Can public employment subsidies render the German construction sector weather proof? *

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January 2009

Abstract

Both the US and Germany have a pronounced pattern of seasonal winter unemployment. In order to confine inefficient high levels of temporary layoffs, US firms are taxed - albeit incompletely - according to the unemployment insurance benefits claimed by their laid off workers. In contrast, German construction firms are not charged according to their layoff history and should thus have much higher layoff incentives. However, in case of a weather-induced shortfall of work, a firm’s workforce is eligible for a partial subsidy to their employment costs. The level of this subsidy was subject to several reforms throughout the 1990s which provide a unique opportunity for examining the empirical link between layoff incentives and layoff rates. Our analysis is based on large individual administrative data merged with information about local weather conditions and the business cycle. We observe economically plausible effects: the higher the subsidy to employment costs, the less layoffs occur and the less weather-dependent is employment.

Keywords: panel data, temporary layoffs, employment stability

JEL: J38, J48, J68

*We thank Julian Link for research assistance and the ZEW Mannheim for financial support through the grant "A microeconometric evaluation of seasonal unemployment in Germany". We would further like to thank Christopher Taber, Michael Lechner and Holger Bonin for helpful comments. We use a sample drawn from the IAB employment sample 2004 - R04 of the Institute of Employment Research (IAB). All remaining errors are our sole responsibility.

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1 Introduction

Countries with unfavorable conditions for winter construction work tend to experience seasonal fluctuations in production requirements that create an incentive for firms to temporarily lay off workers. According to the seminal paper by Feldstein (1976) such an incentive should be particularly strong if the unemployment insurance (UI) and the tax system lower the costs of temporary layoffs to firms and workers. In the US, the system of experience rating ensures that firms contribute to the financing of unemployment benefits by taxing them according to the unemployment benefit receipt of their previous employees. However, this taxing is incomplete so that firms with high layoff rates experience a cross-subsidy by firms with lower layoff rates. As a result, Feldstein (1976, 1978) and others (Card and Levine 1994) have shown both theoretically and empirically that this creates an incentive for inefficiently high layoff rates among the subsidised firms.

In Germany, as in many other European countries, costs produced by the layoff history of a firm are not internalised via a system of experience rating. For this reason, we would expect seasonal layoff patterns to be even stronger in Germany and Europe than in the US as has already been discussed by Gutierrez-Rieger and Podczeck (1981) and FitzRoy and Hart (1984). However, both Germany and the US show a marked pattern of seasonal unemployment as shown in Figure 1. Moreover, very high recall rates of unemployed workers in the construction sector of about 60% in the US (Katz and Meyer 1991) and up to 50% in Germany (Wilke 2005) confirm a comparable relevance of temporary layoffs in both countries. These findings at first seem at odds with the fact that temporary layoffs are much more subsidized by the UI in Germany than in the US. However, construction firms in Germany are subject to an alternative institution that, similar to experience rating, aims at reducing the firm’s incentives for temporary layoffs. We are talking about subsidies to employment costs during the winter period that exempt a firm from paying full wages to its workers in case of a weather-induced shortfall of work. Instead, workers receive a compensation payment of two thirds of their usual pay from the UI for any weather-induced shortfall hour while maintaining their employment relationship. However, firms have to pay social insurance for any shortfall hour for which compensation is claimed from the unemployment insurance. Thus, while layoffs are fully subsidised, claiming the allowance from the unemployment insurance is only partially subsidised. According to the framework by Burdett and Wright (1989), an incentive for layoffs therefore continues to exist and may thus explain why we observe marked seasonal fluctuations in unemployment in Germany despite the possibility of claiming a short-time compensation from the UI.
As a source of variation that allows for examining the empirical link between layoff incentives and layoff rates in Germany, the level of subsidy to employment costs in case of a weather-induced shortfall of work was subject to several reforms throughout the 1990s. For the US, an extensive literature suggests that partially subsidised layoff costs due to incomplete experience rating result in increased temporary layoffs (Feldstein 1976; Saffer 1983), especially in the construction sector (Card and Levine 1994). Moreover, lower layoff costs have been found to make recalls less likely and increase the duration until recall (Jurajda 2004). All of these US studies exploit industry- and state-specific variation in the experience rating factor in order to analyse the link between between layoff costs and layoff rates or the duration of unemployment spells. Since such a source of variation is not available in Europe, similar studies, to the best of our knowledge, are non-existent. As a related exception, Røed and Nordberg (2003) analyse the effect of firms’ pay liability during the periods of temporary layoffs on the length of unemployment in Norway. They show that the length of unemployment spells until a worker is recalled by an employer is highly sensitive to financial incentives for firms.

The prime goal of this paper thus is to exploit the variation in layoff incentives in Germany in
order to provide some first empirical assessment of the link between layoff incentives and layoff rates for a European country. For this purpose, we empirically analyse the effect of publicly subsidising employment costs in case of weather-induced shortfall hours on individual layoff probabilities in the construction sector. We do so based on a unique database that combines daily individual level administrative panel data of more than twenty subsequent years with information on the business cycle, local weather conditions at the workplace and information on institutional changes. Combining all this information is quite unique and helps us in disentangling the relevance of each of these factors as a determinant of seasonal unemployment. In particular, it allows for assessing to what extent the institutional changes during the 1990s had an effect on employment stability in the construction sector. Our empirical approach thus improves upon earlier studies that either analyse temporary layoffs based only on individual and firm level information as in Card and Levine (1994) or analyse the effect of weather conditions on aggregate output in the construction sector on a macro level only (Solomou and Wu 1997). As a result of our study, we thus want to be able to tell whether the use of employment subsidies in case of adverse weather conditions helps in reducing seasonal layoffs and may thus provide an explanation for why seasonal unemployment patterns in Germany are not stronger than in the US despite having a fully subsidised unemployment insurance in the terminology of Feldstein (1976).

