
Germany's role in regional and global security governance

Talk prepared for the Workshop “Regional Security Governance and Regional Powers in a Multipolar World: Burden Sharing or Free Riding?”

EUI Florence, September 30-October 1, 2013

Outline of argument

1. Germany has taken on a substantial contributing role to regional and global security governance since unification.
2. Germany's role has shifted from an alter-dominated to a more ego-centered one, limited by institutional and other domestic factors.
3. Recently, Germany has started to explicitly support 'creative powers' in taking up more responsibilities to stabilize the existing international order:
 1. No coherent government strategy is detectable and it is unlikely to occur soon.
 2. Picking responsible 'creative powers' is difficult, as the Saudi and Qatari case attest.


Germany's role profile: prevention + assurance

- Germany has, on average, taken up a 'fair' share of international prevention and assurance measures.
- Its prevention policy profile is substantially no more civilian than that of other major powers.

German Expenditures in Afghanistan in billion €			
	Military	Civilian	Proportion
2002–2007	1.9	0.55	78:22
2002–2010*	4.0	1.1	78:22
2002–2010 including spending through EU/NATO*	4.4	1.4	76:24
2010	1.0	0.43	70:30

Germany's role profile: protection + compellence

1. Still, strong, if weakening, environmental protection profile as well as in anti-terrorism intelligence cooperation.
2. Clear, if ambivalent, attitude towards western capacity to positively engage in state-building activities (Post-Kosovo/Afghanistan fatigue)
3. Bundeswehr transformation to a volunteer force will not increase absolute number of deployable forces (10.000).



(Graphik 1)³⁵

German policy concepts towards regional/emerging/middle powers

Agency/actor	Concept	Countries	Characteristics
German Development Institute (Stamm 2004)	Anchor countries	PR China; Egypt, Argentine, Iran, Brazil, India, Saudi-Arabia, Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria, Russia, Pakistan, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey	Economic importance, leadership potential
German Institute for Global and Area Studies (Nolte 2006)	Regional powers, emerging middle powers		
Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ 2011)	Global Development Partners	Brazil, India, Indonesia, Mexico, South Africa.	state craft, importance for MDG/ GPG production, economic importance, relevance for reg. integration
Federal Government/Federal Foreign Office (Bundesregierung 2012)	Creative powers	Non-partner countries of EU/NATO/G-8	Regional/global economic importance, strong global political vision; regional/global importance for GPG/regional integration
Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology (BMWt 2012)	New Target Markets	BRICS, Columbia, Mexico, Nigeria, Indonesia, Vietnam and Malaysia	Trade Promotion for development and/or energy security
Federal Ministry of Food, Agriculture, and Consumer Protection (BMELV 2013)	Bilateral Cooperation with foreign countries	Brazil, China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkey, Vietnam	Cooperative food security global consumer protection

Conclusion

1. Conceptually, the role theoretical frame and nexus to security governance is arguably too vague and not systematic enough for comparative analysis.
2. Germany's reflexive multilateralism should not be misinterpreted as support for multipolarity.
3. Germany's support for emerging and creative powers has arguably three sources:
 1. Its ideational preference for regional integration.
 2. Its growing trade interests outside the European Union.
 3. Its own weakening strategcraft during the Eurozone crisis, so that the ‚Merkel doctrine‘ can in part be interpreted as a modern revival of the ‚Nixon doctrine‘.

www.harnisch.uni-hd.de

Chancellor Merkel, addressing the Armed Forces Academy for Communication and Information, October 22, 2012

“Those who feel responsible for peacekeeping, but who are not capable of providing active support everywhere, are called upon to support trustful partners who then are enabled to do the job.”

Rede von Bundesaußenminister Guido Westerwelle vor Studierenden der Universität Leiden am 04. Oktober 2011 in Den Haag

- „Wo wir neue strategische Partnerschaften begründen, ist das keine Abkehr von alten Freunden. Das Gegenteil ist der Fall. Wir müssen neue Partnerschaften fest in einen europäischen Rahmen einbetten.
- Das wird uns nur gelingen, wenn wir die strategischen Partnerschaften der Europäischen Union mit handfesten Inhalten füllen. Zusammen mit der Hohen Vertreterin für die Gemeinsame Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik Catherine Ashton müssen wir deshalb einen gemeinsamen Plan ausarbeiten, wie Europa neuen Gestaltungsmächten künftig gegenüberzutreten soll. Wir müssen uns über gemeinsame Ziele und Strategien verständigen, die wir dabei verfolgen. Nur auf diesem Weg werden wir Europa in die Lage versetzen können, weltpolitisch mit einer Stimme zu sprechen.
- Als Stabilitätsunion kann die Europäische Union selbst globale Gestaltungsmacht sein.“