German Foreign Policy in Dialogue

Newsletter - Issue 05

Transatlantic Relations after September 11th
www.deutsche-aussenpolitik.de

Based in Trier, Germany, the Internet-project www.deutsche-aussenpolitik.de operates as the autonomous arm on German Foreign Policy of the Chair of International Relations at Trier University. Founded in 1998, the thrust of the project’s work is to respond to the increasing interest in Germany's foreign policy by improving research, analysis and teaching in this field through the innovative use of the internet. The project also aims at strengthening the democratic discourse on German foreign policy in the context of an integrating Europe by stimulating debate between researchers and analysts, decision-makers and the wider public.

By organising a series of binational seminars in Poland, Great Britain, France and a Scandinavian country on the subject of German foreign policy in an integrating Europe, the project intends to enhance the quality and competitiveness of political science and political scientists in Europe by europeanising the curriculum of the former and by developing the intercultural competence of the latter.

The project team is presently headed by Wolfgang Brauner and Sebastian Harnisch. Current staff members are Lotte Frach, Holger Pansch, Stefan Werland and Christof Zintel. Overall responsibility for the project lies with Prof. Hanns W. Maull.
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Editorial: What has changed, and what has not, in transatlantic relations?

by Sebastian Harnisch

Since the September 11th terror strikes against New York and Washington, the proposition that "the world has changed" has become conventional wisdom. With some justification, perhaps: the 9/11 attacks and the ensuing anthrax scares certainly have changed dramatically the way America views the threat of terrorism. There is also considerable evidence that United States foreign and security policy will change, too. Once neglected, Afghanistan is now at the center of military and diplomatic action. In some quarters, there is hope for a new strategic partnership between Washington and Moscow. In the wake of the September events the battered Sino-American relations have shown signs of normalization. And at the WTO ministerial conference in Doha, the United States has accepted demands by developing countries concerning the opening of medical patent rights, as the Bush administration itself had asked Bayer to lower the price of its anthrax treatment antibiotic, Ciprobay.

As we tried to come to terms with the horrifying pictures of Ground Zero and to make sense of the unfolding events, we decided to forego our original script for a newsletter on "current transatlantic problems" such as ballistic missile defense, Foreign Sales Corporation tax and US and German policies towards the Caucasus. Rather, we asked experts from Germany and the United States to reflect upon the likely changes in transatlantic relations and German Foreign policy emanating from the Terror attacks. Joachim Krause, former Deputy Director of the Research Institute of the German Council on Foreign Affairs (DGAP) and Jackson Janes, Executive Director of the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies explore the effects on transatlantic relations. Hanns Maull takes a look at the immediate German response and tries to evaluate its impact on the future role of the Federal Republic in world affairs. Wolfgang Brauner and Sebastian Harnisch analyse the current domestic ramifications of the 9/11 events, namely the shift in the domestic political debate from reform of the social security system to internal and external security issues and its implications for the dynamics of party politics in Germany.

The authors conclude that although central pillars of both transatlantic relations and German Foreign Policy remain in place, the September 11th events and subsequent developments are already having a significant impact on the Alliance:
- The US has (again) become more demanding in military terms, although the US request is viewed in Germany as an instrument to secure alliance cohesion and broad support for the Anti-Terror Campaign.
- In this time of crisis, Chancellor Schroeder has seized the opportunity to reinvent himself as a strong leader in foreign affairs, and Otto Schily has positioned himself as a strong leader in domestic security affairs; the SPD-led coalition government will try to keep this "leadership advantage" for the next Federal election campaign. This may well accentuate the leadership struggle within the CDU/CSU.
- German foreign and security policy has once more taken centre stage in the national political agenda. Despite the recent vote of confidence linked to the deployment decision of the Bundestag, Germany’s military participation in the global anti-terror alliance is somewhat guarded. And the present consensus in support of the US could well unravel, as Wolfgang Brauner and Sebastian Harnisch suggest, if the Bush administration decides to bring large scale military power to bear in other regions.

1 We would therefore like to thank the paper contributors to the original newsletter. We promise to publish their analysis as soon as possible in another format.
We close the newsletter with Hanns Maull’s comment on a new volume by Volker Rittberger and his research team from the University of Tübingen on "German Foreign Policy After unification". In this context, we would like to bring to your attention one fruit of our own work in Trier: a monograph on German foreign and security policy from a Civilian Power perspective edited by Sebastian Harnisch and Hanns W. Maull².

1. Transatlantic Transitions

by Jackson Janes

It was only a few months ago that the debates over the Atlantic were shaped by genetically modified organisms, offshore tax havens, the death penalty and climate control. It was only a few weeks ago that the German media was portraying President George W. Bush as a Texas back-woods, gun-slinging sheriff who wanted little interference with the way he wanted to run the world.

And then we all experienced the horror of September 11.

How will this affect the German-American relationship during the coming months and years? In many ways, the answer to that question will be as much found first in how we define our respective domestic responses to the threats from global terrorism and then how we determine that Germans and Americans will be of one mind in cooperating to defeat it. Both processes will not be easy, as each country will struggle with this challenge within its own respective political and cultural frameworks. The question is whether they will result in shared perspectives and policies?

As the victim of this worst terrorist attack in history – and the very real threats of more to come - the United States has to rethink and reorganize vast segments of policies and life throughout the country. President Bush is faced with mobilizing an entire society on the basis of what everyone is referring to as a long-term war. Because of that priority, domestic and foreign policy discussion will be transformed. The fact that the United States has been attacked so brutally is a force shaping our domestic debates like no other before it in American history. We will see urgent debates about immigration controls, emergency medical supplies, urban security, police surveillance and energy resources. Very few sectors of our lives will remain untouched by this catastrophe which is so very new to the American mind. In an ironic twist of fate, the very man who wanted to reduce government in our lives will oversee its expansion in the coming years.

While Germany has had earlier experience with the threat of terrorism, there is intense debate over the appropriate policies to deal with the current situation. Because the terrorists lived in Germany before coming to the United States, there is a particular urgency to U.S.-German discussions and initiatives in cracking down on the sources of these cells. We will be asking ourselves the same questions and seeking similar answers, needing similar kinds of information. These efforts, their success or their failures will shape German-American relations.

