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# Auf gleicher Augenhöhe? Nordkorea und die Anerkennung als Nuklearmacht durch die Großmächte

Vortrag im IPW-Forschungskolloquiums

# Gliederung

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# Das Forschungsnarrativ


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- Die bisherige sozialkonstruktivistische Normenforschung weist große Lücken auf: diese betreffen u.a. die „Umstrittenheit von Normen“ und „oppositionelle Norm-Entrepreneure“.
- Die Ausbreitung westlicher Werte hat die Antagonisierung nicht-demokratischer Regime/Gesellschaften zur Folge. Das Streben dieser Staaten nach Respekt, d.h. die Anerkennung des selbstempfundenen Wertes eines Akteurs durch dessen Umwelt (R. Wolf), verhält sich deshalb kovariant zur Ausbreitung demokratischer Werte („Auf Augenhöhe“).
- Personalisierte Diktaturen sind besonders anfällig ggü. internationalem Respektentzug, weil ihre Herrschaft neben Zwang und Tausch primär auf Charisma basiert.
- Die jüngste nordkoreanische Eskalation wird daher als „Anerkennungskrise“ der Nuklearmacht Nordkorea und des jungen nordkoreanischen Diktators Kim Jong Eun interpretiert.
- Im Rahmen der Krise ‚ermöglicht‘ die Androhung von Zwang (Dislozierung von nuklearwaffenfähigen US-Flugzeugträgern), die Unterbindung von Tausch (Ausweitung des UN-Sanktionsregimes) sowie die mangelnde Anerkennung Nordkoreas als Nuklearmacht die Eskalation der Krise, sie verursacht diese aber nicht.

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# (Theoretische) Vorbemerkungen

# Dilemmata demokratischer Sicherheitspolitik: Anspruchsinflation und Komplexitätszunahme



# Sozialkonstruktivistische Normenforschung und ihre „blind spots“

- 1. Normen, als Standard angemessenen Verhaltens auf der Grundlage gegebener Identitäten, sind effektiv** (Katzenstein et al. 1996; Price 1997; Tannenwald, Sikkink 1993, Klotz 1996, Finnemore 1996; Risse et al. 1999).
- 2. Der Prozess der Normausbreitung (Diffusion) lässt sich kausal- bzw. konstitutionslogisch erfassen** (Risse et al. 1999, Checkel 2001)
- 3. Die Emergenz von (neuen) Normen lässt sich über Prozesse der Sozialisation, des Verhandels, der Imitation, der Diffusion, der Überzeugung, des Lernens u.a.m., erklären bzw. verstehen** (Haas 1992, Nadelmann 1990, Finnemore/Sikkink 1998, Risse 2000).

1. Normen sind grundsätzlich nicht nur umstritten, sondern es kommt zunehmend auch zur Ausbildung von „rivalisierenden Normen“.
2. Die internationale Staatengemeinschaft sieht sich als Normgemeinschaft zu- dem einer wachsenden Zahl „oppositionellen Norm-Entrepreneuren, ‚rogue states/regimes‘, gegenüber, deren Verhalten und Wirkung der Analyse bedarf.

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# Theoretische Ansätze zur Erklärung von Nuklearwaffenproliferation

# Großtheorien und Nuklearproliferation: Hypothesen

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- **Realismus:** Je größer die Machtdifferenz zwischen Staaten, desto wahrscheinlicher strebt der unterlegene Staat nach Nuklearwaffen.
  - a) Je substantieller die materiellen Schwierigkeiten bei der Acquire von Nuklearwaffenmaterial, desto verzögerter ist der Nuklearwaffenerwerb.
  - b) Je geringer die Machtdifferenz zwischen Staaten, desto wahrscheinlicher ist verzögerte Proliferation, weil der unterlegene Staaten deren Kosten und Vorteile abwägt.
- **Liberalismus:** Je größer die innenpolitischen Vorteile einer (Nicht)Bewaffnung, desto wahrscheinlicher ist die Nuklearproliferation.
  - a) Je stärker einflussreiche gesellschaftliche Gruppen an einer N-Bewaffnung zur Sicherung ihrer Position interessiert sind (Militär/Nuklearindustrie), desto wahrscheinlicher ist der Waffenerwerb.
  - b) Je stärker einflussreiche Wirtschaftseliten an einer Einbindung in das liberale Weltwirtschaftssystem interessiert sind, desto wahrscheinlicher ist die Integration in das globale/ein regionales Nonproliferationsregime.
- **Konstruktivismus:** Je stärker die globalen/regionalen Nonproliferationsnormen, desto unwahrscheinlicher ist der Nuklearwaffenerwerb.
  - a) Je stärker eine gesellschaftlich einflussreiche Gruppe Nuklearwaffen aus normativen ablehnt, desto unwahrscheinlicher ist der Waffenerwerb.
  - b) Je stärker nationale Führer ihre Herrschaft über die Opposition gegenüber der Weltgemeinschaft rechtfertigen, desto wahrscheinlicher ist der Waffenerwerb.



