREECE
MALTA
CYPRUS
* Have signed a formal memorandum of understanding with China endorsing the Belt and Road Initiative
Source: FT research
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
The Belt and Road Initiative creates a global infrastructure network
China uses, acquires and builds railroads, ports and pipelines
Existing
Planned / under construction
Railroads
Oil pipeline
Gas pipeline
Port
Silk Road Economic Belt
Maritime Silk Road
Economic Corridor
AIIB member states
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
Building the Digital Silk Road
China is setting up a global network
planned/under construction
completed
INVESTMENT ACTIVITY BY CHINESE TECH GIANTS
NETWORK EQUIPMENT DEALS
SMART PROJECTS IMPLEMENTED BY CHINESE COMPANIES
CHINESE RESEARCH AND DATA CENTRES
FIBRE OPTIC CABLES (COMPLETED)
FIBRE OPTIC CABLES (PLANNED/UNDER CONSTRUCTION)
BRI MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING SIGNED (ACCORDING TO OFFICIAL CHINESE DATA)
Selected projects from MERICS database. Criteria: financial volume, assessment of political and economic impact, representation of larger body of data and variety of project categories
100 million USD
Uzmobile-Huawei equipment deal supported by Chinese Development Bank loan (Uzbekistan)
DIGITAL ECONOMY COOPERATION INITIATIVE (EST. 2017)
China
Laos
Thailand
United Arab Emirates (UAE)
Saudi Arabia
Turkey
Egypt
Serbia
4000 km
National fibre optic backbone project (Guinea)
4 billion USD
Acquisition by Alibaba Group of e-commerce company Lazada (Singapore/Southeast Asia)
National ICT Development
Huawei data centre, e-governance platform, ICT training (Zambia)
China-Pakistan Fibre Optic project
Pakistan-East Africa Connecting Europe (PEACE) system
South Atlantic Inter Link (SAIL) cable system
Guinea's national fibre optic backbone project
Kumul Submarine Domestic Fiber Cable
Moscow
London
Duisburg
Valenciennes
Tashkent
Lahore
New Delhi
Bangkok
Kuala Lumpur
Singapore
Seychelles
Cap Verde
Bamako
Abuja
Caracas
Lusaka
Sydney
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Mercator Institute for China Studies
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Grundsatzrede von Kramp-Karr
MERICS_Silkroad-Energy_2019_final
Merics_Digital-Silkroad-Tracker_RGI
Online Check-in
Neuer Tab
https://www.merics.org/sites/default/files/2019-06/MERICS_Silkroad-Energy_2019_final.jpg
Suchen
Powering the Belt and Road Initiative
China builds and invests in power plants and grid infrastructure worldwide
planned/under construction
completed
no. of projects: >1
Project value: > 100 million USD
FOSSIL-FUEL POWER PLANTS*
*at least: 350 MW
RENEWABLE ENERGY POWER PLANTS**
**at least: 200 MW
NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS
GRID EXTENSION/ DISTRIBUTION NETWORK EXPANSION
TRANSMISSION LINE (PLANNED/UNDER CONSTRUCTION)
TRANSMISSION LINE (COMPLETED)
INVESTMENT IN GRID OPERATORS (COMPLETED)
SILK ROAD ECONOMIC BELT
ECONOMIC CORRIDOR
MARITIME SILKROAD
CHINA'S ENERGY FLAGSHIP PROJECTS
2 billion USD
Pacific Hydro (Australia)
Renewable energy (completed)
1.8 billion USD
Patuakhali Power Plant (Bangladesh)
Fossil fuel (planned)
1 billion USD
Addis Ababa-Grand Renaissance Dam (Ethiopia)
Transmission line (completed)
760 million USD
EETC Transmission Network (Egypt)
Grid expansion (under construction)
360 million USD
ADMIE (Greece)
Grid investment (completed)
PAKISTAN
FLAGSHIP PROJECTS IN PAKISTAN
2 billion USD
Port Qasim Coal Power Plant
Fossil fuel (completed)
1.4 billion USD
Karot Hydro Power Plant
Renewable energy (under construction)
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Reshaping Pakistan with Chinese investments
Projects within the framework of Belt and Road and the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor
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Localization of projects
planned / under construction
completed
Nuclear power plant
Fossil fuel power plant
Renewable energy power plant
Airport
Port
Urban public transport
Course of projects
planned / under construction
completed
Highway (previously existing)
Highway
Transmission line
Oil pipeline
Fiber optic cable
Railroad
Kashgar
TAJIKISTAN
Khunjerab
CHINA
Line of control
Peshawar
Islamabad
Rawalpindi
AFGHANISTAN
INDIA
Faisalabad
Lahore
Multan
Quetta
Nok Kundi
PAKISTAN
IRAN
Karachi / Matiari-Punjab transmission lines
Panjgur
Thar Power Plants
(6 projects: all planned)
Hyderabad
Gwadar
Karachi
Jhimpir Wind Power Projects
(5 projects: 2 completed, 3 planned)
Sea of Oman
Source: MERICS Research; cpec.gov.pk