Within the American foreign policy framework, there will be arguments about tactics but the strategy will be clear: the protection of the United States and the destruction of its enemies. The military response in Afghanistan is only the beginning of an enormous repositioning of the military forces the U.S. have available now and those which will be generated in the coming years. From advanced positions in actual battle to the mobilization of the entire armed forces throughout the world, the United States will be entering a phase similar to that at the beginning of the Cold War. While the enemy is not located in a particular city or country and is rather faceless this time, the response in Washington – and from President Bush - will be to demand the end of global terrorism. And Bush will define his presidency on this issue.

Yet the response will clearly not only involve assembling the military forces. There will be equal urgency in dealing with the financial networks, intelligence, and coalition building in all corners of the globe.
as in the Cold war, some of these coalitions will be fragile and sometimes troubling. There is a clear realization in Washington that the United States needs help at all levels in this fight. But when the price paid will be in rising fatalities on all sides of this battle, maintaining that common front will be more difficult.

With regard to Europe, Washington has already been told clearly that there is a solid level of solidarity with the United States, led now by Britain. The initiatives currently being offered by NATO to help in Afghanistan but also in helping to defend American coastlines are more than a symbolic gesture of support.

As President Bush said recently, each partner in this war can contribute whatever is possible. And it is expected that the United States will ask for quite a lot from Europe, including Germany.

In early October, Chancellor Schroeder stated that Germany is willing to add its military power to defend freedom and human rights and to create stability and security. In fact, Germany has already been engaged in that effort in the Balkans, and is now the lead NATO nation in Macedonia. That is a far cry from where Germans were ten years ago during the Gulf war, just barely reunited and wondering who they were. Schroeder also reemphasized unlimited solidarity with the United States, perhaps underscored by his visit to Washington and the disaster site in New York. Germany’s role as a secondary player on the world stage, according to the Chancellor, now belongs to the past.

If that is truly the case, Germany, its European partners and the United States are going to have to recognize that and make some adjustments.

In the first instance, Germany can help develop a stronger, more capable European defense capability to confront crises within its own region as well as on the global stage in the fight against terrorism. If it wants to graduate to a primary player, it needs to have a primary defense capability. For Germany, that will require a stronger and larger commitment to defense, and possibly the involvement of the KSK Special Forces.

Germany will also need to take the lead in dealing with other dimensions of the fight against terrorism, particularly in dealing with the extensive network of financial support and money laundering, a good deal of which takes place in Germany.

For the EU, this means assembling a more coherent defense force with real staying power. The Balkans have provided a good look at where the Europeans failed and succeeded in dealing with their own security. They need to move forward with the consequences and start thinking in real terms about the long-term.

For the United States, it will require accepting more readily the emergence of a real European Defense Policy without accusations of subverting NATO. In other words, we are faced with a new definition of real burden sharing when and where it counts without theological debates about institutional identity. After more than fifty years of NATO, Germany and Europe are now defending the United States in real terms and that requires recognition.

In 1951, the United States was organizing itself and it alliances around the Cold War with the Soviet Union. It sought to wage that war all over the world with vast resources and in defense of its European allies, in particular, the fledgling state of the Federal Republic of Germany. While the United States felt threatened by communism and nuclear war, it put itself on the line for the sake of its own security and that of its allies.
Today, five decades later, the US remains the primary power in the world with vast resources and the willingness to put them to use against another enemy. But it has never needed its allies more than today. Germany, along with its European allies, is no longer the protected state but a protector itself. And it has never been in a position where it could do more to support this effort. The challenge for German-American relations, for Schroeder and Bush, will be to align these two sets of capabilities and needs with domestic support at home and with coordinated policies around the world.
2. The Consequences of September 11 2001 for transatlantic relations

by Joachim Krause

After the horrendous attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, there was a broad-based understanding both in the US and in Germany that nothing will remain the same after that event. This certainly applies to the transatlantic relationship as well. The question is, however, what is the nature of that change? And which are the new opportunities and the new dangers for these ties? Will it imply closer cooperation among allies over solving a common problem, or will it mean growing differences over strategy and instruments of fighting international terrorism? I argue that the clearer the current danger is being understood and the more determinedly Europeans and Americans act together in order to deal with this danger, the better the state of the Alliance. This also means that the more the US and Germany diverge over the interpretation of the current danger and the more they disagree over the means to cope with it, the larger will be the damage for the cohesion of the transatlantic relationship.

Do we diverge over the interpretation of the events?

In principle, Germany and the US have reacted in a similar fashion to the events from September 11. However, there are differences in the interpretation which need to be addressed. In Germany, the events of September 11 are mainly understood as terrorist acts being directed against the US. While it is acknowledged that these events were prepared by people operating in Germany using organizational and financial structures that have been created many years ago and, while the German Government is ready to support the US in fighting terrorism, the terrorist attacks basically are perceived as something between the US and a transnational terrorist organization.

In the US, on the other hand the fight against terrorism has turned into a war against an informal network of Islamic fundamentalist extremists, whose primary goal is to throw out the US and her allies from the Middle East and to erect some kind of fundamentalist Islamic rule in the Islamic world. This fight might have to be fought on various levels and in diverse theaters, and it could become an international conflict very soon – e.g., if the Taleban or other militant forces took over Pakistan or a militant fundamentalist coup succeeded in Saudi Arabia. The German debate is characterized by a lack of awareness of such strategic implications and rather is shaped by disputes between those who are willing to accept infringements on some civil rights in the struggle against terrorism, and those who insist on protecting civil liberties and information rights as much as possible. Speculations going beyond this level of political debate are rather politically incorrect in today’s Germany – the furthest any politician has dared to move in this direction was the call for a "debate" between Islam and Christendom by Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer. Germany has accepted that Article 5 of the Washington Treaty had to be invoked and that the allies are expected to provide assistance and cooperation. But has the nature of the threat really been fully understood in Germany? This is the question.

Can we increase our ties by cooperation?

German politicians have repeatedly made it clear that Germany stands by the US, and that this does include the possibility of military action. If compared to the German attitude towards allied requests for support during the Gulf-War 1990/1991, this is surely progress. The requests made initially in fact have been for rather marginal German military activities – the dispatch of multinational AWACS planes for the control of the continental North American air space was the most conspicuous one. Even the more detailed
and longer set of requirements presented more recently, which was developed in close co-operation between the two governments, ultimately still demands rather little of the Bundeswehr. This reflects the fact that the German military has only little to offer in that conflict. Given the lack of funding for the Bundeswehr and its ongoing military reforms, there must be serious doubts as to whether this will change rapidly.

