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Scenarios for a Future Kosovo

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1. Introduction

„I am hoping for a different outcome than we are seeing right now. I am hoping, in a ten year's time, we will be in the European Union or very close to being in the European Union. I am hoping for better economic development. I am hoping for a better integrated youth. I am hoping for more transparency from the local government. I am hoping for more in everything. More in being closer to the European Union and as close as we can be to normalization and creating a country that is in one word normal“ (Elvin Blakaj, Student at ISPE College, Pristina).

The question of what Kosovo's future will look like is both a very challenging and interesting one. It is challenging because with its independence from Serbia in 2008, Kosovo is among the youngest states in the world. It is not recognized by every member of the international community. It is both young and dynamic and, at the same time, parts of the population have very stable images in their minds. The question is interesting not only to scientists, but especially to people living in Kosovo, because although they are hoping for a better future, they are not sure what is going to happen. Probably no one can do so. No recognized political scientist has developed scenarios for Kosovo's future after its independence so far.

Accordingly, as part of a field trip from the University of Heidelberg to Kosovo, a binational working group, consisting of two students from Heidelberg University and two students from College ISPE in Pristina, developed four scenarios on what Kosovo's future could look like. The field trip was included in a weekly seminar in the summer term 2014, focusing on 'Conflict Regulation and State Building on the Western Balkans'. This paper documents the results of this group. The four scenarios were developed by following three key uncertainties, namely the question of international recognition and independence, domestic conflict or cooperation and a perspective for EU membership

Before explaining the four developed scenarios, it is necessary to elaborate briefly what scenarios are and what they are not. Consequently, this paper will start with a general

overview on theories about the future, followed by the technique of scenario planning and the particular approach, the binational working group used to analyze Kosovo's future.

2. Theories about the future

No matter whether in social sciences or every day life - predicting the future is usually a very difficult task. Besides visions, trends, roadmaps and forecasts, scenarios are only one out of many techniques to analyze the future (Fink/Siebe 2011: 12). Gabriel argues that both scenarios and predictions are no academic approaches for analyzing the future (Gabriel 2012: 129). In his point of view, predictions produce empirical evidence, however not concerning the future, whereas scenarios, although dealing with the future, do not produce empirical evidence (ibid: 136). Although scenarios are not capable of predicting all future possibilities due to their reliance on pure types of future actions, they constitute a possibility to give an impression on what might happen in the future, without making any predictions on its probability (Gabriel 2012: 156).

In general, scenarios are tools to illustrate and describe possible future developments (Amer et. al. 2012: 23; McWorther/Lynham 2014: 337). They allow one to move forward from the actual to the future situation (Amer et. al. 2012: 23). They are not a strategy themselves, but may help to develop strategies for organizations as private or public enterprises, the military or even non-governmental organizations (Bradfield et. al. 2005: 797). Among the most important aspects of scenarios is that they do not predict the future, but explore plausible future situations (Amer et. al. 2012: 24). The difference between forecasts and scenarios is that while forecasts touch upon probabilities, scenarios abstain from doing so (ibid).

The process of developing scenarios can be undertaken in at least four different ways (ibid: 25). Fink and Siebe distinguish these approaches into those using bottom-up- and those using top-down approaches (ibid). While bottom-up means that researchers first take a look at the empirical aspects and related implications on possible scenarios, top-down approaches are characterized by first defining a general framework or direction of

a scenario, followed by a detailed analysis of related aspects (ibid). When top-down approaches seek to make predictions on the probability of a scenario, they are called ‚genius foresights‘ (ibid). If not, it is called ‚scenario planning‘ (ibid). Bottom-up approaches, which consider probabilities, are so called ‚reciprocal scenarios‘ (ibid). If bottom-up approaches do not take probabilities into account, the approach is called ‚scenario technique‘ (ibid). Considering the complexity of the issue under discussion and the limited amount of time, the ‚scenario planning technique‘ has been deemed to be the most appropriate one in order to come to plausible scenarios on Kosovo’s future. It is also the traditional and most often used deductive approach for developing scenarios (ibid: 31).

