

Foreign Policy in Comparative Perspective
Domestic and International Influences on State Behavior

Second Edition

Edited by

*Ryan K. Beasley, Juliet Kaarbo,
Jeffrey S. Lantis, and Michael T. Snarr*



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
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To Ellie, Quinn, Joshua, Megan, Madison, Ty, Isaiah, and Elise

World Map, Country Cases



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
CHAPTER 4

German Foreign Policy: Gulliver's Travails in the 21st Century

Sebastian Harnisch

Germany, as a large country in the center of Europe with great power status in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, has historically played an important role in international relations. After World War II, however, its division into East and West Germany and its dependence on the Western alliance significantly diminished its freedom and status as an actor in world politics. After the end of the Cold War, German foreign policy evolved in a gradual way, as leaders and other domestic political actors confronted many new challenges in global politics. In this chapter, Sebastian Harnisch characterizes the complex forces—from political culture to party politics to elite preferences—that have conditioned German responses to foreign policy challenges. These factors seem especially important as Germany confronts questions at the heart of the future of the European Union and western security.

Germany, like Japan (Chapter 7), was a state that depended on the United States for its security during the Cold War and struggled with its new post-Cold War role. But Germany was also deeply vested in European integration, and thus its foreign policy patterns can be compared and contrasted with those of Great Britain (Chapter 2) and France (Chapter 3). As one of the most established members of the European Union, German policies can also be compared with a country seeking EU membership, Turkey (Chapter 9). German foreign policy responses to regional and global security challenges, including the global war on terrorism and uprisings during the Arab Spring of 2011 such as the Libya War, also provide a fascinating contrast to that of France (Chapter 3), China (Chapter 6), and Japan (Chapter 7). As are the other democratic states in this book, Germany is an excellent country in which to examine public opinion, the political actors who seek to represent the public, and the effect these actors have on foreign policy. Germany has recently experienced a change of leadership and the effects of the new ruling coalition on contemporary German foreign policy can be compared with the consequences of the new leadership in Great Britain (Chapter 2), Japan (Chapter 7), and Turkey (Chapter 9).



von Bismarck was enmeshed in an intricate net of alliances, the collapse of which triggered World War I. Then in the 1920s, the continental powers and the United States tried to both contain—through reparations and territorial revisions in the treaty of Versailles (1919)—and integrate Germany's first democracy, the Weimar Republic, into the League of Nations. However, the League's incipient system of collective security did not stand up to the challenge of German and Italian fascism and Japanese militarism. In 1945, allied nations finally defeated the German *Wehrmacht* and occupied all of the territory of the so-called "Third Reich."

After World War II, the German Gulliver finally was tied down successfully and the German question thus temporarily resolved when two states, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) in the West, and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in the East, were bound in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO), respectively. The dramatic demise of the Soviet Union and the subsequent unification of Germany in 1990 once again raised serious concerns among neighboring states about "Gulliver's travails." At the time, many contemporaries cited the French novelist Francois Mauriac, who had proclaimed: "I love Germany so much, that I am glad there are two of them."¹

Indeed, major approaches of foreign policy analysis came to very different and sometimes even mutually exclusive predictions for the reunified Gulliver.² Realism, stressing anarchy in the external environment, suggested that gains in territory, population, and economic power, as well as the withdrawal of the Soviet Red Army, would trigger a German quest for great power status through seeking autonomy outside established institutions (such as NATO) or seeking influence within those institutions that could be dominated by Germany (such as the European Union).³ In contrast, liberal institutionalists held that interdependence and

Germany, the European Union's largest economy and most populous state, is often depicted as a Gulliver in the foreign policy literature. After three expansionist wars in the 19th and 20th century (1870–1871, 1914–1918, 1939–1945), neighboring states harbored serious reservations about a unified Germany, resulting in different strategies to address the "German question." In the late 19th century, the German Reich under the Chancellorship of Otto

the institutional ties that had firmly anchored post-war Germany in the West would continue to hold for the sovereign and unified Germany, because of the huge benefits the country had reaped from its membership in Western institutions (NATO, EU, UN, GATT, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, etc.). Other scholars argued that societal and economic preferences may have shifted when 18 million East Germans joined the new unified polity. Liberal and constructivist scholars also posited that strong constitutional constraints and a powerful and consensual foreign policy culture would keep the foreign policy trajectory steady, because the West German political system was maintained almost unchanged and had absorbed the five new East German *Länder* (or States). Yet other identity studies surmised from analyzing discourses throughout the 1990s that German policy elites talked and acted more "self-confidently," pursuing "national interests" openly and thereby shedding the country's traditional image of a "model student" of European integration.⁴

This chapter is based on these different approaches of foreign policy analysis and outlines a pluralist account of the German foreign policy trajectory. First, I briefly summarize the historical context in which Cold War bipolarity and U.S.-led Western institutions interacted with the internal predispositions of the young West German democracy. In the second part, I review how shifting distribution of power and interdependence as well as international norms and domestic beliefs and identities shaped Germany's European and security policy. The final section addresses three cases: the decision against joining the U.S.-led intervention in Iraq, Germany's EU policy leading to the treaty of Lisbon, and its conduct during the current global economic and financial crisis.

Historical Context

Three distinct historical experiences predate Germany's Cold War and post-Cold War conduct. First, in the late 19th century, the quest by the German Reich's policy elite for great power status on par with colonial power increasingly isolated the country from powerful alliance partners in the European Concert of Powers. Internally, rapid industrialization led to growing social inequalities, fostering an aggressive nationalism. Second, the failure of the balance-of-power system, the subsequent horrors of trench warfare in World War I and the harsh provisions of the Versailles Treaty convinced the leading politicians of Germany's first democracy, the so-called Weimar Republic, that they must cooperate with Western states, most notably the emerging great power, the United States, and seek a "peaceful revision" of Germany's pariah status under the Versailles regimes.

However, the 1929 global economic crisis and the subsequent radicalization of the domestic scene swept away the fledgling democratic system and put the National Socialist Party of Germany (Nazi Party) in power. Adolf Hitler, the so-called "*Führer*" of the "Third Reich," adopted a highly aggressive and expansionist strategy to forcefully revise the "Diktat of Versailles." He also would conquer other countries for *Lebensraum* ("living space") and commit genocide among

European Jews and other groups in the Holocaust, causing tens of millions of casualties and enormous destruction up to 1945.⁵

These incredible crimes forged a formidable allied war coalition—which later became the “United Nations”—against the axis powers (Germany, Italy, and Japan). The unconditional surrender of Nazi Germany in May 1945 also triggered the division of the occupied areas (including the capital Berlin) among the four victorious powers (the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and France). In the ensuing Cold War, East- and West-German elites cooperated with the respective occupation powers, leading to the establishment of both the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic in 1949.

From the division of Germany to the collapse of the Berlin Wall, West Germany's foreign policy was shaped by both external circumstances and past experiences.⁶ In material terms, the unconditional surrender in 1945 and military occupation by victorious allies led to Germany's complete disarmament and substantial loss of territory (the so called *Ostgebiete*, former territories east of the river Oder and Neisse, and the Saarland to France).