As another contribution to the literature, our study also allows for comparing the effectiveness of two of the main approaches of promoting all-season employment in the European construction sector. In particular, the German construction sector during the 1990s has seen a major shift from a system based on mainly publicly funding a weather allowance to a system that combines a weather allowance with the use of flexible working hours accounts.¹ Both of these approaches can be found in a number of northern and central European countries. However, to the best of our knowledge, none of these approaches has been analysed with respect to the effectiveness in reducing layoffs. Our analysis thus also provides a first microeconometric assessment of the effectiveness of employment promotion schemes in preventing seasonal layoffs in the European construction sector. This may also shed some light on why the degree of seasonal winter unemployment strongly differs across European countries and is not clearly linked to local climate conditions as suggested by Grady and Kapsalis (2002).

Our results confirm a clear link between layoff incentives and individual layoff probabilities in the German construction sector. In particular, layoff rates decrease with rising subsidies to a firm’s employment costs. Moreover, reduced employment costs due to claiming a weather allowance only

¹For an overview of the changes see also Bosch and Zühlke-Robinet (2003).
after workers have compensated for an initial shortfall of work by a working hours account results in lower layoff rates compared to a pure allowance-based scheme. We also find evidence that layoff rates increase during periods of weak labour demand and adverse weather conditions, although the effects of weather conditions are less strong than generally thought by the public as most layoffs take place at fixed dates. This implies that the seasonal rise in unemployment in Germany to a large extent can be explained by planned capacity reductions rather than unfavorable weather conditions. The paper is structured as follows. The following section describes the main features of the institutional setup for seasonal employment in Germany. We describe our data in section three and the econometric framework in section four. The empirical results are presented and discussed in section five before we conclude in section six.

2 Institutional setup for seasonal employment in Germany

When laid off, workers in the German construction sector are eligible for four (three) month of unemployment benefits if they have been working at least eight (six) month in a socially insured employment during the year preceding the benefit claim.\textsuperscript{2} Regulations for construction workers are thus less strict than in other sectors of the economy in order to ensure that a typical seasonal worker is able to bridge winter unemployment with his unemployment benefit claim. Since there is no element of experience rating in the German UI and unemployment benefits are not taxed, the UI system from the perspective of the construction sector is thus fully subsidised in the terminology of Feldstein (1976) and should result in high layoff incentives. Moreover, employment can be terminated at short notice so that we would expect these layoff incentives to translate into high levels of temporary seasonal unemployment.\textsuperscript{3}

In order to confine temporary layoffs, Germany, similar to many other European countries, developed special institutions to prevent seasonal layoffs in sectors that are periodically hit by adverse production conditions.\textsuperscript{4} At the core of the German regulation, employment costs are partially subsidised during periods of adverse weather conditions in order to reduce the layoff incentive that is generally provided by the UI system. The level of subsidy and the design of the

\textsuperscript{2}These regulation have been modified after our observation period in 2005.

\textsuperscript{3}Unlike employment in other sector, employment in the construction sector can be terminated by giving six (twelve) days’ notice if job tenure has been below (above) six month. A one month’ notice is necessary if job tenure exceeds three years.

\textsuperscript{4}For an extensive review of the institutional setup in the German construction industry see Zühlke-Robinet (1998) and Bosch and Zühlke-Robinet (2000, 2003).
regulation, however, have been subject to a number of reforms.

Until 1995, workers could claim a bad weather allowance from the unemployment insurance fund of the Federal Employment Agency (Bundesagentur für Arbeit) as a compensation for a weather-induced loss of earnings due to a shortfall of working hours, the so called Schlechtwettergeld (SWG). The allowance paid workers as if they were entitled to unemployment benefits, i.e. they received around two thirds of their previous net income. For workers whose entitlements to unemployment benefits did not suffice to bridge the winter period, this meant a financial improvement compared to being laid off. Employers, on the other hand, only had to pay social insurance contributions of around four Euro for each hour that was compensated by the bad weather allowance. This amounts to less than a fifth of the usual labour cost and thus provided a substantial subsidy to a firm’s employment costs. At the same time, employers were no longer allowed to lay off workers during the statutory winter period from November until March due to adverse weather conditions.

As a reaction to its poor financial situation in the post-unification years, the Federal Employment Agency finally retreated from further financing the bad weather allowance in this original state. Starting with the season 1995/1996, a winter allowance equivalent to the weather allowance was only paid from the 151st weather-induced shortfall hour onward only. For the first 149 shortfall hours, firms had to pay workers 75% of their gross wages of which 20% were reimbursed by the unemployment insurance fund. While the level of compensation for each shortfall hour remained roughly unchanged from the perspective of the workers, employers now had to pay around nine Euro per hour for the first 149 hours lost due to bad weather and four Euro per hour from there onward. Under this new regime, the so called Winterausfallgeld (WAG I), subsidies to a firm’s employment costs in case of adverse production conditions thus decreased markedly.

