

Andreas Kemmerling

GRICY ACTIONS

It is often assumed that Paul Grice, in one way or another, has made an important contribution to the theory of speech acts.¹ Grice, as far as I can see, never expressly addresses Austin's theory in his published work. He hardly ever uses the speech act terminology of "illocution", "perlocution", etc.² So what does the more or less implicit Gricean contribution to the theory of speech acts consist in? There is more than one good answer to this question. I shall concentrate on a particularly influential one, which goes back to Strawson (1964). It says that Austin, in his account of the nature of illocutionary acts, over-emphasized the role of conventions; that Austin went wrong in characterizing illocutionary acts as acts which are essentially conventional. The Gricean contribution to speech act theory, according to the envisaged answer, is twofold, both diagnostic and therapeutic. First, it helps us see where and why Austin went wrong in taking illocutionary acts to be essentially conventional. Second, it suggests an essentially intentional – instead of an essentially conventional – element in illocutionary acts.

In his 1964 paper Strawson tried to bring out, as regards the interplay of convention and intention in illocutionary acts, both what can be conceded to Austin and what must be learnt from Grice. Austin (1962: 115) had said that "the performance of an illocutionary act involves the securing of uptake". Strawson (1964: 158 ff.) interprets Austin as meaning to say that the performance of an illocutionary act involves understanding of illocutionary force. Understanding of illocutionary force involves, according to Strawson, grasping a "complex [speaker's] intention" (*ib.*: 160), and it is here, of course, where he brings Gricean ideas into Austin's scheme of what the essence of illocution is. He says:

[...] the illocutionary force of an utterance is essentially something that is intended to be understood. And the understanding of the force of an utterance [...] involves recognizing what may be called broadly an audience-directed intention and recognizing it as wholly overt, as intended to be recognized. (*ib.*: 168)

Stephen Schiffer, in his 1972 book *Meaning*, took up this approach of wedding Austinian illocutions to Gricean intentions and refined Strawson's suggestion with awe-inspiring subtlety. And many have

followed this line of trying to capture what is the heart of the matter called illocution.

In this paper, I shall be primarily concerned with the following question: what makes an action an illocutionary act, or more exactly: what is the generic essence of illocutionary acts? In attempting to answer this question, I'll try to avoid one mistake which may come naturally to a good Gricean: declaring intentions (and what is more: clearly unnecessarily complex intentions) to be necessary ingredients of the performance of illocutionary acts and identifying a certain type of complex intentions as what – or as part of what – is essential of illocutionary acts. I shall argue, against this, that there is a slightly different lesson to be learnt from Grice about the essence of illocutionarity, a lesson which primarily concerns a distinct sort of action, not an exceptional kind of intention.

The illocutionary force of an utterance is essentially something that is intended to be understood, Strawson says. – I have a minor qualm about this claim. It may be inappropriate to speak of “the” illocutionary force of an utterance. (Even on an intention-based account, there seems to be no reason why a normal utterance should have at most one illocutionary force.) Yet for the sake of argument, I shall simply pretend that a normal utterance has just one illocutionary force. So much for the minor qualm. – Moreover, I doubt that the claim is true.

An utterance may have an illocutionary force which is not intended to be understood. An utterance may have the illocutionary force of an assertion, information, declaration or what have you, without there being any pertinent intention on the utterer's part. I don't have in mind here exceptional cases in which force-constitutive conventions are applied rigidly, as may happen in a case of redoubling at bridge (an example which is mentioned by Strawson). Consider the fully normal cases of smooth standard conversation. I doubt that there always has to be a speaker's intention that the force of his utterance be understood. For what is glaringly obvious about our doings is nothing that we normally tend to have an intention about in performing such doings. Given a suitable context, the illocutionary force of an utterance just may go without saying, and even intending. There is no need for intending something which, *ceteris paribus*, would come about anyway. (Taking it for granted, in doing *X*, that *Y* will come about, is one thing; intending, in doing *X*, that *Y* come about, is another thing.)

I suspect that many people have felt, or even taken it for granted,

that what is central to the illocutionary dimension of speech acts is either a special kind of convention, or a special kind of intention. Austin (1962: lectures 8ff.), Searle (1969: ch. 3) and von Savigny (1988: chs. 3 and 4) clearly have assumed that what is characteristic of illocutionary acts are special rules or conventions. Strawson (1964), Schiffer (1972), Bach & Harnish (1979) and many others after them have assumed that the hallmark of the illocution is a certain sort of intention. I don't think that either of these approaches is correct. But I am not going to argue for these negative claims in this paper. Rather I shall try a different approach to the essence of illocutionary acts which is both Gricean and does not centre on a special sort of intention. The essential characteristic of illocutionary acts is a feature which I shall call *griciness*. Gricy actions are *actions* of a special kind, but they do not necessarily involve special conventions or intentions. At the heart of illocution, there is a feature of which Grice has made us aware, but it is not meaning-intentions.

1. Meaning-intentions and their structure

But nevertheless, let us turn to meaning-intentions for a moment. Clearly, one of the fascinating things about the Gricean analyses of utterer's meaning is the complex intention – or the complexity of the intentions – discovered by Grice and scrutinized by many philosophers after him. But I think that the complexity involved in utterer's meaning *à la* Grice has often been unnecessarily exaggerated.

Grice originally postulated a second-order intention. Strawson introduced a third-order intention into the analysis. Bach & Harnish (1979: xiv) have called such an intention reflexive; they say that “a reflexive intention is an intention that is intended to be recognized as intended to be recognized”. Some people, Stephen Schiffer for example, have claimed that utterer's meaning involves an intention which is infinitely complex (Schiffer 1972: 39ff.). Others, like Gilbert Harman (1974: 225), have suggested that it may be self-referential. Concerning the last two proposals, I find it hard even to make sense of them. Forming an infinitely complex intention of the type envisaged by Schiffer is a superhuman intellectual feat. Such an intention cannot be formed in a finite mind. Harman's idea is that meaning may involve an intention like the following: the intention that *A* (the addressee) should believe that *p* at least partly by his recognition of this very intention.

Personally, I have never managed to form such an intention; I tried again and again, but I always ended up muttering unintelligible things to myself and never formed an intention. – What Bach & Harnish (1979) call reflexiveness clearly makes sense, but still it yields an unnecessarily strong requirement. In order to mean something by his utterance, the utterer simply does not need to have an intention that he intends to be recognized as intended to be recognized.

