Abstract
International bureaucrats employed in pre-existing international intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) participated in the design negotiations producing the vast majority of the IGOs that exist today. Why are they ever involved in this pivotal process – let alone so often, and in such varied ways? For answers, other work has looked at soft spots in state capabilities or a matter’s salience to states. But this paper turns attention to international bureaucrats themselves. Drawing on scholarship about the importance of agenda-setting and the inclination of IGO personnel to buffer themselves from state control, I identify a key source of leverage for international bureaucrats. All else equal, they will be better able to agenda-set in institutional design negotiations and buffer new institutions from states’ interventions when they form alliances with fellow non-state actors. To test this prediction while controlling for soft spots in state capabilities or salience, I employ a complementary approach: a case study of the origins of the World Food Program (WFP) and a medium-N qualitative analysis of all IGOs created under Article XIV of the Constitution of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). The empirics support the notion that international bureaucrats’ involvement is explained not only by factors stemming from states – but also from factors stemming from international bureaucrats themselves.
Introduction

Each year, the World Food Program (WFP) assists millions of people through scores of endeavors, such as delivering disaster relief to victims of Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines, feeding refugees of the ongoing Syrian civil war, and supplying technical assistance to the agricultural sector of North Korea. The WFP’s structure is intriguing: it is insulated against several conventional mechanisms by which states attempt to control institutions. Moreover, the organization’s very existence is surprising. In 1946, international bureaucrats in the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) pitched the idea of a body like this, but the United States and the United Kingdom firmly refused. Fourteen years later, FAO bureaucrats resurrected the proposal, and the United States embraced it. In the interim, something must have changed. But did the change lay in states alone – or did it have something to do with international bureaucrats themselves?

The question pertains to a phenomenon that goes well beyond the WFP or FAO. In one way or another, international bureaucrats employed in pre-existing international intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) participated in the design negotiations producing about two-thirds of the IGOs that exist today. The result is a large and growing number of “IGO progeny”: organizations that are descendants of other IGOs and that interact in increasingly complex family trees.

Institutional design is a pivotal process. It has lasting consequences for states: institutions, once created, are difficult to eliminate. Moreover, although institutions can and do change over time, “founding moments loom large,” because the initial institutional design “makes possible certain paths and rules out others.” So, why do international bureaucrats sometimes play quite extensive roles in a process with such high stakes for states? And why do we see IGOs that are insulated against states’ interference?

The natural inclination is to look to states for the answer. In previous work, I uncover evidence that international bureaucrats take on design tasks when states’ capabilities are deficient in some way – for example, when the staff of existing IGOs possess scientific or technical

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1 Consider resources: the World Food Program can accept contributions not only from states, but also from intergovernmental organizations, non-governmental organizations, and even individuals. Or consider oversight: the full membership never convenes. Instead, the organization is overseen by a governing body consisting of only a subset of the member-states, who meet once per year and rotate through terms of about three years.
2 Shanks et al. 1996. Note that two distinct kinds of individuals are associated with international intergovernmental organizations. International bureaucrats are people actually employed in IGOs. States’ representatives are people sent by states as delegates to IGOs. In other words, the latter are explicit representatives of member-states, while it is the former who are actors with longer-term careers within the IGO structure itself. For example, delegates to the International Monetary Fund’s Board of Governors are finance ministers or central bank governors – they are members of states’ domestic civil service and may be susceptible to turnover with changes in domestic government. Meanwhile, staff of the IMF – while obviously hailing from somewhere – tend to make their careers within the IGO itself rather than in their home-country governments.
3 Shanks et al. 1996 use the term “emanation” to refer to intergovernmental organizations created with the participation of international bureaucrats working in pre-existing IGOs. The Yearbook of International Organizations also uses this term, but differently: to flag any offshoot of “persons, places, or bodies,” not only offshoots of IGOs. To avoid confusion, the term “emanation” is not used here.
4 North 1990; Goodin 1996; Aggarwal 1998; Koremenos et al. 2003. The institutional design process entails “the devising and realization of rules, procedures, and organizational structures that will enable and constrain behavior so as to accord with held values, achieve desired objectives, or execute given tasks” (Alexander 2005, 213).
6 Zegart 1999, 7.
expertise that states need for crafting a new IGO.\(^7\) I also find that international bureaucrats take on design tasks when salience to states is lacking in some way. For instance, although states tend to monopolize design negotiations for IGOs with a direct impact on state security or survival, they are much less possessive in the non-high-politics issues that constitute the vast majority of international relations.\(^8\)

Understanding state-based factors to watch, this article shifts attention to international bureaucrats themselves. I argue that, all else equal, *the role and impact of international bureaucrats in institutional design negotiations will increase as their alliances with fellow non-state actors increase.* A key concept of the argument is agenda-setting: circumscribing the choice sets of other actors by shifting the status quo to which other actors refer when evaluating their options.\(^9\) International bureaucrats are inclined to insulate their own IGO and their wider organizational family from interventions by states.\(^10\) Hence, the greater the extent to which international bureaucrats set the institutional design agenda to which states react, the less stringent the mechanisms of state control will be in the resulting institution. Alliances with non-state actors come into play by enhancing international bureaucrats’ agenda-setting abilities in design negotiations.

Such partnerships empower international bureaucrats to take advantage of two-level games. For years, international relations scholars have known that the interaction of international and domestic politics often produces multiple policies that would satisfy groups at both levels. This provides leverage for national leaders to play one level against the other in order to get closer to their own preferred policy within that choice-set.\(^11\) At the same time, the interaction of international and domestic politics opens “boomerang” opportunities by which domestic nongovernmental actors bypass their own state and seek international allies to pressure their states from outside and influence domestic policymaking.\(^12\) It also opens “access” opportunities whereby NGOs, business actors, or scientific experts permeate intergovernmental organizations in order to influence international policymaking.\(^13\)

But scholarship has not explored the possibility that international bureaucrats face something similar. Non-state actors are permeable by international bureaucrats too: the relationship is not unidirectional. Moreover, partnering with staff in fellow IGOs, with domestic non-governmental organizations, or with transnational civil society groups holds the promise of amplifying pressure on states at the international and/or domestic level of two-level games. This, in turn, can move outcomes closer to international bureaucrats’ own objectives. Hence, there are reasons why international bureaucrats would proactively and strategically seek partners among non-state actors. And an observable implication is that an international bureaucracy with greater alliances vis-à-vis states will also have IGO progeny with greater insulation against state control.

In order to investigate this observable implication while controlling for soft spots in state capabilities or salience, the article examines a single organizational family: the web of progeny surrounding the Food and Agriculture Organization. A brief case study shows how an increase in FAO bureaucrats’ alliances helped them to bring to fruition the World Food Program – an IGO that exhibits intriguing insulation from state control and echoes a body that the secretariat

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\(^7\) Johnson 2013a; Johnson and Urpelainen 2014.
\(^8\) Johnson 2013b.
\(^9\) Gruber 2001, 277.
\(^12\) Keck and Sikkink 1998, 12.
\(^13\) Tallberg et al. 2013.
had failed to bring about 14 years earlier. Then, a complementary medium-N qualitative analysis compares and contrasts a related pool of 12 other IGOs within the FAO family. Both empirical approaches provide support for the notion that international bureaucrats’ design role and impact are explained not only by factors stemming from states – but also from factors revolving around international bureaucrats themselves.

The FAO family is well suited for garnering generalizable insights into IGOs more broadly. It is of substantive interest on its own, handling food and agricultural issues that are not necessarily high-politics concerns yet are nevertheless “important” in an absolute sense. But it also possesses characteristics that facilitate the generalizability of empirical results: it offers multiple institutional design instances over time, the potential to control for alternative explanations, and the ability to spot institutions that died or were never created. Moreover, it is a prominent IGO that dates from the same postwar institutional boom that spawned many other prominent IGOs, such as the United Nations and the World Bank.

Theoretical Framework

The institutional design process takes place in a bargaining context in which participants behave instrumentally.\(^{14}\) States are willing to delegate to intergovernmental organizations, but they also strive to retain influence over IGOs and the personnel within them.\(^{15}\) Hence, they are inclined to design stringent mechanisms of state control, and they hedge their bets with three common types of formal mechanisms: 1) management of resources (e.g., limiting the non-state sources from which an IGO can receive funds), 2) institutional oversight (e.g., convening frequent meetings of member-states to monitor an IGO), and 3) decision-making practices (e.g., granting states veto power over an IGO’s activities).\(^{16}\)

In contrast, international bureaucrats are inclined to design insulation from state control. They stand to benefit by gaining influence over an enlarged pool of tasks and resources, and by dampening opportunities for interference by states.\(^{17}\) Like bureaucrats more generally, they have objectives of their own: material security, legitimacy, and the advancement of policies they deem fitting.\(^{18}\) The pursuit of each objective bumps up against stringent mechanisms of state control.\(^{19}\)

Yet this does not mean that in institutional design negotiations with one another, states

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\(^{14}\) Weimer 1995; Goodin 1996; Aggarwal 1998; Nurmi 1998. That is, participants contrive to craft institutions in ways anticipated to advance their own objectives. This is a “thin” conception of rationality, requiring few other presumptions about the context in which actors are operating (Pierson 2000; Wendt 2001; Duffield 2003).