## Hypothesengenerierung: Führer-Diktaturen und Proliferationsentscheidungen


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- When it comes to decisions about pursuing nuclear weapons, personalist dictators face many of the same motives as leaders of other regime types, including concerns about territorial integrity, incentives to stoke nationalism, or the desire for greater prestige. In addition to these motives, personalist dictators may find nuclear weapons to be particularly tempting for three reasons.

1. Personalist leaders have especially strong grounds to fear that foreign interference will jeopardize the security of their regime.
2. Expanding the country's conventional military power to combat these threats entails more acute tradeoffs for personalist leaders.
3. The structure of personalist regimes means that these leaders are much less constrained in their ability to pursue their resulting nuclear ambitions.


# Way/Weeks 2012: Empirischer Befund

**Figure 1: Personalist Regimes and Pursuit of Nuclear Weapons**



# Hymans 2008: Oppositioneller Nationalismus und Nuklearwaffenbesitz

1. Oppositional nationalists believe that their nation's core interests and values are naturally in stark opposition to those of its key comparison others; this is the "oppositional" side of their NIC.
  2. They also believe that their nation both can and should hold its head high in its dealings with its key comparison others; this is the "nationalist" side of their NIC.
- Oppositional NICs give rise to the emotion of fear in dealings with key comparison others, and nationalist NICs give rise to the emotion of pride.



Note: KIS = Kim Il Sung; KJI = Kim Jong Il.

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# Die Genese des nordkoreanischen Nuklearwaffenprogramms

# Genese des nordkoreanischen Plutoniumprogramms


## *auslösende Faktoren*

## *Entwicklung*

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1. US-Drohung mit A-Waffen in Koreakrieg; Kubakrise
  2. US-Abzug aus Vietnam; Südkorea erwägt A-Waffen
  3. Wende in sowjetischer Außenpolitik
  4. Ende des OWK: Verlust traditioneller Bündnispartner SU (VR China)
  5. Veränderung der US-Nordkoreapolitik 2002/2003
1. Ab 1965: Kooperation mit SU, Bau eines Forschungsreaktors.
  2. Ab Herbst 1975: Beschleunigung: Bau eines 5 MW-Reaktors
  3. 1985 NVV-Beitritt
  4. 1989-1991: Entnahme von abgebrannten Brennstäben zur Wiederaufbereitung  
=> Sprengkopfproduktion
  5. Wiederaufbereitung „eingefrorener Brennstäbe, Inbetriebnahme PU-Programm

# Genese des nordkoreanischen Nuklear(waffen)programms 1950-2013



# DPRK Declaratory Nuclear Weapons Posture

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## **2002: N-Weapons as a substitute for security guarantee**

- “The settlement of all problems with the DPRK, a small country, should be based on removing any threat to its sovereignty and right to existence. There may be negotiations or the use of deterrent force to be consistent with this basis, but the DPRK wants the former, as far as possible.”

## **2005: N-Weapons as a regional stabilizer**

- “As everyone knows, US attempts at a war of northward aggression have been frustrated, peace and security are ensured on the Korean Peninsula, and the nation's fate is safeguarded thanks to our powerful nuclear deterrent.”

# Vice President Dick Cheney, December 2003

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„I have been charged by the President with making sure that none of the tyrannies in the world are negotiated with. We don't negotiate with evil, we defeat it.“




# DoD News Briefing - Secretary Rumsfeld And Gen. Pace

## Monday, Sept. 16, 2002 - 1 p.m. EDT

- Q: Mr. Secretary, two months ago I asked you if the United States would consider a preemptive strike against North Korea because North Korea was obtaining weapons of mass destruction, and you said at that time, quote: "You gotta be kidding," unquote. In other words, no way. And yet the United States is considering -- underline "considering" -- a preemptive strike against Iraq. **What's the difference? And should we, perhaps, also consider taking action against North Korea and Iran, since they were mentioned in the State of the Union?**
- Rumsfeld: Well, as you know well, the President's remarks to the United Nations and to the country did not address the subject of North Korea or Iran. He did, properly, in my view, characterize those three countries, those two plus Iraq, as the axis of evil. And I think that what's taken place since that speech has been an indication of how useful that speech was because you can clearly see stirrings in various countries, including one or more of those, taking place, and also in some of the other countries in the terrorist list. So it's been -- that speech has been a good thing.
- **I see distinctive differences in the three myself, as does the President.** And the case against Saddam Hussein is encompassed in the President's remarks to the United Nations. He stands in violation of -- 16 times, I think the President said -- resolutions of the world community.
- Iran is clearly a country that is harboring al Qaeda. It says it isn't, but it is. It is a country that is developing -- aggressively developing nuclear capabilities and increasingly longer-range ballistic missiles and other weapons of mass destruction. **It is also a country, however, that has a population that is in ferment.** And there's no question in my mind but that the young people and the women in that country, particularly, as well as others, who are uncomfortable with this tight control by a small clique of clerics that they try to impose on the people of that country -- is increasingly difficult for them to do.
- And I have no -- I think most of the world was dumbfounded at how quickly that country turned from the shah to the ayatollahs. I think it's possible that we could be dumbfounded someday to see it turn away from this clique of clerics, because clearly, they're not managing their affairs in a way that's in the interest of the Iranian people.
- **North Korea is quite a different situation.** It is -- all one has to do is look at it compared to South Korea and it just wrings your heart out to see what's happening to those people. They're starving. They're being repressed. They're being treated terribly. There's large numbers in concentration camps and fleeing the country.
- I don't know what's going to happen in North Korea, except that we do know that they are one of the world's worst proliferators, particularly with ballistic missile technologies. **We know they're a country that has been aggressively developing nuclear weapons and has nuclear weapons.** {"The IC judged in the mid-1990s that North Korea had produced one, possibly two nuclear weapons," according to the December 2001 Unclassified Summary of a National Intelligence Estimate.} And we know they're a danger first and foremost to their own people, and second, they're a threat principally because of their proliferating activities, as opposed to being a threat to South Korea.