All this complicated stuff was developed in order to block certain so-called counterexamples. But since these counterexamples can be excluded by much weaker and less incredible requirements,³ we should conclude that Gricean meaning-intentions are not reflexive, and certainly neither self-referential nor infinitely complex. – Speaking for myself, I think that Grice had it exactly right in his original analysis: no more than one intention of second order is needed in utterer's meaning.⁴

But the number and structure of meaning-intentions is not what I shall concentrate on in the following. The question: "What is the structure of meaning-intentions? Loop, double loop, infinite loop, self-referentiality?" has been one important issue in the discussions concerning the Gricean concept of utterer's meaning. Let me emphasize again that this is not my topic in the following. I shall concentrate on a certain kind of *actions*, and these actions which I shall call *gricy* do not require, for their successful performance, intentions which contain loops or other exciting structural traits.

Two questions should be distinguished here, although they are not unrelated. (1) What has to be achieved if linguistoid communication (or more specifically: rational communication by means of non-natural meaning vehicles) is to take place? (2) What is characteristic of the class of actions which Austin had in mind when he spoke of "illocutionary acts"? – My concern, in this paper, is with the second question.

With regard to the first question, the best answer I know of is: what has to be achieved, *ceteris paribus*, is meaning and understanding. And it is here, in the context of attempting to answer the first question, where Gricean meaning intentions almost inevitably come into play. For Grice's original account of utterer's meaning in terms of utterer's intentions gives us the best idea available of what the required sense of "meaning" comes to. And in this special context (of attempting to answer the first question), it is quite natural to construe the pertinent concept of understanding as the concept of recognizing-what-the-utterer-meant.

But given this, do Gricean meaning intentions come into play as naturally (and maybe even inevitably) when we deal with the second question? Not at all. The two questions are about distinct (though clearly not unconnected) topics. For, first, rational communication by means of non-natural meaning vehicles can take place even if no illocutionary acts are performed. A speaker may mean by his utterance that so-and-so without performing an illocutionary act with the propositional content that so-and-so. (Utterances made soliloquizingly – maybe not all of them – yield one family of examples; but it seems that there may be other examples as well.)⁵ And secondly, illocutionary acts can be performed even if no communication *à la* Grice takes place. Performing an illocutionary act is not necessarily achieving communication, nor does it necessarily involve an attempt at achieving communication. One may ask a question, even though the addressee does not recognize it.⁶ And one may issue a warning (e.g. by erecting a sign) without even caring if anybody will recognize it. In saying this, I do not mean to suggest that *the standard point of illocutionary acts* is completely independent of speakers' intentions and their recognition. What I want to emphasize is that *the performance of illocutionary acts* does not inevitably require such intentions. Communicating *à la* Grice is one thing, performing an illocutionary act is another thing.

The notion that illocutionary acts are communicative actions is widespread. But what exactly is it supposed to mean? If this is just to say that human communication characteristically contains the performance of illocutionary acts, then the claim would appear to be true. But if what is meant by the term "communicative action" is an action the performance of which essentially requires that it be understood (or at least requires an attempt at being understood), then illocutionary acts would not seem to be communicative actions.

2. The Gricean mechanism

There is another fascinating aspect of Grice's analyses of utterer's meaning, and this aspect is very closely connected with my topic. – So let's turn to what has come to be called the Gricean mechanism.⁷ In speaking of utterer's meaning, I shall in the following restrict myself to cases in which the utterer tries to produce a certain belief – say, the

belief that p – in his audience. The so-called Gricean mechanism is what the utterer essentially relies on in his attempt to get his audience to believe that p . The utterer does not offer any natural evidence for its being the case that p . Instead he relies on the Gricean mechanism; that is to say: S assumes that A will take the fact that S wants him to believe that p as something which (in the light of appropriate background assumptions held by A) is a good reason to believe that p . In a nutshell, A is supposed to come to believe that p in virtue of having noticed that S wants him to believe that p . Whenever the utterer makes such an assumption, he therein relies on the Gricean mechanism. I take it to be part of the conception of the Gricean mechanism that it involves nothing which is glaringly unreasonable or irrational; so the background assumptions on A 's part must not be assumed to be wildly implausible or even crazy. Such background assumptions – although otherwise perfectly apt for doing the work of getting one, validly, from “ S wants me to believe that p ” to “ p ” – probably could not be upheld in the long run. (Think for example of background assumptions like the following: “If S wants me to believe that p , then S believes that non- p ; but S 's disbelieving something is always good evidence exactly for what he disbelieves. [Therefore: p]”; or think of these ones: “If S wants me to believe that p , then God has produced this desire in him; God would not have produced this desire in him, if it weren't the case that p . [Therefore: p]”).)

The Gricean mechanism is embedded in a context of trust and cooperativeness. If the a typical Gricean addressee were to reason explicitly about his doxastic transition from “ S wants me to believe that p ” to “ p ”, his reasoning might well include thoughts like the following: “He wants me to believe that p . Well, he wouldn't, if he himself believed otherwise. And most probably he does not just believe it, but has what he takes to be good reason to believe it. And since he is a sensible person, what he takes to be good reason is pretty good reason. Moreover, he knows that my believing that p may affect my future actions. Since he is a responsible and careful guy, he will have made sufficiently sure that p ”. And so on. Such is the cognitive atmosphere in which the Gricean mechanism flourishes and may develop its full potential.

In an ideal case, the addressee's belief that the utterer wants him to believe that p is for him as good a reason to believe that p as any piece of natural evidence for p . This may strike one as a quixotically naive conception of human communication. But then again, ideal cases are always special.

The Gricean mechanism is that which takes the audience from believing “He wants me to believe that p ” to the belief that p . It takes one, so to speak, from the recognition of the utterer’s desire to its fulfilment. Here comes the simple scheme:

Fact #1: The speaker desires that: A believes that p .

Fact #2: The audience notices that (1) obtains.

Given (1) and (2), by way of the Gricean mechanism,

Fact #3 comes about, namely the fact that A believes that p .

Fact #3 is the fulfilment of a desire which the speaker has, given Fact #1. There is a sense then, in which the Gricean mechanism may be said to be a desire-fulfilling mechanism. It’s a mechanism where you feed in the recognition of the utterer’s desire, and what gets churned out is its satisfaction. Recognition of desire turned into satisfaction. What a great device! Let’s call the underlying pattern, *Recognition-of-desire-leads-to-satisfaction-of-desire*, the *RS*-pattern.

Just to remind you, we are speaking fully literally here. We are speaking literally about desires, their recognition and satisfaction. We are not, for example, talking about vending-machines which “recognize” Coke-desire and then deliver Coke. We are not talking about robots, personal computers, programs or any other kind of model of the real thing. What we are talking about, as straightforwardly as we may, is human beings who genuinely have, and are capable of recognizing others to genuinely have, desires and beliefs.