3. Scenario planning

The technique of scenario planning became very popular in organizations after Royal Dutch/Shell successfully used it for avoiding the impacts of the oil crisis in the 1970s (Korte/Chermack 2007: 645; Wack 1985a; Wack 1985b). While a range of different variations of scenario planning exists, most do agree on the fact that it is characterized by a top-down approach without making any predictions on probabilities (Fink/Siebe 2011: 25).¹ This is exactly where the difference to the so-called ‚scenario-technique‘, a bottom-up approach, lies (ibid). Instead of systematically connecting all possible developments, scenario-planning as a top-down approach follows the tradition of first setting a general framework in which it develops the scenarios (ibid: 24). Usually, few scenarios are developed by a small group of executives (Economist 2008; Wade/Wade 2012: 29). For the development of the scenarios presented in this paper, as already mentioned, the team consisted of four students, while two came from Heidelberg University and two from College ISPE in Pristina. However, due to different educational backgrounds, the main task in developing the scenarios was undertaken by the German students.

¹ For introductory texts on scenario planning see Amer et. al. 2012; Chermack 2004; Fink/Siebe 2011; Korte/Chermack 2007; Mason 1998; Schwatz 1998.

In great parts, the group followed the concept established by Schwartz (Schwartz 1998: 241-247). In his book *The Art of the Long View* he developed a structured approach for scenario planning, which received high appreciation by international scientists (Economist 2001; Fink/Siebe 2011: 36). This approach includes a number of steps on how to plan scenarios (Schwartz 1998: 241-247). Fink and Siebe adapted these steps and thus made them suitable for developing scenarios for a future Kosovo (Fink/Siebe 2011: 38-42).

The first out of five steps focuses on preparing the scenario (Fink/Siebe 2011: 38). At this point the motivation and intention for the scenarios should be clarified (ibid). In the case of developing scenarios for a future Kosovo, the motivation is based on two pillars. First of all, no scenarios exist on Kosovo's future yet, so the topic constitutes an actual research gap. On the other hand, as our trip to Kosovo has shown, the Kosovar society shows a remarkable interest in where the country's future might be heading. A second aspect which should be clarified while preparing the scenario includes both scope and time frame of the scenario (ibid). Should the scenario pursue a global or a more concrete perspective? Should it take a look at the long-term or short-term future? In the case of this research project, the scope concentrated on the political future of Kosovo and the time frame was not set for a clear date, but rather for the future in general. This allowed the scenario planning group to focus on those topics which are very relevant for the Kosovar society, but are not connected to a specific time horizon. In addition, this step includes gathering information about the general topic and the individual scenarios and thereby serves as a foundation for the following steps (Schwartz 1998: 243).

The second step deals with identifying of key factors and driving forces (Fink/Siebe 2011: 39). Key Factors symbolize the most important actors or institutions (ibid: 39). Driving forces, on the other hand, are constituted by the social, economic, political, ecological and technical environment of those key factors (ibid). Scenario planning techniques are usually used by private organizations or economic sciences, but not in political sciences. Therefore the traditional approach has been adapted to this field of studies. The variations will be explained in detail when it comes to the different steps of the planned scenario.

The third step concentrates on assessing trends and uncertainties of the key factors and driving forces and ranking the respective uncertainties (Fink/Siebe 2011: 39-40; Schwartz 1998: 242). Factors and trends which show both importance to the subject and a significant level of uncertainty are classified as key uncertainties (Fink/Siebe 2011: 40). Trends which are regarded as stable shall serve as a foundation for the scenarios (ibid).