# Verlauf der Eskalationsphase 2002-2006



# US & North Korean Declaratory Nuclear Weapons Posture


## 2010: N-Weapons as means to repel aggression

- “The mission of the nuclear forces of the DPRK is to deter and repel aggression and attack against the country and the nation until the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and the world is realized. The DPRK is invariably maintaining the policy not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states or threaten them with nuclear weapons as long as they do not join the act of invading or attacking us in conspiracy with nuclear weapons states.”

## 2010: N-Weapons as a means to contain rogue nations

- In pursuit of their nuclear ambitions, North Korea and Iran have violated non-proliferation obligations, defied directives of the United Nations Security Council, pursued missile delivery capabilities, and resisted international efforts to resolve through diplomatic means the crises they have created.
- “The United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that are party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and in compliance with their nuclear nonproliferation obligations.”

# Projektion der plutonium- und uranbasierten Kernwaffenkapazitäten Nordkoreas, 2001-2013



# Nordkoreanische Provokationen 2010-2012

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- 26. März 2010: Versenkung der südkoreanischen Korvette Cheonan (46 Soldaten sterben)
- September 2010: Kim Jong-Un wird als Nachfolger Kim Jong-Ils in Partei und Militär eingeführt.
- 23. November 2010: DVRK-Artillerie beschießt Insel Yeonpyeong in umstrittenen Seegebiet (2 Soldaten, 2 Zivilisten werden getötet).
- 17. Dezember 2011: Kim Jong-Il stirbt, Kim Jong-Un wird Nachfolger
- 29. Februar 2012: Leap-Day Agreement vereinbart Raketen- und Nuklearmoratorium gegen Nahrungsmittelhilfe
- 13. April 2012: DVRK startet Rakete + Satellit, sie versagt, Übereinkunft zerbricht.
- Dezember 2012: DVRK startet erneut Rakete, die Satellit kurzfristig in Orbit bringt. UN-SR (inkl. PRC) verurteilt dies und verhängt Res. 2087.
- 12. Februar 2013: DVRK testet zum dritten Mal Nuklearsprengsatz. UN-SR (inkl. China) verurteilt dies und verhängt Res. 2094.

# Eskalation nordkoreanischer Rhetorik 2013

Datum	Sprechakt	Eskalation
March 5, 2013	We will take second and third countermeasures of greater intensity against the reckless hostilities of the United States and all the other enemies. Now that the US imperialists seek to attack the DPRK with nuclear weapons, <b>we will counter them with diversified precision nuclear strike means of Korean style</b> . The army and people of the DPRK have everything including lighter and smaller nukes unlike what we had in the past. (Korean People's Army)	Androhung nuklearer Präzisions-schläge
March 7	The revolutionary armed forces of the DPRK <b>will exercise the right to launch a pre-emptive nuclear attack to destroy the strongholds of the aggressors and to defend the supreme interests of the country</b> . (Spokesman for the North Korea's Foreign Ministry)	Nukleare Präemption
March 8	<b>All agreements on nonaggression reached between the North and the South and the joint declaration on denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula are now nullified</b> . (Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland)	Widerruf aller innerkorea-nischer Abk.
	<b><u>We are ready for "all-out war" against our enemies. (Kim Jong Un)</u></b>	Wehrhaftigkeit
March 10	We would exercise the <b>right to conduct preemptive nuclear strikes if today's "Key Resolve" drills were to go ahead</b> . (North Korea's Foreign Ministry)	Befristete Drohung
March 12	The Korean Armistice Agreement is to be scrapped completely just from today and the annual training exercises called Key Resolve are an open declaration of a war. (Spokesman for the Supreme Command of the Korean People's Army (KPA) reported by Rodong Sinmun)	Befristete Drohung