Germany’s main contribution anyway probably should rather consist in destroying the financial and organizational network of Bin Laden’s Al Qaida organization and of organizations supportive of or sympathetic to it. Germany quite likely was the staging ground for the New York and Washington attacks from September 11 and going after these networks and their sympathizers might well be the most important contribution Germany can render today. Such endeavors should not only focus on identifying so-called sleepers, i.e. fundamentalist terrorists living a seemingly normal live until they are being sent out on suicidal attack missions. They must also focus on militant fundamentalist Islamic organizations operating on the territory of Germany. According to informed estimates, the total membership in such organizations – some of them having had contact to Al Qaida – is estimated at more than 31,000. This is an alarmingly high figure, in particular if one anticipates that due to the US bombings and to the further polarization in the Islamic world, more and more of them will be ready to take militant action against some Western targets – be it targets in the US or targets in Germany.

Some efforts to combat this threat have been undertaken in Germany, and others are being discussed currently. It seems, however, that the necessary sense of drama is fading away as the issues got caught up in the current turmoil within the Red-Green Coalition. Thus, it has become almost a taboo to even think about protecting nuclear power plants in Germany by the Bundeswehr, and the Red-Green Coalition is adamantly against deploying air defense units at nuclear power stations. The other taboo are the civil rights of foreigners. Although federal authorities are now entitled to start investigations against associations of foreigners which are pursuing goals directed against international peace and mutual understanding among the peoples, these legal possibilities are a far cry away from realistically tackling the issues connected to the presence of more than 31,000 Muslim extremists living in Germany. So far, the possible expulsion of foreigners living in Germany as followers of fundamentalist organizations that have a hostile attitude against the Western democratic order is out of the question – something that eventually might raise some serious concern among our US allies.

What needs to be done?

There is a great potential for US-German cooperation in responding to the latest terrorist attacks. This potential has been seen by most German politicians, in particular by the Red-Green Coalition, which has made huge strides in proving that it is able to govern the country even at times of serious crisis. The Red-Green Coalition went out of its way to support the use of military force – involving German troops – in order to fight terrorism. Yet, in the process, the coalition started to come apart. On top of this, Germany risked having its military weaknesses exposed, as there was little the German armed forces really could offer. And there also is a risk of transatlantic strife as the Red-Green Coalition is too willing to compromise in the fight against Islamic fundamentalism on German soil.

What is needed is a more stringent and more carefully crafted strategy of coping with the current war-like situation many German politicians still loathe to accept. Yet the current absence of terrorist violence in the US and Europe does not mean that the declaration of war against the Western civilization announced by those who masterminded the attacks from September 11 has exhausted itself. There are more nasty attacks
to be expected in the future and it will be better to prepare for harsh times to come in a more systematic and less taboo-ridden way. The most urgent problem is how to deal with the 31,000 adherents of fundamentalist and extremist Islamic groups in Germany. This thorny problem has not even been touched by the German government. Many politicians of the Red-Green Coalition instead fret about the danger of an excessively transparent citizen (gläserner Bürger) as a result of increased police surveillance and intelligence gathering. One can only hope that this neglect will not come to haunt Germany in the future. After all, a "gläserner Bürger" should be preferable to a dead Bürger!
3. The Guns of November? Germany and the Use of Force in the Aftermath of 9/11

by Hanns W. Maull

The German government has decided to support America’s struggle against international terrorism with up to 3,900 soldiers, airmen and sailors, and the Bundestag has given this decision the required parliamentary blessing. The coalition survived, if badly shaken, and the opposition, which would have backed the deployment, found itself forced to oppose it, as the Chancellor, for his own tactical reasons, had tied the vote on the Bundeswehr to one on confidence in his government and his leadership. The rather narrow outcome of the vote in the Bundestag (336 : 326) is thus doubly deceptive: the actual support for deployment in parliament is considerably stronger than the tally suggest, while the state of the coalition in fact is rather less healthy than the clear majority might suggest.

What does this decision to deploy the Bundeswehr in support of America’s fight against terrorism tell us about Germany’s security policy? Are we witnessing a fundamental departure? Has Germany finally become a "normal" country, as many observers once more suggest? Will it no longer be a "civilian power"?

What happened, and why

Germany has extended military support to the United States as part of the Chancellor’s effort to demonstrate "unconditional solidarity". The deployment will not break new ground geographically (during the 1990s, naval and air force units of the Bundeswehr already participated in missions in the Middle East and in the Persian Gulf region, albeit not in combat missions, and the navy was scheduled to take part in an international enforcement operation as early as 1967, in the context of the Israeli-Arab conflict, when Egypt had closed the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli shipping and the US considered an international naval operation to break this blockade open), nor functionally (combat missions were first flown by the Luftwaffe in 1995 in the context of the NATO strikes against Serbia, and then again in 1999 in the Kosovo war, even without a mandate by the UN Security Council).

Still, the new deployment could, depending on the specific shape it would take, dilute both the strong regional bias towards Europe and the traditional focus on integrated NATO operations which Germany’s use of force has characterised during the last decade. In joining in an ad-hoc military alliance with the US in an ill-defined by large theatre, this deployment of the Bundeswehr does differ from its previous missions. Does this represent “normalisation”? This certainly was the view of NYT veteran journalist John Vinocur who favourably contrasted the strong (verbal) leadership by Gerhard Schröder with the rather less forceful and coherent response from Paris, and chose to interpret it as a sign of Germany’s move towards a dominant political role in Europe. A similar note was struck in an opinion piece in the London Economist, which praised Schröder’s chief foreign policy advisor, Michael Steiner. Yet even if one took the decision taken by Berlin as an expression of a new, more forceful foreign policy stance, it still was clear that Germany’s deployment of military did in no way represent a unilateral policy effort, nor one designed to strengthen Germany’s freedom of manoeuvre. In other words, the standard of "normality" implied in the observation that Germany was becoming a "normal" country was still quite different from a traditional Great Power model of foreign policy behaviour.