\(^{15}\) Hawkins et al. 2006. This is a general tendency. It does not exclude the possibility that states – even when designing on their own – sometimes strive for relatively insulated designs when crafting multilateral central banks or international courts (Alter 2008). For these types of institutions to be effective at long-term goals such as combating inflation or resolving disputes, member-states would need to curtail their own ability to meddle in the short term. It is telling, however, that the vast majority of IGOs are not multilateral central banks or international courts. States do recognize the need to forego stringent control mechanisms in such institutions – but such institutions are special cases and relatively uncommon.

\(^{16}\) Cox and Jacobson 1974.

\(^{17}\) Weiss and Jordan 1976, 429-438; Abbott 1992, 12.

\(^{18}\) Barnett and Coleman 2005, 597-598. Also see Zegart 1999; Barnett and Finnemore 2004; Andonova 2010, 30-31. Legitimacy is “a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” (Suchman 1995, 574).

always seek maximal control, while international bureaucrats always seek maximal insulation. For states, two broad factors reduce the attractiveness or feasibility of designing a new IGO with extremely stringent mechanisms of state control. First, states do not always care enough to pay the actual costs and the opportunity costs of such stringent control.20 They must prioritize in allocating scarce resources, and one way of doing so is by privileging issues with probable implications for their own survival.21 Thus, they more readily pay the costs of control for IGOs dealing with “high politics” issues such as national security, than for IGOs dealing with important yet less immediately salient issues.22

Second, states do not always possess the individual or collective abilities to install and maintain stringent control. One challenge is that many intergovernmental organizations interact primarily with developing countries, for instance by focusing on a region such as Africa, Latin America, or Asia. Unlike strong states, weaker states’ impetus for turning to IGOs is often a recognition that they lack the expertise and wherewithal to do the work themselves – naturally, such states also have a hard time installing and maintaining close control over IGOs.23 Another challenge is that throwing a wider variety of states into the mix does not necessarily alleviate the situation. While this may bring in states with greater individual capabilities, it also amplifies heterogeneity among the parties. Heterogeneity exacerbates preference divergence and the collection action challenges that already complicate states’ ability to operate cohesively and control IGOs.24 In addition, it increases the chance that some states will move to protect organizational activities from other states, or even from themselves.25

In sum: even when states do not interact with international bureaucrats in institutional design negotiations, their inclination toward stringent control mechanisms is tempered by a matter’s salience to states, and the capabilities of states. Similarly, real-world considerations soften international bureaucrats’ inclination toward insulation. Somewhat scaling back insulation may be useful for attracting members and work for a new institution within the organizational family, because states hesitate to join or entrust tasks to bodies that they cannot pressure to at least some degree.26 However, even after being tempered, states’ and international bureaucrats’ design inclinations remain distinct.

Institutional stickiness and path dependency make negotiation outcomes crucial – and much hinges upon participants’ maneuvers to set design agendas.27 The greater the extent to which a particular design participant sets the design agenda, the more the resultant design tends to reflect the inclinations of that particular participant – and not of other participants. For instance, by offering informational services or organizing conferences, international bureaucrats can usher in a world in which the need for a new institution is being discussed in the international realm. Or, even more proactively: by offering design proposals or even launching new bodies themselves, international bureaucrats can usher in a world in which there is a clear vision of an institutional design. Though states might strongly wish to do so, they cannot return to a world in which the issue is not being discussed, nor can they return to a world in which no

22 Lipson 1984; Bierman and Siebenhuner 2009, 334-335.
27 Gruber 2001, 277.
concrete vision for an institutional response exists. Thus, the extent to which international bureaucrats’ insulation objective is actually reflected in design outcomes hinges on the extent to which international bureaucrats set the institutional design agenda, shifting the status quo to which states refer when negotiating with international bureaucrats over how new IGOs will look.

Then what shapes the extent to which international bureaucrats set the institutional design agenda in the first place? Previous research shows that part of the explanation stems from states. The same sorts of factors reducing the attractiveness or feasibility of designing stringent state control mechanisms also can reduce the attractiveness or feasibility of preventing international bureaucrats from setting institutional design agendas. International bureaucrats strive to participate and agenda-set, and states rarely muster the roadblocks to fully impede them. After all, dominating the institutional design process is a costly struggle. States may be less inclined to undertake that struggle if they do not perceive that survival or security is at stake. Moreover, states may be less equipped to undertake that struggle if they face soft spots concerning technical uncertainty, lack of resources, or heterogeneity among states. In other words, salience and capabilities matter here as well.

But another part of the explanation stems from international bureaucrats: their cultivation of allies among fellow non-state actors also shapes the extent to which they set institutional design agendas. As mentioned above, much has been made of the leverage opportunities afforded to government officials by two-level games – that is, by interactions between the international and domestic realms. Government officials may be able to get a deal more in line with their personal objectives when they participate in negotiations at one level but can point out that the result must be palatable to a demanding audience in the other level. Similarly, domestic nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) may be able to obtain their preferred outcomes when they boomerang past their national government and link to international allies who can pressure domestic policymakers, or when they permeate IGOs in order to shape international policymaking.

However, little attention has been devoted to the fact that IGO personnel can take advantage of similar positions. As one scholar points out:

[A] smart organization would use this space and seize the opportunity… If it stays keenly in touch with the domestic realities of its (most powerful) member-states, the organization can fine-tune its policies with the domestic constituencies. Nongovernmental actors, of course, can be seen as keepers of the gate(s) between segments of the society and its international counterpart.

Potential allies come in a variety of forms: personnel in fellow intergovernmental organizations, in domestic non-governmental organizations, in transnational civil society, and so on.

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28 Johnson 2013b.
32 Keck and Sikkink 1998.
33 Tallberg et al. 2013.
By teaming with personnel in fellow IGOs, international bureaucrats amplify pressure on states in the international level of two-level games. For instance, these international partners can help to inform, reinforce, and broadcast states’ commitments – making it more difficult for states to reverse transnational developments. On the other hand, teaming with domestic interest groups may help international bureaucrats to heap pressure on states in the domestic level of two-level games. For instance, these internal partners can help to attract states’ attention while freeing IGO personnel to behave proactively behind the scenes. And last but not least, teaming with civil society groups that transcend national boundaries offer particularly attractive opportunities to amplify pressure on states at both levels of two-level games. These complex partners may be able to influence states internally as well as externally.36

Thus, international bureaucrats can attempt to leverage additional actors in order to apply pressure from “above” (internationally) and/or from “below” (domestically). This increases the likelihood that states will endorse – or at least resign themselves to – an institutional design agenda that has been set by international bureaucrats. Indeed, “it would be a serious mistake to overlook the role of transnational alliances among influential interest groups in developing and maintaining regimes at the international level.”37

Scholars may overlook these potential partnerships, especially outside of a few issue areas such as environmental protection. However, international bureaucrats themselves are unlikely to neglect such opportunities. After all, alliances – perhaps with employees in fellow IGOs, but perhaps with activists in domestic non-governmental organizations, or transnational civil society – can distract or strain states.38 Alliances also provide useful camouflage and diversions, enabling some of the most proactive international bureaucrats to nevertheless elude scrutiny and avoid standing out as “visible provocateurs” in the institutional design process.39

In short, the theoretical framework links institutional design outcomes back to international bureaucrats’ agenda-setting, and agenda-setting back to international bureaucrats’ alliances. The greater the alliances of international bureaucrats vis-à-vis states, the greater the extent to which international bureaucrats set the institutional design agenda. And the greater the extent to which international bureaucrats set the institutional design agenda, the less stringent the mechanisms of state control in the resulting institution. In short:

(A) ALLIANCES OF PARENT BUREAUCRACY ➔ (B) PARENT BUREAUCRACY’S DESIGN AGENDA-SETTING ➔ (C) INSULATION OF IGO PROGENY40

36 Jonsson and Tallberg 2010.
37 Young 1989, 364. Epistemic communities are one form of alliances, uniting intergovernmental organizations and non-governmental organizations – see, for example, Haas 1990.
38 Dai 2007.
39 Mathiason 2007, xii, 95. For instance, domestic environmental groups have pressured their national governments for new institutions that bureaucrats from the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) wanted to create. For more on how UNEP bureaucrats have leveraged alliances with non-state actors to build institutions related to climate change, water pollution, and other environmental issues, see Haas 1990 or Bauer 2009.
40 Johnson 2013a already provides broad support for the link from B to C. Statistical analyses of nearly 200 randomly sampled IGOs find a substantial and robust negative correlation between the stringency of state control mechanisms in an IGO and the extent to which international bureaucrats from a pre-existing organization set the design agenda when that IGO was created. In other words, the more that international bureaucrats agenda-set, the more the resulting institution tends to exhibit insulation from states’ interference. The finding holds across conventional mechanisms of state control: financial domination, oversight meetings, monopolization of delegates, and (to some extent) veto power. This quantitative approach control for alternative explanations such as
This reasoning produces a hypothesis linking A and C directly:

**Alliance Hypothesis:** *All else equal, the greater the alliances of a potential parent bureaucracy *vis-à-vis* states, the less stringent the mechanisms of state control in any IGO progeny.*

Because the traditional focus of international relations scholarship is states, other work on institutional design has focused on state-based factors first. This is instructive yet tells us little about how international bureaucrats’ design agenda-setting also is shaped by their own alliances. To gain insights, we need a different research approach, in which state-based factors would remain fairly steady, while this bureaucracy-based factor would be free to vary. Then we could better isolate whether international bureaucrats’ alliances shape institutional design processes and outcomes. Ideally, such a research approach also would incorporate two possibilities that previous examinations of existing institutions have not: that an institution is proposed but not actually created, and that an institution is created but subsequently dies.  

**Research Approach**

This can be accomplished by focusing on a single organizational family if that organizational family provides multiple opportunities for institutional design negotiations, with state-based factors remaining fairly steady across those opportunities. The institutional web of the Food and Agriculture Organization meets both criteria.

First, the FAO family provides a web of numerous progeny, created under relatively consistent circumstances. The founding documents of most IGOs remain silent about institutional design activities – but the FAO’s Constitution does not. Its Articles VI and XIV lay out guidelines about the rights and responsibilities of the Secretariat and member-states in this pivotal process. This eliminates the possibility that variation in international bureaucrats’ design role and impact arises because states have altered international bureaucrats’ formal rights and responsibilities to participate in design negotiations.

The multiple opportunities for institutional design negotiations within the FAO family also include counterfactuals: an IGO that died can be compared to a similar IGO that survived, or organizational age, states’ laxity in issues other than high-politics, and soft spots in states’ capabilities (technical uncertainty, lack of resources, or the difficulties of working cohesively in a heterogeneous group). It also employs various methods to account for the possibility of selection or endogeneity – that is, the possibility that factors making stringent state control mechanisms less likely also make international bureaucrats’ participation in institutional design processes more likely.

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41 Dimitrov et al. 2007.
42 Mitchell and Bernauer 1998.
43 *Yearbook of International Organizations* 2013. For instance, the organizational family now includes institutions such as the International Rice Commission (launched in the late 1940s), the Codex Alimentarius Commission (launched in the early 1960s), and the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (launched in the early 1990s).
44 Johnson 2013c.
45 According to Article XIV guidelines, member-states can allow the Director-General to act on behalf of a technical meeting or conference that has drafted a convention or agreement: he may submit that draft to member-states for their consideration (Article XIV, paragraphs 1-3). Due to the Director-General’s constitutional powers for convening such meetings and conferences (Article VI), the FAO bureaucracy has opportunities to shape the drafts before submitting them to member-states for potential adoption. Moreover, if the Director-General is “satisfied that urgent action is required,” the FAO bureaucracy can convene conferences without member-states’ prior approval, so long as it subsequently reports its activities to member-states (Article VI, paragraph 6).
an institutional design process that was proposed but never actually happened can be compared to a similar process that did take place. Such comparisons are important but usually very difficult to do: generally, IGOs that are readily available for examination are only those that survived, while institutional design instances that are readily available for examination are only those that occurred. By definition, these counterfactuals do not appear in the universe of intergovernmental organizations that exist today.\textsuperscript{46} Thus, it would be nearly impossible to identify observations that could have existed but do not – unless one focuses on an organizational family to winnow places to look.

Second, the FAO family effectively controls for many alternative explanations stemming from state-based factors. For one thing, the core issue for the FAO and its progeny always has been food and agriculture. This offers constancy across institutional design instances within this organizational family. It also satisfies a scope condition implied in the theoretical framework: so long as states’ security or survival is not at stake, there may be openings for international bureaucrats in existing IGOs to participate in the creation of new IGOs. More broadly, then, the FAO family is reasonably representative of the kinds of non-high-politics topics that IGOs often address.

In addition to controlling for a matter’s salience to states, the FAO family controls for several factors pertaining to the capabilities of states. The extent of states’ need for expertise is generally high.\textsuperscript{47} The organizational focus is usually on less economically and socially developed areas of the world.\textsuperscript{48} And the number of great-power states involved in design negotiations in the FAO family has been remarkably steady: from the beginning France, the United Kingdom, and the United States have been important great-power members, often working in tandem within the FAO. Meanwhile, because the Soviet Union never was an FAO member and Russia did not join the FAO until 2006, this organizational family remained relatively stable even as the Cold War and the Soviet Union unraveled in the 1980s and 1990s.

Furthermore, although two other state-based factors are not necessarily as constant within the FAO family, both are nevertheless relatively stable. The FAO membership has grown markedly since 1945. But because many problems related to food and agriculture lend themselves to regional responses, it is likely that many institutional design instances will involve a similar number of states negotiating, as well as a similar extent of geographic focus.

In short, with only modest variation in state-based drivers – a matter’s proximity to state survival, or soft spots concerning states’ uncertainty, resources, or heterogeneity – we can better pinpoint whether and how international bureaucrats’ alliances shape their design agenda-setting.

**Empirical Analysis**

The empirical analysis of the FAO family proceeds in two parts. The first is a brief case study of a pair of proposals pitched by FAO bureaucrats: a 1940s proposal to create a World

\textsuperscript{46} The International Correlates of War (ICOW) dataset identifies some IGOs that have died – or, more commonly, have changed names or functions. But this constitutes an incomplete list, because the dataset includes only a subset of the universe of intergovernmental organizations as defined by the *Yearbook of International Organizations* (Wallace and Singer 1970; Pevehouse et al. 2004). The *Yearbook* itself attempts to identify some defunct organizations, but it does not do a thorough job of distinguishing IGOs that have truly died versus those that persist in an altered form. For a discussion of how this relates to economic IGOs in particular, see Gray 2013.

\textsuperscript{47} Institutions in the FAO family deal with a variety of technical or scientific topics – nutrition, pest eradication, commodities markets, disaster responses, crop research, and so on.

\textsuperscript{48} After all, issues such as nutrition, pest eradication, etc. tend to be less of a concern for the world’s most advanced states.
Food Board (WFB), and a remarkably similar 1960s proposal to create a World Food Program. The initial proposal failed, and the Board never emerged. But the later proposal prevailed, producing an IGO that exhibits intriguing insulation from state control. The case reveals how a proposal that initially was shot down came to be resurrected successfully 14 years later – and it demonstrates that changes in international bureaucrats’ alliances helped to produce a different outcome, in the form of IGO progeny with notable insulation.

The second part of the analysis is a medium-N qualitative study of IGO progeny created under Article XIV of the FAO Constitution. All Article XIV organizations are considered, and therefore the pool can include organizations that have died. Here, the qualitative approach looks for patterns in the new IGOs’ insulation from mechanisms of state control. It also considers whether those patterns correlate with the alliances of FAO bureaucrats at the time of institutional design negotiations.

**Designing the FAO’s Institutional Progeny: Origins of the World Food Program**

The Food and Agriculture Organization was launched at an October 1945 meeting in Quebec. Delegates elected John Boyd Orr, a Scottish nutritionist, to be the Food and Agriculture Organization’s first director-general. Orr ignored governments’ stipulation that his organization must stick to research rather than operations. Instead, he declared that he and the FAO bureaucracy would fight world hunger directly:

> [T]he organization had neither the authority nor the funds to initiate a policy which would achieve the results hoped for. I decided to try to get governments to give it the necessary power… After it had been explained to [FAO personnel] what I was going to try to do, no one could have had a more enthusiastic and loyal group of colleagues.49

In May 1946 the Food and Agriculture Organization hosted a “Special Meeting on Urgent Food Problems” in Washington, D.C. The goal was to educate states about projected worldwide food shortages and to lay the groundwork for an offshoot organization to address this problem.50

**The 1940s: The Failed Proposal for a World Food Board**

The Director-General saw this as “a propitious moment for him to make a major political move.”51 After spotlighting world hunger with the May 1946 conference, he began developing plans for a World Food Board that would coordinate nearly every aspect of long-term global food policy. It would set maximum and minimum prices for agricultural commodities. It would buy, sell, and store supplies for a world food reserve. It would collect surplus production from rich countries for reallocation among needy populations. It would extend financial and technical assistance so that poor countries could develop more self-sufficient agricultural and industrial sectors.52 States would be the members, but Orr envisioned that the Board itself would be quite insulated from state control. His vision consisted of businessmen representing all areas of the world, under the general supervision of the FAO and United Nations.53

Yet over the next few months, Orr’s maneuverings would not produce the desired result.