# Eskalation nordkoreanischer Rhetorik 2013

Datum	Sprechakt	Eskalation
March 12	We would wipe out a South Korean island Baengnyeong and turn the island into a "sea of fire." (Kim Jong Un)	Örtliche Drohung (NLL)
March 14	North Korea conducts live-fire drills near a disputed maritime border. (KCNA)	Mil. Reaktion auf US-ROK Manöver
March 20	North Korea military personnel are standing by to annihilate the US imperialist aggressors, only awaiting an order from Supreme Commander Marshal Kim Jong Un. (KCNA)	Befehlshaber KJU
	North Korea conducts air-raid drills, issuing air raid warnings for its soldiers and citizens. (Korean Central Broadcasting Station, KCBS)	Mil. Reaktion auf US-ROK Manöver
	<b>US B-52 bomber deployments in the Korean Peninsula prove the aggressive and adventurous nature of the drills as a test nuclear war rehearsal. If the US sends B-52 to Korea again, they will meet catastrophic end by the strong military counteraction of the DPRK.</b> Time has gone when words worked. (KCNA)	Mil. Reaktion auf US-ROK Manöver
March 21	The U.S. should not forget that Andersen Air Force Base on Guam, where B-52s take off, and naval bases in Japan proper and Okinawa, where nuclear-powered submarines are launched, are within the striking range of our precision strike means. Now that the US started open nuclear blackmail and threat, the DPRK, too, will move to take corresponding military actions. (Spokesman Supreme Command of the KPA)	Gezielte Drohung

# Eskalation nordkoreanischer Rhetorik 2013

Datum	Sprechakt	Eskalation
March 25	Crack storm troops will occupy Seoul and other cities and take 150,000 US citizens as hostage. (In the video, titled "A Short, Three Day War" posted on the North Korean website Uriminzokkiri)	Gezielte örtl. Drohung
March 26	We will put on the highest alert all the field artillery units including strategic rocket units and long-range artillery units, which are assigned to strike bases of the US imperialist aggressor troops in the US mainland and on Hawaii and Guam and other operational zone in the Pacific, as well as all the enemy targets in South Korea and its vicinity. (Supreme Command of the KPA)	Gezielte örtl. Drohung
March 27	North Korea cuts its last military hotline with Seoul. (Message from the DPRK head of the delegation, inter-Korean general-level military talks)	Abbau VSBM
March 29	North Korea reveals its US mainland strike plan in a map targeting primarily Hawaii, Washington, DC, Austin, Texas and Los Angeles, California. (A picture shown on the report by KCNA)	Gezielte örtl. Drohung
March 30	From this moment, the North-South relations will be put at the state of war, and all the issues arousing between the North and the South will be dealt with according to the wartime regulations (KCNA)	Kriegszustand mit ROK
March 31	<b>Nuclear weapons are the "nation's life," an important component of the country's defense, and an asset that wouldn't be traded even for "billions of dollars."</b> (Declaration adopted by Kim Jong-Eun and top party officials)	N-Waffen sind Überlebenswichtig



# Eskalation nordkoreanischer Rhetorik 2013

Datum	Sprechakt	Eskalation
April 2	We will restart our 5-megawatt graphite-moderated nuclear reactor in Yongbyon to extract plutonium for nuclear weapons. (KCNA)	Aufnahme NW-Programm
April 4	North Korea moves its Musudan missiles to the launching site on the east coast of the country. (ROK Ministry of National Defense)	Gezielte örtl. Drohung
April 5	All embassies in Pyongyang should prepare to evacuate North Korea because their safety cannot be guaranteed during conflict. (Spokesman for the Russian embassy in Pyongyang, Denis Samsonov)	Abbau VSBM
April 8	We will tentatively put operation at the Kaesong Industrial Complex on hold. How the situation will develop in the future will entirely depend on the South Korean government's attitude. (Statement by Kim Yang-gon, Secretary of Central Committee)	Abbau wirtschaftl. Kooperation
April 9	<b>Foreigners should leave South Korea to avoid getting caught up in the "all-out war, a merciless, sacred, and retaliatory war."</b> (Korean Asia-Pacific Peace Committee)	Abbau VSBM
April 12	Japan is always in the cross-hairs of our revolutionary army and if Japan makes a slightest move, the spark of war will touch Japan first. (KCNA)	Gezielte Drohung
April 15	Our retaliatory action will start without any notice from now if anti-North Korean activities continue in South Korea. ("Ultimatum" by the Supreme Command of the KPA)	Gezielte temporäre Drohung

# Eskalation nordkoreanischer Rhetorik 2013


Datum	Sprechakt	Eskalation
April 18	There will be no dialogue until Seoul halts provocations and apologizes. Statement by the Policy Department, National Defense Commission)	Konditionierte Deeskalation
April 20	We will not give up nuclear weapons. The US should not think about the denuclearization on the peninsula before the world is denuclearized. (Rodong Sinmun)	Gezielte örtl. Drohung
April 25	Our forces are ready to launch intercontinental ballistic missiles and kamikaze-like nuclear attacks at the US. (Statement by the North Korean generals including Ri Pyong-chol and Kim Rak-gyom. Reported by KCNA)	Gezielte Nukl. Drohung
April 26	We will take “final, decisive and serious measures” if President Park Geun-Hye’s government continues to issue ultimatums. (National Defense Commission)	Konditionierte Deeskalation

