International leadership as a role theoretical concept

Role Theory Workshop,
Tuesday 20th November 2012, Institute of International Relations, Prague
Outline

1. The research question
2. The research narrative
3. International leadership as a social role
4. Measuring international leadership indicators: the case of Germany
5. Internal expectations: representation and effectiveness
6. External expectations: representation and effectiveness
7. Conclusion and outlook
The research question

What is international leadership and how can we conceptualize it from a role theoretical perspective?
The research narrative

1. International leadership refers to a „social relationship“ which constitutes „leaders“ and followers“ with respect to a common goal by a group of states.

2. There have been various leadership conceptualizations in the past. A role theoretical conceptualization is a plausible alternative to more actor-centered conceptualizations.

3. To examine leadership performance, I propose an input (representation) and output (effectiveness in achieving group goal) scheme.

4. When analyzing German foreign policies trajectory under the merkel government, I find that there is no clear-cut pattern of leadership avoidance/ malperformance for German foreign policy, but a complex mix of both internal and external factors resulting in „leadership reticence“.
International leadership as a social role
International Roles: definition and explanation

- In role theory, roles are typically recognized as social positions which are constituted by ego and alter expectations regarding the purpose of an actor in an organized group (cf. Thies 2010: 3-4; Andrews 1975: 529).

The position’s function in the group is limited in time and scope and it is dependent on the group’s structure and purpose. Whereas some roles are constitutive to the group as such, e.g. a recognized member of the international community, other roles or role sets are functionally specific, e.g. balancer, initiator etc.
“Roles” in International Relations literature

Social environment

Role expectation (alter part)

Role expectation (ego part)

Role bearer
Individual

Culture
Societal norms

Socialization

Internalization

Identity
Individual values

Role behavior
International Leadership: definition and explanation

• International leadership may be defined as a social role consisting of expectations of a group of states towards one or more group members to enhance the group’s goals by means at the leaders disposal and compliance by following states. This regularly includes the partial transfer of national policy competences and power resources to the group leader (Harnisch 2013).

Leadership thus requires both hard and soft power, that is leadership through representing the interests of the group (input legitimacy of leadership) and effectively achieving the goals of the group (output legitimacy).

To pursue leadership functions, the role holder needs social capital among which trust is the most important one.
Trust as an essential ressource of international leadership

- Trust is the belief that one will not be harmed when his or her fate is placed in the hands others (Hardin 2006: 29).

1. Trust always entails a combination of uncertainty and vulnerability as the trusting partner is exposed to potential opportunism.
2. Nicolas Luhman: „trust is paid … as an advance on success“.
3. Ostrom/Walker: trust is not altruism but rather the expectation of reciprocity“.
4. Trust may be strategic/limited – both in scope and time – and generalized – diffuse reciprocity in kind and time.
Measuring international leadership: the case of Germany
# Measuring International leadership

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Composition of leadership / Scope of constituency</th>
<th>Singular</th>
<th>Collective</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coalitional</td>
<td>Coalition of the willing</td>
<td>EU3+3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Inclusive</td>
<td>Germany in the Euro Crisis</td>
<td>EU/German leadership in UNFCC</td>
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Measuring International leadership: the input and output dimension

Role expectation (alter part)

Role expectation (ego part)

How representative?

Role bearer
Individual

Culture
Societal norms

Socialization

Internalization

Identity
Individual values

How effective?

