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# The case of Japan

International Conference:  
Structures of cooperative and common security: A  
prospect for development of East Asia?  
Hamburg, University of the Federal Armed Forces

# Outline

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1. Confidence Building Measures: Lessons learned
2. Japan and Confidence Building Measures: the track record
3. Conclusion: Findings and Prospects

# Confidence Building Measures: Lessons & Principles


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1. CBMs facilitate and embody changed interstate relations, but they do not initiate them.
2. CBMs should be launched in stable and not in crisis situations. Parties should have a strong overarching goal: war prevention/arms control.
3. CBMs should involve a few parties first to strengthen their confidence. Then CBMs may include all parties concerned=> multilateral approach.
4. CBMs must address and stabilize several principal-agent relations, i.e. strong societal forces and local military commanders to be effective.
5. CBMs do not have to be symmetrical but they have to be perceived as such to be effective.
6. CBMs should include some structure/forum provided with a mandate. (aim, principles, modalities, zone of application, etc.), the necessary resources and an agenda.


**Principles:** Gradualism, Selectiveness, Flexibility, Mutual Interest, Ownership, Open-endedness.

# Japan and CBMs: a reluctant supporter


Fig. III-2-1-3 From Dialogues and Exchanges to Cooperation



# Japan's Defense Pivot to Southeast Asia



# Towards a „managed rivalry“: Sino-Japanese CBMs and a Maritime and Air Communication Mechanism



# Regarding Discussions toward Improving Japan-China Relations, November 7, 2014

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- Toward the improvement of the Japan-China relations, quiet discussions have been held between the Governments of Japan and China. Both sides have come to share views on the following points:
- **1.** Both sides confirmed that they would observe the principles and spirit of the four basic documents between Japan and China and that they would continue to develop a mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests.
- **2.** Both sides shared some recognition that, following the spirit of squarely facing history and advancing toward the future, they would overcome political difficulties that affect their bilateral relations.
- **3.** Both sides recognized that they had different views as to the emergence of tense situations in recent years in the waters of the East China Sea, including those around the Senkaku Islands, and shared the view that, through dialogue and consultation, they would prevent the deterioration of the situation, establish a crisis management mechanism and avert the rise of unforeseen circumstances.
- **4.** Both sides shared the view that, by utilizing various multilateral and bilateral channels, they would gradually resume dialogue in political, diplomatic and security fields and make an effort to build a political relationship of mutual trust.

# Conclusion: Findings and Prospects

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- Japan's position on CBMs has evolved considerably over time. At this time, there is principle openness to conclude a SINO-J- MACM. However, this must not compromise Japan's legal territorial claims concerning Senkaku islands and East China Sea.
- Japan has not recognized China's ECS-ADIZ and subsequently challenged it at ICAO Council as a violation of the Chicago Convention:
  - Lacking prior consultation with overlapping ADIZ states.
  - Lacking appropriate Rules of Engagement for Civilian aircraft.
  - Lacking clear differentiation from China's EEZ, suggesting expansive territorial claims.
- Through words and deeds Japan seeks to discourage the PRC to prepare for the declaration of a Chinese SCC-ADIZ and to install multilateral dialogue fora, including Japan, (MOD Nakatani Shangri-La Dialogue initiative 2015) to frustrate any agreement which could set a precedence for the dispute in the East China Sea.

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<http://www.uni-hd.de/harnisch>

# Relative penetration of Maritime territories Senkaku/Diaoyu administered by Japan, 2013-2016

Fig. I-2-3-5

Changes in the Number of Scrambles against Chinese Aircraft






Fig. III-1-2-2

Number of Incursions into the Territorial Waters around the Senkaku Islands by Chinese Government Ships




# Number and origin of Aircraft scrambles by JSDF

Fig. III-1-2-3 Number and Breakdown of Scrambles since the Cold War



Note: The peak of the cold war

MOD Japan 2016



### 1. Geographical Advantage of Okinawa


- The main island of Okinawa is located roughly in the center of the Southwestern Islands and also close to key sea lanes for Japan, and thus its location is extremely important from the perspective of Japan's security.
- Okinawa is located close (but not overly so) to potential conflict areas that could affect Japan's peace and security, including the  
⇒ Okinawa is located at a distance that makes it possible to expeditiously send units to potential conflict areas and at the same time has sufficient distance so as not to heighten military tension unnecessarily and is not overly close in terms of protecting units.
- In the eyes of neighboring countries, Okinawa's location is strategically important in both enabling access to the Pacific from the continent and rejecting access from the Pacific to the continent.