Step number four is the so-called ‚heart of scenario planning‘, because it deals with constructing them (ibid: 40). In this step, researchers ask themselves how many scenarios they need to construct and which topics they should touch upon (ibid). According to Fink and Siebe, scenario planning can be undertaken through an inductive or a deductive way (ibid). By choosing the deductive path, the research team of this paper first decided upon the topics under discussion and then took the two key uncertainties as axis of the scenario scheme (ibid: 41).² While one key uncertainty was the future status of Kosovo and international recognition or neglecting of its independence, the other axis was constituted by the question of domestic conflict or cooperation.

The fifth and final step is about shaping and phrasing the scenarios (ibid: 42). Researchers should seek to explain the scenarios in a comprehensive, consistent, memorable and detailed manner (ibid). They should include all key factors, driving forces and basic trends and connect them with the scenario topics (ibid). Possible ways to present the scenarios include a formal description, a story from the future, a newspaper article, a video- or multimedia presentation, theatrical performances or personal readings (ibid). Since the scenario planning group on Kosovo’s future already presented their scenarios in a multimedia presentation, including a video with different points of view from the Kosovar society as well as interviews with students and professors from abroad, this paper seeks to complement the existing presentations by giving a formal description of the scenarios. This will be accompanied by a short newspaper article on each scenario.

² The scenario scheme can be found in chapter 9.1.

4. Scenarios

In the following sections, the four scenarios identified in the group will be presented. Starting with a formal presentation, where the preconditions for each individual scenarios will be defined, followed by the key factors and driving forces. Serving as a short summary for each scenario, each section will conclude with a short newspaper article.

4.1. Independent EU member

4.1.1. Preconditions

As all EU member states need to vote in favor of new members in the EU Council and ratify the accession treaty, the recognition of Kosovo's independence by all those EU members is a precondition for its membership in the European Union (European Commission 2013). Currently, Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia and Spain do not recognize Kosovo as an independent state, mostly because they fear, that secessionist movements in their own countries could be fostered by such recognition (European Union 2013; Ministry of Foreign Affairs Kosovo 2013). A second precondition consists out of domestic cooperation in Kosovo, meaning that tensions between Serbian and Albanian populations as well as between other minorities will no longer constitute a severe problem.³ Finally, the European Union and its member states would need to be generally interested in giving Kosovo a perspective as an EU-member and Kosovo would be able to fulfill the EU requirements.⁴

4.1.2. Key Factors

With regard to the preconditions, the EU and its member states, the government of Kosovo, the European society and the Kosovar society would be among the most

³ For the current situation see Polloczek 2014a and Polloczek 2014b.

⁴ For current EU membership requirements see: European Union 2013.

important actors, since they influence the political, domestic and economic environment and thereby the conditions for this scenario to pass.

Various EU-institutions such as the European Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX), the European Union Office in Kosovo, including its projects and programs (EUSR), the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) and the OSCE would play an important role in helping to implement the necessary reforms (Eulex 2014; European Union Office in Kosovo 2014a; European Union Office in Kosovo 2014). UNMIK and Security Council resolution 1244 could be particularly useful in the initial phase when not all member states have recognized Kosovo yet. As the resolution is globally accepted (also by Serbia), it may help Kosovo to participate in and sign international agreements. This would ease the process of establishing security, stability and guaranteeing minority rights. It would try to improve the relationship between Belgrade and Prishtina. Accordingly, state-building would proceed, which would improve chances of being recognized by the remaining five EU countries. Furthermore, NATO's KFOR troops would help to establish security.

4.1.3. Driving Forces

Political environment

The European Union would be stable and continue with its course towards an incorporation of the West-Balkans into the union. It would support the state-building process and help Kosovo to establish the necessary standards for accession. The Government of Kosovo would implement essential reforms and behave cooperatively. Thus the country would become increasingly consolidated and less dependent on foreign aid. The nation would uphold friendly relations with its neighbors and tensions between Kosovo and Serbia would ease. The country would become a full member of the European Union and an inspiring example for other states who were born out of the ashes of civil wars and ethnic conflicts.

Domestic environment

The population would view an EU membership as desirable. The domestic situation would improve and minority rights would be guaranteed and protected. The tensions in northern Kosovo would ease, and the country would be on its path towards peace and stability. Otherwise, an EU accession would not be possible due to EU members' expectations and requirements (European Union 2013).