When unemployment among construction workers doubled during the winter seasons of 1995/1996 and 1996/1997 compared to the early 1990s, the Winterausfallgeld II (WAG II) replaced the WAG I scheme as a major regime shift in the season of 1997/1998. While the same weather allowance was again paid from the 120th shortfall hour onward, the burden for the first 119 shortfall hours were now split more equally between employers and workers. In particular, the first 50 shortfall hours had to be compensated by an accumulation of overtime during spring and summer and were thus cost-neutral for an employer while workers lost any additional compensation.\(^5\). For the 51st to 119th shortfall hour, firms could choose between two options. Option WAG IIa was to claim a

\(^5\) A worker with overtime would previously receive the overtime pay including a premium and in addition receive the bad weather allowance. In the new setting, the worker only received the overtime pay including the premium.
weather allowance of the usual benefit level from a fund that was financed by a statutory winter levy of 1.7% of a firm’s gross wage bill. This fund also financed a 50% deduction of an employer’s social insurance contributions so that employers only had to pay reduced social insurance contributions of around two Euro per shortfall hour. Option WAG IIb was to further compensate the first 120 shortfall hours by a working hours account. Compared to the previous regime, a firm’s employment costs for weather-induced shortfall hours were thus clearly reduced at the expense of somewhat lower compensation levels on the part of the workers. A minor modification of this regime was introduced as WAG III in the season 1999/2000. The thresholds for the two options fell to 30 and 100 hours instead of the previous 50 and 120 shortfall hours, thus again increasing a firm’s employment costs and worker’s compensation level for shortfall hours while shifting some of the financial burden back to the Federal Employment Agency. In addition, a *Zuschusswintergeld* was introduced in order to promote the use of working hours accounts beyond the first threshold by paying an additional Euro per hour that was compensated by a working hours account.

With these reforms during the 1990s, the financial burden of a shortfall of work during the winter period shifted back and forth between employers, workers and the employment agency and thus also affected a firm’s relative cost of a seasonal layoff compared to continuing an employment relationship during periods of adverse weather conditions. Figure 2 summarises the employment costs for a firm in the construction sector under the different regimes. For a given number of shortfall hours, employment costs are highest under the WAG I regime, followed by SWG and WAG II or WAG III depending on whether a small or large working time flexibility is chosen. At some point though, the costs of continued employment during weather-induced shortfall hours among all of these regimes may exceed the costs saved from not laying off the worker (e.g. potential loss of firm-specific human capital, hiring costs). Therefore, incentives to circumvent the special dismissal protection that bans layoffs due to adverse weather conditions continue to exist despite the partial subsidising of employment costs. In fact, this incentive may explain why we observe seasonal unemployment patterns as shown in Figure 3 despite the special dismissal rule during the statutory winter period.

In spite of the special dismissal protection, we thus expect seasonal unemployment to be related to weather conditions and to also vary with the legal setup that affects a firm’s economic rationale. In particular, we expect the incidence of seasonal layoffs to increase c.p. with the cost of continuing employment during shortfall hours, i. e. from WAG II and WAG III to SWG to
Moreover, we expect the relationship between weather conditions and seasonal layoffs to differ depending on the legal setup. The stronger the cost of continuing employment rise with an accumulating shortfall of work during the winter, the earlier total employment costs exceed the cost of a seasonal layoff and the stronger is the relationship between weather conditions and seasonal layoffs. Hence, a cushioning effect against bad weather conditions may be especially weak for WAG I while it may be relatively strong for WAG II and WAG III.

However, Figure 3 does not suggest a simple relationship between the individual unemployment risk and the current regime. Unemployment risk among construction workers doubled with the reduced subsidy levels during the winter seasons of 1995/1996 and 1996/1997 compared to the early 1990s. Yet, unemployment transitions were similarly prevalent during the 1980s. In fact, the increase in winter unemployment compared to the preceding summer period was particularly pronounced for two winter seasons: 1987/88 and 1995/96. Moreover, unemployment transitions

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6Due to lower compensation levels for the latest two regimes, workers might have incentives to voluntarily end employment and leave the sector. Our empirical analysis, however, looks at layoffs only and not at voluntary quits. For the incidence of layoffs, the firm’s economic rationale should be decisive.
remained at a high level under the latest two regimes. These observed seasonal layoffs likely result from the combined effect of the regulation of the labour market, the severity of weather conditions in a particular year as well as from business cycle conditions. In periods of empty order books, firms are more likely to lay off workers. Moreover, it is cheaper for firms to lay off redundant workers than keeping them if the expected length of the redundancy and the corresponding total costs of continued employment is long enough such that the costs saved from not laying off become negligible. For this reason, fixed calendar times ahead of less productive time intervals or company holidays could also increase layoffs. In order to assess the effectiveness of the four regimes in preventing seasonal unemployment, the empirical analysis thus needs to disentangle the impact of weather conditions, the business environment, the relevance of certain fixed calendar times as well as the legal setup.

Unfortunately, we cannot evaluate the legal regimes relative to a state without any all-season employment promotion because our period of analysis is restricted to 1981 until 2004. Instead, we compare the relative effectiveness of the four regimes in reducing seasonal layoffs. From the perspective of the Federal Employment Agency, a legal setup that minimizes seasonal unemployment with a minimum of public spending on employment promotion should be preferable. Figure 4 shows the real expenses of the Federal Employment Agency on employment promotion measures during the observation period. Apart from an initial peak in 1981/1982 and a low around Ger-
man reunification, the Federal Employment Agency spent around 500 Mio. Euro on the weather allowance (SWG) per season. While expenses dropped sharply under the WAG I regime, the expenses under the WAG III regime again rose to approximately half of the level of spending under the SWG regime.