The emergence of a powerful ideological adversary, the Soviet Union, encouraged the first Chancellor Konrad Adenauer to align the young Federal Republic with the United States and key Western European partners, most importantly France and Great Britain. Adenauer's Western policy, or *Westpolitik*, sought to safeguard Germany's territorial security. After World War II and the horrible crimes of the Holocaust it was also meant to ultimately reestablish German society as a legitimate part of Western civilization and thus to ensure a future sovereignty.

Soviet aggression in Europe (e.g., the blockade of land routes to Berlin in 1948/1949) and support for the North Korean military onslaught in Asia in 1950 led many analysts in the United States and Europe to conclude that NATO had to be transformed into a formidable military force to prevent an imminent attack by the Red Army.⁷ But some policy-makers, especially in France, were either totally opposed to German rearmament or favored the deep integration of German Armed Forces in a supranational European Defense Community (EDC). Chancellor Adenauer, who favored rearmament as a tool of greater sovereignty, first pursued a dual-track diplomacy towards both NATO and EDC integration. But when France failed to ratify the treaty establishing the EDC in 1954, the Federal Republic was swiftly integrated into NATO, triggering the GDR's integration into the WTO. Domestically, a majority of Germans and the oppositional Social Democratic Party (SPD) rejected the idea of German rearmament and accession to NATO, leading to the first major foreign policy debate, the so-called “Wehrdebatte.” The Adenauer government, led by the conservative Christian Democratic Union (CDU), was able to secure parliamentary action only after an electoral landslide victory in 1953 and significant compromises on the constitutional limits on the executive's authority to establish and deploy armed forces.

When the Federal Republic joined NATO in May 1955, these domestic constraints were reinforced by alliance obligations. Consequently, the Adenauer

government readily accepted that almost all of its 340,000 combat forces were assigned to NATO and its territorial defense was determined by NATO's defense strategy. It also pledged to forego the production of atomic, biological, chemical, and other heavy weapons.⁸ To bolster NATO's alliance pledge (which included a commitment by the United States to extend its nuclear umbrella over West German territory), Germany agreed on the forward deployment of various NATO armed forces, most significantly up to 100,000 U.S. combat forces in its territory during the Cold War. Thus, from a German perspective the quip attributed to Lord Ismay on NATO's security functions being “to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down” seemed to neatly describe the alliance's intent. Adenauer's efforts to gain political integration in Europe focused on France. After three wars in 70 years, he believed that amicable and lasting relations with the former “arch enemy” were essential for Germany and the future of European integration. French President Charles de Gaulle not only promised a long-term relationship in the 1963 *Elysée* accords but he viewed the relationship as a springboard for an active, independent and global presence of (Continental) Europe as a “Third Force” (see Chapter 3). De Gaulle also accepted some territorial revisions—in 1957 citizens of the Saar region voted in favor of joining the FRG—and political and economic limits to France's autonomy through bilateral and European integration.⁹

During the 1950s and 1960s, security and sovereignty in the West took clear priority over German unity. The GDR as such did not represent a direct challenge to the security or legitimacy of the West German democracy. However, immediately after the onset of the Cold War, several million GDR citizens fled from the East illegally, and in June 1953 Soviet troops led a crack down on striking workers. The communist regime started building a system of border fences (1952) and a massive wall (1961) to prevent further emigration. Against this background, West German governments argued in the so-called *Hallstein doctrine* that the Federal Republic was the sole representative of all Germans, refusing to recognize the GDR and also withholding diplomatic recognition from any state that established formal relations with the GDR.

Under Chancellor Willy Brandt (1969–1974), who led the first social-democratic government in a coalition of the SPD with the liberal Free Democratic Party (FDP), this controversial policy was revised. Instead, Brandt initiated an “East Policy” (*Ostpolitik*) based on the belief that change between the blocs and the two Germanys could only result from a *rapprochement* strategy of more interaction, not less. Thus, while Chancellor Adenauer had already established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in 1955 to ensure the repatriation of German prisoners of war, the Brandt government negotiated a whole system of treaties in 1972 through 1974—the so-called East Treaties—establishing a substantial, special, economic, and political relationship with the GDR below the level of diplomatic recognition.

After Soviet domination of Eastern Europe finally collapsed and the Berlin Wall fell in November 1989, German Chancellor Helmut Kohl (1982–1998)

and his foreign minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher employed these strategies—Western integration and cooperation with the East—in the “Two-Plus-Four Agreement” talks on unification. Again, the Gulliver willingly bound himself: while the four allied powers conferred their remaining rights over Berlin and Germany as a whole to the German government, the unified Gulliver settled all outstanding territorial issues (especially with Poland over the Oder-Neiße border). It once again renounced biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons and obligated itself to limit its armed forces to 370,000 personnel.¹⁰

Reconstruction and security required the jump-starting of the war-torn German economy (to help prevent political radicalization) and deep international integration (to avert protectionism and beggar-thy-neighbor policies). Under U.S. political leadership and with substantial financial support, West European economies recovered through transatlantic policy coordination and deeper European integration. The Marshall Plan (1947)—rejected by East European countries under Soviet pressure early on—not only provided much needed U.S. financial aid and market access, but also initiated cooperation between former enemies in Western Europe. Thus, Germany developed into a trading state in the 1950s, more than tripling its share of world exports from 3.5 percent to 11 percent (1950–1965).¹¹

Domestically, the Federal Republic pursued a strategy often called “middle way” or “social market economy.” This strategy mixed instruments to promote economic growth and social protection through a high percentage of public spending, relative to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), but a moderate amount of public employment (in comparison with Scandinavian welfare states). In addition, the economy is governed through a corporatist policy consensus in which government, trade unions, and business leaders negotiate to regulate the economy while also relying on “expert institutions,” such as an autonomous central bank.

Externally, Germany's goals of security and economic development merged into a strategy of deeper European economic cooperation. In this approach, integration into the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC, including member states Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands), derives from a mutually reinforcing effect of seeking security and development: West Germany would shed its pre-World War II autarchy policy and integrate its export-oriented economy into European institutions, thereby alleviating concerns about its strong trade performance.¹² Based on the supranational institutional structure of the ECSC—the fixing of steel and coal production quotas was delegated to a high authority—member states with converging economic interests also established the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC) in 1957. The member states then established (1993) and consolidated the European Union (EU) through further treaty revision processes (1997, 2001, and 2009) and expanded the EU's issue areas of coordination such as agriculture, development, currency, and migration. In order to lock in cooperative gains and reassure its neighbors, consecutive German governments pooled and often delegated national regulatory competences in

European institutions, such as the European Commission, the European Court of Justice (ECJ), and the European Parliament. Over the decades, this strategy gained greater legitimacy as Germany's economic interests and values became “vested” in the European constitutional order.¹³ In this way, Germany's economic recovery and revival followed from the concurrently emerging European economic order, accepted by an ever-growing number of EC/EU member states. This order also implies regional security, preventing others from balancing the emerging Gulliver militarily, protecting economic interests, and adjudicating disputes through common European institutions.