It has been noticed, or felt, by many that the *RS*-structure of the Gricean mechanism points to an important aspect of human interaction. Nagel (1979: 47) has detected an occurrence of the *RS*-pattern outside the realm of linguistic communication: A ’s desire to arouse B , if recognized by B , might lead to B ’s being aroused. Maybe he has a point there, but we shall see in due course that arousing somebody is not a gricy action.

3. Illocutionary intentions and the *RS*-structure

More to the point, it has been noticed, or felt, by many that the *RS*-structure of the Gricean mechanism may be a key for understanding better what exactly is involved in illocutionary acts. One idea was that the performance of illocutionary acts – or at least of certain important

illocutionary acts – essentially involves special intentions, namely intentions which in some way contain the *RS*-structure. Let me mention one example of this kind of approach. Bach & Harnish (1979: xv and 15) say that illocutionary intentions are “intentions whose fulfilment consists in nothing more than their recognition”. That is hard to believe. For it follows from this characterization that there is just one illocutionary intention – an intention which, even if recognized (and thereby fulfilled), hardly leads to anything worth mentioning. Let me explain.

Niceties aside, an intention is fulfilled if and only if the intended state of affairs gets realized. The intention that so-and-so is fulfilled if and only if so-and-so comes about.⁸ Therefore, an intention whose fulfilment consists in nothing more than its recognition is fulfilled if and only if it is recognized. But such an intention – an intention, to repeat, which is fulfilled if and only if it is recognized – is a fairly unique intention: namely the intention that it itself be recognized. No other intention has the feature of requiring for its fulfilment nothing more than its recognition. (The proof of this negative existential claim I leave to the reader, as a homework problem.)⁹ But then, counting intentions and not their instantiations, there is exactly one intention which satisfies the Bach & Harnish condition for being an illocutionary intention, namely the intention that this intention itself be recognized.

I don't think that this is very plausible. Anyway, let's leave the topic of illocutionary *intentions* aside for a moment, and let's ask: what are illocutionary *acts*? What makes an action an illocutionary act?

4. Austin on illocutionary acts

Austin tried to systematize the kinds of actions people can perform by uttering sentences. Concentrating on the case of oral speech, he distinguished five dimensions of such actions:

(1) The dimension of *phonetic acts*: that is, actions which are performed by producing those sound waves the production of which brings about the sentence-utterance (at least, if we consider the sentence merely as a phonetic item).

(2) The dimension of *phatic acts*: that is, actions which are performed by uttering a sentence as a sentence of a particular language. A German speaker who utters the sentence “Harvey liebt” may perform the same phonetic act as an English speaker who utters the English sentence “Harvey leaped”; but the two phatic acts performed are different.

(3) The dimension of *rhetic acts*: that is, actions which are performed by uttering a sentence in order to refer to something and say something about it. Two speakers who utter the same English sentence, "Harvey leaped", as this sentence of the English language, and thereby perform the same phatic act, may still perform different rhetic acts, for the one may be speaking about Harvey Keitel whereas the other refers to Harvey P. Gavagai.

An action insofar as it comprises acts of these three dimensions is called a *locutionary act*. With this label, Austin wants to emphasize that all these actions are *acts of speaking* in the most common sense of emitting meaningful noise and thereby saying something. Illocutionary and perlocutionary acts are actions performed by uttering sentences which, in a certain sense, go beyond that. This leads us to:

(4) The dimension of *illocutionary acts*: that is, actions which are performed *in* performing a complete act of speaking. Famous Austinian examples are promising, warning, christening and stating. Two speakers who utter the same sentence, and in their utterances perform the same locutionary act, may still perform different illocutionary acts; both may, referring to the same items, utter the sentence "This is the most expensive bottle of wine in this shop", but the one speaker may thereby recommend this bottle to his addressee (who is looking for an exceptionally good wine for a special occasion), whereas the other speaker, using the same sentence, may warn his addressee not to buy this bottle.

(5) The dimension of *perlocutionary acts*: that is, actions which are performed *by* performing a complete act of speaking. Good examples are upsetting, intimidating, irritating, confusing, impressing or soothing. Two speakers who utter the same sentence, and in their utterances perform the same locutionary and illocutionary act, may still perform different perlocutionary acts: both may utter the sentence "This is the most expensive bottle of wine in this shop", both may therein recommend to the addressee the same bottle of wine, but the one may thereby delight his addressee and the other may upset him ("Who do you think I am, Bill Gates?").

Our question was, what exactly are illocutionary acts? For Austin, there was the twofold problem of delineating illocutionary acts both from locutionary ones and from perlocutionary ones. I shall concentrate on the second problem.

Concerning this problem, what we find in Austin's *How to Do Things With Words* are basically three kinds of hints: first, the sparse characterization I have just given, second, many examples of illocutionary forces and of perlocutionary effects:

Illocutionary forces	Perlocutionary effects
promise	upset
christen	irritate
state	soothe
bequeath	impress
...	...

The third type of hint about how to distinguish the illocutionary from the perlocutionary consists in various remarks concerning what Austin calls the conventionality of illocutionary acts. There seem to be at least four different ideas concerning the specific sense in which such acts are assumed, by Austin, to be conventional.

At one point, Austin says that the use of language for arguing or warning "may [...] be said to be *conventional*, in the sense that at least it could be made explicit by the performative formula" (Austin 1975: 103). He may have had in mind a more subtle version of the following:

(1) *The criterion with the performative formula*: A verb "v" names an illocutionary act iff the following convention obtains: under appropriate conditions, the utterance of a sentence of the type "I hereby v that so-and-so" (or "I hereby v you to so-and-so") constitutes the speaker's performance of an act of v-ing.

This criterion fits all verbs listed above as illocutionary. We can say such things as "I hereby promise I'll be there", "I hereby christen you with the name Marsellus Wallace", "I hereby state that the earth is flat" or "I hereby bequeath you my watch", and in saying these things we can, given an appropriate context, bring about exactly the actions denoted by the main verb of our sentence; that is, we promise, christen, state or bequeath.