Figure 4: Real expenses of Federal Employment Agency on employment promotion in Mio Euro (in 2004 prices). Source: Federal Employment Agency

Apart from institutional changes with respect to the promotion of all-season employment, the construction sector has also undergone further changes that need to be kept in mind for the following empirical analysis. In particular, the previously domestic construction industry has experienced an increasing transnationalization (Bosch and Zühlke-Robinet, 2003). While foreign workers until the early 1990s were employed at the same pay and working conditions than domestic workers, this territorial principle no longer applies within the EU member states. Foreign workers, especially from central and eastern European countries, could now be posted from their company to work in Germany on the terms that apply in their home country. Despite bilateral agreements on quotas for these posted workers and recommended minimum wages, officially posted workers in Germany reached an all time high in 1992 (see Figure 5). The Posted Workers Act in 1996 meant the introduction of binding minimum wages for all legal workers in Germany including posted workers from abroad. However, illegal employment continues to provide opportunities for considerably reducing labour costs. According to Bosch and Zühlke-Robinet (2003: 65), "considerable numbers of German construction workers have been made redundant and replaced by
contract or illegal workers”. This crowding out of domestic employment may also explain why revenues per (legal) head have been increasing during the 1990s. Since we were not able to obtain data on the amount of illegal employment from official sources, we cannot evaluate the effects of these accompanying policy reforms. However, we assume that the inflow of non-domestic workers is not correlated with the four policy regimes and we control for cyclical patterns by using year dummies. Moreover, we use individual level indicators for possible effects of binding minimum wages in different parts of the construction sector which were introduced between 1996 and 1999. The identification of the policy effects can also be hampered by improvements in the production technology in presence of severe weather conditions over time. This could result in a reduced weather-dependency of layoffs in later years. Since we are not aware of any data about production technology in the construction sector, we are not able to control for it. In order to identify changes in response to the policy reforms, we have to assume that such trends are of minor importance or not correlated with the policy reforms.

Figure 5: Number of officially posted non-EU construction workers in Germany.

Finally, we want to point out that we are not able to analyse possible effects of the introduction of the Saisonkurzarbeitergeld in 2006 since our individual data does not cover the period after 2004. As we also do not have information about the receipt of the bad weather allowance (Schlechtwettergeld) or the winter allowance (Winterausfallgeld) on an individual level so that we cannot analyse the determinants for claiming these allowances. Moreover, due to the lack of this information we cannot assess the overall changes in compensation transfers in reaction to the
policy reforms.

3 Data

Our analysis is based on comprehensive administrative individual data from Germany which is merged with several regional indicators about the business cycle and weather conditions.

**Individual data.** We use the IAB employment sample 1975-2004 - regional file (IABS-R04) which is described in detail by Drews (2008). This administrative data set contains information on a 2% sample of the population working in jobs that are subject to social insurance payments. In particular, we have daily information on employment periods and periods for which the individual received unemployment compensation from the Federal Employment Agency. Due to data quality problems in the early years of the data set, we restrict our sample to information between 1981 and 2004. Moreover, we do not include information from Eastern Germany as information is not available before 1991.\(^7\) We further restrict our sample to individuals working in the construction sector.\(^8\)

From a descriptive analysis of the daily information it became evident that there are mass points in the distribution of unemployment inflows at the end of each month, year and on each Friday. Moreover, there are major peaks at the last two Fridays before Christmas. Since these mass points have to be adequately modelled, we transformed the spell information into a weekly panel starting every Friday. Hence, for each individual, we have a panel of weeks that contains information on whether an individual is employed or whether there was a transition to unemployment in a particular week. We assume a transition to unemployment to occur if an individual receives unemployment compensation within two weeks after the end of the foregoing employment spell. Since workers in the construction sector are used to the administrative process of claiming unemployment compensation, workers who receive unemployment compensation with a greater lag than two weeks are likely to be temporarily suspended from unemployment compensation due to quitting the job rather than being laid off by the firm. However, we performed a sensitivity analysis by using four and twelve weeks as the limiting gap between employment and the receipt of unemployment and found stable result patterns.

\(^7\)For the period after 1991, estimates both ex- and including the eastern German counties did yield robust findings.

\(^8\)In order to receive a consistent time series of employment relationships, we further exclude so called minor employment relationships that are included in the data since March 1999 only.
Based on this panel data set, we construct dummies for the weeks that contain the end of a month, the end of a year and the two pre-Christmas Fridays in order to capture the corresponding mass points of transitions to unemployment. Moreover, we compute year dummies to capture aggregate trends and dummies for the statutory winter season between November 1 and March 30. In addition, we construct bi-weekly dummies for the period November to April to capture potential seasonal layoff patterns that are independent of weather conditions or the business cycle. On the individual level, we further compute several work history related variables such as the incidence and length of previous employment and the incidence of previous recalls or re-employment by former employers. Moreover, we compute a dummy variable if a worker’s occupation suggests a particularly high dismissal risk during the winter period due to being a blue-collar worker in an outdoor activity such as a bricklayer.

The resulting sample consists of about 7.1m observations that are produced by 31,000 individuals of which about 10,400 experience at least one transition to unemployment in the observation period. However, only 0.4% of our observations experience a transition to unemployment since many individuals are employed for many weeks during the year. Moreover, in an average winter season, 7.5% of all individuals working in the construction sector become unemployed of which only 1% experience a transition to unemployment twice. This indicates that individuals tend to be laid off once for the whole winter period instead of switching back and forth between employment and unemployment. Even though this suggests that the effect of weather conditions on the employment status may be limited, it does not preclude that the actual layoff time depends on current weather conditions or cumulative weather conditions in the current winter season as discussed in the previous section. Summary statistics of the sample can be found in Appendix A.

Regional data. Since the IABS provides county level information about the workplace location, we can merge regional data about weather conditions and the business cycle. The business cycle information on yearly revenues in the construction sector as plotted in Figure 5 is also available for the sixteen German states. In order to avoid a scaling problem due to the different sizes of states, we generate for each state an index of real revenues. We thus merge the state level index on

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8Note that our sample differs from previous work by Mavromaras and Rudolph (1995) and Mavromaras and Orme (2004) who examine recalls and temporary layoffs in Germany during the 1980s for all business sectors based on similar data. They identify temporary layoffs based on the firm’s reported information on whether an employee has permanently or temporarily quit the firm. In our sample, only < 1% of all transitions to unemployment go along with a reported temporary break so that the intersection of our sample of seasonal layoffs in the construction sector only has a marginal intersection with their sample of temporary layoffs.
real revenues. Moreover, we merge information on the annual percentage change of real revenues compared to the previous year to capture a changing business environment in the construction sector.