Why did Schröder decide the way he did, and why did the coalition and the Bundestag go along with his decision? First, it should be underlined that this indeed was a decision by the Chancellor, rather than by his

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3 John Vinocur, Schroeder urges Europe To Stand Against Foes, in: International Herald Tribune, Sept. 20, 2001
4 Charlemagne, Michael Steiner, Germany’s foreign-policy guru, in: The Economist, Oct. 13, 2001
foreign minister Joschka Fischer or by the cabinet. But this has been the rule since the days of Helmut Kohl, indeed – with a few exceptions such as the foreign ministers Brandt and Genscher - since the early days of the Bonn Republic. Second, the decision probably really was motivated by a sense of emotional shock and solidarity: Gerhard Schröder saw "Ground Zero" in New York for himself, and he was visibly impressed. Moreover, the leitmotif of "never alone", of a firm commitment to the Western alliance and European solidarity, has characterised post-war German foreign policy since its inception. It was this desire to firmly anchor Germany in the Western, democratic world which overrode objections against military re-armament in the 1950s and turned West Germany into the largest conventional West European military land power, and the most heavily armed country in the Western half of the continent. By firmly joining the Western camp, Germany always also hoped to enhance its influence within the Alliance, and just as Konrad Adenauer used the German military contribution to the joint NATO effort against the Soviet Union to advance Germany’s own agenda (namely, regaining complete sovereignty but also getting a say in NATO’s military and political strategies), so Gerhard Schröder and his government clearly have seen military participation in the effort against international terrorism as a way to enhance German influence on US policies. Third, there seems to have been a genuine desire by Schröder to rid Germany of its negative image as a proponent of "cheque-book diplomacy", and to demonstrate foreign policy leadership.

What it Means

Yet rejoicing (or deploration, depending on one’s point of view) about a militarily "born-again" Germany turned out to be premature. This was recognised quickly by none other than John Vinocur who on November 16 contributed a thoughtful peace on the difficulties and limitations of Germany’s foreign and security policy shift. In this, he noted the obstacles which Schröder had had to overcome and drew a parallel between Germany’s half-finished economic reform agenda and the re-orientation of its foreign and security policy.

This view seems much more pertinent than the earlier assessment. There is rather less than meets the eye in Germany’s posture of forceful support for the American fight against international terrorism, for several reasons:

- While public opinion in Germany regarding the use of force has shifted considerably since the early 1990s and now poses to fundamental objections to German participation in out-of-area operations, it continues to be sceptical about the utility of force in solving political problems. While the Green party does build on a pacifist movement which was quite strong in the early 1980s, pacifism is not a dominant theme of overall German public opinion (if it were, it would be hard to understand how Germany could have sustained, from the late 1950s onward, very strong conventional armed forces and a remarkable concentration of military power, including nuclear weapons, on its soil). Rather, Germany’s foreign policy culture could be called "pacificist" – i.e., inclined towards negotiated political solutions to conflict, rather than imposition through military force. This attitude reflects the German experiences with war and aggression during the Nazi era, which continues to persist. Scepticism towards the use of force does not prohibit support for German military participation in peace keeping or peace enforcement missions, as long as these are perceived by the public as legitimate and appropriate, but it will withdraw support once the legitimacy of military action in terms of both international norms and the chances for success in terms of officially defined objectives look doubtful. This was the case with US and UK military efforts in Afghanistan, and it could well become an issue again in the future. In short, German foreign policy culture of reticence vis-à-vis the use of force has not (yet?) changed fundamentally, and it continues to differ substantially from that of America, France or Britain.

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5 John Vinocur, German Role Weakened by Need to Vote on Troops, in: International Herald Tribune, Nov. 16, 2001
6 I am indebted for pointing out this distinction to me to Christopher Hill.
Second, government policies also seem ill attuned to German foreign policy culture in another sense. The course of the government implied "unconditional" support of, and therefore close co-operation with, the United States, while the European dimension was neglected. This goes against the considerable scepticism towards American policies, if not outright anti-Americanism, in many quarters in Germany, and neglects Germany’s by now very strong "European" orientation.

Third, the reality is that German foreign policy cannot be very effective in this rather unilateralist mode of ad-hoc coalition-building. It immediately stirs up concerns, criticism and resentment among its European partners and effectively reduces, rather than enhanced, German leverage in Washington. While German foreign policy can be very effective in leading the European Union, discreetly, towards projecting Europe’s "soft power" resources, it simply will not be very effective by trying to pretend to be France or the UK.

Fourth, Germany simply does not have the military means to assume a major role in the international war against terrorism. As two recent reports document persuasively, the present German government so far has done little to reverse the persistent neglect of the Bundeswehr since unification, and the small increase in defence spending now pencilled into the budget outlines of this and the coming financial years will not be sufficient to change this. Any significant change in security policy would therefore have to start with the budgetary allocations for the Bundeswehr. Given the state of German finance, but also the cautious public attitude towards things military, this will be a hard task to achieve.

Fifth and last, the government would also have to start to take foreign and security affairs much more seriously than it has done recently. In spite of strong rhetoric, the actual record of government "leadership" in foreign policy management has, as the authoritative IISS noted recently, been rather less than impressive. In fact, foreign and security policies have, until Sept. 11 at least, been neglected, rather than cultivated.

In short, Germany’s foreign and security policy will continue to evolve slowly, as any German policy tends to do, and the Schröder/Fischer government still needs to put its deeds where its words are. The events of September 11 have added considerable urgency to this task, and the vote in the Bundestag has given the government the chance to come up with a strong and coherent foreign policy posture. No doubt it will be watched closely as it tries to live up to self-inflicted expectations.

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8 Germany’s ‘new’ foreign policy, Principles and practicalities, in: Strategic Comment, Vol. 7 No.9 (Nov.2001)
4. The German Response to the September 11th Terrorist Attacks: A Shift in the Domestic Political Debate and Party Politics?

by Sebastian Harnisch and Wolfgang Brauner

Introduction

In the wake of the September 11th attacks in the United States, Germany’s foreign policy role and domestic political agenda have been transformed. As many other countries, Germany lost citizens in the attacks of the World Trade Center. As other countries, Germany encountered hundreds of hoax anthrax attacks in the subsequent weeks. But in contrast to its allies, Germany’s coalition parties, the Social Democratic Party and the Green Party, have benefited unequally from the public’s call for a strong executive response to the attacks. In fact, as Tony Blair rose to new heights of international leadership and the French President Chirac responded cautiously due to the deadlock of cohabitation before the Presidential elections next year, the Red-Green coalition almost collapsed under the pressure of the events. Even though the coalition survived the confidence vote on Friday, November 16th 2001, German foreign and domestic policy will never be quite the same. As a consequence of the military response to terrorism a small but significant part of the SPD and the Alliance 90/Greens as well as the whole PDS and a majority of the East Germans have been alienated and will stick to their principled opposition in foreign and security affairs. The shift in Germany’s foreign and domestic political agenda can be explained by a confluence of both external and internal events centering around Chancellor Schroeder’s quest to redefine the agenda of federal elections in 2002 from his earlier theme of "steady leadership in necessary domestic reforms" to "forceful leadership in times of crisis". While Schroeder’s strategy is likely to work well for the Social Democrats in the next elections, the Green party is likely to again loose votes and might even disintegrate subsequently. Thus, there is the possibility if not the likelihood of a center-left coalition between the SPD and the liberal Free Democrats.