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# Erklärungen für nordkoreanische Eskalation 2013

# Drei Erklärungen

1. Der junge Führer
2. Inter-Institutioneller Machtkampf
3. Oppositioneller Nationalismus



# These 1: Kim Jong Un, der junge Führer

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1. KJU wird als unerfahren und auf Popularität bedacht dargestellt.
2. KJU bedarf der Unterstützung seines Onkels Chang Song Taek sowie weiterer Mentoren.
3. KJU hat persönlich mehrere Vorort-Visiten bei Militärverbänden abgehalten, die in militärische Provokationen involviert waren und er hat direkte Drohungen ausgestoßen.
4. Fazit: Nordkorea ist eine totalitäre Diktatur: Verhalten hängt an psychischer Stabilität des „Führers“.



# These 2: Inter-Institutioneller Machtkampf

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- Eskalation geht auf wachsenden Interessenpluralismus zwischen Faktionen innerhalb des Regimes zurück (McEachern 2009).
  - Kabinett: Imperialisten bedrohen DVRK, aber Revolution ist stark genug zu widerstehen.
  - Militär: Imperialismus kann nur militärisch besiegt werden.
  - Partei: Auseinandersetzung mit Imperialisten bedingt die Geschlossenheit der Revolution.
- Am 31. März 2013, mitten in der Krise, wurde ein Wirtschaftsreformer, Pak Pong Ju, erneut von der Obersten Volksversammlung zum Ministerpräsidenten bestellt.

# These 3: Oppositioneller Nationalismus

- Es gibt eine lange Vorgeschichte eines nuklearen „oppositionellen Nationalismus“
- Die Songun (Military first)-Politik besagt, dass nur Staaten mit entwickelter Militärtechnologie unter Bedingungen des ‚US-Imperialismus‘ eine erfolgreiche ideologische, politische, militärische und wirtschaftliche Entwicklung haben.
- Das Regime definiert sich zunehmend in Opposition zu einer als „feindlich wahrgenommen westlich-demokratischen Weltordnung“.
- Es gibt keine Anzeichen für einen Faktionismus während der Krise, vielmehr spricht KJU mehrfach und direkt. Seine Aussagen decken sich mit entsprechenden Drohungen aus Militär und Partei.



# Gründe für Eskalation im Winter 2012/2013

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1. DVRK Führung ist zunehmend beunruhigt, dass konventionelle Bewaffnung nicht ausreichend ist.  
=> Irak und Libyen zeigen westliche konventionelle Überlegenheit.
2. DVRK-Führung ist zunehmend überzeugt, dass USA aggressive Intentionen und Bereitschaft hat, diese militärisch umzusetzen.
  1. UN-SR Resolutionen 2087 u. 2094 mit PRC-Unterstützung.
  2. Verlegung von Strategischen Bombern während der Krise.  
=> Sanktionen zeigen Bereitschaft der USA zur Eskalation.
3. DVRK-Führung ist (fälschlicherweise) überzeugt, dass nukleare Bewaffnung „Unverwundbarkeit“ herstellt und neue “strategische Handlungsräume“ eröffnet.  
=> konventionelles Gleichgewicht leidet u. DVRK-Provokationen werden wahrscheinlicher.  
=> die Nichtanerkennung des Waffenstatus nährt Befürchtung, dass Waffen nicht ihren Wert erzielen, wenn sie nicht eingesetzt werden.



## Speech delivered by Kim Jong Un on April 15th, 2012, at Kim Il Sung Square in Pyongyang

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- Military technological supremacy is not a monopoly of imperialists any more, and the time has gone forever when the enemies threatened and intimidated us with atomic bombs.
- **Ministry of People's Armed Forces Spokesman's Statement, 13 March 2013:**
- The army of the nation and people possessing nuclear weapons will always win a victory in the fight against formidable enemies and most reliably guarantee the powerfulness and security of the country.

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
# Fazit

# Fazit

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1. Der wachsende externe Interventionsdruck und die interne Transition erklären das verstärkte militärische Autonomiestreben des nordkoreanischen Regimes.
2. Militärische Provokationen verschließen Sechs-Parteien-Gespräche als Ressourcenquelle – illegale Aktivitäten werden stärker genutzt: Eskalationsrisiko steigt!
3. Nordkoreanische Provokationen verändern Koalitionsverhalten in Nordostasien
  1. Lautere Diskussion über autonome N-Waffenkapazität in Japan und Südkorea
  2. Informelle trilaterale Allianz (USA, Japan, Südkorea)
  3. Abkühlung der DVRK-VR China Beziehungen.
4. Eine weitere Schwächung des Atomwaffensperrvertrages ist möglich, wenn nicht gar wahrscheinlich.