The weather data is obtained from the German meteorological service (Deutscher Wetterdienst, DWD) and comprises information about daily temperature intervals, the amount of snow, rain and the wind speed for a sample of 35 weather stations throughout Germany.\textsuperscript{10} These stations were chosen by the DWD based on the criterium that weather conditions measured at these stations are representative for the densely populated areas of the surrounding county. Hence, weather stations that capture local or extreme weather conditions (e.g. hilltops) were excluded. Moreover, for many counties, the meteorologists at DWD could not identify a weather station with representative weather conditions for its surrounding county. Owing to these limitations, our sample of workers in the construction sector is limited to 35 German counties which may not be fully representative for Germany as a whole. On the other hand, the sample includes a broad mixture of rural and urban counties spread throughout Germany (see Figure 9 in the Appendix).

As an alternative to including weather indicators such as temperature, precipitation or wind in our analysis, we decided to define days with severe weather conditions that hamper outdoor construction work, in short \textit{DSW}, according to the official DWD definition. We reconstruct DSW as precise as possible based on the available weather information on temperature and precipitation. In order to make the data compatible to our weekly panel data, we define weekly weather conditions. In particular, we consider a week to have severe weather conditions, in short \textit{WSW}, if at least three days fulfil the DSW criterium. While for the individual data, a weekly information reflects the employment status in the week following a Friday, the weather information merged for this week reflects weather conditions between the last Monday and the next Sunday, thus taking account of short-term expectations concerning the weather on the weekend. We tested alternative specifications but found this one to yield the sharpest estimates. In addition to the indicator concerning weather conditions in the current week, we also compute the cumulative number of DSW in a winter season in order to capture the varying severity of the winter that is likely to affect layoffs. Figure 6 reports the smallest and the largest number of DSW in any region in addition to the overall average during the winter seasons from 1981 until 2003. The figure thus illustrates that we are able to exploit substantial annual and regional variation during an interval of more than 20 years.

\textsuperscript{10}The data is available for academic use from the DWD by paying a low administrative fee. We thank the DWD for its scientific advice and support.
Figure 6: Number of days with severe weather conditions (DSW) per winter season: min, mean and max taken over weather stations. Source: German meteorological service

Aggregate time series  Figure 7 summarises some of the previously shown time series and marks the different institutional regimes. Note that we observe the SWG regime during both prosperous and declining business conditions while the subsequent WAG regulations were implemented in mainly declining market environments. Including the less prosperous early 1980s in our analysis is thus important to observe the different legal regimes under similar business conditions. Moreover, the figure suggests some relation between unemployment transitions in the winter and the business cycle. In fact, the correlation between revenues and unemployment transitions in the winter is $\rho = -0.6$. We also find some positive relationship between unemployment transitions and the average number of days with severe weather conditions ($\rho = 0.4$). However, the transition probability to unemployment increased after the abolition of the SWG regulations and remained on a higher level since then. To what extent the latest regimes thus have been successful in preventing seasonal layoffs compared to the previous SWG regime is an open question that we can answer only by disentangling the impact of institutional regimes, weather conditions and the business cycle. For this purpose, we can exploit a higher degree of regional and time variation in our data than Figure 7 suggests: yearly state level data on business cycle conditions as well as
weekly county level information on local weather conditions.

Figure 7: Macro developments and institutional regimes. Sources: Federal Employment Agency, DWD, IABS 2004.

4 Econometric Model

As discussed before, layoffs tend to take place only once per winter season with almost no multiple transitions between the two labour market states. We therefore consider a framework in which an employed individual \(i = 1, \ldots, N\) can either continue employment or experience a transition to unemployment at period \(t = 1, \ldots, T\). Thus, unemployment risk is examined as a binary outcome with \(y_{it} = 1\) if there is a transition to unemployment and \(y_{it} = 0\) otherwise. Using this transition indicator, we explore the determinants of experiencing a layoff by modeling the transition probability as a function of \(k = 1, \ldots, K\) explanatory variables \(x_{kit}\). In particular, we assume

\[
Pr[y_{it} = 1|x_{it}] = F(\beta_0 + x_{it}'\beta)
\]

with \(F\) is a monotone function ranging from 0 to 1, \(\beta_0\) is an unknown coefficient, \(\beta\) is a \(K \times 1\)
vector of unknown coefficients, and $x_{it}$ is a $K \times 1$ vector. In most applications and textbooks, $F$ is the cumulative logistic or normal distribution function and the models are referred to as logit and probit, respectively. We follow this literature by assuming that the true function $F$ is logistic. The explanatory variables are a combination of individual, regional information and calendar time dummies. Note that $x_{it}$ does not include a common constant. In our empirical analysis we estimate the $\beta$ coefficients by means of different methods and model specifications using STATA. In particular, we apply pooled and fixed effects methods.

**Pooled Model.** Pooled estimation of the logit model is mainly attractive because of its convenience. Moreover, it delivers an estimate for the constant $\beta_0$ and for time invariant regressors such as gender. A detailed review of this model can be found in Wooldridge (2002). The pooled model does not exploit the panel data structure. In this model, standard statistics are not valid and need to be corrected due to serial correlation of the individual specific errors over time. While this does not affect consistency, potential correlation between the regressors and unobserved individual specific effects (such as ability or motivation) does. Moreover, panel attrition may lead to inconsistency if the reasons for attrition are correlated with the regressors of interest. Due to these disadvantages, we do not present full estimation results in our empirical part. However, since this model provides interesting insights on the effects of time constant individual specific explanatory variables, we briefly list them in a table in the Appendix. Our specific model setup faces the additional problem of rare event data (King and Zheng, 2001). Rare event data is characterised by a huge amount of zeros (no transition) and just very few ones (transitions) in the dependent variable. This can lead to a systematic finite sample bias of the estimated coefficients and to an underreporting of estimated probabilities. Even though we have about 7m observations in our pooled sample, we checked these potential issues by using the STATA code of King and Zheng (*relogit*). As the corrections resulted in very minor changes only, we concluded that our sample is indeed not small.