Economic environment

Due to close cooperation with the EU, the Kosovar economy would grow and would thus be able to provide financially for the necessary reforms. Foreign trade and investments would increase and other EU members would encourage the inflow of Foreign Direct Investments. The economy would begin to depend less on development aid and remittances.

4.1.4. Newspaper from the future

The Future Times

January 1, 20something

Kosovo's EU Council Presidency begins

Pristina. As Kosovo's Presidency of the EU Council begins today, Prime Minister Ahmeti stated: *„Our great nation can serve as an inspiring example for every country in the world! With a booming economy and a peaceful society, every citizen of Kosovo can proudly declare that he or she contributed to this marvelous success!“* As Kosovo will have the right to set the agenda of the EU Council for the next six months, it is expected to put emphasis on a stronger economic cooperation, free markets and international visa regimes. Ahmeti further explained that the economic and political success of his nation would have never been possible without the cooperation of the Serbian and Albanian governments and that he looks forward to increasing economic and and cultural exchange between the nations in the Balkan region. The EU Council Presidency in the next term will be held by Serbia, followed by the UK.

4.2. Partition

4.2.1. Preconditions

If the EU membership is not a plausible option for Kosovo and if not every state of the international community does recognize Kosovo's independence, it is possible that the current state may be divided. Kosovo today is officially an international protectorate under Security Council Resolution 1244 (United Nations 1999). Any legal change in Kosovo's status will entail a new Security Council resolution (United States Institute of Peace 2002: 11). The EU perspective depends on both the EU's internal struggle to hold its members together and the EU members' willingness to recognize Kosovo as a state and a possible EU member. The EU's struggle with keeping the United Kingdom as a member state is only one example out of many, which illustrates potential problems with holding the EU together (Oliver 2013). As mentioned before, five EU member states still do not recognize Kosovo's independence, at least in part due to secessionist movements in their own countries (European Union 2013; Ministry of Foreign Affairs Kosovo 2013). The ultimate precondition for such a partition is that, although Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo might still see each other as enemies, they would find a peaceful solution, in which the northern part of the country would become a part of Serbia while the rest would from then on belong to Albania.

4.2.2. Key Factors

In addition to the government of Kosovo, the governors of the municipalities from Northern Kosovo (Zvecan, Zubin Potok, Leposavic and the Serbian part of Mitrovica) as well as the people living there would be the key actors. The same counts for the Albanian and Serbian governments and populations.

Article 1.3 of the Kosovar constitution states: „*The Republic of Kosovo shall have no territorial claims against, and shall seek no union with, any State or part of any State.*“ (Republic of Kosovo 2008: 1). Accordingly, the nation may not unite with another state until the constitution has been changed. Therefore, the constitution needed

to be changed, if this scenario should become reality. A two third majority would be needed for such a constitutional amendment (Republic of Kosovo 2008: 55). In addition, the constitutions of Serbia and Albania needed to be adapted, since the preamble of the Serbian constitution states that entire Kosovo is still a part of the Serbian territory (Serbian Government 2004). Such a change in the constitution requires a two third majority and a referendum (ibid). Consequently, referenda in Southern and Northern Kosovo, Serbia and Albania would be needed in order to provide legitimacy to partition and dissolution of Kosovo. Moreover, Security Council resolution 1244 and the EULEX mandate needed to be changed or simply ignored by the three regional states in order to let this scenario become reality in accordance with international institutions (United Nations 1999).