(2) *The judge-criterion*: Here is a quote from the beginning of the tenth lecture of *How to Do Things With Words*:

Illocutionary acts are conventional acts: perlocutionary acts are *not* conventional. [...] perlocutionary acts are not conventional, though conventional acts may be made use of in order to bring off the perlocutionary act. A judge should be able to decide, by hearing what was said, what locutionary and illocutionary acts were performed, but not what perlocutionary acts were achieved. (Austin 1962: 121-22)

(3) *The criterion with act-consequences*: The performance of an illocutionary act necessarily has conventional consequences (that is, a standard of correctness for certain future actions gets established by the performance of the act). – When a baby has been christened “José”, it is from then on correct, *ceteris paribus*, to refer to him as José; when a promise has been made, the speaker is, *ceteris paribus*, from then on obliged to a certain kind of behaviour; when a statement has been made, the speaker is, *ceteris paribus*, from then on committed to it, and so on.¹⁰

(4) *The criterion of the only-effect-needed*: The only effect which a speaker has to achieve on his audience in order to perform an illocutionary act is “bringing about the understanding of the meaning and the force of the locution” (Austin 1962, lecture IX: 117). Maybe what Austin has in mind here is this. The only effect which a speaker has to achieve on his addressee in order to perform an illocutionary act is “bringing about the understanding of the meaning and the force of the locution”. No further *effects* have to be achieved by the speaker. The rest is taken care of by a convention. The illocutionary act is complete – that is, completely performed – as soon as the speaker brings about the addressee’s understanding. In this respect, perlocutionary acts are different. When somebody wants to impress you by telling you, for example, that he is going to buy a Porsche tomorrow because he got bored with his Ferrari (or *vice versa*), your understanding of the meaning and force of his locution is not all he has to achieve. The rest is *not* taken care of by a convention. There simply is no convention to the effect that making an utterance of this kind (and bringing about understanding) *is* to impress one’s addressee. Whereas, according to Austin, in the case of performing illocutionary acts, e.g. the act of promising, there always is a convention to the effect that making an appropriate utterance (and bringing about understanding) *is* to promise.

All of these suggestions shed some light on the intended distinction, none of them appears to be fully satisfactory. What I have called here “criteria” for distinguishing the illocution from the perlocution, are ideas which on closer inspection are full of difficulties. Austin was acutely aware of many of them. He never thought, it seems, that he could answer our question: “What is an illocutionary act (in contrast to a perlocutionary one)?” to his own satisfaction. But he gave us a reasonably clear idea of what illocutionary acts and what perlocutionary

acts are – we owe to him a lot of instructive examples and some interesting attempts at drawing the desired distinction in a general way.

For the moment, I want to leave these things at that. Now let us turn to our topic.

5. Gricy actions

Let us define a special type of actions; I shall call them *gricy* actions.

An action-type X is **gricy**

if and only if

making it clear that one wants (or intends)¹¹ to X in doing what one does, is, by conceptual necessity, sufficient for therein X -ing.

Let me explain what I have in mind. Think of somebody who wants to do something, like turning on the washing machine. In order to do that, he presses a certain button. In philosophical terminology, this might be described as follows: in doing what he does (namely exerting pressure on the button) he wants to perform an action of the type “Turning on the washing machine”. Just to make sure, let us ask if turning on the washing machine is a gricy action.

Is it sufficient for turning on the washing machine to do something which makes it clear¹² that thereby you want to turn on the washing machine? Clearly not. In order to see that turning on a washing machine is not a gricy kind of action, you may simply imagine a situation in which somebody presses a button, thereby making it clear (under the circumstances he is in) that he wants to turn on the washing machine, but does not turn it on. It is clearly not a part of the concept of turning on a washing machine that in order to turn on a washing machine it is enough to do something which makes it clear that you want to turn on a washing machine. Therefore, turning on a washing machine is not a gricy action. (For somewhat similar reasons, turning somebody on is, *pace* Nagel, not a gricy action either.)

The paradigmatic actions of action-theory, like hammering a nail into the wall, killing somebody or opening a window are clearly not gricy. Unfortunately, it is not enough for you to make clear that you want to hammer a nail into the wall, in order to really drive it in. Hammering is not *that* easy. (And the ungriciness of killing may have

saved many a life.) But even convention-constituted actions like kicking a goal or protecting your queen in a game of chess are not gricy. In order to perform those actions, you have to achieve more than just making it clear that you want to perform them.

By the way, meaning something by an utterance is not a gricy action either. In fact, it is no action at all. Moreover, it's not even a candidate of griciness. For it clearly (and categorically) doesn't fit into the scheme. Meaning does not belong to the things of which one can make clear, by doing what one does, that one wants to do them. "By waving his hand, he made it clear that he wanted to mean that the car should stop" does not make much sense.¹³

One more remark about the nature of gricy actions. They have a very strong tendency to allow for the informal. Think, in contrast, of an action type the performance of which is rigidly regulated up to the point of ritualization. Think, for example of saluting in the army. Saluting is ungricy; greeting is gricy. The tricky point here is this. If you wanted to formalize greeting up to the point that, for a given context, nothing but, say, whistling the opening riff of *Satisfaction* is greeting, you would be faced with a problem. Greeting, being a gricy action type, is essentially something that can be done by just making your greeting-desire clear. And making it clear that one has this desire can be achieved, at least in principle, in indefinitely many ways. If you wanted to rigidly formalize greeting, for a certain context, you would have to bring it about that, within this context, there be only one way of making it clear that one wants to greet. This is very difficult. What may be easier is to introduce a distinction between contextually proper and improper ways of greeting. But this, of course, does not lessen the informal character of greeting itself.

*

Now, I would like to put forward some claims and a few considerations about gricy actions. I want to suggest, first, that all central illocutionary acts are gricy actions. Secondly, that all other illocutionary acts are para-gricy actions. Thirdly, that some of Austin's criteria indicate that his conception of conventionality came close to the envisaged conception of griciness. After that, I shall indulge in several inconclusive reflections concerning gricy actions. As I said, I want to *suggest*

all of this. The illocutionary force of what I shall say in the rest of the paper is intended to be recognized as quessertive.¹⁴

Claim #1: All central illocutionary acts are gricy actions. – A central illocutionary act is one we expect to encounter in any human community which communicates by using a common natural language. Let's take a few examples: telling, asking, promising. If somebody walks up to me and behaves in whatever manner which makes it clear to me that he wants to tell me by what he does that the train to Bologna leaves at 9 o'clock, then he has told me that. If somebody makes it clear to me that, by doing what he does, he wants to ask me to light his cigarette, then he has asked me to light his cigarette. If somebody walks up to me and behaves in whatever manner that makes it clear to me that he wants to promise me that he will return the umbrella in five minutes, then he has made that promise to me. – Here come some more examples, not all of which may be considered as central: recommending, warning, congratulating, requesting, accepting, inquiring and suggesting.

Claim #2: All other illocutionary acts are para-gricy. – Not all illocutionary acts are gricy actions. Christening a baby, declaring war, bequeathing a watch, marrying somebody – these are actions which have to be performed properly, in order to be performed at all. These actions don't allow for dispensing with all formalities. Gricy actions are, as we have just noticed, informal; their successful performance is not essentially connected to a particular form or way of doing them. In a sense, it is completely irrelevant *how* they are performed. Yet, several illocutionary acts are firmly linked to special ways of performing them, and therefore not gricy.