**Fixed Effects Model.** There are competing model specifications such as random effects (RE) and fixed effects (FE) models which have preferable properties in presence of unobserved individual effects. Fixed effect estimation gains its popularity from the fact that it produces consistent estimates even if the individual time constant effect has a non zero population covariance with the observed regressors. The logit FE panel estimator gains its convenience mainly from its computational convenience as it is a conditional maximum likelihood estimator. In contrast to
the linear FE panel estimator it uses period data from individuals only, for which the value of
the dependent variable switches between two periods. For the observations generated by these
individuals, it is essentially a pooled logit estimator with period changes of regressors (Baltagi,
2005). Therefore, similar to the linear FE model, it does not yield estimates for time constant
variables such as gender and it does not reveal any information about the individual fixed effect.
In contrast to the linear FE model and pooled logit model, it is not possible to compute changes in
conditional probabilities as the constant and the fixed effects are unknown. Given this limitation
for interpretation, we also considered a linear FE model as an alternative specification. As up to
20% of the fitted values of this model do not fall in the unit interval we decided not to pursue in this
direction and results are therefore not reported. Moreover, we also considered the estimation of a
RE panel model. As the RE model is characterised by a substantially higher computational effort,
we were not able to obtain results in a reasonable amount of time and estimated the fixed effects
approach instead. This is possible as our main coefficients of interest are time varying (policies,
weather, business cycle). In our application we therefore mainly report results and statistics for
the FE logit model. Our main empirical findings are, however, robust with respect to the choice
of the econometric method (pooled logit, linear FE model). Moreover, as estimated asymptotic
standard errors and robust standard errors are very similar in our application, we do not report
the latter.

We emphasize that our sample is representative for the employment in the construction sector.
If it is not random in the sense that unemployed, inactive and employees in other business sector
differ systematically from the observations in our sample, our results are not valid for the entire
German population.

**Choice of regressors.** In our empirical exercise we use different sets of regressors to explore
and determine the effect of weather conditions and the legal setup on unemployment risks in the
construction sector. We do not include region dummies and most of the individual level regressors
since the use of fixed effects requires time varying regressors. However, in Table 4 (Appendix) we
summarize the pooled logit estimates for the individual level covariates. These include a low wage
variable to explore the effect of minimum wages in the construction sector which was introduced in
the late 1990s. Moreover, we use age group dummies for older unemployed to capture the effects
of different early retirement regulations during the 1980s and 1990s. As some of these variables are
time varying, we also included them in the FE logit model but as the main results were unsensitive
we decided to omit them in the panel analysis.
To analyse the effect of the policy changes on unemployment risks we will report results for three models (A, B and C) which are summarised in Table 1. All models contain year dummies and several calendar time dummies, such as the end of month, end of year, pre-Christmas period and bi-weekly dummies during the whole winter period. These dummies capture the effects due to the calendar time only and help in disentangling the effects of severe weather conditions and calendar time. Model A is a simple approach to illustrate the main variation in layoff risks during the observation period. Estimates for year and winter dummy coefficients can be related to the descriptive results in Figure 3, but differ from the pure descriptive findings by controlling for a changing composition among construction workers across time. Model B does not contain winter dummies. Instead it controls for weather conditions, the changes in the business cycle and allows for different effects of the four policy regimes (SWG, WAG I, WAG II, WAG III). It is
therefore a first attempt to disentangle the effect of weather conditions and policy regimes while controlling for the business cycle (real revenue, change in revenue, year dummies). In order to capture both short-term and long-term effects of the local weather conditions, model B includes both a dummy variable on whether the current week had severe weather conditions as well as four dummy variables for the number of DSW during the current winter season. Model C contains interactions between weather conditions and policy regimes to allow for heterogeneous treatment patterns depending on the regime, the current weather conditions and the cumulative bad weather period during a season.

5 Empirical Results

Table 2 shows estimates for the three specifications of the fixed effects logit model as described in the previous section. Year and winter season dummies are not reported to ease the reading of the table. Instead, Figure 8 shows the corresponding odds ratios for model A which resemble the purely descriptive evidence from Figure 3 in many but not all respects. In particular, unemployment risks during the summer period have been constantly increasing since the early 1980s according to Figure 8. Moreover, unemployment risks during the winter period have always exceeded those during the summer, but the difference temporarily vanishes during the boom period after German reunification. The largest increase of unemployment transitions compared to the summer level can be found during the mid 1980s, mid 1990s and the last three years, thus spanning all major policy regimes. Without taking account of weather and business cycle conditions, there is thus no clear prediction as to the effectiveness of the policy regimes in reducing layoffs. Note that we do not report year dummy estimates for models B and C because year dummy coefficients are similar across the three specifications and have already been shown in Figure 8.