The ancient Silk Road, 13-14th century

BRI: The Response of the European Union

- EU-Response evolves in two phases:
  - 2013-2017: Cautious optimism, broad and diverse national responses, ranging from 16+1 format to participation in Asian Infrasturcture Investment Bank (AIIB) to moderate critique
  - 2018-??: open scepticism and autonomous inffrastructure initiative:
    - August 2017: German Foreign Minister Gabriel calls for „One Europe Policy“ of PR China
    - July 2018: 27 EU MS Ambassadors to China criticize BRI
    - Sept. 19, 2018: Connecting Asia and Europe (EU-HR Mogherini)
- EU institutions and supermajority of EU member states (exception Hungary) insist that BRI must respect, global investment rules on environment, working conditions (World Bank, OECD) and EU rules on public procurement.
- Outlook: ASEM-Summit Meeting October 18-19, 2018 EU will outline its own Initiative: focussing on sustainability, investment need to respect labour rights, not create political or financial dependencies, and guarantee a level playing field for businesses.

EU Joint Research Institute weighs EU-China power grid link



Source: https://www.euractiv.com/section/eu-china/news/eu-looks-into-benefits-of-energy-silk-road-to-china/

CEEC Country expectations towards the BRI

- **Hungarian Prime Minister Victor Orban** pursues an Eastern Opening policy: “We are sailing under a Western flag, though an Eastern wind is blowing in the world economy.”
- **Czech Prime Minister Bohuslav Sobotka** supports the idea of the Czech Republic becoming a transport node between Europe and China (2016).
- **Poland’s Prime Minister Beata Szydlo: “**the Belt and Road Initiative is of key importance to not only Poland's, but also the world's balanced and sustainable development.”
- **Serbian Prime Minister Vucic**: "From the very beginning, we considered BRI as an initiative for promoting peace," "We saw great benefits in cooperation with China, and we hope that China can see its own interests in the cooperation with Serbia,"

China and CEE Countries: the 16+1 process

- **16+1 process emerged before BRI**: 2012 Warsaw Summit (Leader's Meeting) + Warsaw Initiative (12 Measures for enhancing cooperation between China and CEEC)
- It is organized around annual summit meetings: 2013 Bucarest, 2014 Belgrade, 2015 Suzhou, 2016 Riga, 2017 Sofia, 2018 Budapest and nat. coordinators meet twice a year.
- It has generated quite a few, if moderate, institutional structures:
  1. China-CEEC Association of Tourism Promotion Institutions and Travel Agencies (Hungary)
  2. Secretariat of China-CEEC Contact Mechanism for Investment Promotion Agencies (Poland and China)
  3. China-CEEC Joint Chamber of Commerce (Poland and China)
  4. China-CEEC Federation of Agricultural Cooperation (Bulgaria)
  5. China-CEEC Federation of Heads of Local Governments (Czech Republic)
  6. China-CEEC Federation of Logistics Cooperation (Latvia)
  7. China-CEEC Federation of Transport and Infrastructure Cooperation (Serbia)

China‘s OFDI outflows to CEE Countries, 2008-2016

Country /year	Czech Rep.	Hungary	Poland	Bulgaria	Romania	Slovakia	Slovenia	Estonia	Latvia	Lithuania	Croatia	Year Sum
2008	12.79	2.15	10.7	0	11.98	0	0	0	0	0	0	37.62
2009	15.6	8.21	10.37	-2.43	5.29	0.26	0	0	-0.03	0	0.26	37.53
2010	2.11	370.1	16.74	16.29	10.84	0.46	0	0	0	0	0.03	416.57
2011	8.84	11.61	48.66	53.9	0.3	5.94	0	0	0	0	0.05	129.30
2012	18.02	41.4	7.5	54.17	25.41	2.19	0	0	0	1	0.05	149.74
2013	17.84	25.67	18.34	20.69	2.17	0.33	0	0	0	5.51	0	90.55
2014	2.46	34.02	44.17	20.42	43.25	45.66	0	0	0	0	3.55	193.53
2015	-17.41	23.2	25.1	59.16	63.32	0	0	0	0.45	0	0	153.82
2016	1.85	57.46	-24.11	-15.03	15.88	0	21.86	0	0	2.25	0.22	60.38
Country Sum	62.10	573.82	157.47	207.17	178.44	54.84	21.86	0.00	0.42	8.76	4.16	1269.04

Source: the authors, with reference to Ministry of Commerce, National Bureau of Statistics, State Administration of Foreign Exchange PRC. 2016. Statistical Bulletin of China's Outward Foreign Direct Investment, Beijing: China's Statistics Press.