There are many illocutionary acts which are *para-gricy*, in that they can be split up in a component which is gricy and in an additional component. Take the act-type of naming a ship. It is not gricy, for even if somebody does something which makes it perfectly clear that he wants to name a given ship the *Generalissimo Stalin*, he may thereby have failed to name the ship. Maybe he did not have the right kind of authority. There are lots of illocutionary acts the performance of which requires that the agent have the relevant authority: issuing a command, dedicating a book and so on. But among these authority-presupposing acts, there are some which are otherwise gricy; that is to say, once you have the required authority to perform the act at all, you may perform them any old way you like. If the ship is yours, it's up to you which way you choose to make it clear that you want to name it

the *Generalissimo Stalin*. (Note that I am here not referring to official names that get registered in official documents; I'm talking of casual name-giving as it applies, for example, in the case of master and dog.)

Most, indeed maybe all, illocutionary act-types are either gricy or para-gricy. The residual acts which Austin classified as illocutionary but which are ungricy to the bones, are not really linguistic acts anymore: they can be viewed as legal or ritual acts that bear only a family-resemblance to genuinely linguistic actions. (An example might be: swearing an oath, canonizing or knighting.)

Is the locutionary act of saying (in particular the act of referring to something and saying something about it) gricy? No. For it can happen that in uttering something one makes it clear that one wants to say that so-and-so but still doesn't say it by one's utterance. Are there any perlocutionary acts which are gricy? I have not found one clear example. But here is one problematic case. Consider drawing somebody's attention to oneself. This, I presume, is a perlocutionary act. But is it not sufficient for drawing attention to oneself that one makes it clear that one wants to draw attention to oneself? There are two reasons for being not so sure. First, it would have to be a conceptual necessity that making it clear that one wants to draw attention to oneself suffices for drawing attention to oneself. But this may be nothing but a psychological fact about human beings. A different sort of intelligence might be able to recognize that somebody wants to draw attention to himself without paying attention to him. To me, a different sort of intelligent beings of this kind seems to be a conceptual possibility. Secondly, there is a sense of "making it clear" in which one may make it clear, in doing what one does, that one wants to *X* without anybody's recognition. (Making it clear that so-and-so, in this sense, does not entail the actual recognition of so-and-so.) Somebody may make it clear that, by waving his arm, he wants to greet, and therefore he may actually greet, and yet his addressee may fail to recognize all this. But drawing attention to oneself clearly *requires* recognition if it is to be achieved by way of making it clear that one wants to draw attention to oneself. — And so I tend to conclude that griciness, as specified above, is a good criterion for distinguishing illocutionary acts from both locutionary and perlocutionary ones, even though it excludes some acts which Austin called "illocutionary".

So let's assume that illocutionary acts are gricy (or para-gricy). But are all gricy actions illocutionary acts? I shall not try to answer this

question here. It certainly would be nice, if all gricy actions were illocutionary acts; we would then not have to search for a feature which marks the illocutionary gricy actions from the rest. But there are delicate cases which need careful consideration, like for example: expressing one's desire to communicate. Such expressings are clearly gricy, but it is not completely clear that they should be considered as illocutionary acts. Neither is it completely clear, I think, that it would be untenable to class them among the illocutionary acts.

Claim #3: Austinian conventionality resembles griciness. – The suggested identification of illocutionary acts with gricy actions may shed some light on what Austin called their conventionality. Let me just briefly indicate how griciness may be explanatory in this context. Consider the first criterion which concerns the performability of illocutionary acts by use of the explicit performative formula. Why is that so? We don't have to postulate the existence of special conventions to understand this feature. All we have to do is to observe that the use of the explicit performative formula is an excellent means for making it clear that one wants to perform the act in question. And with gricy actions, this is enough for performing them. Or consider the last criterion, the criterion of the only-effect-needed. As regards gricy actions, if you bring about the understanding, then no further effects are needed. And again, no special conventions are needed to bring about the act. Being gricy, it is in the conceptual nature of such acts that they are performed as soon as understanding has been achieved.

6. The dispensability of both conventions and intentions

If griciness is what lies at the heart of illocutionary acts, then illocutionary acts are neither essentially conventional nor essentially intentional. It seems obvious that a gricy action cannot be essentially conventional; it would have to be a conceptual truth that making it clear that one wants to perform such an action involves conventions. (Let X be a gricy action. By definition, making it clear that one wants to X is sufficient for X -ing. If there is a possibility of making it clear that one wants to X without any convention being involved in this, then X is not essentially conventional: It is conceivable that X be performed without conventions playing a role in this performance.) It is less obvious, I presume, that gricy actions are not essentially intentional. Let me go through a bunch of objections and replies.

Objection #1. Being actions, they must be intentional. Therefore they are essentially intentional.

Reply. I accept this objection. If you think, as I do not, that actions, by necessity, are intentional (in the fatuously strong sense of being intended to belong to the action-type in question), then of course gricy actions are essentially intentional. So let me modify my claim: gricy actions are not essentially intentional in any interesting sense which does not apply to other actions as well. This is to say: either it is a general fact about all actions, gricy or not, that performing them involves the intention to perform them. In this case, Objection #1 does not address the revised claim. Or there are actions which can be performed without the intention to perform them. In this case I am prepared to deny that the performance of a gricy action necessarily involves the intention to perform it.

Objection #2. But performing a gricy action, let's call it α , essentially involves making it clear that one wants to α ; making it clear that one wants to α essentially involves wanting to α ; "wanting to α " is just another word for "having the intention to α ". And all this is not an observation about actions in general, but a fact about gricy actions in particular.

Reply. Performing α does not essentially involve making it clear that one wants to perform α . Being gricy, it is of α 's essence that one *can* perform it by making it clear that one wants to perform it. But it doesn't follow from α 's griciness that performing α involves making one's desire clear. It does not even involve that one has this desire. The definition of griciness, as it stands, does not exclude the possibility that α is performed without the agent's intention to perform α .

Objection #3. Yet this is not a possibility. Gricy actions (and clearly the ones which have been mentioned so far) cannot be performed without the agent's intention to perform them. It is indeed true that your definition of griciness does not require these actions to be performed with the intention to perform them. But this is nothing but a weakness of your definition. For it is undeniable that the performance of those acts requires the intention to perform them.