Table 2: Estimated odds ratios obtained by fixed-effects logistic regression model.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Calendar time</th>
<th>Model A</th>
<th>Model B</th>
<th>Model C</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>End month</td>
<td>2.535***</td>
<td>2.516***</td>
<td>2.523***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>End year</td>
<td>4.563***</td>
<td>4.998***</td>
<td>4.883***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Continued on next page
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2 – continued from previous page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre Xmas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weeks 45-46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weeks 47-48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weeks 49-50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weeks 51-52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weeks 53+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weeks 1-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weeks 3-4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Weeks 5-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weeks 7-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weeks 8-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weeks 10-11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Business cycle**

Revenue        0.291*** 0.302***
Change revenue  3.263*** 3.271***

**Bad weather**

WSW            1.118
WSWw1          1.015
WSWw2          1.246***
WSWw3          1.197**
WSWw4          1.435***

**Policy regime base effect**

SWG            1.618*** 1.575***
WAG I          1.703*** 1.728***
WAG II         1.486*** 1.330***
WAG III        1.382*** 1.411***

**Interaction of policy regime and bad weather**

SWG × WSW       1.096

Continued on next page
Table 2 – continued from previous page

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model A</th>
<th>Model B</th>
<th>Model C</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WAG I × WSW</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.607</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WAG II × WSW</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WAG III × WSW</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.301**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SWG and ...</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WSWw1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WSWw2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.238**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WSWw3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.241**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WSWw4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.454***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>WAG I and ...</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WSWw1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.709</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WSWw2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WSWw3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.741</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WSWw4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2.277*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>WAG II and ...</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WSWw1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WSWw2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.757**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WSWw3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WSWw4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2.288***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>WAG III and ...</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WSWw1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.874</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WSWw2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.854</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WSWw3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.866</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WSWw4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.015</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Number of obs = 2,750,395
Number of groups = 10,426
Obs per group: min = 2, avg = 263.8, max = 1,251
Log Likelihood -74,850 -74,887 -74,879

Significance levels: ***: 1% **: 5% *: 10%

Note: results for year dummies not reported (all models)
results for season dummies shown in Figure 8 (model A)
Model A also suggests another interesting finding. The odds of experiencing a transition to unemployment is much higher at fixed calendar times such as the end of a month or week as well as the one to two weeks prior to Christmas. We also find a strong bi-weekly pattern of unemployment inflows during the winter period. Of course these patterns could to some extent reflect the effects of weather conditions, which are not accounted for in model A. However, these strong result patterns with regard to these fixed calendar times remain robust when including the relevant indicators (as done in models B and C). Therefore, consistent with our hypothesis in section 2, we find strong evidence for layoffs being strongly determined by fixed calendar times.

Figure 8: Estimated odds ratio of experiencing a transition to unemployment (Model A). Reference level is the summer period in 2001.

In the public debate, weather conditions have been considered as a major determinant of seasonal unemployment. In fact, adverse weather conditions are the prime justification for the peak in the unemployment rate during the winter period as shown in Figure 1 and the introduction of all-season employment promotion measures. Model B is therefore a first attempt to disentangle the
impact of weather conditions, the business cycle and the legal setup by simultaneously controlling for all these factors.

The estimation results for model B suggest that adverse weather conditions significantly increase unemployment risks only if there have been more than two weeks of such conditions in the current winter season. Moreover, the odds of experiencing a transition to unemployment further increases with an extended period of four or more weeks of adverse weather conditions. Nevertheless, the impact of weather conditions appears minor compared to most calender times, a finding that is robust with respect to other model specifications which we do not present. However, this may partly reflect that the employment promotion during the statutory winter period has to some extent already made the construction sector weather-proof (e.g. stronger dismissal protection in presence of bad weather). The impact of weather conditions might have been stronger in absence of employment promotion measures prior to our observation period. As an additional explanation, the impact of weather conditions may have been partly exaggerated and confused with other factors such as empty order books. In fact, unemployment risks strongly decline with increasing revenue levels in the construction sector (keeping the percentage change constant). Moreover, the partial effect of an annual percentage change in revenues is not significant during the summer (and has therefore not been included in the model) while it is significantly positive during the winter. In years of increasing revenues (given the same revenue level), firms thus seem to hire additional workers that do not belong to the core personnel and that are laid off in the subsequent winter period. Thus, we do find a strong and plausible impact of the business cycle on the inflow into unemployment.

In reference to the summer period, unemployment risks are significantly higher during the statutory winter period as captured by the four regimes of employment promotion in model B. Note that we do not observe a time period prior to the introduction of employment promotion regimes so that we can only compare the relative effectiveness of the four regimes in reducing individual layoffs. In particular, compared to SWG and WAG I unemployment risks appear lower during winter periods in which flexible working time approaches have been implemented (WAG II and WAG III). Furthermore, differences between SWG and WAG III and WAG I and WAG II/WAG III are highly significant, indicating that the last two regimes may have been more effective in cushioning the impact of adverse work conditions during the winter period. This ranking of employment promotion regimes is in line with the hypothesis in section 2 since WAG II and WAG III relieve firms of some of the financial risk of a shortfall of work compared to SWG and especially WAG I.
As a major limitation, model B does not yield any insights on the effect of the employment regimes depending on weather conditions. According to the discussion in section 2, the cushioning effect of certain regimes may wear off at a varying speed with accumulating adverse weather conditions during a winter season. In particular, the cushioning effect should wear off faster, the faster a firm’s total cost of maintaining an employment relationship increase with accumulating shortfall hours due to adverse weather conditions. Model C thus extends the previous specification by interacting the four legal regimes with weather conditions in the current week and cumulative weather conditions in the present season. Findings for the other covariates are mainly unaffected by this extension so that we concentrate on the interpretation of these interaction effects. Table 3 eases this interpretation by not only showing the odds ratio of the SWG regime and its interactions with weather conditions, but by also displaying the corresponding differences to the three alternative regimes and their significance levels.