In Mio. US$

China‘s OFDI outflows to CEE Countries, 2008-2016

Country/ Year	Albania	Bosnia & Herc.	Macedonia	Montenegro	Serbia	Year Sum
2008	0	0	0	0	0	0
2009	0	1.51	0	0	0	1.51
2010	0.08	0.06	0	0	2.1	2.24
2011	0	0.04	0	0	0.21	0.25
2012	0	0.06	5.15	0	2.1	7.31
2013	0.56	0	14.94	0	11.5	27
2014	0	0	3.87	0	11.69	15.56
2015	0	1.62	10.72	0	7.63	19.97
2016	0.01	0.85	11.37	0	30.79	43.02
Country sum	0.57	2.57	46.05	0	63.92	113.11

Source: the authors, with reference to Ministry of Commerce, National Bureau of Statistics, State Administration of Foreign Exchange PRC. 2016. Statistical Bulletin of China's Outward Foreign Direct Investment, Beijing: China's Statistics Press.

In Mio. US$

CEEC countries differ in their attitude towards BRI

- Most of the high CEEC economic and political expectations towards BRI have not been met.
- CE EU Member states have moved closer to EU during the starting debate on the EU‘s budget for the period 2020-2027.

The evolving German position towards the BRI, 2013-2018

- **Chancellor A. Merkel 2016:** „Germany has taken positive note of the so called Silk Road projects, which primarily should improve the interconectivity… We believe that we would like to partipate on those projects and hope for a transparent bidding process. Then Germany can play its part in implementing these projects.“

- **German Ambassador to China, Claus (2017):** “I suggest two ways to deal with China’s Silk Road ambitions. One, partner with China to close development gaps, while reinforcing the open, transparent and non-hierarchical world order, as seems to be working with the AIIB. Two, Europe could offer its own concept to act as another friendly pole with the power to attract. Local content – that is, maximum participation by local labor, local companies and local products – could be the signature of connectivity, European-style. Open tenders where the best offer wins, hopefully through a bid from the country where the project is built, would be another. Labour safety, environmental standards and fair and sustainable financing would be a third.“

Chinese Investment in Europe/Germany, 2006-2016
Public attention towards BRI in Germany, 2012-2017

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Germany	13	7	35	45	33	45	46	68	105	74	118
Other Europe	45	44	52	66	82	95	82	85	129	164	179
Europe in total	58	51	87	111	115	140	128	153	234	238	297
German share	22 %	14 %	40 %	41 %	29 %	32 %	36 %	44 %	45 %	31 %	40 %



German response to the BRI: findings

- German government welcomes the economic and development related aspects of BRI and has thus participated as the largest non-Asian member in the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB).
- The German response has hardened considerably over time: a) extent and sensitivity of Chinese high-tech investment (KUKA, Leifeld); b) 16+1 and China‘s political influence campaign; c) the questionable sustainability of projects in various Asian states (Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Malaysia, Myanmar) and the prospect of debt default.
- The German government has pushed hard for a common European approach, resulting in common Ambassadorial positioning and Initiative by EU HR Mogherini (Sept. 19, 2018)

Chinas Engagement in Myanmar: erhebliche Widerstände

Year	Event
2011	President Thein Sein takes office in March, having won the 2010 election, the first in 20 years. He invites EAOs to peace talks along with making concessions on democracy, freeing political detainees, and relaxation of media censorship.
2015	In October,Thein Sein's government signs the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement with eight EAOs. In the November election, the National League for Democracy wins 80% of contested seats.
2016	Aung San Suu Kyi takes charge as "State Counsellor" and de facto head of state.
2017	In August, Myanmar's army begins an ethnic cleansing campaign against Rohingya Muslims, sending thousands fleeing into Bangladesh. Aung San Suu Kyi's defense of the military's actions brings widespread condemnation by Western states.
2018	Myanmar and China sign a memorandum of understanding (MoU) to jointly pursue the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) within the framework of BRI.
2020	The National League for Democracy wins a landslide victory in the November elections.
2021	Citing unsubstantiated claims of electoral fraud, Myanmar's military seizes power on February 1st, detaining Aung San Suu Kyi and President Win Myint. The coup ignites widespread protests across the country.