External Factors

Any analysis of external factors influencing West German foreign policy trajectory must begin with a clear definition of what these factors are and how they relate to internal, cognitive, and social factors. Does the Federal Republic's post-war conduct correlate with its relative power position (as measured by neorealist scholars), or does it fluctuate with the “perception” of that power position by German foreign policy elites? If international institutions shape choices by providing information and setting incentives for their members, how do we account for the influence of member states in establishing their “institutional design”? Also, when countries seek to generate a stable sense of *self* in the international social order, or what constructivists call “ontological security,” how do we know when states decide that their traditional role, identity, or strategic culture is detrimental to achieving this in the current order and try to either change their role or pursue a “revolutionary foreign policy”?¹⁴

Neorealism may lead us to infer that Germany's West Policy resulted from its weak power position as a penetrated state, both lacking full sovereignty and hosting several hundred thousand foreign troops by allied nations. We could account for this “bandwagoning” behavior (i.e., joining the most powerful pole rather than balancing against it) by employing the neoclassical realist “balance of threat” approach, and also draw the conclusion that acquiescence to allied expectations would falter once Germany's relative economic gains in the 1960s allowed for a more independent course.¹⁵ But then again, in those instances where West Germany pursued relative autonomous policies *vis-à-vis* Washington (e.g., Brandt's *Ostpolitik* and Chancellor Helmut Schmidt's various arguments with the Carter administration over security and economic issues), these never turned into strategies of “autonomy seeking” outside the U.S.-led liberal institutional order.

In a first neoclassical realist cut, we may also infer that Germany's opposition towards the U.S.-led intervention in Iraq (2003) emanated from the perception that the Bush administration had an imperial design in both the Middle East and among its alliance partners. In this reading, the Schröder government's public suspicion resulted in a “soft balancing” strategy to frustrate Washington's expansive designs through institutional deadlock in the UN Security Council and NATO council.¹⁶ And yet, even this interpretation does not fully explain the

Schröder government's extensive support of the Iraq mission through over-flight rights, intelligence cooperation, and target assistance as well as complementary defensive measures for U.S. bases and allied partners.¹⁷

In the German case, liberal and institutional accounts pose a plausible challenge to the prevailing realistic narrative of post-World War II foreign policies. First, West Germany's culture of restraint, deeply engrained in both public opinion and the checks and balances of its political process, challenged structural and allied pressure to adopt a competitive containment strategy based on military power and posture. In the *Wehrdebatte* of the 1950s, the *Notstandsdebatte* of the 1960s, and the debate over nuclear rearmament of the 1980s, large majorities or minorities revolted against the decisions of the Adenauer, Brandt, and Schmidt governments to follow NATO's collective or U.S. policy positions on conventional rearmament, the Vietnam war, or nuclear deterrence and posture. Second, the FRG's strong support for European integration and supranational institutions is more plausibly explained by Germany's economic interests and its willingness to manage and distribute the costs of complex interdependence. Unlike in France or Britain, a strong political and societal consensus to seek a European federalist state existed in West Germany well into the 1980s. Third, one could argue from a social constructivist perspective that Germany's experience as a "semi-sovereign state,"¹⁸ in which corporatism, federalism, and strong institutional veto players, such as the Federal Constitutional Court (FCC), tamed the executive's power to act autonomously, and resulted in a European strategy that safeguarded this "semi-sovereign self" and allowed for a substantial delegation of sovereignty onto the European level.¹⁹

To assess the relative weight of external factors on German foreign policy, however, there are two requirements. First, one must acknowledge that these include material (territory, population, industrial base, etc.) and ideational (status, authority, trust, etc.) resources. Second, one must recognize the close connections between external and internal factors. Indeed, explorations of the growing salience of internal factors on German foreign policy have become a common trend in all theoretical explanations.

Internal Factors

The metaphor of Gulliver is typically invoked by scholars in reference to the constraints of Germany's external environment. However, eminent scholars contend that external pressures alone are inadequate to explain the observed variance in Germany's policy trajectory. Internal factors are often the bridge between external forces and foreign policy choices.

According to Germany's constitution, the *Grundgesetz*, the power to conduct foreign and security policy is generally vested in the executive branch. Germany's parliamentary system, based on an electoral system of modified proportional representation, regularly produces coalition governments in an increasingly factionalized party system. The chancellor has the power to select members of the Cabinet,

the central body in overall decision making, and to set the course in domestic and foreign policy. However, the composition and majority of coalition governments have often imposed strict limits on the chancellor's (and senior party's) ability to conduct foreign policy (see Chapter 1).

In addition, Germany's postwar framers equipped the guilt-stricken polity with an unprecedented constitutional framework for checking executive power and enabling international (and European) cooperation. Normatively, the *Grundgesetz* commits all state authority to respect human rights, to seek the maintenance of international peace under all circumstances, and to pursue a strategy of "cooperative internationalism."²⁰ Procedurally, the latter principle even allows for the possible transfer of sovereign power to international institutions (Article 24) like the EU, NATO, or the United Nations.²¹

After formal unification in October 1990, the original norm, seeking unification (Article 23), was revised. The new Article 23 of the *Grundgesetz* now calls for a "unified Europe" as a "national objective." However, it also contained a clause in which Germany's EU policy "is committed to democratic, social and federal principles, to the rule of law, and to the principle of subsidiarity, and that guarantees a level of protection of basic rights essentially comparable to that afforded by this Basic Law" (Article 23, paragraph 1). In addition, Article 23 heightened ratification requirements for EU treaty revisions both in the lower and upper house of the German Parliament.

In terms of politics, both the legislative (the *Bundestag* and *Bundesrat*) and judicial branch (the Federal Constitutional Court) have become more important players in the foreign policy process while the executive has sought and partially attained autonomy in policy making in international institutions. European policy making, it follows, has thus come under increased scrutiny by the German *Länder* and the Court, with the latter setting clear limits for both military interventions and further integration in various rulings on the ratification of EU treaties.²²

In Germany's parliamentary democracy, governments are typically coalitions of two or more parties of varying strength, with Grand Coalitions (two major parties sharing 60 percent and more of the parliament seats) being an important exception to the rule. Over four decades (1970–2010), this setting meant that the junior coalition partners—from which the foreign minister and vice chancellor are usually drawn—had a strong influence on foreign and security policy decision making.²³ Germany's constitution, the electoral laws, and regulations on party activities and finance are all regarded as moderating political conflict and institutionalizing democratic party governance and electoral competition.²⁴

Over the past 60 years, Germany's political party system has evolved from a two-and-a-half party prior to unification to a five-party system after unification, with three parties dominating cabinet governments well into the 1990s. The Christian Democratic Union (CDU), together with its regional Bavarian sister party Christian Social Union (CSU), led governments in the 1950s and 1960s under Chancellors Konrad Adenauer, Ludwig Erhard, and Kurt Kiesinger. It had

a mostly conservative party platform, representing both Catholic and Protestant voters as well as small and medium business interests. The Social Democratic Party (SPD) Chancellors, Willy Brandt (1969–1974), Helmut Schmidt (1974–1982), and Gerhard Schröder (1998–2005), headed the second *Volkspartei*, or mass party, which traditionally represented a liberal social welfare state and labor interests. The Free Democratic Party (FDP, the Liberals), drawing on economic and republican liberalism, are supported by a smaller constituency of business and academics. Under the leadership of Hans-Dietrich Genscher (1974–1985) and Guido Westerwelle (2001–2011), the FDP played a pivotal role in both CDU- and SPD-led governments by providing the foreign minister. In the current Merkel coalition government (2009–), Christian Democrats and Liberals built an uneasy alliance since 2011, which is plagued by a veto wielding opposition in the upper house, the *Bundesrat*.