4.2.3. Driving Forces

Political environment

The international community would be likely to condemn the partition, but since it lost credibility due to a lack of concrete outcomes, it would also have lost influence on the key actors. If the international community still had a say, it would be very much against a partition, as it already objected a complete partition of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It would fear that a partition of Kosovo would lead to increasing migration and maybe also ethnical cleansing, which it wanted to prevent with any means since the Dayton Agreement (Kreidl 2006: 273). The Government of Kosovo, possibly under the rule of Lëvizja Vetëvendosje! or other parties that favor a creation of greater (“natural”) Albania, would realize that their goal would only be achievable in a peaceful way if they found a compromise with the other actors. Consequently, they would redraw their claim to forcefully bring North-Kosovo under the control of Pristina and would favor a partition of the state.

The Northern Kosovo municipalities would be unhappy with the status-quo. They would view Belgrade, not Pristina, as their rightful government. As it is unlikely that the entire country of Kosovo would be brought again under Serbian control, they would

accept partition in order to become part of Serbia again, which would be an improvement compared to the status quo. The Albanian Government would aspire to a “Greater Albania” and view the EU membership as unrealistic (Austin 2004: 247). The Serbian Government would see no realistic chances of regaining control over entire Kosovo and would regard a peaceful partition as the best solution. Serbia would no longer see the province of Kosovo as an integral part of their country and they would abstain from proclaiming that Kosovo is the cradle of the Serbian nation (Mojzes 2011: 197; Stegherr 2011: 14). Serbia would claim that the model of a multiethnic nation in Kosovo failed and that stability could only be provided by a great Serbian state and a peaceful partition (Kreidl 2006: 270). Although the partition would not be the desired outcome for any party in the conflict, it would bring each of them closest to their actual goals.

Domestic environment

The people in Kosovo would seek for peace and concrete outcomes, not just unrealistic promises like EU membership. Tensions between ethnic groups would not escalate and thus be on a level which allows a peaceful partition without violent protests. Albanian nationalism would rise. Hence, the creation of a “Greater Albania” would be viewed as a realistic goal for which it would be worth to sacrifice or at least suspend EU accession.

Economic environment

The Kosovar economy would not be strong enough to supply the government with required financial resources through taxes or fees. Accordingly, the integration into the other two states would be more beneficial for the Kosovar government and society.

4.2.4. Newspaper from the future

The Future Times

January 1, 20something

Kosovo's future in Great Albania

Pristina. From today on, our country has new borders. While a small part in the North belongs to Serbia, the largest part has been united with Albania. The citizens of Kosovo may finally live in peace and harmony, have better travel opportunities and better economic perspectives. Albin Kurti stressed in an interview this morning that a dream for him and his country has become true. He pictures our nation with a prosperous future and calls for more international recognition by the international community. *„Our country has shown that, despite tensions and humiliations from certain ethnic groups, Kosovo was able to establish peace and security“*, Kurti said. He further expressed his sincere gratitude to the Albanian government and people who voted in favor of a Great Albania. Meanwhile, the situation in Mitrovica is relaxing. Albanian groups are leaving Serbian territory, under protection of KFOR troops and Serbian police officers.

4.3. Serbian Intervention

4.3.1. Preconditions

Kosovo's independence would not be recognized by every member of the international community. There would be no peaceful agreement on an independent Kosovo between Serbia and Kosovo. In 2006, the Serbian parliament adopted a new perambulatory clause to its constitution, which stated that every change to the constitution would from then on require a two third majority (Petrovic 2013: 281). In addition, the President of Serbia who came into office in 2012 is a former radical nationalist who still claims that he dreams of a Great Serbian Solution, although he pretends that his radical views changed in favor of a more cooperative policy towards the EU and Kosovo (ibid: 287). Furthermore, an EU-membership would be no realistic option for Kosovo and the government would therefore lack a major incentive for more cooperation with Serbia. The ultimate precondition would be that Serbian minorities in Kosovo would not be protected from violence. Consequently, the Serbian government would argue that they needed to protect the Serbian population in Kosovo and would intervene.

4.3.2. Key Factors

Major actors in this scenario would be the governments and people of Serbia and Kosovo, since they would not find a compromise on the political future of Kosovo. Governments of other nations as the Security Council members would play an important role due to their inaction and inability to intervene when the conflict intensified. NATO, OSCE, UN and EU are also to be seen as key actors, since they would fail in upholding peace and security in the region (Basic 2013: 167).