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49 Orr 1960, 166, 167.
50 Shaw 2007, 11.
51 Talbot 1994, 4.
53 Orr 1960, 171-172.
At a September 1946 conference in Copenhagen, he formally presented the proposal to FAO member-states and asked for a vote. Governments demurred, instead asking the Director-General to set up a committee to consider the proposal and report back the following year. This bought time for the United States and United Kingdom to kill the proposal.  

By the start of 1947, American officials such as Will Clayton (U.S. Under-Secretary for Economic Affairs) made it clear to other states that there would be no WFB, for the body would be an empty shell without the United States, the globe’s foremost agricultural producer. The United Kingdom went along. Reined in by their two biggest donors, international bureaucrats’ institutional design vision flickered. “Britain and America,” Orr concluded, “were not prepared to give either funds or authority to an organization over which they had not got full control.”

**After the Failure: International Bureaucrats Cultivate Alliances**

The initial bold proposal failed to produce the desired new body. However, by calling the May 1946 meeting on food crises and then in September outlining specific design visions for a food aid institution, Orr and his staff began shifting the status quo. The Director-General devoted the remainder of his term to putting FAO staff in a better position for “some future happier time” when circumstances might be more favorable for establishing a World Food Board.

This set the FAO bureaucracy on the path it would take in the 1950s under subsequent leaders: awaiting an opening, all the while bolstering their expert credentials, forging partnerships with nongovernmental organizations and other non-state actors, and keeping the hunger issue alive in a series of seminal publications. Mid-decade, an opening arose for FAO bureaucrats: the 1956 ascent of the Food and Agriculture Organization’s first Director-General from a developing country. This was a surprise. Prior to the actual election of India’s B.R. Sen, many observers presumed that the FAO chief would continue to come from one of the biggest agricultural producers, not from one of the biggest recipients.

Sen led the Food and Agriculture Organization for 11 years and proved to be one of the longest-serving and most proactive heads in FAO history. In 1959, he launched the Freedom

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54 Shaw 2007, 27.
55 At the launch of the FAO, the United States and the United Kingdom agreed to provide 40 percent of the new organization’s $5 million annual budget. The remaining 60 percent would be funded by other member states in proportion to their respective gross national product figures (Abbott 1992, 17).
56 Orr and Lubbock 1953, 57.
57 Orr 1960, 192. FAO headquarters initially were placed in the U.S. capital, Washington D.C. The defeat of his WFB proposal prompted Orr to rethink his organization’s vulnerability to states’ interference and his staff’s need for non-state allies. In addition to beginning to pursue the latter, he tackled the former: he decided the FAO bureaucracy “would be freer if we moved to one of the European countries” (Orr 1960, 202). He helped to convince Denmark, Italy, and Switzerland to bid to relocate FAO headquarters. The ensuring four-country race pitted Europe against the United States and forced a vote among member-states in 1949. Rome beat Washington D.C. by a tally of 30 to 28 (Talbot 1990, 2, 4, 20). The FAO bureaucracy completed its move to Italy in February 1951.
58 Shaw 2001, 20. Among the most important studies were 1954’s *Disposal of Agricultural Surpluses* by Gerda Blau, and 1955’s *Uses of Agricultural Surpluses To Finance Economic Development in Under-Developed Countries* by Mordecai Ezekiel. With such reports, “the intellectual basis was laid for an operational multilateral food agency” (Singer et al. 1987, 27).
59 Abbott 1992, 42. Philip Cardon, an American, resigned in 1956 due to health problems. The U.S. nominated another American as a replacement. Other member states nominated individuals from India and the Netherlands. This forced balloting, from which the American decided to withdraw after the second round. Thus, the third ballot consisted only of an Indian candidate and a Dutch candidate, which the former won by a tally of 42 to 29.
from Hunger Campaign (FFHC), which brought attention to continuing food shortages around the world. A key part of the FFHC was the publication of a series of studies carried out by FAO and UN employees.  

States were not the sole audience, though. Instead, the campaign reached directly to potential allies in charitable organizations, religious groups, agribusinesses, and other non-state actors to raise private funds for FAO to combat hunger. This leveraged non-state allies to alleviate the organization’s past dependence on financing from states alone, and at a time when the United States was making overtures to reduce its contributions.  

To fund additional agriculture-related projects in developing countries, Sen also forged a partnership with staff at the World Bank. He secured further resources through the United Nations Special Fund for Economic Development (SUNFED) – a program that became operational in 1959 and eventually would morph into the UN Development Program. This enabled FAO employees to take a larger on-the-ground role, operating technical assistance and training projects in developing countries. The SUNFED arrangement also put Sen in close contact with development economist Hans Singer, a senior UN bureaucrat.

The 1960s: The Successful Proposal for a World Food Program

Sen’s actions laid a foundation for reviving Orr’s proposal for a World Food Board. The FAO bureaucracy had accumulated more expertise and experience, diversified its funding sources, and cultivated relationships with non-state actors. The Director-General and his employees would take advantage.

In autumn 1960, the Eisenhower administration rubber-stamped United Nations Resolution 1496 XV, which floated the idea of “food for peace.” Behind the scenes, Sen had worked hard to make sure that the United Nations resolution included several passages privileging the FAO bureaucracy. With his prodding, the resolution endorsed the Freedom from Hunger Campaign. It advocated the FAO secretariat’s view that hunger would be solved in the longer term only by fostering economic development in poor countries. And it authorized FAO personnel to develop the design proposal for a new institution.

FAO personnel were pleased to oblige. After all, the secretariat had angled for such “delegation” for years. To a casual observer, it would appear that international bureaucrats took on an extensive design role only because states instructed them to do so. But in fact, this was merely a face-saving post hoc authorization by states, reacting to status-quo-shifting that IGO personnel already had done on their own.

FAO Director-General Sen formed a five-person expert group to aid him in fashioning a formal design proposal to be presented to states. He chose UN economist Hans Singer to chair the group. These men already were collaborating through SUNFED, the UN Fund that had

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60 Shaw 2001, 50, 51.
61 Talbot 1994, 49, 69.
62 States’ contributions to the FAO budget were assessed in proportion to each country’s Gross National Product. The U.S. Congress grew frustrated, and in 1961 passed a law decreeing that the United States’ contributions to the United Nations system and its specialized agencies (including the FAO) could not exceed 25 percent of the total assessed dues for all member states (Talbot 1990, 28). Sen’s actions began reducing the FAO’s exposure to U.S. whims even before this law was passed.
64 It also successfully relocated its headquarters from the United States to Europe, completing the move in 1951.
65 Shaw 2007, 89.
66 Shaw 2001, 22; Shaw 2007, 89-90.
enabled FAO bureaucrats to take on operational activities. Because so much institutional design groundwork had been laid during preceding years, it took only 19 days for the group to submit their proposal to the FAO Director-General.67

The 1960 plan adhered closely to Orr’s vision for a World Food Board. Although the newly proposed body would not set explicit prices, it would operate an international food reserve. It would redistribute agricultural products from rich states to poor ones. It would administer on-the-ground financial and technical assistance projects so that recipient countries could further their own economic and social development.68

One departure was that the 1960 proposal included an intriguing hybrid arrangement. The food aid agency would be overseen by a governing body consisting of only a subset of the full state membership at any given time. The full state membership would never convene. The new institution also would have its own budget and staff, but it would be closely linked to the FAO bureaucracy. For example, it would be situated in Rome and submit reports to the Food and Agriculture Organization. In addition, it would collaborate closely with FAO allies in other international bureaucracies, including the United Nations and the World Bank.69 The FAO Director-General and the advisory group called a small intergovernmental meeting for April 1961, to present their proposal to the U.S. and other key states.

Among the meeting’s U.S. representatives was George McGovern, deployed by the new U.S. president John F. Kennedy. Kennedy lacked expertise on food aid, but during election season he had made many promises about it, and now his administration needed a plan for fulfilling those promises. McGovern latched onto the agenda set by international bureaucrats, and he secured Kennedy’s go-ahead for $100 million in farm commodities to launch a new World Food Program.70 Sen’s proposal was adopted without a great deal of revision.