Following the social protest movement of the 1960s and unification in the early 1990s, the party system changed in two profound ways. First, the Green Party (after unification called Bündnis '90/the Greens) became a major contender for the junior partner position, drawing on environmental, pacifist, and feminist concerns of the 1960s protest movement generation. Under the leadership of Joschka Fischer, an autodidact and vocal critic of the “establishment” in 1980s, the Greens joined the SPD in 1998 in a Red-Green coalition government, which saw both German support of the NATO-led, Kosovo campaign and Berlin's opposition against the U.S.-led Iraq intervention. Second, after unification the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS, now called the Left), which succeeded the communist party of the GDR, and the Socialist Unity Party (SED) rallied discontented voters (mainly in the former East) with a populist left program based on a strong welfare state model and an isolationist foreign policy platform.²⁵ As a consequence, both the Social Democrats and Greens have rejected a coalition with the Left party on the federal level.

These changes have further complicated coalition building and foreign policy making. The original, smaller party system established a stable bipartisan consensus on key questions, enduring three contentious policy debates: the rearmament debate of the 1950s, the emergency constitution debate of the 1960s, and the nuclear re-armament debate of the 1980s. But the polarization of the party spectrum has caused a decline of nonparty politics and brought about a parliamentary opposition that is vocal on military intervention and European affairs.

As noted in Chapter 1, public opinion may considerably alter the course of a ship of state. With regard to Germany, scholars agree that elite and societal attitudes on foreign and security policy have also changed. But they differ substantially on how much variance there is and how this affects different policy areas. Evidence from public opinion polls suggests that German society still holds on to a “culture of restraint” (i.e., a policy preference for nonmilitary instruments, often economic sanctions) while adapting to the increasing number of *Bundeswehr* missions abroad, but recent data also show that societal support for European integration has weakened considerably over the 1990s.²⁶ German mass public opinion

was neither in favor of the creation of the Eurozone nor the opening of accession negotiations with regard to Turkey or with Germany's Eastern European neighbors. Against the background of a traditional prointegrationist sentiment, the EU's troubled recent history in dealing with the global financial crisis and the bailout of several of its member states have further eroded the trust Germans put into the EU.²⁷

While researchers delve deeper into the question of how individual and elite perceptions matter, the theories they rely on are often spurious regarding the causal pathways by which a particular chancellor or foreign minister brought about a specific decision. Under the stringent structural conditions of the Cold War, it is clear that Chancellors Adenauer and Brandt had a significant influence on West and East Policy respectively. However, after unification it has become apparent that coalition governments and the domestication of executive autonomous decision authority have constrained major foreign policy changes.

To the extent that perceptions or foreign policy identities and roles constructed by elites do matter, the evidence suggests that the old consensus on Germany as a civilian power may be gradually changing.²⁸

Contemporary German Foreign and Security Policy

The success of reunification on October 3, 1990, has been a critical driver for policy continuity. By anchoring Gulliver domestically and internationally, and by ensuring peaceful and prosperous relations with all its neighbors, the traditional foreign policy trajectory became the role model. Historical success is not, however, the only factor shaping Germany's postunification policies. French, British, or Chinese foreign policies may be viewed as successful too, although they are far more robust in military terms or economic terms. Indeed, the very norms that informed Germany's culture of military restraint—never to act alone and never to allow another genocide—were used to legitimate an increasing number of “humanitarian interventions” in the 1990s within the multilateral framework of NATO, the UN, and the ESDP. Federalism, coalition politics, and other institutional veto points may limit executive choices, but they may also instigate highly controversial policy choices, such as Germany's opposition to the 2003 invasion of Iraq.

Thus, there is no single, well-articulated theory of postunification German foreign policy. Nonetheless, we can deduct predictions from major theories of comparative foreign policy and subject them to critical examination when reviewing Germany's policy track record. While each policy field may involve different actors and thus create unique policy patterns, we may be able to infer some broad trends. First, current realist accounts of the German Gulliver's postunification policies assume that geopolitical changes re-created Germany as a natural hegemon in the middle of Europe which would pursue an influence-seeking strategy, maximizing its institutional power *vis-à-vis* other European great powers, such as France and the United Kingdom.²⁹ While taking relative power constellations

into account, these studies integrate institutional and perceptual factors, thus opening up structural realism for the "neoclassical realism" of the 21st century.³⁰ Second, in contrast, contemporary liberal analyses either stress the waning financial basis for a proactive, checkbook-centered integration strategy due to the costs of unification, or they focus on continuity and change in the representation of shifting societal interests.³¹ Third, the social constructivist view suggests that changes in Germany's self-perception (i.e., national foreign policy identity, or role, as constituted by self- and other expectations), or strategic culture (attitudes towards the use of military force), are crucial for the understanding of Germany's institutional and policy choices.³²

If realism is to be a plausible contender for explaining foreign policy changes after dramatic international power shifts, and if liberal and social constructivists are serious contenders to account for continuity and change in societal, institutional, and individual choices, then we should be able to examine these alternative theories and their policy implications. Two issue areas, the use of military force and Germany's European diplomacy, seem particularly promising case studies because they feature variance in both external and internal factors.

From Kuwait to Kabul: Gulliver and Military Force

Prior to September 11, 2001, there had been a clear evolution apparent in Germany's security policy, most importantly in the use of force. The incremental but decisive extension of *Bundeswehr's* engagement (both geographically and functionally) led to the notion that German security policy finally had become "normal," that is similar to that of traditional great powers.³³ This process began in the wake of the 1990–1991 Persian Gulf War, when Germany's policy elite was still busily managing unification. At the time, Chancellor Kohl and Foreign Minister Genscher wanted to avoid any active role in the conflict, because of serious domestic disagreements on the constitutionality of the use of German force abroad. Thus, Germany played its traditional role of a paymaster during the crisis, donating about \$12 billion U.S. dollars to the cost of the war. It also deployed minesweepers to the Gulf under strong political pressure by the United States and UN-mandated coalition forces.