Role behavior

How effective?
Internal expectations: representation and effectiveness

Cases: Afghanistan and the ESM
Three Phases of Bundeswehr Deployment Abroad

- 1990: Humanitarian D.
- 1995: Peacekeeping D.
- 2000: Peace Enforcement D. /Air
- 2005: Peace Enforcement D. Ground forces

- FCC ruling: 12.07.1994
- AFG-OEF Mandate: 18.11.2001

- Societal debate
- Parliamentary debate
- Parliamentary co-decision
Intensification of German Military Deployment in Afghanistan 2011-2012
German Parliament: ISAF-Mandate Voting Pattern

Abb. 1: Abstimmungsergebnisse für die ISAF-Mandatierung im Bundestag. (Quelle: Eigene Darstellung)

Harnisch 2012: 233
Majority of Germans consider AFG-deployment a mistake, FAZ, 26.05.2010
Article 23 [Structural Safeguarding Clauses]

(1) With a view to establishing a united Europe, the Federal Republic of Germany shall participate in the development of the European Union that is committed to democratic, social and federal principles, to the rule of law, and to the principle of subsidiarity, and that guarantees a level of protection of basic rights essentially comparable to that afforded by this Basic Law.
The FCC’s Maastricht Judgement: Safeguarding Germany’s domestic order

1. Only an existing demos can create a state. Since there is no European demos (a European Volk) there can be no European state in the foreseeable future.

2. To ensure legitimacy of a „confederation of states“ (Staatenverbund) three conditions have to be met:
   1. Procedural transparency
   2. An adequate determinability of the scheme of integration
   3. Obligations and competences of substantial importance remain with the Bundestag.
# Summary of FCC Rulings on EC/EU

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Solange I</th>
<th>Solange II</th>
<th>Maastricht</th>
<th>Lisbon</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Concept of Democracy</strong></td>
<td>Open (individualistic)</td>
<td>Open (Individualistic)</td>
<td>Closed (Statist)</td>
<td>Mixed (Individualistic/Statist)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Core Elements</strong></td>
<td>Fundamental Rights / Democratic process</td>
<td>Fundamental Rights / Democratic process</td>
<td>Fundamental rights / Art. 79, 3</td>
<td>Fundamental rights / Art. 79, 3: right to vote, sovereign statehood, constitutional identity + 5 policy fields</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cooperation with ECJ</strong></td>
<td>Division of labor (active)</td>
<td>Division of labor (passive)</td>
<td>Declared Cooperation</td>
<td>No reference to Judicial cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Coalition of Nat. Constit. Courts</strong></td>
<td>No clear reference</td>
<td>No clear reference</td>
<td>No clear reference</td>
<td>Reference to Czech Const. Court</td>
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02.05.2015  
#20
1. Art. 38 GG (electoral right) prevents citizens from loss of substantial decision of the Bundestag due to sovereign rights transfer to supranational bodies (BVerfGE 89, 155 <172>; 123, 267 <330>). Safeguarding dimension of Art 38, para. 1 GG will be invoked if the competences of the Bundestag are exhausted to an extent that it does not represent the free will of the electorate anymore.

2. a) The decision on the budget of the public purse is fundamental part of democratic self-determination and government (vgl. BVerfGE 123, 267 <359>). The Bundestag has to decide on all expenses and income. The budget competences is fundamental part of the BT competences (vgl. BVerfGE 70, 324 <355 f.>; 79, 311 <329>).

   b) As representatives of the people the parliamentarians must hold fast to the control of the budgetary process.

3. a) The Bundestag must not transfer its budgetary competences onto other actors by way of vague empowerment. In particular, it must not engage in any scheme which may involve unforeseeable costs without its prior constitutive consent.

   b) No permanent international legal mechanisms must be established, which may involve any liability for free policy decisions by other member states, especially if they involve highly risky follow on effects. Any substantial international or EU-based aid measure must be appropriated by the Bundestag.

   c) Moreover, it has to be clear that parliament has substantial influence of the ways and means of providing the aid.
FCC ruling on ESM: Spectrum of choices

- Stabilization of int. Financial markets
- Stabilization of int. Financial markets
- High volatility of int. Financial markets
- Shock & awe of int. Financial markets

No monita  Conditional support  Explicit withdrawal clause  Explicit withdrawal clause
Preliminary FCC decision of September 12, 2012

- German President is now allowed to sign three bills into law
  1. law to transfer European Stability Mechanism (ESM) into German law
  2. law to transfer international treaty on Fiscal Pact into German law
  3. law to change the EU treaties in Art. 136 to allow Eurozone member states to safeguard the Euro better.