Due to their responsibilities and tasks in the region, EULEX, UNMIK, KFOR and OSCE, belong to the key institutions for this scenario, as well as Security Council Resolution 1244, which would not provide appropriate solutions to rising tensions (King/Whit 2006; Kreidl 2006: 203-262; Rathfelder 2010: 328-359; Wierse 2008: 30-40).

4.3.3. Driving Forces

Political Environment

In this scenario, the Kosovar government would not be willing or able to protect Serbian minorities in Kosovo nor would it be able to ease tensions between Albanian and Serbian population. Therefore, the situation, especially in Northern Kosovo, would intensify. Current political rights for minorities, including reserved seats in the parliament and the fact that one minister must be from the Serb minority and one from another minority, would be decreased or eliminated, leading to further tensions (Baliqi 2013: 47). The Serbian government would feel the need to protect Serbian minorities. It would be strong enough to intervene and an EU-membership would not be a realistic option for Serbia or would no longer be intended. Accordingly, a major incentive for cooperation would be lacking. Besides the fact that cooperation between Serbia and Kosovo would be lacking, the international community would not be able or willing to intervene in the conflict. Reasons could be found in past conflicts and bad experiences with interventions, strategic interests or lacking financial or military capabilities.⁵ Some nations would even be supporting the Serbian government. The EU would not be able to react due to internal problems and factions, which would hinder a common policy for the situation. A new Security Council Resolution would not pass due to the strategic interests of states like Russia or China who would use their veto powers. A Security Council reform would not be implemented by then. Kosovo's neighbors like Albania or other nations would not intervene or support the Kosovar government because of financial or political reasons. NATO would or could not intervene, mostly because of political limitations of their mandate.

Domestic Environment

Inside the Kosovar society, tensions between the Albanian and Serbian population would intensify. Although the constitution, which is based on the Ahtisaari-plan, guarantees an equal status for all ethnic groups, the reality would look completely

⁵ For a better understanding of how past conflicts can effect nation's willingness for foreign interventions, see Kuperman 2013.

different (Republic of Kosovo 2008; United Nations 2007). Media would foster violence through biased reporting and by producing friend and enemy dichotomies. Interest groups with a strong focus on suppressing Serbian minorities would rise in power.

Economic Environment

The Kosovar economy would not be strong enough to provide the state with sufficient resources to uphold public goods nor to satisfy public opinion. Political revolts in the society would be the direct consequence. Serbian minorities and the relations between Kosovo and Serbia would be taken as scapegoats for the miserable economic development. Economic cooperation between Kosovo and Serbia, both on a state level as well as on a local level, would not take place or would not lead to increased security and stability.

4.3.4. Newspaper from the future

The Future Times

January 1, 20something

Serbian troops on their way to Pristina

Mitrovica. This morning, Serbian troops crossed the Kosovar border and took over Mitrovica. The Serbian government announced that by the end of the day, Pristina and all Kosovar territories would be under Serbian control. They made clear that the Kosovar Army did not have any chance against their troops. Due to the miserable economic situation and no international support, Kosovo's attempts for resistance are extremely weak. Although the population and army are defending themselves with all means, they cannot counter the Serbian intervention. Serbians and Albanians are fighting against each other all around the country. People in our country are suffering, but the international community still does not see its responsibility to protect the people in our country. A Security Council resolution on the situation in Kosovo has been blocked by Russian and Chinese veto powers. EULEX and KFOR troops left the country.