The Federal government’s response to the September 11th attacks

The Schroeder government’s response to the September 11th attacks has developed in three stages. Two crucial turning points can be identified in the course of events. The first was the election success of the populist law-and-order candidate Ronald Schill in the Hamburg local elections, September 24, which shifted the domestic agenda to anti-terrorism and law enforcement. The second turning point came with the United States request for military support against terrorism in early November which shifted the foreign policy agenda to the crucial and sensitive question of German military action beyond its borders.

In the first phase, in the immediate aftermath of the attacks, the cabinet focused on improving internal security and expressing external solidarity with the United States. Domestically, the administration reacted promptly, when it was learned that at least three of the suspected hijackers lived and studied for an extended period of time in Hamburg. After a short but intense debate the German Bundestag passed the so called "Security Package I", which changed the Vereinsrecht, banning religious groups that are deemed to be extremist and introduces a new Section 129 b in the anti-terror paragraph of the criminal code. This revision allows the police to pursue suspected terrorists who reside in Germany but plot their attacks in other countries. In addition, the federal authorities toughened air travel and banking security regulations, bolstered security for public buildings (especially American and Israeli) and allowed for access by the police to personal information gathered by government agencies, thereby breaking a long-held taboo. To

underpin these measures, the finance ministry earmarked some 3 billion marks for improving both domestic and external security\textsuperscript{10}.

With regard to the government’s external response, Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder stressed in several early speeches that the attacks, although taking place in the US, were directed against all "civilized nations" and that the Federal Republic would extend "unlimited solidarity" to the United States, including the deployment of German military forces\textsuperscript{11}. Both the chancellor and Foreign minister Joschka Fischer further argued that the emerging global Anti-Terrorism coalition should apply a broad range of political, economic, financial, prosecutorial and military means. In a September 19th address to the Bundestag, Schroeder argued fervently that the fight against terrorism had nothing to do with a "clash of civilizations" or a "war against Islam". He characterized the adoption of UN Security Resolution 1368 and NATO’s activation of the Art. 5 provision as a necessary redefinition of international law and as a sufficient legal basis for US (military) actions against the perpetrators and those countries harbouring them\textsuperscript{12}. Subsequently, the Schroeder government on September 19th received full support from the Bundestag with a resolution calling for, among other things, "unlimited solidarity" with the United States. This was a clear signal that the government was now considering German military action\textsuperscript{13}.

The first phase ended when the Schill Party won a staggering 20% vote on a law-and-order ticket in the northern city of Hamburg\textsuperscript{14}. The city had been governed by Social Democrats for more than 40 years, but was now to be led by a center-right coalition including the CDU, the FDP and the Schill Party. With the calm but forceful Interior Minister Otto Schily rising in popularity, the Schroeder government promptly initiated an additional sweeping domestic security package (Sicherheitspaket II), which put the coalition to a severe test in mid-October.

Hence, the second phase saw a much more active German response both internally and externally. In foreign policy, senior officials embarked on extensive shuttle diplomacy, trying to minimize the political fallout of the emerging military conflict in Afghanistan and to maximize German influence on the future policy course in Washington. First, both Foreign Minister Fischer (Sept. 20th) and Chancellor Schroeder (October 1st) traveled to Washington. There they again expressed Germany’s unlimited solidarity, but as Schroeder had already hinted earlier, this did not mean that Berlin would be willing to engage in "adventures", a barely veiled reference to the possible extension of US military action in Iraq\textsuperscript{15}. In mid-October, Foreign Minister Fischer departed for an extended tour of the Middle and Far Eastern region, trying to mediate between the Israeli and Palestinian authorities as well as extending financial assistance to Pakistan and other Central Asian members of the Anti-Terror alliance\textsuperscript{16}.

In these diplomatic initiatives, the European Union and the United Nations remained the preferred


framework of action. German policy makers have repeatedly stressed the need for a common European response. In some instances, such as diplomatic initiatives in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Germany has coordinated its efforts with the EU presidency and the High Representative of the CFSP, Javier Solana. Also, in late September Germany (for the first time) took command of a NATO mission in Macedonia, displaying its willingness to bear more responsibilities in multilateral security arrangements. In other instances, however, such as the policy planning for a post-Taleban government in Afghanistan, Berlin initially collaborated closely with other member states such as France and Great Britain, thereby bypassing the EU policy process.

Domestically, the Schroeder government responded immediately to the election success of the Schill party and the tense security situation (which was exacerbated by hundreds of hoax anthrax letters). As mentioned, Interior minister Schily introduced a second, broad-ranging security package with far-reaching legal and administrative consequences. The package, which was agreed upon by the coalition on October 27, 2001 after intense debate, foresees the revision of several laws related to government agencies in order to coordinate the government’s anti-terrorism policy more effectively. Specifically, the package calls for the Federal Office for the Recognition of Asylum Claimants and Länder offices dealing with asylum applications to report evidence of extremist activities involving asylum applicants to the Office for the Protection of the Constitution, a provision which had been a bone of contention between the Interior minister and Green party officials.

This second phase came to an end when the US diplomatic and military campaign in Afghanistan hit a snag in late October. With Ramadan and the winter approaching, US efforts to build a political and military coalition among Pashtun tribes in southern Afghanistan and its guarded support for Northern Alliance did not show the expected results. Worse, images of civilians dead or injured, as well as the looming humanitarian crisis, diminished public support for the US campaign in Europe and especially among members of the Green party.

The third phase of Germany’s involvement started when the United States asked the Germans in earnest for their military support in late October. Planned as a means to broaden the political support for the US campaign – German troops are unlikely to add much fighting capability to the US efforts – the request set in motion a process which threatened to bring the Red-Green coalition down. Domestically, the outcome of the Berlin elections once again showed the SPD leadership that the Green party was unable to garner enough support to build a coalition with the SPD alone. Hence, the SPD in Berlin opted for a three-party coalition (SPD, FDP, Alliance90/Greens), which underlined the new range of coalition options available to a strong Social Democratic candidate.

