
Twenty Years After Reunification. The Sources of Germany's Foreign Policy Conduct

Lecture at Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh

sponsored by the Center for International Relations and Politics
and the Modern Languages Department

The Argument


1. Different yet converging theoretical approaches can explain changes in German foreign policy.
2. Empirically, the evidence indicates gradual but ongoing changes: fiscal restrictions, a melting cross-partisan consensus and constitutional restraints clearly limit Germany's "reflexive multilateralism".
3. Paradigmatically, Germany's EU policy during the Euro crisis shows waning Berlin's "reflexive civility" and autonomous capacity to shape events.

Outline


1. The Argument
2. Theoretical Explanations
3. Competing Hypotheses
4. Empirical Findings
 1. The 1990s
 2. The Grand Coalition
 3. The CDU/CSU-FDP Coalition
5. Conclusion and Outlook

Theoretical Explanations

Foreign Policy Analysis: Systemic + Subsystemic appr.



“Roles” in Foreign Policy Analysis



“Civilian Power Role”: Ideal Type (MauI)


- 1) Willing and able to civilize international relations as a promoter or initiator of international actions (Leadership)
- 2) Willing to transfer sovereignty or autonomy to supranational institutions as a promoter of collective security and opponent of unilateral action (Monopoly of use of force)
- 3) Eager to realize a civilized international order, even if this implies to forego short-term national interest (community-centered norm implementation)

Three Competing Hypotheses


- **Great Power:**
 1. As it improves its relative power position, unified Germany will seek to maximize its autonomy, preferring uni- and unilateral action.
 2. As it improves its relative power position, unified Germany will seek to maximise its influence in international institutions, preferably those where its power counts most.
- **Trading Power**
 1. Depending on the competitiveness of its export industries, unified Germany will support multilateral institutions which promise sustained absolute commercial gains.
- **Civilian Power**
 1. As it faces increasingly diverging ego- and alter expectations, unified Germany's civilian power role will change, but stay compatible with corresponding roles by significant others.

Empirical Findings: Bundeswehr Deployment in the 1990s


Three Phases of Bundeswehr Deployment Abroad



German Deployment Patterns: Is there a European Bias?




German Parliament: ISAF-Mandate Voting Pattern



Empirical Findings: Germany's Constitutionalization Policy under the Red-Green Coalition

Germany's Constitutionalization Policy for the EU: Initiatives und Policy Outcomes



Article 23 [Structural Safeguarding Clauses]


(1) With a view to establishing a united Europe, the Federal Republic of Germany shall participate in the development of the European Union that is committed to democratic, social and federal principles, to the rule of law, and to the principle of subsidiarity, and that guarantees a level of protection of basic rights **essentially comparable to that afforded by this Basic Law.**

Summary of FCC Rulings on EC/EU

	Solange I	Solange II	Maastricht	Lisbon
Concept of Democracy	Open (individualistic)	Open (Individualistic)	Closed (Statist)	Mixed (Individualistic/ Statist)
Core Elements	Fundamental Rights / Democratic process	Fundamental Rights / Democratic process	Fundamental rights / Art. 79, 3	Fundamental rights / Art. 79, 3: right to vote, sovereign statehood, constitutional identity + 5 policy fields
Cooperation with ECJ	Division of labor (active)	Division of labor (passive)	Declared Cooperation	No reference to Judicial cooperation
Coalition of Nat. Constit. Courts	No clear reference	No clear reference	No clear reference	Reference to Czech Const. Court

The Euro-Zone Crisis: The German Response

- 2002/2003: Schröder Gov. violates SGP
- 01/2010: Rescue Plan for Greece in place
- 03/2010: Greece Gov. reacts with austerity budget
- 04/2010: Debt crisis morphs into banking crisis
- 02.05.2010: Eurozone/IMF decision on bilateral rescue program
- 07.05.2010 NRW election



Source: <http://www.economist.com/node/18285565>

German Position on Eurozone Crisis: Constraints and Achievements

German cabinet minister: “We have to take Karlsruhe’s conditions laid out in its ruling on monetary union extremely seriously. If we cannot convince the judges that the Greek rescue is a last-resort action to safeguard the euro’s stability and EMU’s survival, the complainants will win their case” (Proissl 2010: 28).

1. IMF was made integral part of rescue for Greece and any other following Eurozone member states under stress (FCC condition)
2. Rescue would come at the last possible moment: ultima ratio (FCC condition)
3. Euro Stabilization Fund is an entity separate from EU institutions under Luxembourg law (FCC condition)
4. ESF is limited for three year period (FCC condition)
5. Strong commitments by troubled Euro Zone members on structural reforms .

Conclusion and Outlook

- Sources of German conduct have become domesticized.
- Post-unification policy trajectory changed gradually: domestic restraints challenge foreign expectations.
- Do not expect strong German leadership in 2011!



Source: http://www.economist.com/node/17905825?story_id=17905825