# Unipolarität und Staatenverhalten



## Stellungnahme eines Sprechers des DVRK AM, 22.03. 2011

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“The present Libyan crisis teaches the international community a serious lesson. It was fully exposed before the world that "Libya's nuclear dismantlement" much touted by the U.S. in the past turned out to be a mode of aggression whereby the latter coaxed the former with such sweet words as "guarantee of security" and "improvement of relations" to disarm itself and then swallowed it up by force. It proved once again the truth of history that peace can be preserved only when one builds up one's own strength as long as high-handed and arbitrary practices go on in the world.

**The DPRK was quite just when it took the path of Songun and the military capacity for self-defence built up in this course serves as a very valuable deterrent for averting a war and defending peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula.”**

Quelle: KCNA 2011: DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesman Denounces U.S. Military Attack on Libya, March 22, 2011,

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<http://harnisch.uni-hd.de>

Table 1: Diminishing institutionalization of Conflict Resolution on Korean Peninsula

	Commonality	Specificity	Autonomy	UN SC
Agreed Framework	Bilateral + Consortium Implementation; Political + legal	Growing specification through KEDO Protocols	Plurilateral Consortium without DSB; IAEA involvement	Abstention
September 2005	Minilateral political understanding	Growing specification leads to breakup	Bilateral Implementation; limited IAEA input	Abstention
Leap Day Agreement	Parallel unilateral political statements	vague understanding	No third party involvement	Growing involvement + PRC veto

# Sechs-Parteien Vereinbarungen vom 13. Februar und 3. Oktober 2007

DPRK	USA (und Anrainerstaaten)
<b>1. Phase:</b> Außerbetriebnahme aller Nuklearanlagen in Yongbyon, IAEA-Inspektionen	<b>1. Phase:</b> USA beginnen Gespräche über Normalisierung der Beziehungen (Terrorstaatenliste + Handelsbarrieren)
Erstellung und Diskussion einer Liste aller Nuklearanlagen/Technologie	Japan und DPRK beginnen Gespräche über Normalisierung (Entführungen) Humanitäre Kooperation 50.000 t Schweröl
<b>5 Arbeitsgruppen: Denuklearisierung, USA-DPRK, Japan/DPRK, Wirtschaftskooperation; Frieden in NEA</b>	
<b>2. Phase:</b> Vollständige Erklärung der Nuklearaktivitäten und Unbrauchbarmachung von N-Anlagen (bis zum 31. 12. 2007) Verzicht auf Weitergabe von Nukleartechnologie, Know-how, Material	<b>2. Phase:</b> Lieferung von 950.000 t Schweröl USA streichen Nordkorea von der Liste terrorunterstützender Staaten und bauen bilaterale Handelsbarrieren ab
<b>USA/IAEA verifizieren Unbrauchbarmachung u. USA erhält PU-Dokumente</b>	

60 Tage Laufzeit

Bis zum 31. 12. 2007



# The Leap Day Agreement, February 29, 2012

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## DPRK obligations

- Moratorium on Long-range Missile Tests
- Moratorium on Nuclear Test
- Moratorium on Uranium enrichment at Yongbyon
- IAEA monitoring of UE moratorium
- IAEA monitoring of PU disablement
- IAEA UE moratorium outside Yongbyon

## US obligations

- Delivery of 240.000 t of nutritional aid (12 x 20.000)
- End of hostile US policy
- Lifting of sanctions
- Consideration of delivery of LWR

# Those famous three words

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
- A U.S. delegation has just returned from Beijing following a third exploratory round of U.S.-DPRK bilateral talks. To improve the atmosphere for dialogue and demonstrate its commitment to denuclearization, **the DPRK has agreed to implement a moratorium on long-range missile launches,...**
- UNSCR 1874 of June 2009: "*Demands* that the DPRK not conduct any further nuclear test or any launch using ballistic missile technology"


# US-DPRK Defection from Leap Day Agreement: voluntary or not


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1. US negotiators may have thought that DPRK may not want to strike a deal only to destroy it (the honest negotiator).
  1. DPRK negotiators (MFA) had agreed (to realize nutritional aid) to a deal. They still had to secure agreement on skipping launch.
2. US negotiators may have thought that DPRK will launch anyway because even DPRK highest decision makers cannot reverse a decision taken by the late leader Kim Jong Il (the creative ambivalent US negotiator)
3. US negotiators wanted the DPRK to destroy the agreement (the domestic-oriented negotiator) because it
  - a) makes a democratic president look tough in an election year
  - b) makes a democratic president look bad in an election year because he strikes deals with enemies which are