In this third phase, the focus of the Schroeder government again shifted from leadership in the domestic

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19 E.g. the notorious pre-summit meeting in Genth and the (aborted) Big-Three Summit dinner meeting in London, cf. Guess who wasn’t coming to dinner?, The Economist, 10.11. 2001, p. 31-32.
21 These changes deal with the laws administering the Federal Criminal Office, the Office for the Protection of the Constitution, the Federal Border Police, the Military Intelligence Agency and the Federal Intelligence Service as well as immigration laws, cf. BMI 2001, Eckpunkte Sicherheitspaket II, http://www.bmi.bund.de/top/dokumente/Pressemeldung/ix_61128.htm [17.11.2001].
25 Already in late September Peter Struck, majority whip of the SPD parliamentary group, issued a strong warning to the Alliance90/Green Party: “They either endorse the involvement of German troops in any campaign, which I would welcome, or they oppose this decision – that would effectively signify the end of the coalition”, cited in: Key SPD Leader Claims Coalition Fall if Greens Fail to Stand by Government, in: FAZ (Engl. Ed.), 29.09. 2001.
realm to leadership in foreign affairs. In his widely noticed October 11th address to the Bundestag, Schroeder took his earlier argument for recasting Germany’s traditional foreign policy role one step further. He stated that "ten years ago, no one would have expected anything more than secondary help – providing infrastructure or funding." However, he added, this era had "irrevocably passed". The chancellor claimed that "after the end of the Cold War, the restoration of German unity and the recovery of our full sovereignty, Germany needs to show a new international responsibility."

In early November, the chancellor traveled to the Far East (with his Foreign minister just returning from there) to bolster the international Anti-Terror Coalition. While in China, Schroeder focused on export-promotion activities for the ailing German economy. But in New Delhi, Islamabad and Moscow Schroeder stressed the need for continued military action in Afghanistan, thereby countering calls from members of the Green party for a bombing halt.

When Schroeder returned home, he found his coalition government in the doldrums. As part of his efforts to forge a majority within the coalition for the deployment order, Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer threatened to resign when he failed to persuade enough members in his Alliance 90/Green parliamentary group on November 6th.

With the crucial vote approaching, the government initially seemed content to secure a majority for deployment with support from the opposition (which was readily offered). Thus, in a reversal of the stance taken earlier, SPD chief whip Peter Struck stated that a majority of the coalition parties for deployment was not necessary to keep the coalition going. Gerhard Schroeder then again changed tack when he faced strong resistance in his own party and at a meeting with the parliamentary group of the Alliance90/Greens on November 13th. Hence, Schroeder called for a confidence vote later that week, thereby putting maximum pressure on the eight dissidents among the Greens. With the opposition party CDU/CSU still weak and the Free Democrats eagerly offering themselves as an alternative coalition partner to the Greens, the Chancellor obviously felt that an early federal election – after a dissolution of the Bundestag in the wake of a no-confidence vote on the deployment decision – would benefit the SPD and his leadership more than any other party.

The Bundestag’s resolution of November 16th provides the legal means to deploy up to 3,900 German soldiers to the US-led anti-terror coalition for up to twelve months. While the resolution indicates approximate numbers of soldiers by services (Navy: 1,800; Army: 800; Special Forces: 100; Air Forces: 500; Medical Corps: 250) it does neither specify which units will be sent nor where and when exactly they will be deployed. The resolution characterizes the operational area rather broadly as NATO territory, Arabian Peninsula, Central Asia, Northeast Africa and the adjacent seas. It allocates 15 Mio. Euro for the

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33 An extension of this period requires another vote by the Bundestag. In addition, the Green party has – upon request - received further specification on the exact terms of the deployment and the information of the Bundestag during the deployment.
rest of 2001 and foresees financial requirements of up to 160 Mio. Euro for 2002.\textsuperscript{35}

\textit{Position of parties in parliament}

After the crucial vote on November 16th, there appears to be, with the exception of the PDS, broad support among the members of Parliament for Schroeder’s recasting of Germany’s foreign policy role and a sense that the government’s policy represents the right mix of diplomatic, economic and military means. However, a closer examination of the discussions within the parties reveals a significant minority within the ranks of both the Green Party and the SPD. Hence, the SPD party Congress in Nuremberg (starting November 19) and the Green party Congress in Rostock (starting November 26) will be important indicators of how far the sense of ”new confidence” in the coalition actually goes.

In an interview after the vote of confidence, Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder admitted that he had ”underestimated” the extent to which members of the parliamentary groups of the Greens, but also of the SPD were opposed to military participation.\textsuperscript{36} In fact, this admission confirms a tactical mistake that was made by leading members of the governing coalition. As late as a few days before the decision of 14 November to link the vote on the military participation with the confidence vote, Peter Struck and Franz Müntefering repeatedly suggested publicly that it would not be ”a catastrophe” if the coalition would not gain its own majority since the opposition of CDU/CSU and FDP were unequivocally supporting Germany’s military contribution.\textsuperscript{37}

In this, the government clearly underestimated the number of parliamentarians of their own parties opposing this policy shift. On November 11th, eight members of the Green Party announced that they would vote against deployment of the Bundeswehr.\textsuperscript{38} In the end, they decided to split their vote, four maintaining their opposition and the other four saying yes, thus ensuring passage of both the deployment and the confidence vote, but actually meaning no. This attitude was most clearly expressed by Antje Vollmer (who supported the government) and Christian Ströbele (who opposed it); the latter called his behaviour ”schizophrenic”: having voted ”no”, he nevertheless felt happy that the coalition had been saved.\textsuperscript{39} Perhaps even more importantly, in an oral declaration after the vote, 15 members of the SPD unequivocally declared in the Bundestag that they would have rejected the decision had it not been for the rescue of the coalition.\textsuperscript{40}

In this context, it is interesting to note that while only 48% of the population are in favour of the continuation of the present coalition (with 46% opposed to it), 60% of the supporters of the SPD and even 92% of the supporters of the Green party are in favour.\textsuperscript{41} This clearly shows that the Greens, which are supposed to be doomed, are most interested in maintaining the coalition, which they – just like the SPD – believe to have worked successfully so far, and to have the potential to do so in the future. This is also why it is likely that a majority of the Green Party will support the military participation at their next meeting in Rostock on November 25/26. To the degree that Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer will be able to


\textsuperscript{36} ARD Brennpunkt, ARD, 16.11.01, 20h15-20h30

\textsuperscript{37} Kommando zurück und volle Schubumkehr, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 13.11.2001


\textsuperscript{40} Kritik an der Verknüpfung von Vertrauensfrage und Militäreinsatz, AP, 16.11.2001

demonstrate the Green profile in the decisions of the government in the coming months, the chances of the re-election of the party will improve. In contrast, for the conservative opposition, the current crisis is "the beginning of the end of the red-green coalition" (Merkel, Glos). However, opinion surveys show that the FDP would currently do much better against a possible coalition with the SPD, while the CDU/CSU would hardly gain in comparison with the last election. This is why Guido Westerwelle has called for new elections.
The PDS will probably win over principled pacifists from the Alliance90/Greens and the SPD, thereby broadening its meager electoral base in the old Bundesländer. In the long term, however, the party’s stance against any UN peacekeeping with German participation will impede its chances to gain credibility in foreign and security affairs, as the focus in Afghanistan (and elsewhere) shifts from large scale military action to political solutions.