Because key states such as the Soviet Union were UN members but not FAO members, the World Food Program was instituted as a joint endeavor of both intergovernmental organizations. The new institution began operations in 1962, on a probationary basis. Again, IGO and NGO allies proved useful. The UN Secretary-General joined the FAO Director-General in declaring that the WFP’s notable achievements warranted the Program’s continuation and enlargement.71 Non-governmental organizations echoed this. For example, three issued a joint statement imploring governments for a renewal and substantial expansion of the World Food Program.72 In December 1965, via parallel resolutions in the UN General Assembly and the FAO Conference, states made the WFP a permanent intergovernmental organization.

Process-Tracing from the WFB/WFP Case Exhibits the Hypothesis’ Causal Story

The World Food Program exhibits insulation across all three conventional mechanisms of state control covered in the theoretical framework.73 In terms of management of resources, the WFP enjoys diverse sources. It can accept contributions not only from states, but also from intergovernmental organizations, non-governmental organizations, and even individuals. In terms of institutional oversight, the organization’s full state membership does not convene.

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67 Shaw 2007, 90.
70 Talbot 1990, 50.
71 Food and Agriculture Organization 1965, v.
72 Shaw 2001, 57, 59. The three organizations were: the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), the International Cooperative Alliance (ICA), and the International Federation of Agricultural Producers (IFAP).
73 Cox and Jacobson 1974.
Instead, the World Food Program is overseen by a governing body consisting of only a subset of member-states, who meet once per year and rotate through terms of about three years. The FAO Council chooses half of these member-states, while the UN Economic and Social Council chooses the other half. In terms of decision-making practices, states tend to send active government officials as their representatives. These representatives are supposed to operate by consensus if possible, with the WFP rules of procedure specifying a two-thirds majority rule for substantive votes if consensus is unobtainable.74

The WFP’s insulation is traceable to international bureaucrats’ ability to set the design agenda. In turn, international bureaucrats’ success in agenda-setting is traceable to the allies that FAO personnel cultivated for themselves after their failure to create a World Food Board in the 1940s. Following that proposal’s demise, FAO bureaucrats learned valuable lessons about their need for non-state allies. Director-General Orr began working in earnest to get his staff recognized as international experts on which governments and non-governmental organizations would rely. A decade later, a successor managed to get further breathing room by launching the Freedom from Hunger Campaign, which raised money from a variety of private sources and diluted FAO reliance on states’ funding. This was part of a larger campaign to cultivate allies among fellow IGO personnel in the United Nations family and among non-governmental organizations.

By illuminating the first two decades of the FAO’s existence, the case study of the World Food Board and the World Food Program suggests potential turning points in the alliances of the FAO bureaucracy. From the early 1950s, FAO personnel dampened their dependence on funding from states, and instead obtained funding from other sources: fellow IGOs such as the World Bank and United Nations Special Fund for Economic Development, but also some non-governmental organizations. Then, in 1959, Director-General Sen’s 1959 conception of the Freedom from Hunger Campaign prompted a sudden and even greater increase in alliances between the FAO bureaucracy and non-state actors – especially domestic and transnational civil society groups.

Certainly, states – particularly the U.S., with the newfound eagerness the Kennedy administration exhibited for multinational food aid – were important in the origins of the World Food Program. But in line with the causal story proposed by the hypothesis, increases in non-state allies of FAO personnel also contributed to the 1960s success of a proposal that had fallen flat in the late 1940s. Without the proactiveness of FAO bureaucrats, a concrete design proposal would not even have existed. Then, by the time they reintroduced their proposal, they could count on allies in IGOs and NGOs to back the creation of a new food agency. Indeed, as one observer puts it, “WFP owes its birth to the vision and tenacity of FAO leadership, supported by senior management at the United Nations.”75 Alliances with fellow non-state actors were instrumental: UN bureaucrats assisted in updating the design proposal, the UN Secretary-General publicly praised the probationary organization, and C.A.R.E. and other civil society groups lobbied their governments to make the organization permanent.

**Designing the FAO’s Progeny: Bodies Established under Article XIV of the FAO Constitution**

The WFB/WFP case is instructive but raises two linked questions. Is there a way to test the hypothesis across more observations, and also to hold steadier the factors pertaining to states? Doing so would bolster confidence that insulation in other IGO progeny is likewise due

75 Shaw 2001, 36.
to the alliances of the international bureaucrats that helped to design those institutions.

A Medium-N Study

A medium-N qualitative study tackles both questions, complementing the case study. It considers all IGOS – including dead ones – created under Article XIV of the FAO Constitution. As discussed in greater detail below, this pool is large enough to reflect patterns in design outcomes. In addition, it approximates a matching approach: by comparing organizations with very similar values of state-based factors but different values of bureaucratic alliances, it can expose how design outcomes differ in organizations “treated” by greater levels of alliances in the parent bureaucracy.

To date, 18 treaties fall under Article XIV of the FAO Constitution.76 Of these, 12 establish new intergovernmental organizations.77 The pool is:

1940s
Asia-Pacific Fishery Commission (APFIC) – 1948
International Rice Commission (IRC) – 1948
General Fisheries Commission for the Mediterranean (GFCM) – 1949

1950s
European Commission for the Control of Foot-and-Mouth Disease (EUFMD) – 1953

1960s
Commission for Controlling the Desert Locust in South-West Asia (SWAC) – 1963
Commission for Controlling the Desert Locust in the Central Region (CCLDNE) – 1965

1970s
Commission for Controlling the Desert Locust in North-West Africa (CLCPANO) – 1970
Regional Animal Production and Health Commission for Asia and the Pacific (APHCA) – 1973

1990s
Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC) – 1993
Regional Commission for Fisheries (RECOFI) – 1999

2000s
Commission for Controlling the Desert Locust in the Western Region (CLCPRO) – 2000
Central Asian and Caucasus Regional Fisheries and Aquaculture Commission (CACFISH) – 2009

The Commission for Controlling the Desert Locust in North-West Africa was terminated in 2007. The others continue to operate.

The origins of these IGOS span the Food and Agriculture Organization’s history, even its early years. Yet all were made under a shared and explicit constitutional instrument – hence, any variation in the observations cannot be stemming from fluctuation or vagueness in the “rules” about what international bureaucrats can and cannot do in the institutional design process. In

77 An additional treaty involves an IGO but does not establish it: a 1959 treaty moves the extant International Poplar Commission to the auspices of the Food and Agriculture Organization, using Article XIV of the FAO Constitution.
short, the pool is advantageous, offering a comprehensive and comparable set of observations that span a broad swath of time.

 Bodies established under Article XIV take on a life of their own – they are not mere FAO departments or subsidiaries. Agreements that establish Article XIV organizations are recognized under international law as distinct treaties. These treaties are “placed under the framework of FAO, operate through FAO, and in some cases FAO and the Director-General exercise substantial responsibilities.” 78 Generally, Article XIV organizations obtain their own budgets and entail obligations or regulations beyond those set out in the FAO’s Constitution and Basic Texts. 79 Their parties are states, and those states do not have to be FAO members. 80

 The WFB/WFP case suggests 1950 and 1959 as turning points in the alliances of FAO bureaucrats, with 1959 being starker. 81 These turning points connect to the hypothesis, suggesting testable predictions about Article XIV organizations: insulation from state control ought to be greater in Article XIV institutions established in the 1950s than in those established in the 1940s, and those established in the 1960s ought to be even more insulated than those established in the 1950s.

 Controlling for a Matter’s Salience to States and the Capabilities of States

 As noted in the theoretical framework, several state-based factors may shape the extent to which international bureaucrats in pre-existing IGOs set the agenda in negotiations that create new institutions. These same factors also may influence the stringency of state control mechanisms in the resulting institution. Thus, there are dual possibilities: that an IGO exhibits insulation because states do not always care enough to install and maintain stringent mechanisms of state control, or because states do not always possess the individual or collective abilities to do so.

 The medium-N analysis follows earlier work in employing six variables to capture these dual possibilities relating to a matter’s salience to states or the capabilities of states: High-Politics Issue, Need for Expertise, Developed-Area Focus, Number of Great Powers Negotiating, Number of States Negotiating, and Extent of Geographic Focus. 82 The Appendix explains the coding strategy for each variable. Table 1 displays the variables’ values for each Article XIV IGO.

 [TABLE 1]

 Table 1 is reassuring: the organizations exhibit little variation in these six variables. The few exceptions are highlighted. None of the organizations deal with national defense or other high-politics issues that directly threaten state survival or security. All are scientific bodies for which states’ need for expertise is high. None but one concentrates on more economically and socially developed parts of the world. For slightly more than half, great-power states did not participate in institutional design negotiations. For all but two, the group of states participating in institutional design negotiations was small. All but three focus on a single geographic region.

