

# Alice SOLDA

## Research Interests

Experimental and Behavioral Economics

Self-Deception, Overconfidence, Motivated Beliefs, Punishment and Social Preferences

## Academic Position

2019 - **Post-doctoral Research Fellow in Environmental Economics**, *AWI for Economics*, University of Heidelberg.

## Education

2016 - **Joint PhD in Experimental Economics**, *Overconfidence as an Interpersonal Strategy*, University of Lyon/Queensland University of Technology.

2015-2016 **Master GAEXA 'Game Theory, Experimental Economics and Applied Econometrics'**, *University of Lyon*, Lyon, with high honors.

2014-2015 **Master EQUANT 'Quantitative Economics'**, *University of Lyon*, Lyon, with honors.

2011-2014 **Bachelor Law, Economics and Management**, *UFR-SJEPG*, Besançon, with high honors.

## Publication

2018 **Exclusion and Reintegration in a Social Dilemma**, *Economic Inquiry*, (with Marie Claire Villeval), [Link](#); [pdf](#).

**Abstract:** *Using a social dilemma game, we study the cooperative behavior of individuals who reintegrate their group after being excluded by their peers. We manipulate the length of exclusion and whether this length is imposed exogenously or results from a vote. We show that people are willing to exclude the least cooperators and they punish more, and more severely, chronic defectors. In return, a longer exclusion has a higher disciplining effect on cooperation after reintegration, but only when the length of exclusion is not chosen by group members. Its relative disciplining effect on cooperation after reintegration is smaller when the length of exclusion results from a vote. In this environment, a quicker reintegration also limits retaliation. The difference in the impact of long versus short exclusion on retaliation is larger when the length of exclusion is chosen by group members than when it is exogenous. Post-reintegration cooperation and forgiveness depend not only on the length of exclusion but also on the perceived intentions of others when they punish.*

## Working Paper

2019 **Strategically Delusional**, *R&R Experimental Economics*, (with Changxia Ke, Lionel Page and William von Hippel), [pdf](#).

**Abstract:** *In the present study, we test von Hippel and Trivers (2011)'s theory that people hold inflated self-beliefs when they can advantageously influence others in social interactions. We design an experiment where participants are incentivized either to form accurate beliefs about their performance at a test, or*

to convince a group of other participants that they performed well. We also vary participants' ability to freely gather information about their performance. Our results provide, for the first time altogether, the different empirical links of Von Hippel and Trivers (2011)'s theory of strategic confidence. First, we found that participants are more likely to become overconfident when they anticipate convincing others about the strength of their performance. Second, when offered the possibility to gather information about their performance, they bias their search of information in a way conducive to receiving more positive information on their performance. Third, we find that the increase in confidence generated by this motivated reasoning is likely to have a positive effect on their persuasiveness.

## Work in progress

**Overconfidence: a strategy in leadership striving**, (with Changxia Ke, Lionel Page and William von Hippel).

**Abstract:** *In this paper, we investigate whether individuals become strategically overconfident when being a leader comes with material benefits and to what extent overconfident leaders are detrimental to the group. We design an experiment in which participants are matched in groups of four and incentivised to select the best performer of their group as the group leader. The leader will make decisions on behalf of the group. In one treatment, the leader receives an additional prize to be the leader. Preliminary results show that participants select the best performer in their group as leaders two times more when there is no bonus to be the leader. When there is a bonus, leaders make overconfident decisions which, in turn, leads to the average payoff being two times smaller than in the No Bonus treatment.*

**Overconfidence as a bargaining strategy**, (with Changxia Ke, Lionel Page and William von Hippel).

**Abstract:** *This paper investigates the effect of an exogenous variation in confidence on the outcome of a bilateral bargaining situation. In this experiment, participants are matched in pairs and each pair performs a task to earn points on a group account. At the end of the task, we manipulate participants confidence about their performance relative to their partner's. The group account is then divided into two unequal shares and both partners are asked to agree on the allocation of these shares. However, the longer each pair takes to agree, the lower the final amount of each share will be. Preliminary results show that an increase in confidence relative to the partner's confidence increases the probability to earn the high share when participants reach an agreement before the shares start to decrease.*

**Overconfidence, preferences for accuracy and beliefs updating.**

**Abstract:** *This paper aims to investigate to what extent an exogenous change in individuals' confidence about their ability to succeed in an independent task affect their willingness to pay to increase the accuracy of a binary signal and whether people who hold positively biased beliefs about their probability of success exhibit conservatism.*

## Conferences and Workshops

Jan. 2019 **2019 Asia-Pacific ESA Meeting**, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates.

Nov. 2018 **13th Annual Australia New Zealand Workshop on Experimental Economics**, Auckland, New Zealand.

Jul. 2018 **Behavioural and Experimental Economics and Finance Workshop**, Sydney, Australia.

Sept. 2017 **12th Annual Australia New Zealand Workshop on Experimental Economics**, Melbourne, Australia.

Feb. 2017 **2017 Asia-Pacific ESA Workshop**, *Taipei*, Taiwan.

Sept. 2016 **11th Annual Australia New Zealand Workshop on Experimental Economics**, *Brisbane*, Australia.

## Teaching Experience

S2 2018 **"Introduction to micro- and macroeconomics" (EFB223)**, *Tutoring*, Queensland University of Technology (Brisbane), Undergraduate level.

S2 2017 **"Introduction to micro- and macroeconomics" (EFB223)**, *Tutoring*, Queensland University of Technology (Brisbane), Undergraduate level.

S1 2017 **"Introduction to micro- and macroeconomics" (EFB223)**, *Tutoring*, Queensland University of Technology (Brisbane), Undergraduate level.

## Skills

2017-2018 **Responsibilities**, *QUT 'Brown Bag' Seminar Series organizer*.

**Programming**, *oTree, Python, Javascript, Qualtrics, z-Tree, Stata and LaTeX*.

**Language**, *French (native speaker), English (fluent) and German (intermediate)*.

## Referees

### **Prof. Marie Claire VILLEVAL**

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### **Prof. Lionel PAGE**

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### **Prof. William VON HIPPEL**

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