Reply. I do not think so. Let's make a distinction. There are those cases in which α is performed by an agent who does something which makes it clear that he wants to perform α . In these cases, the agent has to have the intention in question, for the simple reason that making it clear that one wants to α (or doing something which makes it clear that

one wants to α) entails that one wants to α . But there are, or can be, cases in which α is performed in a different way. Here is one type of case: the agent does something without the intention to perform α ; therefore what he does is nothing which makes it clear that he wants to α ; but what he does may nevertheless be something which in the circumstances *counts as making it clear that he wants to do α* ; and moreover, it may, in those circumstances, be sufficient for performing α to do something which counts as making it clear that one wants to do α . So by doing what he does, he performs α , but he does not intend to perform α . Here is another, simpler kind of case: the agent may do something without the intention to do α ; but what he does may nevertheless be something which in the circumstances *counts as doing α* .

Objection #4. Now you have modified your definition of griciness. You now assume that if X is gricy, then doing something which counts as making it clear that one wants to X is, by conceptual necessity, sufficient for therein doing X .

Reply. No, I'm not doing anything like this. The definition stays as stated. (Let me emphasize once again that what makes an action-type gricy is that it *can* be performed in this characteristic manner, i.e. by just making it clear in doing what one does that one thereby wants to perform it. But it is not required of a gricy action that each and every of its performances involves the agent's making such an intention clear. Nor does it involve the agent's having such an intention at all. In any particular case, there may be other ways of performing an action of this type – ways which may, or may not, involve intentions on the part of the agent.) And I have not assumed in the foregoing reply that doing something which counts as making it clear that one wants to α might, by conceptual necessity, be sufficient for therein doing α . What I do assume indeed is that as a matter of fact it may be sufficient in certain circumstances.

Objection #5. But for such circumstances, special arrangements would have to be conventionally established. And then there would be no real dispensability of conventions *and* intentions, as you claim. Performing a gricy action requires one of two things: either an intention to perform it, or a convention which establishes a special arrangement (for performing it without such an intention).

Reply. No. No special arrangements need to be conventionally established. Performing α without an intention to do so requires neither (i) conventions in virtue of which certain doings (which for some

reason count as making it clear that one wants to α) are doings of α , nor (ii) conventions in virtue of which certain doings count as making it clear that one wants to do α .

Ad (i). I take it to be uncontroversial that doing something which counts as making it clear that one wants to α may be, in certain circumstances, sufficient for doing α , even if there are no conventions to this effect. At German universities, knocking at your desk after the lecture is something which, *ceteris paribus*,¹⁵ counts as making it clear that you want to applaud. Given this, and the gricy nature of applause, no special convention is needed to turn a piece of behaviour (which counts as making it clear that you want to applaud) into applauding. There is, in this case, a convention involved – but it is one in virtue of which knocking counts as making it clear that one wants to applaud. What I want to emphasize here is this: there need be no convention involved in virtue of which something which counts as making it clear that the agent wants to α is a performance of α .

Ad (ii). Doing something, y , which counts, in certain circumstances, as making it clear that one wants to do X requires, in those circumstances, nothing but acting in such a way that an inference to the best explanation for one's doing y contains the assumption that one wants to do X . Sometimes, no special conventions are needed in order to turn a given piece of behaviour into something which counts as making it clear that the agent wants to do X . The agent's behaviour itself may, in appropriate circumstances, give us the best reason to assume that he wants to do X . There would be no need for special conventions to count the behaviour as a way of doing something which makes it clear that he wants to do X . Counting-as does not, at least not always, require special ("counting-as") conventions. What counts as making it clear that one wants to ask for help, for example, need not depend on special conventions. Asking for help is a gricy action which you can perform without intending it. Moreover, you can do something which makes it clear (or counts as making it clear) that you want to do it, without there being any special conventions. It is easy to imagine circumstances in which somebody asks for help without intending to ask for help, although there are no special conventions which, in these circumstances, turn what he does into (a) an asking for help, or into (b) something which counts as an asking for help, or into (c) something which makes it clear that the person in question wants to ask for help, or into (d) something which counts as making this clear.

But maybe we don't need to bring in complicated concepts like "x counts as y in circumstances of kind c"; maybe we'd rather slightly modify our specification of griciness. This could be done in the following way:

An action type X is **gricy***
if and only if
expressing one's intention to X in doing what one does, is, by conceptual necessity, sufficient for therein X -ing.

This characterization clearly allows for cases in which the agent performs the gricy* action but does not intend to do so. For expressing an attitude or state of mind does not entail that one actually has the attitude in question. Consider the following conditions:

S does Φ ;

S belongs to a population P such that the following is a conceptual truth:¹⁶ if a normal member of P does Φ , then, *ceteris paribus*, he is in mental state Ψ ;

in the circumstances in which S does Φ , it is neither noticeable that S is not a normal member of P nor that the *ceteris paribus* clause just mentioned is violated.

If these conditions are fulfilled, then S , in doing Φ , expresses Ψ . Expressing Ψ therefore is compatible with not being in Ψ . For S may be one of those exceptional members of P who sometimes do Φ without being in Ψ , or there may be something exceptional in those circumstances in which S does Φ ; these possibilities are not ruled out by the three conditions listed – it is only ruled out that these possibilities are noticeably realized. If the fulfilment of these three conditions is, as I assume, sufficient for expressing Ψ , then, given that X is a gricy* action and expressing the intention to perform X is therefore sufficient for X -ing, it follows that gricy* actions can be performed *via* the expression of intentions which one does not have.

It might be objected, first, that there are no gricy* actions. And it might be objected, secondly, that expressing a mental state Ψ entails being in Ψ . As against the first objection, I hold it to be obvious that at least some illocutionary acts are not only gricy but also gricy* actions (asking for help, for example). And as regards the second objection, I understand that there is at least one sense of "expressing one's Ψ " which is quite close to one sense of "representing oneself as Ψ -ing", and that no sense of this latter phrase contains a requirement

to the effect that one actually Ψ s, when one represents oneself as Ψ -ing. One may express regret, sympathy or appreciation without regretting, sympathizing or appreciating. This point can be generalized. Searle, for example, seems to accept it as a completely general truth that in performing a speech act, one may express an internally associated mental state “where one does not have the [...] state that one expresses” (Searle 1983: 10). And I think that this is correct – at least, if it amounts to the following claim:

If Ψ is a mental state which, by conceptual necessity, is expressed¹⁷ in the performance of an illocutionary act, then a normal speaker may express Ψ although he is not in Ψ .

Here is an example in support of this claim. Let Ψ be the intention to come tomorrow. The intention to come tomorrow is expressed, by conceptual necessity, in the performance of a promise to come tomorrow. (It is a conceptual truth that if somebody promises to come tomorrow, he, *ceteris paribus*, intends to come tomorrow. Yet, it is possible to make this promise even though one does not have the associated intention; but this possibility is, by conceptual necessity, an exceptional one).¹⁸ Nevertheless, a normal speaker may express the intention to come tomorrow although he does not have this intention. As soon (and, alas, only as long) as you represent yourself as a normal speaker in normal circumstances, you can bring about many surprising feats of this kind. But then again, there’s a price to be paid for performing such feats – for example, the price of representing yourself as a normal speaker in normal circumstances. Sometimes, it can be such a drag.