 78 Food and Agriculture Organization 2010, paragraph 9.
 79 Food and Agriculture Organization 2010, paragraph 8.
 80 For example, membership in Article XIV bodies often is open to states that are members of the United Nations or the International Atomic Energy Agency.
 81 This is a first cut. Of course, it does not rule out the possibility that additional junctures would appear with process-tracing of the FAO secretariat in more recent years.
 82 Johnson 2013a.
Even where some state-based factors vary in the pool, the variation is modest. *Number of Great Powers Negotiating* is never “Many,” *Number of States Negotiating* is never “Large,” and *Extent of Geographic Focus* is never “Global.” Lack of variation is useful, making it unlikely that these variables—although theoretically important—are major drivers of differences across the organizations examined here.

*Comparisons of Article XIV Bodies Exhibit the Hypothesis’ Predicted Correlations*

Tables depict these IGOs by decade of creation, summarizing all 12 Article XIV organizations according to key features relating to the bodies’ insulation from states. Specifically, the tables follow other work in considering four operationalizations that capture concrete mechanisms of state control in these IGO progeny:

1) *Financing* – the extent to which states supply an IGO’s funding
2) *Oversight Meetings* – the extent to which states oversee an IGO’s activities
3) *Voting* – the extent to which a minority of states can block decisions regarding an IGO
4) *Representatives* – the extent to which member’s representatives to an IGO’s decision-making body are active government officials

In addition, the tables list any other notable features pertaining to insulation. The primary sources of information are the treaties establishing the organizations—as well as any subsequent amendments. These treaties are verified and supplemented by information from the Food and Agriculture Organization’s website and document repositories, the *Yearbook of International Organizations*, and reports and other documents produced by the IGOs themselves.

Tables 2, 3, and 4 reveal that design outcomes across the institutions align with the predictions developed above: that 1950 and (especially) 1959 were turning points in increasing the alliances of FAO bureaucrats, and therefore these years also would be turning points in dampening state control mechanisms in the institutions that FAO bureaucrats participate in creating. The first three Article XIV bodies emerged in 1948 and 1949, just a few years after the establishment of the Food and Agriculture Organization itself.

**[TABLE 2]**

Table 2 shows that for all three, design outcomes exhibit a fairly even balance between states’ inclination toward control and international bureaucrats’ inclination toward insulation. For example, voluntary funding for the APFIC, IRC, and GFCM comes from states and the parent organization only, with the budget proposal submitted to the FAO Director-General for approval.

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83 Johnson 2013a; Johnson 2013b.

84 The underlying treaties of the four newest IGOs have never been amended. The other eight treaties were amended in the following years: APFIC (1977, 1984, 1994); IRC (1961, 1975); GFCM (1964, 1976); EUFMD (1973, 1977, 1989, 1997); SWAC (1977, 2001); CCDLNE (1977, 1995); CLCPANO (1977; then the organization was terminated in 2007 when membership fell below the threshold number specified in the treaty); APHCA (1978, 1979, 1986).

Most amendments do one or more of the following: 1) change outdated phrasing in the name of the organization and/or the name of the area the organization serves (e.g., the Asia-Pacific Fisheries Commission used to be called the Indo-Pacific Fisheries Council); 2) add provisions for admitting regional integration organizations (e.g., the European Union) as members or observers; 3) alter the frequency of oversight meetings (e.g., from annual to biennial meetings). Only the third type directly pertains to insulation from state control.
But with EUFMD, established in 1953, a different balance abruptly arises. True, decision-making rules shift from simple majority to two-thirds majority, and arguably this makes it easier for a minority of states to block decisions regarding the IGO. But Table 3 reveals that other design elements empower international bureaucrats in the FAO, in the offshoot organization, or in partner organizations.

[TABLE 3]

For instance, all EUFMD meetings are open to representatives from particular international organizations, such as the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE). Even more important, financing looks very different. Instead of being voluntary, financing from member-states is compulsory, assigned according to a scale of contributions. And beyond that, EUFMD can accept additional resources from international organizations (intergovernmental or non-governmental) and even from individuals. The body can “bank” these resources, retaining any funds not used in a particular financial cycle. These are significant design elements that enlarge and diversify the pool of potential funding, buffering EUFMD personnel from states’ financing whims. The existence of these design elements is particularly striking because this is the only Article XIV institution with a developed-area focus – a relatively hard case for observing IGO progeny gaining insulation from state control.

Table 4 demonstrates how, with the creation of the SWAC in 1963, the compulsory mechanism gains teeth in a striking way.

[TABLE 4]

As in the EUFMD, there is leeway for IGO personnel: they are able to accept resources from “international organizations or individuals.” But unlike in the EUFMD, there is a new constraint on states: member-states’ voting rights can be suspended if their financial contributions are in arrears. This duality – financial leeway for IGO personnel but constraints on member-states – insulates the organizations from one of states’ favorite control mechanisms, fiddling with the financial spigot. The two-part provision appears in every Article XIV organization created from 1963 onward.

Two years later, with the creation of the CCDLNE in 1965, a more modest difference provides bureaucrats in the parent organization with some important inroads. Whereas in earlier institutions only states could propose amendments to the charter, in the CCDLNE the FAO Director-General also holds that right. Amendments to the charter take effect only if approved by two-thirds of member-states, but this institutional design element nevertheless grants an important right to the head of the FAO bureaucracy. This right is institutionalized in every Article XIV organization created from 1965 onward.

Beyond the 1960s, it is less clear what to expect. With process-tracing, the case study of the World Food Board and the World Food Program demonstrates how 1950 and 1959 bump-ups in the FAO bureaucracy’s alliances with non-state actors contributed to a key institutional design achievement. That is, in the 1960s they created a relatively insulated body called the World Food Program – an institution very similar to the World Food Board that they had pushed on their own, and unsuccessfully, 14 years before. However, without detailed insights into post-

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85 For caveats about using decision-making rules to gauge insulation or control, see Johnson 2013c.
1960s turning points in the FAO bureaucracy’s alliances, it is difficult to predict exactly how insulated post-1960s Article XIV institutions ought to look, compared to their older siblings.

Nevertheless, some broader assessments are possible. Alliances – partnerships with transnational civil society groups, in particular – are important to the Food and Agriculture Organization. These groups can complete an official application and, if approved, they then have the right to participate as observers in FAO governing bodies and technical committees. Moreover, the FAO itself sets standards by which applications are judged. For instance, a formal NGO partner “must be consistent with FAO’s mandate and enhance the effectiveness of its work.”

FAO meeting minutes provide a concrete way to estimate the FAO bureaucracy’s alliances with transnational civil society groups. Figure 1 shows the number of transnational civil society groups in attendance as formal observers at the FAO’s conferences in 1951, 1961, 1971, 1981, 1991, and 2001 – the decades spanned by Article XIV organizations.

The figure shows that FAO alliances have fluctuated, with significant increases in the 1950s and 1960s, downturns in the 1970s and 1980s, and an increase and leveling in the 1990s and 2000s. This variation makes sense, given the Food and Agriculture Organization’s history: in the 1970s and 1980s, the FAO struggled to deal with prolonged droughts and famines in Africa and elsewhere, and member-states called for reforms. But beyond being understandable, this variation is useful. After all, if alliances only increased across the decades, it would be impossible to untangle the potential impact of alliances from unobserved factors that are closely associated with the simple passing of time.

Thus, in conjunction with Figure 1, Tables 5, 6, and 7 provide additional evidence supporting the hypothesis: international bureaucrats’ ability to agenda-set and to insulate their IGO progeny does appear to be positively correlated with their alliances with non-state actors.

Indeed, Table 5 reveals that Article XIV institutions established in the 1970s – when the FAO bureaucracy was beginning to experience a drop in alliances – were not much differently insulated than those established in the 1960s. Moreover, no Article XIV institutions were established in the 1980s, when the FAO bureaucracy sustained even further drops in alliances.

However, Tables 6 and 7 show that bodies created in the 1990s and 2000s begin exhibiting additional elements of insulation again.

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86 Food and Agriculture Organization. 2013. “Cooperation with Civil Society: How To Become a Partner.” Available at: http://www.fao.org/tc/ngo/work_with_us_en.asp Beyond those with formal status, many more international non-governmental organizations assist with on-the-ground FAO operations in an informal role.


88 FAO conferences occur every other year, but obtaining the minutes from every conference (particularly outside of recent years) has proved challenging. To deal with this, I have focused on obtaining minutes from the first conference held in each decade.
For instance, the IOTC and the CACFISH can make policy recommendations that become binding on states if accepted by two-thirds of the membership. These institutional design outcomes coincide with a revival of the number of transnational civil society groups participating as formal observers in FAO conferences.