# Umstrittene Northern Limit Line im Gelben Meer







# VN-SR-Resolutionen: Nordkorea


Datum	Resolution	Inhalt
11. Mai 1993	S/RES/825 (spezifisch DPRK)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Reconsider Announcement of Letter of 12. March 1993</li> <li>- Honor its non-proliferation obligations under the treaty</li> <li>- Requests Director General IAEA to continue to consult with the DPRK with a view to resolving the issues</li> </ul>
15. Juli 2006	S/RES/1695 (spezifisch DPRK)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Condemns multiple launches of Ballistic missiles</li> <li>- Demands suspension of ballistic missile program</li> <li>- Requires member states to exercise vigilance and prevent procurement and proliferation and transfer of financial resources and technology</li> <li>- Underlines the DPRK to show restraint and refrain from action aggravating tension</li> <li>- Strongly urges DPRK to return to Six Party talks without precondition</li> </ul>
14. Okt 2006	S/RES/1718 (spezifisch DPRK)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- (1) Condemns nuclear test proclaimed by DPRK on 9 Oct. 2006</li> <li>- (2) Demands no further tests</li> <li>- <b>(3) Demands DPRK to immediately retract its announcement of withdrawal from the NPT</b></li> <li>- <b>(4) Return to NPT and IAEA Safeguards</b></li> <li>- (5) Suspend all activities related to ballistic missiles</li> <li>- (6, 7) Decides DPRK shall abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear as well as WMD programs</li> <li>- (8 a) All members states shall prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale and transfer to DPRK of: (i) military goods: battle tanks, armored vehicles, large caliber systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles or missile systems (ii) all goods and technology in documents S/2006/814 (Letter by French Representative to UNSC with List of nuclear material) and S/2006/815 (Letter by French Representative to UNSC with List of ballistic missile material)</li> <li>- (8 b) All member states shall freeze funds and financial assets and economic resources, prevent entry or transit of designated DPRK personnel</li> <li>- (10-12) Establish Committee to undertake tasks of seeking information, consider and decide upon requests, designate individuals</li> <li>- (14ff) Strongly urges DPRK to return to Six Party talks without precondition, keep DPRK under review</li> </ul>

# UN-SR-Resolutionen: Nordkorea

<p>12.Juni 2009</p>	<p>S/RES/1874 (spezifisch DPRK)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- (1) Condemns nuclear test conducted by DPRK on 25 May 2009</li> <li>- (2) Demands DPRK not to conduct further nuclear tests</li> <li>- (3) Decides DPRK shall suspend all activities related to ballistic missile program</li> <li>- (4) Immediately comply with S/RES/1718</li> <li>- <b>(5) DPRK immediately retracts its announcement of withdrawal from the NPT</b></li> <li>- <b>(6) Return to NPT and IAEA Safeguards</b></li> <li>- (7) Calls upon member states to implement their obligations pursuant to resolution S/RES/1718</li> <li>- (8) Decides DPRK shall abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear as well as WMD programs</li> <li>- (9) (10) Decides that paragraph 8 (b) and 8 (a) of S/RES/1718 shall apply to all arms and related materiel, as well as financial transactions, training, advice, services or assistance and calls upon states to exercise vigilance over direct or indirect supply sale of transfer to DPRK</li> <li>- (11-17) calls upon all member states to inspect, cooperate with inspections, authorize to seize and dispose of items</li> <li>- (18-21) calls upon member states and financial institutions to implement obligations of S/RES/1718, 8 (d)(e) not to enter commitments for grants, assistance or loans to DPRK</li> <li>- (23) applies to INFCIRC/254/Rev.7/Part 2a, INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 1a</li> <li>- (25- 27) Committee intensify efforts to promote the full implementation of 1718, establish panel of experts, urges states to cooperate</li> <li>- <b>(29) Calls upon DPRK to join Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty</b></li> <li>- (30ff) Strongly urges DPRK to return to Six Party talks without precondition, keep DPRK under review</li> </ul>
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# Kernwaffen: Uran + Plutoniumproduktionswege



# Way/Weeks 2012: Making it Personal: Regime Type and Nuclear Proliferation

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- Study after study has found that regime type has little or no effect on the decision to pursue nuclear weapons. Indeed, in a literature that features little consensus, one point of “specific agreement” is that “regime type has only a minimal effect on proliferation” (Sagan 2011, 236). We argue, however, that conventional approaches comparing the behavior of democracies to that of non-democracies have resulted in incorrect inferences. We combine insights from the study of comparative authoritarianism with those on the causes of nuclear proliferation and argue that leaders of highly centralized, “personalistic” dictatorships have more to gain, and less to lose, by pursuing nuclear weapons than leaders of other regime types.