Objection #6: But if neither intention nor convention were required in performing a gricy action, what else could possibly do the trick of turning a given piece of behaviour into an performance of the gricy action α ?

Reply. Here is something which, in appropriate circumstances, does the trick: the agent may just do something which gives us best reason to assume that in doing this he intends to α . He acts in such a way that an inference to the best explanation for his acting in this way contains the proposition that he thereby wants to α . (I presume that it is possible to act in such a way even if one does not want to α . Moreover, I presume that in such a case there need to be no special conventions which render such an acting a performance of α .) Now who is to decide in a case of conflict? Let’s assume that the audience

took an agent's piece of behaviour as making it clear that he thereby wanted to α , but the agent, after the event, insists on not having wanted to α in doing what he did. Nobody questions the agent's truthfulness. Clearly, some sort of misunderstanding has occurred. But who misunderstood what? The audience may have misunderstood what the agent was up to. But on the other hand, the agent may have misunderstood his own behaviour. Maybe he failed to recognize that he indicated something by his behaviour. Austin's *dictum*: "A judge should be able to decide" comes to mind. As I tend to view these complicated matters, the crucial point is that it may well have been the agent's fault to act in a way which made it look like he wanted to α . Such would have been the case, if an "impartial and well-informed spectator"¹⁹ of the agent's behaviour in the relevant circumstances would hold it to be beyond reasonable doubt that the agent, in behaving as he did, displayed a desire to α .

Objection #7: Even if what you say about the genericness of illocutionary acts were right, it does not add anything to our understanding of what illocutionary acts are. If I am told that, say, promising is an illocutionary act because making it clear that one wants to promise is, by conceptual necessity, sufficient for promising, then this doesn't help me a bit in understanding what promising is.

Reply. I would agree with this objection, if what is at issue were the specific essence or the individual essence of illocutionary acts. I disagree with it since my concern here is exclusively the generic essence of illocutionary acts. Let me explain. With regard to a complete illocutionary act α – like promising to Harvey to return the umbrella in five minutes – we may ask:

- (i) What makes it an illocutionary act?
- (ii) What makes it a promise?
- (iii) What makes it a promise to Harvey to return the umbrella in five minutes?

Let's call an answer to (i) an account of α 's generic essence, an answer to (ii) an account of α 's specific essence, and an answer to (iii) an account of α 's individual essence. What I have said in this paper concerns exclusively the generic essence of illocutionary acts. No account of the specific and the individual essences of illocutionary acts has been attempted here.²⁰ So what I have argued here is *not* that α 's specific or individual essence is such that α can be performed without

the agent's intention to perform it. In the terminology which I have just introduced, the point I want to make can be put as follows: even if a given illocutionary act *X* were essentially intentional (in the sense that it could not be performed by an agent who fails to have the characteristic intentions), then this fact would have to be explained in virtue of *X*'s specific or individual essence – not in virtue of the fact that *X* is an illocutionary act.

Let me hereby end this interlude of objections and replies. I just wanted to give an idea of how one may hope to be able to argue for the claim that gricy actions – and in particular the illocutionary acts among them – are not essentially intentional in an interesting sense. The crucial point may be put thus: the concept of intending-to-perform-the-action belongs to the *definiens* of griciness, but the definition does not exclude the possibility of unintended gricy actions. Griciness (and hence illocutionarity) is conceptually linked to action intentions, since the concept of making-it-clear-that-one-intends-to-perform-an-action-of-type-so-and-so brings in the concept of action intention. But gricy actions are not essentially intentional.

7. Conclusion

There is, I think, an important contribution of Paul Grice's ideas to the theory of speech acts beyond the intention-or-convention issue. The *RS*-feature which Grice discovered in utterer's meaning may be thought of as constituting the essence of illocutionarity. If so, the performance of illocutionary acts is obviously not conceptually dependent on conventions. But neither is it obvious that the performance of illocutionary acts is conceptually dependent on intentions – let alone complicated ones. As I propose to view these matters, what is characteristic of illocutionary acts is that they *allow* for a very special way of performing them, namely a way which involves the *RS*-pattern. They are *RS*-performable, if you forgive me this neologism. It is not essential that they are always or at least standardly performed in this way. Strawson said that "the aim, if not the achievement of securing uptake is essentially *a standard, if not an invariable*, element in the performance of the illocutionary act" (Strawson 1964: 158 his italics). I think that is not exactly right. The essence of illocutionarity is, I propose, griciness, that is: being *RS*-performable, and not, as Strawson claims: being standardly

performed in this way. Intentions and their recognition may play a role in standard performances, I don't know. But even if this were true, it might still be a contingent fact about illocutionary acts.

Notes

¹ This paper was written several years ago, as a contribution to the San Marino conference on Grice's work. Assuming that not everybody in the audience would be familiar both with Austin's speech act theory and the discussions on Grice's explication of speaker's meaning, I tried to give a rough sketch of these in the first part (sections 1-4). Having received generous comments by friends and colleagues in the meantime, I should like to recommend those readers who know both about Austin and Grice to just skip the first four sections.

Thanks to Kent Bach, Axel Bühler, Manfred Harth, Gita van Heerden, Nikola Kompa, Brian Loar, Eike von Savigny, Mark Siebel, Wolfgang Spohn and Peter F. Strawson for helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper. (If I were to write it today, it would be a different paper.)

² For one of the few exceptions, cf. Grice (1989: 19).

³ Cf. Bennett (1976: ch. 5). For a more detailed account of a similar idea, see Kemmerling (1980).

⁴ See my "Utterer's meaning revisited" in Grandy & Warner (eds.) (1986), where I have argued for this claim in detail.

⁵ Think of somebody who utters, assertively: "I think it's raining". Let's assume that he means what he says. Then what he means by his utterance, among other things, is that *he thinks that it's raining*. But does he perform an illocutionary act with this content? He may make no assertion at all about what he thinks; but rather he may make a weak claim about the weather. If we leave far-fetched candidates aside, maybe there is no illocutionary act at all performed in such a case, the propositional of which is: *that he thinks that it's raining*. – He then would mean, by his utterance, that he thinks that it's raining. But he then would not perform an illocutionary act with the propositional content that he thinks that it is raining.

⁶ What is more, one may ask a question without meaning to ask this question or meaning to ask any question at all. – And maybe there is even a perfectly good sense in which one may ask a question although (i) one does not mean to do so and (ii) one is not by one's addressee understood as doing so.