**Conclusions and Avenues for Future Research**

Institutional design is a high-stakes process in which much hinges on agenda-setting. International bureaucrats face reasons to insulate their own IGO and their wider organizational family from interventions by states. Hence, this article’s theoretical framework predicts that the more international bureaucrats set the institutional design agenda to which states react, the more insulated from state control the resulting institution will be. The extent to which they agenda-set may be influenced by factors stemming from states: a matter’s salience to states or the capabilities of states. But once these factors are taken into account, we can see the importance of factors stemming from international bureaucrats themselves – specifically, their alliances with fellow non-state actors.

The case study of the World Food Board and World Food Program establishes the causal chain. These were very similar institutions, proposed by personnel in the Food and Agriculture Organization in 1946 and 1960, respectively. States shot down the earlier proposal but accepted the latter one, which yielded an IGO with striking insulation from state control. By understanding how FAO bureaucrats cultivated greater alliances for themselves in the interim, we see how they enhanced their ability to set the design agenda and to produce an institution reflecting their inclination for dampened state control mechanisms.

Then, a medium-N qualitative analysis complements the case study. The account of the WFB and WFP established the causal chain while acknowledging the importance of states’ capabilities and a matter’s salience to states – but it could not hold those other factors constant, nor could it demonstrate that the expected correlations hold across a broader pool of intergovernmental organizations. This is why the comparison of Article XIV bodies is useful. For IGOs created under this provision in the FAO Constitution, the alliances of the parent bureaucracy change, but state-based factors do not vary much. As a result, we can investigate a larger pool of IGOs, focusing on the endpoints of the causal chain: do increases in FAO bureaucrats’ alliances correlate with dampened mechanisms of state control in FAO offshoot organizations? Yes, according to evidence spanning bodies created between the 1940s and today.

Of course, this medium-N analysis of Article XIV IGOs is equipped only to assess correlations. Alone, it would give little insight into the hypothesized causal mechanism. But united with the process-tracing from the WFB/WFP case study, it amasses evidence in line with the theoretical framework:

The greater the alliances of international bureaucrats vis-à-vis states, the greater the extent to which international bureaucrats set the institutional design agenda. And the greater the extent to which international bureaucrats set the institutional design agenda, the less stringent the mechanisms of state control in the resulting institution.
Features discussed earlier boost confidence that these results from the FAO family are generalizable to other international bureaucracies, too. Such expectations can be probed in future research.

At least three other patterns in Article XIV organizations are worth noting, for they may inform this future research. First, these “siblings” share a few features\(^89\) – but overall, the “look” of these 12 organizations varies. Clearly, IGO progeny are not clones of the parent bureaucracy’s structure, nor are they crafted according to a static template. If they were, this pool – all with the same parent bureaucracy, operating under an explicit and unchanged constitutional provision – would be a prime place to see it. This provides further substantiation for the theoretical framework and research approach, dovetailing with the notion that a parent bureaucracy’s alliances influence design outcomes. After all, those outcomes vary, even though a matter’s salience to states and the capabilities of states remain relatively steady across the design instances.

Second, the Article XIV institutions exhibit some institutional design innovations. For example, many include a provision along the lines of “this organization may accept donations and other forms of assistance from organizations, individuals, and other sources for purposes connected with the fulfillment of any of its functions.”\(^90\) And several include a provision similar to “proposals for amendments to this treaty may be made by any member-state of the organization or by the Director-General of the Food and Agriculture Organization.”\(^91\) This hints that personnel in the parent bureaucracy learn: they consider their immediate organization and their prior experiences in design negotiations to figure out which design features they like and dislike for their IGO progeny.

Third, there appears to be a modest trend toward more insulation within institutions over time. For all but the four most recently established IGOS, the charters have been amended at some point. Usually the changes are cosmetic – changing the body’s name from “Indo-Pacific” to “Asia-Pacific” Fisheries Commission, for instance. But in the relatively rare instances in which an amendment affects any of the features summarized in Tables 2 through 7, what changes is that an organization is subject to oversight meetings less frequently, usually shifting from yearly to every other year.\(^92\) This aligns with the growing body of work indicating that

\(^89\) For instance, the initial designs of all 12 IGOS call for the full membership to meet either annually or every other year to oversee organizational activities. In addition, although the charters generally do not specify the kind of individual that a member-state must select as its representative to these meetings, in practice most or all of the representatives are active government officials – for example, a Ministry of Agriculture employee, rather than a scientist from an agricultural research center at a prominent university. Furthermore, in almost all of the charters, the FAO Director-General alone possesses the authority to appoint the Secretary of the offshoot body and is not always required to consult with member-states concerning the appointment (Food and Agriculture Organization 2009, 23). The sole exceptions are the IOTC charter (which stipulates that member-states must approve the choice by the FAO head) and the EUFMD charter (which declines to place appointment power in the hands of the FAO head).

\(^90\) Agreement for the Establishment of a Regional Animal Production and Health Commission for Asia and the Pacific. Article XV, paragraph 3, emphasis added.

\(^91\) Agreement for the Establishment of a Commission for Controlling the Desert Locust in the Western Region. Article XVI, paragraph 2, emphasis added.

\(^92\) One notable exception to this trend within institutions is CLCPANO, which died in 2007 when its number of member-states fell below the threshold specified in its charter. Part of the reason is that fellow Article XIV body CLCPRO began operating in an overlapping region in 2000. Upon CLCPANO’s termination in 2007, CLCPRO absorbed some of the organization’s resources.
international bureaucrats strive over time to insulate their organizational family against states’ interference.\textsuperscript{93}

Together, the medium-N comparison and process-tracing demonstrate that international bureaucrats matter for understanding why IGOs exist, why they look as they do, and why state struggle to control them. This contributes to a burgeoning literature on interdependence and opportunities that arise in the nexus of domestic and international politics.\textsuperscript{94} It also contributes to the literature on international cooperation, by exposing further complexities in agency relationships between states and intergovernmental organizations.\textsuperscript{95} In addition, it contributes to the literature on institutional design, by highlighting important repercussions: a proliferation of IGOs, even ones that states did not initially demand and cannot easily manipulate.\textsuperscript{96}

\textsuperscript{94} See, for example, Newman 2008; Carpenter 2011; Farrell and Newman forthcoming.
\textsuperscript{95} Haas 1964; Shanks et al. 1996; Abbott and Snidal 1998; Gruber 2001; Ikenberry 2001; Hawkins et al. 2006.
\textsuperscript{96} Cox and Jacobson 1974; Koremenos et al. 2003; Mathiasen 2007; Johnson 2013.
Table 1: State-Based Factors Vary Little in the Pool of Article XIV IGOs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>High-Political Issue</th>
<th>Need for Expertise</th>
<th>Developed-Area Focus</th>
<th>Number of Great Powers Negotiating</th>
<th>Number of States Negotiating</th>
<th>Extent of Geographic Focus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Asia-Pacific Fishery Commission (1948)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>A Few</td>
<td>Small</td>
<td>Regional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Rice Commission (1948)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>A Few</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Cross-Regional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Fisheries Commission for the Mediterranean (1949)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>A Few</td>
<td>Small</td>
<td>Cross-Regional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Commission for the Control of Foot-and-Mouth Disease (1953)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>A Few</td>
<td>Small</td>
<td>Regional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commission for Controlling the Desert Locust in South-West Asia (1963)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Small</td>
<td>Regional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commission for Controlling the Desert Locust in the Central Region (1965)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Small</td>
<td>Regional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commission for Controlling the Desert Locust in North-West Africa (1970)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Small</td>
<td>Regional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Animal Production and Health Commission for Asia and the Pacific (1973)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Small</td>
<td>Regional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (1993)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>A Few</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Cross-Regional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Commission for Fisheries (1999)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Small</td>
<td>Regional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commission for Controlling the Desert Locust in the Western Region (2000)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Small</td>
<td>Regional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Asia and Caucasus Regional Fisheries and Aquaculture Commission (2009)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Small</td>
<td>Regional</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Highlighting indicates factors that vary somewhat across institutions.
Table 2: Insulation from State Control in Article XIV IGOs Established in the 1940s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Financing</th>
<th>Oversight Meetings</th>
<th>Voting</th>
<th>Representatives</th>
<th>Other Notable Features</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>APFIC</strong></td>
<td>From member-states and from FAO</td>
<td>Every 2 years</td>
<td>Simple majority</td>
<td>All are active government officials *</td>
<td>FAO Director-General appoints APFIC Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia-Pacific Fishery Commission (1948)</td>
<td>Budget proposal submitted to FAO Director-General</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>IRC</strong></td>
<td>From member-states and from FAO</td>
<td>Every 2 years until 1975 amendment, then every 4 years</td>
<td>Simple majority</td>
<td>Most – but less than all – are active government officials *</td>
<td>FAO Director-General appoints IRC Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Rice Commission (1948)</td>
<td>Budget proposal submitted to FAO Director-General</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GFCM</strong></td>
<td>From member-states and from FAO</td>
<td>Yearly</td>
<td>Simple majority</td>
<td>Most – but less than all – are active government officials *</td>
<td>FAO Director-General appoints GFCM Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Fisheries Commission for the Mediterranean (1949)</td>
<td>Budget proposal submitted to FAO Director-General</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>GFCM can recommend specific policies to member-states</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Highlighting indicates elements of insulation that are discussed in the text.