# Way/Weeks 2012: Empirischer Befund

**Table 1. Personalist Regimes and the Pursuit of Nuclear Weapons**  
(Dependent Variable: Singh and Way codings)

	<i>Basic Model</i>	<i>Plus Population</i>	<i>Plus Capabilities</i>	<i>Plus Economic Development</i>
Personalist Regime	1.86 <sup>&lt;.001</sup> (.556)	1.89 <sup>&lt;.001</sup> (.588)	1.88 <sup>&lt;.001</sup> (.544)	1.20 <sup>.002</sup> (.63)
Number of Land Borders (security environment)	.66 <sup>&lt;.001</sup> (.181)	.49 <sup>.162</sup> (.178)	.98 <sup>&lt;.001</sup> (.234)	.17 <sup>.249</sup> (.145)
Population (ln)	-	1.45 <sup>&lt;.001</sup> (.332)	-	-
Capabilities	-	-	45.39 <sup>.042</sup> (22.31)	59.72 <sup>.013</sup> (24.07)
GPD per Capita (ln)	-	-	-	.165 <sup>.626</sup> (.353)
Years Without Pursuit of Nuclear Weapons (t)	-1.34 <sup>&lt;.001</sup> (.127)	-1.27 <sup>&lt;.001</sup> (.122)	-1.32 <sup>&lt;.001</sup> (.122)	-1.73 <sup>&lt;.001</sup> (.174)
t <sup>2</sup>	.064 <sup>&lt;.001</sup> (.007)	.061 <sup>&lt;.001</sup> (.007)	.063 <sup>&lt;.001</sup> (.007)	.096 <sup>&lt;.001</sup> (.012)
t <sup>3</sup>	-.0008 <sup>&lt;.001</sup> (.0001)	-.0008 <sup>&lt;.001</sup> (.0001)	-.0008 <sup>&lt;.001</sup> (.0001)	-.0014 <sup>&lt;.001</sup> (.0002)
Constant	-8.48 <sup>&lt;.001</sup> (1.25)	-8.48 <sup>&lt;.001</sup> (1.25)	-8.27 <sup>&lt;.001</sup> (1.32)	-2.88 (3.42)
Log likelihood	-227.95	-223.66	-232.55	-159.81
Countries	196	196	196	187
Observations	7,599	7,599	7,599	5,902


Notes: two-tailed p-values in italicized super-scripts, standard errors in parentheses. Shaded row highlights the variable of interest.

**Table 2. Personalist Regimes and the Pursuit of Nuclear Weapons**  
(Dependent Variable: Jo and Gartzke codings)


	<i>Basic Model</i>	<i>Plus Population</i>	<i>Plus Capabilities</i>	<i>Plus Economic Development</i>
Personalist Regime	2.09 <sup>&lt;.001</sup> (.573)	2.13 <sup>&lt;.001</sup> (.599)	2.10 <sup>&lt;.001</sup> (.593)	1.10 <sup>.045</sup> (.552)
Number of Land Borders (security environment)	.977 <sup>&lt;.001</sup> (.202)	.577 <sup>.003</sup> (.193)	.893 <sup>&lt;.001</sup> (.267)	.149 <sup>.219</sup> (.122)
Capabilities	-	-	84.42 <sup>.003</sup> (28.27)	37.35 <sup>.069</sup> (20.54)
Population (ln)	-	1.64 <sup>&lt;.001</sup> (.409)	-	-
GPD per Capita (ln)	-	-	-	.0001 <sup>.999</sup> (.299)
Years Without Pursuit of Nuclear Weapons (t)	-1.73 <sup>&lt;.001</sup> (.166)	-1.65 <sup>&lt;.001</sup> (.163)	-1.70 <sup>&lt;.001</sup> (.168)	-1.67 <sup>&lt;.001</sup> (.158)
t <sup>2</sup>	.103 <sup>&lt;.001</sup> (.012)	.099 <sup>&lt;.001</sup> (.012)	.101 <sup>&lt;.001</sup> (.012)	.095 <sup>&lt;.001</sup> (.012)
t <sup>3</sup>	-.0017 <sup>&lt;.001</sup> (.0002)	-.0015 <sup>&lt;.001</sup> (.0002)	-.0016 <sup>&lt;.001</sup> (.0002)	-.0015 <sup>&lt;.001</sup> (.0002)
Constant	-8.76 <sup>&lt;.001</sup> (1.40)	-22.01 <sup>&lt;.001</sup> (4.96)	-8.99 <sup>&lt;.001</sup> (2.41)	-2.87 <sup>.925</sup> (3.05)
Log likelihood	-217.74	-206.42	-211.94	-168.63
Countries	190	190	190	145
Observations	7,591	7,591	7,591	4,491

Notes: two-tailed p-values in italicized super-scripts, standard errors in parentheses. Shaded row highlights the variable of interest.

# Konstitutionelle Ordnung des NVV – Handlungsmodi und externe Regimestützung




# Ballistische Raketenprogramme der DVRK: Reichweiten und Einsatzfähigkeit



Quelle: [http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/files/2013/03/9873C2E2-67C6-4ECD-BAAA-2147433219AA\\_mw1024\\_n\\_s.jpg](http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/files/2013/03/9873C2E2-67C6-4ECD-BAAA-2147433219AA_mw1024_n_s.jpg)

# Das nordkoreanische Proliferationsnetzwerk

Pakistan:  
A.Q Khan



## Spokesman, Korean People Armed Forces, March 5, 2013

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- Now that the U.S. imperialists seek to attack the DPRK even with nuclear weapons, it will counter them with diversified precision nuclear strike means of Korean style.

Those means are bound to be launched once their buttons are pressed, and the enemies' strongholds be turned into a sea in flames.

This land is neither the Balkans nor Iraq and Libya.