- The Court set several conditions for the Executive branch for the participation in ESM/FP from mid-2012 on:
  1. FRG-Gov. has to make sure that German 190 Bio Euro liability ceiling may not be changed without previous consent of the German member on the ESM board/constitutive parliamentary decision.
  2. FRG-Gov has to assure treaty interpretation does allow for full information of German Parliament and federal Chamber despite obvious confidentiality constraints.
Art. 136 AEUV (new)

- Those member states, which have the Euro as their currency, may establish a stability mechanism, which is activated, if essential for the stabilization of the whole Euro-Zone area. The provision of the necessary financial transfers underlies strong conditions.
External expectations: representation and effectiveness
External expectations in the Euro debt crisis: Whose expectations matter?

- The problem countries: Greece, Spain, Italy, France („FIGS“, not „PIIGS“)
- Characteristics:
  - Heavily indebted
  - Loss of international competitiveness, due to
  - Structural economic, social and political problems
  - Growth prospects dim
- The demands:
  - External financial support („solidarity“) to subsidize interest rates, reduce debt burden, allow for growth stimulus
  - „Patience“ with efforts to secure structural reforms
  - „Understanding“ for reluctance/difficulties to cede sovereignty
External expectations in the Euro debt crisis: Germany‘s Allies

• The „allies“ of Germany: Finland, Austria, Estonia, Slovakia, Netherlands, Luxemburg

• Characteristics:
  – Reasonably sound public finances
  – Internationally competitive economies

• The demands:
  – No further financial support
  – Conditionality

• Why they do not matter as much:
  – Newcomers, smaller and more periferal countries (except NL)
  – Focus of markets on weak countries; markets dominate
External expectations in the Euro debt crisis: „The markets“

- Who are „the markets“?
  - Long-term investors (Pension Funds)
  - Short-term speculators/profit orientation (Hedge Funds)

- Expectations:
  - Long-term, modest returns (but: risk of debt default!)
  - Abandon risky investment („debt socialisation, speculative investors)
  - Fluctuation of prices

- Power
  - Direct: Market demand and supply
  - Indirect: Political lobbying
German leadership: the issue of trust

• Germany’s (and German governments public standing in other European countries remarkably favourable
  – Germany most admired nation in Europe (except Greece)
  – German Cancellor most admired and respected politician in Europe (except Greece)
  – Germans hardest-working, least corrupt in Europe

• …but how sustainable is that remarkably positive image under pressure?

• Public attitudes towards Europe turn less favourable
  – Majorities in all polled countries except Germany think that European integration has weakened economies

• …and the power of national sovereignty has not yet been tested seriously
Common Foreign and Security Policy

• Effort to develop coherent and consistent common European policies
• Principal components:
  – CFSP
  – Common Security and Defence Policy
  – Enlargement, Neighbourhood, Association policies

• Principal Instruments
  – Common positions
  – Joint actions
  – Common strategies
  – Civil/military missions
Principal institutions

• High Representative
  – VP of European Commission, Commissioner for External Relations, chairs Council of Foreign Ministers
  – represents EU (together with President)
  – Heads External Action Service

• Governments (intergovernmental)
  – Council of Foreign Ministers, Secretariat
  – Political and Security Committee (CoRePer)
  – Military Committee

• European Commission, European Parliament, European Court of Justice (supranational)
Principal activities

• Pacifying the Balkans/enlargement
  – Bosnia-Hercegovina
  – Kosovo
  – Serbia

• Transforming Southern/Eastern Mediterranean
  – Turkey
  – North Africa (Arab Spring)
  – Israeli-Palestinian conflict

• Non-Proliferation (Iran)
  – Russia/Ukraine

• „Strategic partnerships“ with Rising Powers
Conclusion and outlook