In sum, two conclusions can be drawn from the parties’ responses to the September 11th attacks and subsequent events in Germany. First, foreign and security policy has become at last an important topic on the domestic political agenda of unified Germany. Second, it could be argued that anti-terror policies have been instrumentalised to change the inner dynamics of party politics in Germany. On the one hand, Chancellor Schröder has (single-handedly) changed the campaign agenda of the 2002 elections for the SPD and has put enormous pressure on the Alliance90/Green party. He has also opened up an alternative option for a coalition partner after the federal election next September. On the other hand, the PDS has been able to present itself as the only principled opposition party to the emerging, cautiously permissive consensus on German military action abroad. Thus it will most likely be able to garner support from members and voters of the Green party who are not willing to follow their party leadership.

**Implications**

What are the immediate policy implications of this analysis? First, our overview of party responses suggests that there is strong support for the government’s policy mix of diplomacy plus guarded military action. Yet, given the strong pressure exerted by the party leaderships on the coalition parties, it cannot be excluded that opposition within the governing Red-Green coalition could again endanger the Schroeder government. But even if Schroeder’s arm twisting tactics produced more "collateral political damage", Germany will still stand by its most important ally.

Second, the loss of cohesion of the coalition under the pressure of international events underscores the central position of the Green Foreign minister, Joschka Fischer, in building domestic support (especially among Green party officials) through a "civilian response" to the terrorist attacks, stressing diplomatic and humanitarian aspects of Germany’s anti-terror policy. With foreign and security policy high on the national agenda and a significant part of the Green party and the SPD in opposition to current government policies, Fischer’s persuasiveness has become vital for the Red-Green reform project. Thus, high-profile German diplomatic initiatives, such as the plan for a UN-sponsored conference with Afghan political and tribal leaders in Berlin next weekend, are likely to become more frequent.

Third, under the current circumstances, Chancellor Schroeder’s focus on "unlimited solidarity" with the United States seems plausible. Most Germans, as the overwhelming majority in the Bundestag on September 19th showed, would agree that this was a necessary step. But given the unclear long-term implications of unlimited solidarity, the current consensus could come under pressure if the US government should decide to expand the war on terrorism, e.g. to military action against Iraq. Military action in Iraq (with its immediate implications for the stability of Saudi-Arabia and the security of Israel, to name but a few likely consequences) is clearly beyond the current policy consensus in Germany. Thus,
if US action occurred (especially without European explicit approval), this could seriously damage transatlantic relations.

Finally, whatever one’s view on the German military contribution to the anti-terror coalition, it now will materialise as a response to the September 11th events. After the dust has settled (and even if there is no further successful attack), Germany’s foreign and security policy will have changed considerably. As Chancellor Schroeder’s vision of a new German role in international politics suggests, policymakers only have started to think about the long-term implications of the September 11th events.
Background Information: The Politics of Germany’s Policy against Terrorism before the September 11th Attacks

by Sebastian Harnisch

Before September 11th, Germany’s policy to combat terrorism had been an unlikely candidate to reshape the country’s political landscape. After reaching a first hiatus in the 1970s campaign against left-wing terrorism of the Baader-Meinhof Group and the German Red Army Fraction, Anti-Terrorism policy declined in prominence. In the 1990s the terror threat in Germany receded markedly when the Red Army first renounced its armed struggle and then dissolved\(^43\). The remaining threats from militant groups opposing the Middle East peace process, such as Hamas and Hisbollah, or fighting the legitimate government in their home countries, as the Algerian FIS or the Kurdish PKK were regarded as potentially dangerous as they used Germany as safe havens for their political and armed struggle. However, as these groups appeared not to be interested to endanger their „comfortable” situation in Germany, they were not seen as immediate threats to public security.\(^44\)

A series of different laws and administrative arrangements provided the basis for the activities of several federal and Länder ministries and agencies dealing with internal security issues before September 11, 2001\(^45\). The anti-terror policy process centered around the Federal Ministry of the Interior, the Coordinator for Intelligence in the Chancellery and State-level ministries of the Interior. These actors coordinated their work in interagency committees such as working groups of the Council of Ministers of the Interior. In case of terrorist attacks, the Länder police under the guidance of the State ministries of Interior respond first, with the Federal Criminal police taking over upon request from the state and/or the Federal prosecutor. Basically, the Federal Criminal police is responsible for the protection and investigation of acts of terrorism whereas Länder police authorities are responsible for criminal investigations within their state. The federal division of responsibilities – which Germany adopted as one of the lessons learned from the abuse of police powers by the centralized intelligence and police system of Nazi Germany – also applies to domestic intelligence services. The Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution collects and analyzes intelligence relating to politically motivated extremism and terrorism. It coordinates its work with the State Offices for the Protection of the Constitution, which have similar roles but are independent of the federal government\(^46\). Within the Executive, the Chancellery (and especially the Coordinator for Intelligence) and the Minister of Interior provide overall oversight for national issues concerning acts of terrorism. In the legislative branch, a standing committee on Internal Affairs (Innenausschuss) monitors the police and intelligence authorities’ compliance with the law\(^47\).

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\(^{43}\) Right-wing extremism and hate crimes have thus far not been characterized as terrorism by federal authorities.


\(^{45}\) The principal terrorism-related law is Section 129 (a) of the German Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch). Section 129 prohibits the formation or support of an association whose objectives are directed toward committing murder, genocide, or certain other criminal acts against personal liberty or endangering the public.

\(^{46}\) Other intelligence organizations include the German Intelligence Service (Bundesnachrichtendienst) which is responsible for the investigation of threats from abroad (under the guidance of the Coordinator for Intelligence) and the Military Service Intelligence Services which focuses on intelligence matters that are relevant to military affairs (under the guidance of the Ministry of Defense).