Against the background of strong societal opposition to any military involvement, Germany's elite reacted to the first Gulf crisis by committing only small (but still legally contentious) "out-of-area" deployments to Cambodia, Somalia, and Bosnia. The conservative CDU/CSU argued that these deployments in the early 1990s were legitimate if based on Article 24 participation in collective defense. Its junior coalition partner, the liberal FDP, held that Article 87 (use of force only for self- or alliance defense) required a constitutional amendment. This political conflict, which also involved the oppositional SPD and *Bündnis '90/Greens* charging hard against militarization, was resolved only after the Federal Constitutional Court ruled in July 1994 that deploying the *Bundeswehr* abroad was constitutional under two conditions: it had to take place under a mandate of a system of collective

self-defense or collective security, and it had to be individually authorized by the lower house of parliament.³⁴ In effect, the FCC did change the traditional interpretation of Germany's constitution to allow for active participation in collective security operations and humanitarian interventions, thereby bringing postunification Germany more in line with the expectations of its major allies.

Germany's subsequent contribution to the NATO-led, Kosovo intervention was heralded as another defining moment in its new security policy profile. The Kosovo crisis (1998–1999) was the first major foreign policy challenge for the Red-Green coalition under Chancellor Schröder (SPD) and Joschka Fischer (the Greens). In September 1998, the *Bundestag* voted in favor of a NATO activation order allowing for the use of force and German participation. In March 1999, when Germany simultaneously held the EU and Group of Eight presidencies, German Tornado bombers participated in NATO's air strikes against Serbian targets both in Kosovo and Serbia itself. In contrast to the domestic debates during the Persian Gulf War and the Bosnian wars (1992–1995), the Kosovo war faced little public opposition.

Three indicators are typically mentioned when arguing that the Kosovo engagement pushed Germany's normalization further. First, the deployment was explicitly a combat mission. Second, the troop deployment broke with the taboo that the *Bundeswehr* should never be deployed where the *Wehrmacht* had been in World War II. Third, the NATO-led campaign did not have an explicit UN Security Council mandate, and this put into question Germany's strict adherence to the primacy of international law and the UN Security Council as its final arbiter.³⁵

Liberal and constructivist analyses note, however, that this change in the *Bundeswehr's* engagement was couched in a moral argument, stressing the German obligation to end the killings in Kosovo. Schröder, Fischer, and Defense Minister Rudolf Scharping all argued that the principle of *Nie wieder Krieg* (never again war) had to be superseded by a far higher principle, namely to stop the ethnic cleansing of Albanian-Kosovars. Moreover, they point out that a key characteristic of the Red-Green coalition's crisis management was its insistence on multilateral diplomacy. As the leader of the Group of Eight industrialized nations, Berlin sought to forge a broad international consensus and proposed a plan for a bombing halt in April. Germany reached out to Russia and China in the Security Council as well as UN Secretary General Kofi Annan to pursue its objectives. German Foreign Minister Fischer, who tirelessly persuaded many former pacifists in his own party, also put forward the idea of a Stability Pact for Southeast Europe to promote cooperation among former conflict parties and with the EU.³⁶

After the September 11th attacks, Chancellor Schröder promised "unconditional solidarity" with the United States, announcing the willingness to participate in "Operation Enduring Freedom" (OEF) to fight terrorist groups in Afghanistan. The Iraq crisis, however, revealed stark differences in U.S. and German views on the use of military force. The September 11th attacks changed the German government's threat perception considerably, resulting in various

contentious domestic and international counterterrorism laws and regulations. It did not, however, forge a transatlantic consensus on Iraq.

In his first major address in the *Bundestag* on September 19, 2001, Schröder already made clear that Germany would not join in what he termed “foreign adventures” and that any military action within the framework of NATO required prior consultation. This seemed to counter early musings by several U.S. officials that the Global War on Terror (GWOT) should be expanded to Iraq. Subsequently, the chancellor’s early positioning received widespread support among both the policy elite and the German public. When the Red-Green coalition brought the necessary mandate for German military participation in OEF to a vote in the *Bundestag* (November 16, 2001), the coalition fell short by several votes. The chancellor had to invoke the vote of confidence procedure and to assure skeptics in the coalition, through clear legal limits on the geographic and functional scope of the mandate, that Germany would not join military action against Iraq. Only then did the coalition gain the necessary parliamentary permission to deploy *Bundeswehr* forces to Afghanistan, and only by a very narrow margin.³⁷

The German government’s position against foreign adventures persisted throughout the crisis. After President George W. Bush listed Iraq as a member of the “the axis of evil” in his State of the Union Address in January 2002, and after he declared a doctrine of preemptive self-defense later that year, the public stance of German officials hardened considerably. German domestic politics also played an important, albeit secondary role in the unfolding drama. While Germany continued to cooperate quietly throughout the crisis by providing access to its airspace and sharing intelligence, the Schröder government turned its “quiet into a vocal opposition” in the 2002 national election campaign.

Chancellor Schröder and the SPD used their critical position *vis-à-vis* Washington to shore up support among German voters skeptical of the Bush administration, in general, and its escalation towards military conflict with Iraq, in particular. This explicit instrumentalization of societal attitudes began on August 1, 2002, when Schröder gave an interview in which he replied to a question on how the SPD may improve their election chances by referring to the key points of the election manifesto while adding ominously: “We have alarming news from the Middle East. There is talk of war.” He also insisted that while Germany would act in solidarity with its allies, “it would not participate in any adventures.”³⁸

After reelection in September 2002—winning a very close race by 6,000 votes—the Red-Green coalition insisted that UN Security Council Resolution 1441 was not sufficient to legitimate military action. In January 2003, after Germany had joined the Security Council as a nonpermanent member, Chancellor Schröder even went so far as to hint that Germany might only use an abstention to allow for a second Council resolution. Domestic considerations continued to prevail, even under tremendous U.S. and allied pressure. In February 2003, Berlin temporarily rejected NATO planning for defense against a possible attack by Iraq on Turkey (Germany’s NATO ally). This occurred because the deployment of

German Patriot missile batteries and personnel to Turkey would have required parliamentary approval, which did not seem likely.³⁹

In sum, Germany’s vocal opposition to the U.S.-led military intervention in Iraq is best explained by both external and domestic political considerations. Cooperating with the United States with logistical support, basing, over-flight rights, intelligence sharing, and increased military participation in Afghanistan reflected Germany’s willingness to keep its alliance commitments as long as they did not require parliamentary approval. German foreign policies that did not support the allied coalition in the global war on terror—such as the rigid stance on German nonparticipation in the invasion of Iraq as well as leaders’ vocal opposition in the summer and fall of 2002—can be attributed to the fragility of the parliamentary majority of the Red-Green coalition and electoral considerations to exploit the widespread antiwar attitudes of the German electorate.