### 2. The Significance & Roles of the U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa

It is essential to maintain defense capabilities for the area of the Southwestern Islands in the main island of Okinawa, which is important as a strategic location for Japan, for the security of Japan. The stationing of the U.S. Marine Corps, which is capable of rapid response and high mobility and also has readiness for a wide variety of missions, ranging from armed conflicts to natural disasters, in Okinawa, which features such geographical advantages, plays an important role in ensuring not only the security of Japan but also the peace and safety of East Asia.

Fig. III-1-2-1

Conceptual Image of Warning and Surveillance of the Sea Areas and Airspace Surrounding Japan






Fig. III-1-2-4

Example Flight Patterns of Aircraft to Which Scrambles Responded





Fig. III-1-2-5

Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) of Japan and those of Neighboring Countries



**Chinese naval vessels have sailed several times in the following areas (examples of activities since 2014):**

- (1) Vessels sailed through Soya Strait in December 2014 (four vessels, westward) and in August 2015 (five vessels, eastward).
- (2) In February 2016, four vessels including Luh-class destroyer sailed through Tsugaru Strait.
- (3) In December 2014, vessels transited Osumi Strait and moved from the East China Sea to the Pacific Ocean, and then sailed through Soya Strait westward. In August 2015, vessels transited Soya Strait from the Sea of Japan to the Pacific Ocean, and then navigated in the high seas of the Bering Sea. Subsequently, the vessels sailed the Pacific Ocean, transited between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island, and moved to the East China Sea. In February 2016, vessels sailed through Tsugaru Strait from the Sea of Japan to the Pacific Ocean, and then transited Osumi Strait from the Pacific Ocean to the East China Sea.
- (4) In December 2015 and February 2016, an AGI conducted round-trip passages in waters outside of the contiguous zone southeast of the Boso Peninsula.
- (5) Vessels transited Osumi Strait in June (three vessels, westward) and December 2014 (five vessels, eastward), in December 2015 (three vessels, eastward), and in February (four vessels, westward) and March 2016 (two vessels, eastward).
- (6) Vessels passed between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and advanced to the Pacific Ocean in March (three vessels), May (two vessels), and June 2014 (three vessels), in February (two vessels), June (two vessels), July (three vessels), and December 2015 (three vessels), and in April (three vessels twice) and June 2016 (five vessels).
- (7) In March 2014, three vessels sailed the Pacific Ocean southwest of the main island of Okinawa.
- (8) Vessels transited between Yonaguni Island and Nakanokami Island in March 2014 (four vessels, northeastward), in August 2015 (three vessels, northward), and in April 2016 (three vessels, northward).
- (9) Government vessels have intruded into territorial waters near the Senkaku Islands since December 2008 and intruded into territorial waters intermittently since September 2012. In November 2015, an AGI conducted round-trip passages in waters outside of the contiguous zone south of the Senkaku Islands. Since December 2015, government vessels carrying what appears to be cannons have repeatedly intruded into territorial waters. In June 2016, a frigate entered the contiguous zone north of the Senkaku Islands, and an AGI conducted round-trip passages in waters outside of the contiguous zone south of the Senkaku Islands.

In addition, in March 2015, two vessels including Sovremenny-class destroyer (10) sailed between Amamiyoshima Island and Yokoatejima Island in the southwest direction. In June 2016, an AGI (11) sailed in territorial waters near Kuchinoerabu Island and then (12) in the contiguous zone north of Kitadaito Island. Furthermore, in January 2013, a Jiangkai I-class frigate is suspected to have directed fire-control radar at a helicopter based on an MSDF destroyer in the East China Sea. In the same month, a Jiangwei II-class frigate directed fire-control radar at an MSDF destroyer in the East China Sea.

In the South China Sea, incidents have occurred, including standoffs between Chinese and Philippine vessels and Chinese and Vietnamese vessels.



Fig. I-2-3-6

Recent Chinese Activities in Airspace near Japan (The flight paths shown are an illustration)