⁷ See Bennett (1976: 124).

⁸ This is not correct as it stands, since the coming about of so-and-so has to satisfy certain requirements. For our present purposes, those additional requirements may count as niceties to be left aside.

⁹ Take the following as a hint. First, let's give a name to the intention that itself be recognized. Let's call it "Otto". And let's call any intention "fritzy" which has its own recognition as a proper part of its content. Any fritzy intention is, like Otto, only

fulfilled if it itself is recognized; yet a fritzzy intention's content, unlike Otto's content, is not exhausted by the requirement of being recognized.

The thesis to be proven is that there are no fritzzy intentions which require nothing more for their fulfilment than their recognition. (Otto, just to make sure, is not a fritzzy intention.)

Now ask yourself: What could be added to the content of Otto, such that the result of this addition – call it Otto⁺ – is a fritzzy intention which requires nothing more for its fulfilment than its recognition? Otto⁺ would have to have two properties:

- (1) the Bach/Harnish property: requiring nothing more for its fulfilment than being recognized,
- (2) the fritzzy property: having a content which deals with more than sheer self-recognition.

These two properties cannot be co-instantiated.

[*Comment added in proof-reading:* I blush to confess that Kent Bach, in an email exchange on this point, has disagreed vigorously. And let me add a clarificatory remark on what is at issue here and what is not. I am not trying to criticize the Bach/Harnish account of illocutionary acts in any general kind of way. The point which is at issue here is a fairly picayune one which I find nevertheless worth considering: Is the characterization of illocutionary intentions, given by Bach and Harnish, as “intentions whose fulfilment consists in *nothing more* than their recognition” (my emphasis), correct? Although I am highly sympathetic to the Bach/Harnish approach to speech acts in general, I think, for the reasons sketched in this footnote, that this characterization won't do.]

¹⁰ On flicking through *How to Do Things With Words*, I didn't stumble upon a neat formulation of this third criterion, but I think it is obvious that the spirit of some such principle pervades all of the twelve lectures.

¹¹ I prefer the word “want” here, not because “intend” would be inappropriate, but because this terminological choice may remind us of the fact that the attitude in question need not involve any of the complexities of the intentions characteristic of Grice's definitions of utterer's meaning.

¹² In a sense, the crucial concept in the *definiens* of griciness is the concept of doing-something-which-makes-it-clear-that-so-and-so (or, what I take to be the same: the concept of making-it-clear-that-so-and-so-in-doing-what-one-does). Notice that in the *definiens*, the concept of intention (or wanting-to) is embedded in this conceptual frame.

¹³ *Meaning* so-and-so by one's utterance is not gricy. *Expressing one's intention* to so-and-so (or *expressing* any other kind of intentional state) by one's utterance is the paradigm of griciness.

¹⁴ For the speech act of quassertion, cf. Grice (1989: 297).

¹⁵ If you manifestly do your knocking for some unrelated reason or for no reason at all, your knocking does of course not count as making it clear that you want to applaud. So a *ceteris paribus* qualification is needed at this point. But that's just fine.

Of course, this qualification must not be interpreted as excluding your lack of intention to applaud. And that's just fine, too.

¹⁶ I distinguish what I call *conceptual truths proper* from semantical truths. A conceptual truth need not be obvious in the way which is characteristic of semantical ones. Doubt concerning a semantical truth indicates lack of linguistic mastery. Semantical truths are, if you wish, the most trivial conceptual truths. There are non-trivial conceptual truths, and it is these which I refer to as "conceptual truths *proper*". Conceptually true generalizations concerning doings and mental states come in two varieties: some contain an essential *ceteris paribus* qualification, i.e. without this qualification they would not be conceptual truths of any kind (example: "If somebody is reading a book, then, *ceteris paribus*, he is aware of reading"). Others do not require such a qualification ("If somebody is reading a book, he is conscious"). I assume that all true generalizations of the first type are conceptual truths proper, and that all of the second type are semantical.

¹⁷ Note that the conceptual necessity we are dealing with here typically concerns *ceteris paribus* generalizations. Here is an example: "If somebody promises to —, then, *ceteris paribus*, he intends to —". If the *ceteris paribus* clause were dropped, the generalization would not be conceptually true; in fact, it would be false. Apparently, all generalizations concerning actions and the mental states expressed in them inevitably contain a *ceteris paribus* qualification, if they are to be true at all. I regard it as most remarkable that there seem to be no generalizations of this "expressive" type such that (a) without a *ceteris paribus* qualification they would not be true, (b) with the qualification added they are true, but (c) they are not conceptually true.

¹⁸ If it were to become the regular thing that people promise but have no intention to keep their promises, then promising would cease to be the thing it is. It is part of the conceptual essence of promising that in promising to so-and-so, one expresses the intention to so-and-so. For if it were a normal thing to promise to do *X* without the intention to do *X*, then the concept of promising would be incompatible with the practice of promising. But *nota bene*: promising, by conceptual necessity, does not allow for such a *practice*. Yet it allows for exceptions of this kind, as long as they are clearly not normal cases.

¹⁹ Adam Smith, *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, London 1759, section 2, chapter 1.

²⁰ In some of my above replies, I have assumed without argument that the specific and individual essences of some illocutionary acts allow for unintended act performances.

References

- AUSTIN, J.L.
1962 *How to Do Things with Words*, Oxford: Oxford University Press (2nd revised ed. 1975).
- BACH, K. & M. HARNISH
1979 *Linguistic Communication and Speech Acts*, Cambridge (Mass.): MIT Press.

BENNETT, J.

1976 *Linguistic Behaviour*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

GRANDY, R.E. & R. WARNER (EDS.)

1986 *Philosophical Grounds of Rationality*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

GRICE, H.P.

1989 *Studies in the Way of Words*, Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University Press.

HARMAN, G.

1974 "Review of: Stephen Schiffer, *Meaning*", *Journal of Philosophy*, 71.

KEMMERLING, A.

1980 "How many things must a speaker intend/before he is said to have meant?",
Erkenntnis, 15.

1986 "Utterer's meaning revisited", in Grandy & Warner (eds.) (1986).

NAGEL, T.

1979 "Sexual perversion", in *Mortal Questions*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

SAVIGNY, E. VON

1988 *The Social Foundations of Meaning*, Berlin/Heidelberg/New York: Springer.

SCHIFFER, S.

1972 *Meaning*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

SEARLE, J.R.

1969 *Speech Acts*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

1983 *Intentionality*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

STRAWSON, P.F.

1964 "Intention and convention in speech acts", *Philosophical Review*, 73 (reprinted
in P.F. Strawson *Logico-Linguistic Papers*, London 1971: 149-69).