Viewed through a lens of domestic rather than external factors, it becomes obvious that Germany’s opposition to commit combat troops to the UN Security Council mandated No-Fly-Zone operation over Libya in 2011 also goes back to a widespread societal skepticism, and subsequent concerns of the Merkel government in several state elections. At the same time, these concerns are amplified by Western government experiences during state-building missions in Afghanistan, the Balkans, and elsewhere. These lessons, as cited by the Merkel government, indicate serious risks associated with being drawn into an escalating conflict or civil war, even in the face of serious humanitarian concerns and the heavy expectations of alliance partners.⁴⁰

From Rome to Lisbon: Gulliver in Europe

Since participating in the Marshall Plan in the late 1940s, Germany’s economic wellbeing and foreign economic policy have been linked to the political and economic integration of Europe. In the beginning, closer cooperation with its western neighbors reassured the region in three distinct ways. First, without a strong and internalized allegiance of its citizens to democratic values, the young democracy lacked a stabilizing democratic political culture. Second, it was uncertain whether the perpetrator could rebuild war-soured relations with its former enemies on which its postwar economic recovery depended. Third, the young German polity faced a new and formidable security threat from the Soviet Union and its satellites.

Adenauer’s European integration policy proved extraordinary successful in Europeanizing Gulliver’s threatening economic and military potential (i.e., coal, steel, trade, atomic energy) in Europe, while reaping the fruits of integration to satisfy the societal needs for economic accomplishment and political acceptance. Over the next decades, Germany’s political elites and society thus developed a robust attachment to European institutions, incorporating the strongest European identity among the larger member states. Also, German trade flows with EU partners—on which its formidable economic revival was built—are in excess of

60 percent of overall German trade. German external relations were mediated through European institutions. As a consequence, the institutional penetration of the German polity by European institutions grew steadily, especially after supranational governance had made quantum leaps in the 1980s and 1990s.⁴¹

When unification hit the German policy elite unexpectedly in the fall of 1989, Chancellor Helmut Kohl came back to these lessons of history. Externally, central decision makers faced critical (if not hostile) questions about the future intentions and policies of the soon-to-be new German Gulliver by neighboring countries—despite its strong prointegrationist policies in establishing a Common European Market, freedom of movement, and a common currency in the 1980s. Domestically, it soon became obvious that unification posed tremendous economic risks because the five former East German *Länder* had barely any industry or infrastructure that could survive capitalist competition. In addition, the chancellor had ruffled feathers both abroad and at home when he proposed a ten-point plan for unification in November 1989 without consulting allied nations and his coalition partner, the FDP. Yet, with strong American backing and galvanizing French cooperation, the Kohl government launched a barrage of initiatives for deeper economic and monetary integration as well as further political integration. During the intergovernmental conference for the Maastricht treaty, the German delegation proved very successful in projecting its policy ideas of a strong independent Central Bank, which was committed to low inflation, into the Treaty on the European Union (TEU).

The resulting Maastricht Treaty, consisting of three distinct pillars, the European Monetary Union (EMU), a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and cooperation in Home and Justice Affairs (HJA), was signed in November 1991. The treaty garnered overwhelming support in the *Bundestag*, but during the ratification process both the German *Länder* and the FCC raised concerns about the growing impact of European legislation. Consequently, the *Länder* managed to extract an Amendment to the Basic Law Article 23, which provided them and the *Bundestag* with veto power (if they could muster a two-thirds majority). Furthermore, this so-called Europe Article contains several guiding principles for Germany's future integration policy, the *Struktursicherungsklauseln*, which oblige the executive to respect the core principles of the *Grundgesetz*.

In a similar vein, the FCC in its controversial ruling on the Maastricht Treaty established a high degree of control for itself *vis-à-vis* the executive and EU institutions (including the ECJ), and it also created a set of normative criteria that any additional transfer of competences to the EU would have to meet. Public support for deeper integration also weakened considerably over the 1990s. The willingness of Germans to integrate dropped from 80 percent at the beginning of the 1990s to just 40 percent at the end of the decade. Similarly, German voter turnout in European elections dropped from almost 60 percent (1989) to 43 percent (2004).

In the end, Germany ratified the Maastricht Treaty, which subsequently established the *Euro* as the common European currency. It also pushed for the

enlargement of the EU through the European Free Trade Area states (Austria, Sweden, and Finland) in 1995 and central European states (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Malta, and Cyprus) in 2004. Through both the EU-Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) and Nice (2000), Germany proposed a further deepening of the competences of the European Commission and Parliament while also insisting on unanimity in Home and Justice Affairs due to pressure from the German *Länder*. As a response to the Maastricht ruling of the FCC, the Kohl and Schröder governments also started to call for a European catalogue of fundamental rights to be integrated into all EU treaties.

In sum, the changes in the German polity resulted in a two-pronged development. Not only did new players start to “domesticate” the executive's prointegrationist European policy, but Germany's support for ever deeper integration became much more contingent, combining strong approval in common foreign, security, and defense policy with a much more narrowly defined position in other policy areas (i.e., EU budget, agricultural subsidies, etc.).

Germany's new contingent Europeanism is also visible in the differentiated push for a constitutionalization of the European Union during the Grand Coalition (CDU/CSU and SPD, 2005–2008) and the CDU/CSU and FDP coalition (since 2008). German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer launched the debate with his agenda-setting speech at Humboldt University in May 2000. The German *Länder*, by insisting on a post-Nice process to codify a catalogue of competences for the EU during ratification, also initiated the subsequent constitutional convention (2001–2003). During the convention, the *Länder* with their own representatives managed to insert the catalogue of competences with various other demands into the European Constitutional Treaty (CT). The resulting treaty was ratified in parliament in May 2005, but challenged in the FCC so that the German ratification process was not finished when it was stopped by the negative referenda in France and in the Netherlands. Then in 2007, Chancellor Merkel decided on a new treaty initiative during Germany's EU presidency. The strategy foresaw to keep as much as possible from the CT while addressing the concerns of those publics which were to hold (presumably close) referenda on the resulting treaty. Effective multilateral diplomacy ensured that several German key preferences were met in the subsequent Lisbon treaty, including increased provisions for qualified majority voting (QMV) in the Council of Ministers.

Called on by skeptics of EU integration, the FCC ruled again. The court held that the Lisbon Treaty itself is constitutional. However, it also stipulated that the accompanying German statute on the rights of the *Bundestag* and the *Bundesrat* in European Union was not. It instructed the legislators to modify the statute in accordance with its own decision thereby leaving no doubt that the FCC ultimately sets the limits for legislative acts. Moreover, the ruling took another (radical) step to delimit the integrative competences of the legislative and executive branch. Under the guise of the new concept of *Integrationsverantwortung* (“responsibility for integration”), the court withdrew a large chunk of procedural

and normative competences from the legislative and executive branches which they cannot delegate to the Union under the given German Constitution. The Lisbon ruling was highly significant, and may serve to further dampen Germany's integrationist ambitions.