4.4. Failed State

Before this scenario can be explained in detail, we need to define what a failed state is. Since no internationally accepted definition of a failed state exists, the one provided by the Washington based Fund for Peace is useful to describe such a state (Fund for Peace 2014a). The fund no longer speaks from failed, but from failing states, which show the following attributes: loss of physical control over its territory or a monopoly on the legitimate use of force; erosion of legitimate authority to make collective decisions; an inability to provide reasonable public services and an inability to interact with other states as a full member of the international community (Fund for Peace 2014b). They constructed 12 indicators, which cover a wide range of state failure risk elements, including extensive corruption and criminal behavior; inability to collect taxes or otherwise draw on citizen support; large-scale involuntary dislocation of the population; sharp economic decline; group-based inequality; institutionalized persecution or discrimination; severe demographic pressures; brain drain, and environmental decay (ibid).

4.4.1. Preconditions

As for the last two mentioned scenarios, an EU-membership would again not be a perspective for Kosovo. There would be no peaceful agreement between Serbia and Kosovo. Serbian minorities would not be protected by the Kosovar government. The ethnic conflict would intensify, but in this case, Serbia would not intervene.

4.4.2. Key Factors

The most important actors in this scenario would be the government and society of Kosovo, as well as Serbia and the international community as such, since they would not intervene. The EU, UN and NATO would again play a role through their inaction. Most important institutions would be EULEX, OSCE, UNMIK and Security Council Resolution 1244, because they would not provide appropriate answers to improving the situation (King/Whit 2006; Kreidl 2006: 203-262; Rathfelder 2010: 328-359; Wierse

2008: 30-40). Accordingly, the international community and its institutions would allow a failed state to happen.

4.4.3. Driving Forces

Political Environment

The government of Kosovo would no longer be able to provide basic public goods as security and stability for its own nation. It would not be capable of dealing with rising domestic tensions nor upholding national sovereignty. It would not protect Serbian minorities. It would not cooperate with the Serbian government and corruption would dominate the political system. The international community would not intervene because the UN Security Council and the European Union would be divided upon the question of Kosovo's independence and would therefore not come to a resolution. Other nations would not intervene due to their past experiences with interventions without UN mandate or due to strategic interests or lacking financial or military capabilities. Kosovo's neighbors would also abstain from intervening.

Domestic Environment

Various interest groups inside Kosovo would fight against each other and, although the constitution might still officially be protecting minority groups, the fact that state control would no longer be guaranteed would allow other groups to oppress and humiliate minorities (Weller 2009: 240-258). Some interest groups would get very powerful and undermine state activity. The public opinion would be dominated by friend or foe thinking. Violence and crime would dominate everyday life. Media would foster the ethnic conflict through very biased reporting.

Economic Environment

The Kosovar economy would decrease and consequently could not provide enough financial resources for the state to provide basic public goods and so to satisfy the needs

and demands of the population. The economy would be dominated by black markets, extensive corruption and crimes. Development aid would either be misused for the personal benefit of criminal actors or would no longer be provided by other states since the Kosovar economy would have no future perspective at all.

4.4.4. Newspaper from the future

The Future Times

January 1, 20something

Albin Mbreti: „I am the King of Kosovo“

Pristina. Albin Mbreti, business man and designated Mayor of Pristina, said in an interview yesterday evening: *„I am the King of Kosovo! You better follow my lead! The country is under my control! I have people everywhere!“* Mbreti is seen as the wealthiest man in entire Kosovo. He owns enterprises in communication-, security-, hotel- and transport businesses. To foreigners who accuse him for war crimes, corruption and election fraud he replied: *„Only the powerless and unsuccessful ones desperately criticize the successful ones in order to satisfy their jealousy!“* Mbreti's plans for his term as Mayor of Pristina include a decriminalization of war heroes and less state control over the economy. Recently, he won a trial against several anonymous business men who accused him for contract killing. Meanwhile, the national economy is on record low levels. KFOR and EULEX left the country months before.

5. Summary

A future in the European Union, in Great Albania and Serbia, in a country under Serbian control or in a Failed or „Failing“ State? According to the four scenarios presented in this study, almost everything is possible - depending on the preconditions, key factors and driving forces.