II. Book Reviews

Volker Rittberger (ed), German Foreign Policy Since Unification. Theories and Case Studies, Manchester: Manchester University Press 2001 (Issues in German Politics)

Reviewed by Hanns W. Maull

German foreign policy since unification has defied the laws of gravity in international relations, at least in the view of the dominant post-war theoretical paradigm, that of realism. Rather than exploiting its newly secured unification by pushing for greater autonomy and a return towards its earlier role as continental Europe’s predominant power, united Germany preferred to stick to its traditional foreign policy axioms of multilateralism and institutionalisation, European integration, (junior) partnership in a transatlantic security alliance with the United States and co-operative security policies towards the former Soviet Union. How can this be explained? Has the old paradigm simply been wrong? Volker Rittberger and his team have tried to shed some light on those questions in their rigorously theory-led analysis of German foreign policies since unification. Their interest is primarily theoretical: which theoretical paradigm is best able to explain German foreign policy in the 1990s? In an impressively scientific, if somewhat unwieldy, research design, this volume tests four major theoretical paradigms in foreign policy analysis: neo-realism, modified realism, utilitarian liberalism and constructivism. (The last paradigm is somewhat mislabelled: constructivism really constitutes not so much an alternative paradigm than a meta-theory, an entirely different research perspective which could be applied to realist as well as idealist constructions of international relations. What Rittberger’s team really want to test with this paradigm is the explanatory power of norms and ideas in German foreign policy). Somewhat surprisingly, neo-institutionalism has not been taken on board of this otherwise comprehensive study, although institutionalist explanations of German foreign policy behaviour since 1990 have considerable intuitive plausibility and also impeccable academic credentials (one need to think only of Jeffrey Anderson’s and John Goodman’s famous essay in the volume on “Europe after the Cold War, edited by Keohane, Nye and Hoffmann, or of the writings of Peter Katzenstein). Eight specific foreign policies – ranging from the use of the Bundeswehr in out-of-area operations to the telecom procurement issues in German foreign trade policy – are then dissected with this theoretical framework, with a view to test the four paradigms, but also to assess the mixture of continuity and change in German foreign policy during the 1990s. The results of this endeavour can briefly be summarised as follows: German foreign policy can best be explained as driven by norms and ideas, though the authors also find evidence that German foreign policy is increasingly interested in enhancing its influence and its (absolute) gains. Thus, the "constructivist" or idealist paradigm comes out on top, but modified realism and liberal utilitarianism are also thought to have explanatory power. Only the traditional neo-realist paradigm is found completely wanting. Empirically, the authors find more continuity than change, though with interesting tendencies towards greater assertiveness and a more hard-nose pursuit of national economic interests.

Overall, this is a highly exacting, rigorously theoretical and thoroughly scientific study of German foreign policies in the 1990s. It is likely to be of greater interests to those interested in theory-building, however, than to readers interested in German foreign policy: the case studies are generally very tightly argued, they suffer from an excess of jargon (not everybody will be thrilled by encountering a German Chancellor with a "high level of situative mobilisation", meaning: he had a heavy hand in that particular decision) and, above all, are often argued deductively (thus, policy constantly is "assumed" or expected to" show this and
that pattern of behaviour: one begins to long for a historian’s or even a journalist’s prose in describing what happened. Nevertheless, there are quite a few empirical nuggets in that theoretical sand, and the level of empirical analysis is generally quite accomplished. Still, the principal value and merit of this study lies in its research design and in the development of four different foreign policy theory paradigms. The most innovative contribution in that context is the modified realism paradigm, which builds on the assumption that, under conditions of low security threats, states will be more interested in enhancing their influence than their autonomy, and therefore willing to work in and through institutions. The most problematic theoretical paradigm is that of liberal utilitarianism, which here is conceived in such highly abstract and stilted terms as to make it almost useless for empirical analysis. What is needed for a liberal utilitarian approach is the kind of detailed inductive process tracing analysis which Andrew Moravcsik has been doing, rather than the deductive approach favoured by Rittberger’s team.

In spite of its impressive research design and its many accomplishments both theoretically and empirically, this volume ultimately leaves this reader less than persuaded, for several reasons:

- The empirical analysis generally is too tight, too deductive and too jargonised; too little emphasis is given to the empirical decision-making process.

- The paradigms, as well as the case studies, are full of assumptions of dubious plausibility. The study generally exudes what comes across almost as a disdain for politics: to the authors, policies are simply deduced from certain assumptions, without regard for possible creative policy alternatives and policy innovation. Those many assumptions and expectations sometimes seem to produce circular reasoning (the authors find the behaviour they expect), and often simply comes across as simplistic. For example, the "modified realism" paradigm postulates a choice between autonomy and influence but fails to accommodate policy behaviour striving to optimise both autonomy and influence (was US "predatory" external trade policy under Bill Clinton "realist", "modified realist" or "utilitarian"?).

- Power is treated as a key variable throughout, but the authors fail to treat it properly as a relational category. Yet their own research shows that Germany’s power – by their yardsticks – increased only vis-à-vis the former Soviet Union/Russia; it remained broadly unchanged vis-à-vis the other European states and actually decreased vis-à-vis the United States. Yet this crucial qualification is never considered in its implications. Nor is the ubiquitous role of power in politics of any kind properly acknowledged: it seems as if for Rittberger and his team only the realist paradigm really is about "power", yet it is difficult to deny the need for power whenever political actors try to realise their objectives, no matter how "utilitarian" or "idealistic" they may be.

- Lastly, the study is built on the assumption of a strict division between domestic politics and international relations. Yet this assumption is becoming increasingly dubious. Thus, the authors fail to do justice to the degree to which German foreign policy throughout the 1990s already has been "Europeanised": policy outcomes cannot be explained without recourse to complex trade-offs and package deals in the multi-level games of European politics, which involve both domestic, European and international actors in the same game.

Overall, this ambitious study is as impressive as it is, ultimately, unsatisfactory: it pushes a rigorously scientific mode of inquiry to the limits of sophistication and abstraction, and in doing so impresses us with its ingenious research design. Yet the insights into German foreign policy this research provides remain,
albeit plausible, in the end also tentative. Thus, this remarkable quest for the holy grail of a scientific theory on foreign policy behaviour ultimately fails - not for want of trying but, one suspects, because the task is intrinsically impossible to achieve.

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