Ever since the global financial and economic crisis hit the *eurozone*, domestic constraints on Germany's traditional role as a prointegrationist and cash-dispensing leader have become even more apparent. This pattern was already visible when Germany (and France) violated the deficit limits of the EMU Stability and Growth Pact in 2003, even managing to prevent censure by the European Commission. Subsequently, economies in the eurozone stabilized due to low interest rates and a barrage of cheap credit: Germany became very competitive because of low wage increases and efficiency gains, but Southern European economies exploited cheap credit lines, creating sizeable housing and investment bubbles. When the global credit crunch hit in 2008, it left these economies (and Ireland) seriously exposed.⁴²

The Merkel government first reacted very cautiously to the Euro crisis, advising Greece and other troubled economies to follow the German example by improving their competitive edge. But when Greece tinkered on the edge of default for the first time in March 2010, the chancellor, albeit reluctantly, accepted a multilateral loan facility which included the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The Merkel government rejected an all-out bailout for Greece, because it suspected another intervention by the Federal Constitutional Court and a growing public skepticism, which was ratcheted up by the German media. Thus, to sustain public and parliamentary support, which had been weakened by several electoral losses and the abstention of both the SPD and Green Party in the vote on the eurozone stabilization package bill, Berlin insisted on stringent conditions attached to the loan facility. The chancellor asked for and received IMF involvement, the troubled economies must have exhausted their capacity to borrow on the financial markets, and harsher conditions for eurozone members with budgetary indiscipline were accepted.⁴³

In sum, Germany's European policy has become weaker. In a European Union of twenty-seven member states, Gulliver's capacity alone (or in tandem with France) to procure the necessary majorities and resources to solve some of the most pressing problems has been waning. Berlin's integration policy has become "leaner" in the sense that its prointegrationist stance has become much more qualified since reunification. Moreover, Gulliver has become "meaner" in the sense that domestic, financial, political, and ideational concerns often take precedence over commonly held European interests.

Conclusion

German foreign policy has evolved dramatically over time. The largest change occurred after World War II, when the pursuit of the expansionist and racist Nazi grand strategy was dropped, and the legitimacy and security of the young

democracy itself became a priority. A second major change took place after unification, resulting in a shift from military restraint to humanitarian interventions and from prointegrationist to contingent European policies. This contingent Europeanism is now visible in the guarded German response to the global financial and Euro crisis, with a yet unknown outcome.

When examining postwar and contemporary German foreign policy, contrasting the different approaches reveals that the mix between external and internal factors also shifted over time. While policy choices seemed severely constrained in the early years of the Cold War, key decisions such as the unilateral recognition of Croatia and Slovenia (1991) or the noncoalition strategy during the Iraq crisis, display a greater willingness to stick to controversial positions despite strong pressure by Germany's traditional allies and partners.

Several patterns lend themselves to further analysis. First, while the strong domestic consensus on the use of force may change—even in the guilt-stricken case of Germany—it does so only gradually and path-dependently. To change attitudes, policy-makers, and citizens alike need critical situations in which their traditional beliefs are challenged and where key norms contradict each other. When government forces or militias targeted large ethnic groups in Africa and the Balkans, committing genocide and ethnic cleansing, a strict pacifism became untenable for many in the SPD and Green Party. And yet, Germany foreign military interventions still must be legitimated on humanitarian grounds or based on vital security interests to garner the necessary parliamentary and societal approval.⁴⁴

Second, the German polity and foreign policy process are not independent from its international and domestic environment. In turn, changes in the party system (i.e., the emergence of the Green and Left party) not only change the coalition arithmetic in parliament, they also influence policy choices through the disproportional effects of junior partners on coalition governments in the German system. Changes in the external institutional setting, including the delegation of sovereignty to supranational EU institutions, enhance the relative autonomy of the German executive *vis-à-vis* other branches of government. European obligations also may directly challenge Germany's constitutional order, such as when transfer payments during the Euro crisis undermine Germany's ability to comply with its own debt limits in its constitution.

Third, legitimate German foreign policy may not always be effective multilateral foreign policy. As the vocal opposition to the Iraq intervention and the waning support for the Afghanistan operation displays, democratic German governments do not always offer "unlimited solidarity." Rather, to maintain support in a polity which still differs from major allies and partners on issues like the use of military force, data and privacy protection, or environmental security, German leaders have broken with, circumvented, or reinterpreted their respective institutional obligations. In many cases, particularly in the EU, these conflicts go back to the enduring economic and budgetary implications of incorporating the former East German states.

These theoretical implications also provide a sketchy road map for the future. Most pointedly, they suggest that both domestic and international constraints on the German Gulliver after World War II complicate its foreign policy development. As the fragmentation and polarization of its party system further progresses, these crosscutting pressures are unlikely to vanish anytime soon. To minimize these pressures, German society has to either adapt to foreign expectations, or to shape those expectations so that they fit more comfortably with German interests and preferences.

Suggestions for Further Reading

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Notes

1. Walter Isaacson et al., "Is One Germany Better than Two?" *Time Magazine*, November 20, 1989, <http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,959068,00.html>.
2. Volker Rittberger, *German Foreign Policy Since Unification*; John S. Duffield, "Political Culture and State Behavior: Why Germany Confounds Neorealism," *International Organization* 53, no. 4 (1999): 765–803.
3. Henning Tewes, *Germany, Civilian Power and the New Europe* (Houndsmills, UK: Palgrave, 1998); Sebastian Harnisch and Hanns W. Maull, *Germany as a Civilian Power. The Foreign Policy of the Berlin Republic* (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2001).
4. Gunther Hellmann, *Germany's EU Policy on Asylum and Defence. De-Europeanization by Default?* (Houndsmills, UK: Palgrave, 2006); Beverly Crawford, *Power and German Foreign Policy. Embedded Hegemony in Europe* (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).
5. The Lebensraum concept of the National Socialist German Workers Party (NSDAP) involved the claim of foreign territory postulated to be essential for the survival and well-being of the Arian race.
6. Hans-Joachim Spanger, *The GDR in East-West Relations*, Adelphi Paper #240 (London, UK: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1989).
7. The Alliance, as it is often simply referred to, was established as a political commitment to contain the spread of Soviet communism in Europe.