If Kosovo's future lay in the *European Union*, Kosovo's status question needed to be resolved - at least among EU member states - and Kosovo must be able to fulfill the EU's membership criteria. The EU itself needed to be politically stable and the Kosovar government needed to act cooperatively and implement reforms. The population inside Kosovo needed to view the EU membership as desirable while at the same time, the domestic situation would be improving. Minority rights needed to be guaranteed - both in theory and practice - and the situation in Northern Kosovo needed to improve. The Kosovar economy needed to be growing and thus able to provide financially for the necessary reforms.

If a *peaceful partition* defined Kosovo's future, the EU could or simply would not focus on new accessions and the process of international recognition of the newly founded state would be stagnating. At the same time, the key actors in the Serbian, Kosovar and Albanian government, as well as in Northern Kosovo municipalities, would be interested in resolving the situation peacefully and cooperatively. The international community would lose influence on the key actors and other states would thus not be very involved in the decision making. The Kosovar government would redraw their claim to forcefully bring North-Kosovo under the control of Pristina and compromise. Northern municipalities would accept the partition in order to become a part of Serbia. As the EU membership would be unrealistic for Albania, they would aspire a Great Albania and vote in favor of the partition. Serbia would see no realistic chances of regaining control over entire Kosovo and therefore agree with the partition. The Kosovar population would be in favor of a peaceful agreement. The Kosovar economy would not be strong enough to support the state, which would make the integration into the other two states more beneficial.

A *Serbian intervention* would only be possible, if Serbia was strong enough to intervene, Kosovo too weak to defend and the international community not willing to or not capable of reacting. Kosovo's independence would not be recognized by all states of the international community. The EU membership would be no realistic option for both Kosovo and Serbia, thus a major incentive for cooperation would be lacking. Serbian minorities in Kosovo would not be protected, giving the Serbian government a justification to intervene as their responsibility to protect their own population. Domestic conflict, fostered by the media and interest groups, would be a characteristic of every day life in Kosovo. The Kosovar economy would be too weak to provide the state with sufficient financial resources for buying arms and other military capabilities.

If Kosovo became a *Failed State*, the Kosovar government would have severe problems with providing basic public goods as security and stability. Interest groups would undermine the state's national sovereignty. Corruption, black markets, frauds and criminal acts would dominate Kosovo's political, domestic and economic environment. As preconditions, an EU membership would not be a realistic option, there would be no peaceful agreement between Kosovo and Serbia and Albanian and Serbian populations. Serbian minorities would not be protected, but this time, the Serbian government would not intervene. The ethnic conflict would intensify.

6. Critical reflection

As mentioned before, the presented scenarios do not seek to make any statements on the likelihood of some events. They present what might happen if certain conditions were met. When it comes to probabilities, the research team believes that, based on our experiences in Kosovo, none of the proposed scenarios will become reality the way it was presented.

It is more likely that Kosovo's future will lie in-between the four presented scenarios because the presented conditions will probably not be met in their extreme characteristics, but as some sort of variations. Furthermore, four scenarios for Kosovo's future cannot be enough for such a diverse and dynamic, newly born state. On the other hand, those four scenarios are developed following three key uncertainties, namely the question of international recognition and independence, domestic conflict or cooperation and a perspective for EU membership. As our field trip has shown, these questions are also among the most important ones for the people from Kosovo. Accordingly, also regarding the fact that scenarios are usually developed in larger groups over longer time periods with distinctly more financial resources, the four scenarios presented in this study, have contributed to closing the research gap in this area and responding to some urgent questions of the Kosovar society.

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
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8. Appendix

8.1. Scenario scheme



8.2. Scenario paths



9. Solemn Affirmation

I, Maximilian Jungmann (born on 7 November 1991 in Saarbrücken-Dudweiler, matriculation number 3216192), hereby declare under oath that I have written the paper with the following title

„Scenarios for a Future Kosovo“

completely by myself and only with the help of the sources and texts listed in the bibliography. This work has not been handed in at any other examination office yet and has not been published yet.

Heidelberg, 9 September 2014

Maximilian Jungmann