



Upcoming Seminars

Monday, 20.6.2022

Departmental Seminar

13.30-14.30

AWI room 00.010

Jobst Heitzig, Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research

"Efficient Non-Cooperative Provision of Costly Positive Externalities via Conditional Commitments"

Abstracts

Departmental Seminar

Jobst Heitzig

"Efficient Non-Cooperative Provision of Costly Positive Externalities via Conditional Commitments"

I'll consider games where individual contributions are costly but beneficial to other players, so that contributing nothing is a dominant strategy. Considering that players may be unable to write binding agreements but may make binding unilateral commitments that are conditional on others' actions, I'll present a general mechanism based on conditional commitment functions (CCFs). If players must choose their CCFs once and simultaneously, the mechanism contributes to the Nash program since its strong (or coalition-proof) equilibria realize precisely the core outcomes of the corresponding bargaining problem. This might be considered a contribution to the Nash program of deriving solution concepts from cooperative game theory from suitable non-cooperative mechanisms. If players can communicate, the outcome can thus be expected to be Pareto-efficient. Even without communication, the core outcomes may be found by simple individual learning rules.

Talks and Research visits

Tillmann Eymess presented "Perceived Relative Income and Revealed Preferences for Clean Air" (joint work with Anca Balietti and Angelika Budjan) at the AERE 2022 Summer Conference in Miami, Florida, June 1-3.

Editorial deadline for issue 14/2022 of the newsletter:
Wednesday, June 22, 2022, 12 p.m.
newsletter@awi.uni-heidelberg.de