Table 3: Insulation from State Control in Article XIV IGOs Established in the 1950s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EUFMD</th>
<th>Financing</th>
<th>Oversight Meetings</th>
<th>Voting</th>
<th>Representatives</th>
<th>Other Notable Features</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>European Commission for the Control of Foot-and-Mouth Disease (1953)</td>
<td>Member-states face scale of contributions from member-states and from international organizations of even individuals. Budget proposal submitted to FAO Director-General. EUFMD retains unused funds.</td>
<td>Yearly</td>
<td>Two-thirds majority for budgetary and other important decisions. Founding constitution can be terminated by three-fourths majority.</td>
<td>Most – but less than all – are active government officials *</td>
<td>Representatives from the following IGOs can attend all sessions of EUFMD and its committees: Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), European Union (EU), Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), World Organization for Animal Health (OIE).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Highlighting indicates elements of insulation that are discussed in the text.

Table 4: Insulation from State Control in Article XIV IGOs Established in the 1960s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SWAC (Commission for Controlling the Desert Locust in South-West Asia (1963))</th>
<th>Financing</th>
<th>Oversight Meetings</th>
<th>Voting</th>
<th>Representatives</th>
<th>Other Notable Features</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Member-states face scale of contributions From member-states and from international organizations or even individuals</td>
<td>Yearly until 2001 amendment; then every 2 years</td>
<td>Two-thirds majority for budgetary and other important decisions</td>
<td>All are active government officials *</td>
<td>FAO Director-General appoints SWAC Secretary</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CCDLNE (Commission for Controlling the Desert Locust in the Central Region (1965))</th>
<th>Financing</th>
<th>Oversight Meetings</th>
<th>Voting</th>
<th>Representatives</th>
<th>Other Notable Features</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Member-states face scale of contributions From member-states and from international organizations or even individuals</td>
<td>Yearly until 1995 amendment; then every 2 years</td>
<td>Two-thirds majority for budgetary and other important decisions</td>
<td>All are active government officials #</td>
<td>FAO Director-General appoints CCDLNE Secretary</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Member states in financial arrears will lose vote

Highlighting indicates elements of insulation that are discussed in the text.


Table 5: Insulation from State Control in Article XIV IGOs Established in the 1970s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IGO</th>
<th>Financing</th>
<th>Oversight Meetings</th>
<th>Voting</th>
<th>Representatives</th>
<th>Other Notable Features</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CLCPANO Commission for Controlling the Desert Locust in North-West Africa (1970) <strong>TERMINATED IN 2007</strong></td>
<td>Member-states face scale of contributions From member-states and from international organizations or even individuals Budget proposal submitted to FAO</td>
<td>Yearly until 1983 amendment; then approximately every 2 years</td>
<td>Two-thirds majority for budgetary and other important decisions Member-states in financial arrears will lose vote</td>
<td>All are active government officials *</td>
<td>FAO Director-General appoints CLCPANO Secretary FAO Director-General can propose amendments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APHCA Regional Animal Production and Health Commission for Asia and the Pacific (1973)</td>
<td>Member-states face scale of contributions From member-states and from international organizations or even individuals APHCA retains unused funds</td>
<td>Yearly</td>
<td>Two-thirds majority for budgetary and other important decisions Member-states in financial arrears will lose vote</td>
<td>All are active government officials</td>
<td>FAO Director-General appoints APHCA Secretary FAO Director-General can propose amendments</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6: Insulation from State Control in Article XIV IGOs Established in the 1990s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IOTC</th>
<th>Financing</th>
<th>Oversight Meetings</th>
<th>Voting</th>
<th>Representatives</th>
<th>Other Notable Features</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (1993)</td>
<td>Member-states face scale of contributions From member-states and from international organizations or even individuals</td>
<td>Yearly</td>
<td>Two-thirds majority for budgetary and other important decisions Member-states in financial arrears may lose vote</td>
<td>Most – but less than all – are active government officials *</td>
<td>FAO Director-General appoints IOTC Secretary, subject to member-states’ approval IOTC can recommend specific binding policies to member-states</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RECOFI</th>
<th>Financing</th>
<th>Oversight Meetings</th>
<th>Voting</th>
<th>Representatives</th>
<th>Other Notable Features</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regional Commission for Fisheries (1999)</td>
<td>From member-states and from international organizations or even individuals</td>
<td>Every 2 years</td>
<td>Two-thirds majority for budgetary and other important decisions Member-states in financial arrears may lose vote</td>
<td>All are active government officials *</td>
<td>FAO Director-General appoints RECOFI Secretary</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Highlighting indicates elements of insulation that are discussed in the text.


Table 7: Insulation from State Control in Article XIV IGOs Established in the 2000s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Financing</th>
<th>Oversight Meetings</th>
<th>Voting</th>
<th>Representatives</th>
<th>Other Notable Features</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CLCPRO</td>
<td>From member-states and from international organizations or even individuals</td>
<td>Every 2 years</td>
<td>Two-thirds majority for budgetary and other important decisions</td>
<td>Most – but less than all – are active government officials *</td>
<td>FAO Director-General appoints CLCPRO Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Member-states in financial arrears may lose vote</td>
<td></td>
<td>FAO Director-General can propose amendments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CACFISH</td>
<td>From member-states and from international organizations or even individuals</td>
<td>Yearly</td>
<td>Two-thirds majority for budgetary and other important decisions</td>
<td>All are active government officials #</td>
<td>FAO Director-General appoints CACFISH Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Member-states in financial arrears may lose vote</td>
<td></td>
<td>CACFISH can recommend specific binding policies to member-states</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Highlighting indicates elements of insulation that are discussed in the text.


Figure 1: The FAO Bureaucracy’s Alliances with Transnational Civil Society Groups Vary over Time

Number of Transnational Civil Society Groups in Attendance as Formal Observers in FAO Conferences
Appendix

A Matter’s Salience to States

The variable High-Politics Issue captures how directly an issue pertains to state survival. It is coded “yes” if an IGO deals with any of the following high-politics issues: governance/administration, law/arbitration, security/military/defense, energy, general cooperation. It is coded “no” otherwise.

The Capabilities of States

Uncertainty

The variable Need for Expertise approximates states’ need for technical or scientific information in design negotiations. The variable has three categories: “High” if the IGO deals with highly technical or scientific issues; “Moderate” if it is an ordinary organization, requiring some form of expertise, but not of a highly technical nature; and “Low” if it serves largely as a forum for states and is unlikely to require much specialized expertise. In pursuit of an objective and replicable approach, coding of this variable makes use of a search for keywords within the IGO’s name, its aims as described in the online Yearbook of International Organizations, or its mandate. For example, finding a keyword such as “research” or “science” places the IGO in the “High Need for Expertise” category.

Resources

The variables Developed-Area Focus and Number of Great Powers Negotiating capture the resources that states possess. Developed-Area Focus is a dichotomous variable coded as “yes” if an IGO concentrates on more economically and socially developed parts of the world – this would apply to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), for instance. It is coded “no” otherwise. Meanwhile, the variable Number of Great Powers Negotiating captures how many of the states involved in institutional design negotiations were great powers at the time. “Great-power states” are defined according to the major powers portion of the Correlates of War project. The variable has three categories: “Many” if more than four great-power states participated; “A Few” if there was great-power participation but not by more than four great-power states; and “None” if no great-power states participated.

Heterogeneity

The variables Number of States Negotiating and Extent of Geographic Focus portray the extent of heterogeneity among states. Number of States Negotiating captures the size of the

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97 “General cooperation” applies to IGOs that are not pigeonholed in just one or two narrow issue areas, but instead encompass cooperation in high-politics as well as low-politics issues simultaneously. In other words, the areas of cooperation in such an IGO include – either from the start, or at least foreseeably – topics such as security, alongside other topics. Examples include the League of Arab States, the Council of Europe, or the Commonwealth of Independent States.

group of states that were involved in institutional design negotiations. The variable has three categories: “Large” if 60 or more states participated; “Medium” if more than 20 but less than 60 participated; and “Small” if 20 or fewer states participated. Meanwhile, *Extent of Geographic Focus* captures the extent to which an intergovernmental organization was set up by and serves states from various parts of the world. It has three categories: “Global” if the IGO serves the entire globe; “Cross-Regional” if the IGO serves multiple regions but not the entire globe; and “Regional” if the IGO serves a single geographic region, such as Africa or Europe.
Bibliography


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