8. Through these treaties, the FRG and its Western partners ended the occupation statute, administered the FRG's membership in NATO and West European Union (WEU) and the FRG established a political understanding with France on the Saar territory.
9. Philipp Gordon, *A Certain Idea of France: French Security Policy and the Gaullist Legacy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993).
10. There is voluminous literature on the diplomatic process surrounding German unification. The best account to date is Philipp Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, *Germany Unified and Europe: A Study in Statecraft* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995).
11. The term "trading state" was coined by Richard Rosecrance, describing economies which pursue a peaceful trading thereby transforming their positions in the international political sphere, . . . [while (S. H.)] "other states also benefit from the enhanced trade and growth that economic cooperation makes possible." See Richard Rosecrance, *The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World* (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1986).
12. Wolfram Hanrieder, *Germany, America, Europe: Forty Years of German Foreign Policy*, 2nd ed. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1991); Helga Haftendorn, *Coming of Age: German Foreign Policy Since 1945* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006).
13. Andrew Moravcsik, *The Choice for Europe. Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996); Simon Bulmer, "Shaping the Rules? The Constitutive Politics of the European Union and German Power," in *Tamed Power. Germany in Europe*, ed. Peter Katzenstein (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), 49–79.
14. The social constructivist concept of "ontological security" stresses that uncertainty motivates decision makers and societies to establish (detectable) structures of meaning across time and space, which provide cognitive and emotional stability and that these actors seek to update and protect those critical structures salient to ontological security, see Jennifer Mitzen, "Ontological Security in World Politics," *European Journal of International Relations* 12, no. 3 (2006): 341–70.
15. Stephen Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987); On neoclassical realism and foreign policy analysis, see Steven Lobell et al., *Neoclassical Realism, The State, and Foreign Policy* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
16. "A world with six billion people will not be led into a peaceful future by the mightiest power alone . . . I do not support anti-Americanism at all, but even all the differences in size and weight, alliances between free democracies should not be reduced to following. Alliance partners are not satellites." German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer (in 2002) as cited in Judith Kelley, "Strategic Non-cooperation as Soft Balancing: Why Iraq Was not Just About Iraq," *International Politics* 42, no. 2 (2005): 153–73.
17. Daniel Baltrusaitis, *Coalition Policy and Iraq War. Determinants of Choice* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2010).
18. The term was coined by Peter Katzenstein, originally describing Germany's domestic policy structure from a comparative perspective. However, its meaning was broadened subsequently to encompass its foreign policy process, see Peter Katzenstein, *Policy and Politics in West Germany* (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1987); Peter Katzenstein, "Conclusion: Semisovereignty in United Germany," in *Governance in Contemporary Germany: The Semisovereign State Revisited*, eds. Simon Green and

- William E. Paterson (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 283–306; William E. Paterson, "European Policy-making: Between Associated Sovereignty and Semisovereignty," in *Governance in Contemporary Germany: The Semisovereign State Revisited*, eds. Simon Green and William E. Paterson (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 261–80.
19. Ibid., 261–80.
20. These key provisions are stated in the preamble of the basic law for the Federal Republic of Germany, the *Grundgesetz* in Article 1 and 9, paragraph 2 as well as Articles 23 through 26.
21. Based on Article 24, the Federal Constitutional Court held in a July 1994 ruling that German integration in systems of collective defense and systems of collective security meant that foreign deployments of Germany's Armed Forces was constitutional.
22. Sebastian Harnisch, "German Politics Lecture: The Politics of Domestication: A New Paradigm in German Foreign Policy," *German Politics* 18, no. 4 (2009): 455–68.
23. Juliet Kaarbo, "Power and Influence in Foreign Policy Decision-Making: The Role of Junior Coalition Partners in Germany and Israel," *International Studies Quarterly* 40, no. 4 (1996): 501–30.
24. For example, the electoral law of 1957 institutionalized the so-called 5 percent hurdle, requiring parties to receive at least 5 percent of the popular vote or three direct constituency seats.
25. Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS) after joining the WASG—the Electoral Alternative for Labor and Social Justice in West Germany—the two have now merged into the Party called The Left or *Die Linke*.
26. Angelika Scheuer and Hermann Schmidt, "Sources of EU Support: The Case of Germany," *German Politics* 18, no. 4 (2009): 577–90.
27. Thomas Petersen, "Gemeinsames Interesse an Europa in Gefahr," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, January 25, 2011. <http://www.faz.net/s/Rub99C3EECA60D84C08AD6B3E60C4EA807F/Doc~EAE005CA324524217B16D205CA47FBE88~ATpl~Ecommon~Scontent.html>.
28. Gunther Hellmann, "Fatal Attraction? German Foreign Policy and IR/Foreign Policy Theory," *Journal of International Relations and Development* 12, no. 3 (2009): 257–92; Akan Malicki, "Germans as Venutians: The Culture of German Foreign Policy Behavior," *Foreign Policy Analysis* 2, no. 1 (2006): 37–62.
29. See Thomas Pedersen, *Germany, France and the Integration of Europe. A Realist Interpretation* (London, ENG: Pinter, 1998); Beverly Crawford, *Power and German Foreign Policy. Embedded Hegemony in Europe* (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007); Regina Karp, "Germany: A 'Normal' Global Actor?" *German Politics* 18, no. 1 (2009): 12–35.
30. See Steven Lobell et al., *Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
31. Jeffrey Anderson, *German Unification and the Union of Europe: The Domestic Politics of Integration Policy* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1999). See select chapters in *Germany's Uncertain Power. Foreign Policy of the Berlin Republic*, ed. Hanns W. Maull (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006).
32. See John S. Duffield, *World Power Forsaken: Political Culture, International Institutions and German Security Policy after Unification* (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998); Thomas Banchoff, *The German Problem Transformed: Institutions, Politics and Foreign Policy, 1945–1995* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999); Felix Berenskoetter and Bastian Giegerich, "From NATO to ESDP: A Social Constructivist Analysis of German Strategic Adjustment after the End of the Cold War," *Security Studies* 19, no. 3 (2010): 407–52.
33. See Rainer Baumann and Gunther Hellmann, "Germany and the Use of Military Force: 'Total War,' the 'Culture of Restraint,' and the Quest for Normality," in *New Europe, New Germany, Old Foreign Policy? German Foreign Policy since Unification*, ed. Douglas Webber (London, ENG: Frank Cass, 2001), 61–82.
34. See Kerry Longhurst, *Germany and the Use of Force: The Evolution of German Security Policy 1989–2003* (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2004).
35. Adrian Hyde-Price, "Berlin Republic Takes to Arms," *The World Today* (June 1999): 30–2.
36. Hanns W. Maull, "Germany and the Use of Force—Still a 'Civilian Power'?" *Survival* 42, no. 2 (2000): 56–80.
37. Sebastian Harnisch, "German Non-Proliferation Policy and the Iraq Conflict," *German Politics* 13, no. 2 (2004): 1–34.
38. Quoted in Joachim Rieker, "Schröder und der Irakkrieg," *Neue Gesellschaft/Frankfurter Hefte* 49, no. 12 (2002): 717–19.
39. Daniel Baltrusaitis, *Coalition Politics and the Iraq War* (Boulder, CO: FirstForum Press, 2010).
40. See Guido Westerwelle, "Bedenke das Ende," *Sueddeutsche Zeitung*, March 24, 2011. <http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/libyen-einsatz-kritik-an-der-deutschen-position-bedenke-das-ende-1.1076441>.
41. Kenneth Dyson and Klaus H. Goetz, *Germany, Europe and the Politics of Constraint* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2003).
42. See Simon Tilford, "How to Save the Euro," *Centre for European Reform Essays* (London, ENG: CER/Centre for European Reform), http://www.cer.org.uk/pdf/essay_euro_tilford_14sept10.pdf.
43. See Simon Bulmer and William Paterson, "Germany and European Union: From 'Tamed' to Normalized Power?" *International Affairs* 86, no. 5 (2010): 1051–73.
44. As the resignation of Federal President Horst Köhler indicates, Germany's discourse on the use of force is still narrowly confined. In an interview in May 2010 he seemed to suggest that the Bundeswehr could also be deployed for economic purposes, and after some public furor he subsequently resigned.