Table 3: Comparison of estimated odds ratios (OR) for the SWG regime with the three WAG regimes of employment promotion by weather conditions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OR of</th>
<th>OR of SWG minus OR of ...</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Base effect of policy regime</td>
<td>SWG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Base effect ∧ WSW</td>
<td>1.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Base effect ∧ WSW ∧ WSWw1</td>
<td>1.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Base effect ∧ WSW ∧ WSWw2</td>
<td>1.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Base effect ∧ WSW ∧ WSWw3</td>
<td>2.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Base effect ∧ WSW ∧ WSWw4</td>
<td>2.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Base effect ∧ WSW ∧ WSWw4</td>
<td>2.51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Based on the results for model C in Table 2.

Significance levels: ***: 1% **: 5% *: 10%

First of all note that the odds of experiencing a transition to unemployment rises under the SWG regime from a base level of 1.6 to 1.7 if bad weather conditions obstruct outside work in the current week and to 2.5 if there have been at least four weeks of adverse weather conditions in the present season compared to a summer week with normal weather conditions. Thus, as hypothesised, the cushioning effect of employment promotion wears off with accumulating bad weather days.
When compared to the WAG I regime that increases the financial burden for the employer, we do not find any significant differences between the SWG and the WAG I regime. Thus, in contrast to a widespread perception, WAG I does not perform worse than SWG. However, WAG I has been effective only in two winter seasons so the estimates might not be very reliable. A similar qualification applies with respect to the first of the two regimes that introduce flexible working hours and thus reduce the financial burden for employers (WAG II). Although Table 3 indicates a stronger cushioning effect of the less costly WAG II regime in the absence of adverse weather conditions, this positive outcome disappears with adverse weather conditions and even reverses after a bad weather period of four weeks in the present season. While these results should not be overemphasised, a comparison of the SWG and the latest WAG III regime should be more reliable due to spanning a longer observation period. As expected from the discussion in section 2, the WAG III regime mostly reduces the risk of unemployment compared to the SWG regime. In particular, we have a significantly lower unemployment risk under the WAG III regime in the absence of adverse weather conditions. Somewhat cautiously, one might interpret this as some evidence that the expectation of possible shortfalls of work in the winter period triggers less anticipating layoffs under the flexible working time regime WAG III than under the bad weather allowance scheme SWG. With incipient bad weather conditions, however, differences between WAG III and SWG at first turn insignificant, but strongly increase with a prolonged period of adverse weather conditions. If adverse weather conditions prevail for at least two weeks in a present winter season, the odds ratio under the WAG III regime is significantly lower by around $-0.6$. These estimates have a causal interpretation if there are no relevant trends other than the business cycle which affect the probability of lay-off. For this reason, we have also estimated a model with a linear time trend to proxy for technological change. While this trend had a significantly positive effect, our main results remained unchanged. Although it is difficult to verify that trends are not correlated with the policy regime periods under investigation, we do not find evidence that our results are seriously biased.

Our estimation results therefore suggest that the flexibilization of working hours by means of working hours accounts and the corresponding reduction of the fiscal burden a shortfall of work means to employers has been effective in reducing weather-induced seasonal layoffs compared to the long-standing SWG regime. In fact, our results indicate that seasonal unemployment has become less dependent on weather conditions under the most favorable regime WAG III. Layoff probabilities no longer significantly increase with prolonged periods of adverse weather conditions as suggested by the corresponding interaction effects in Table 2. The construction sector under the
WAG III regime has thus turned largely weather-proof. The increasing seasonal unemployment during the last observed years can thus not be attributed to a failure of the legal regime, but seems to be dominated by macro developments with regard to the declining business environment and a possible crowding out of domestic workers by mainly illegal foreign workers. Most of the increase in unemployment transitions thus seems captured by the year dummies for 2002 to 2004 that are much higher than in the previous years (see Figure 8).

Furthermore, note that even under the most effective regime WAG III, the odds of experiencing a layoff during the winter period is significantly higher than during the summer period (base effect of 1.4). This suggests that a substantial share of seasonal layoffs is unrelated to either weather conditions or the business cycle. One explanation for this finding could be that employers prefer to permanently layoff workers (e.g. due to retirement) during the winter period as another adjustment mechanism to the seasonal character of construction work. This could also explain the mass points of layoffs at fixed calendar times during the winter period and would indicate that a certain level of seasonal unemployment is unlikely to disappear even with the most effective employment promotion measure. We created a variable indicating a very hard winter by comparing cumulative bad weather days to the average number over the whole observation period. Surprisingly we found that unemployment risks are not systematically higher during extremely adverse winter periods. This is further evidence for a planned capacity reduction by firms. We also estimated a model where we interacted fixed calendar times with the regimes. As several weather and regime related coefficients in this model loose significance, we concluded that such a specification is too flexible so that we do not report results here.

We finish this section by briefly summarising the main findings for the individual level variables from the pooled estimation (see Table 4, Appendix). Since all variables are dummy variables, it is possible to relate them directly. Having had a previous unemployment period strongly increases the incidence of unemployment. In addition, having already had a recall in the past weakens the effect in the summer while it strongly increases the effect during the winter. Interestingly, there is some evidence for discrimination against foreign nationals. Information on the citizenship is sometimes missing in the data even after imputing previous or future values from the individual employment biographies. For this reason we create a dummy for unknown citizenship. The coefficient on this variable is highly positive but more research on data quality is necessary to understand the composition of this group (German/non German). We observe a significant increase in unemployment risk for older employees with longer entitlement lengths for unemployment benefits after the late 1980s. We do not obtain evidence that the 1997 reform of the unemployment
benefit system was able to offset these developments. Unemployment risk decreases if tenure is more than one year and strongly increases if the worker’s wage is in the lowest quintile of the population wage distribution. The situation for low wage workers became even worse during the late 1990s. With the introduction of the Posted Worker Act, the German government has introduced minimum wages in several sub sectors of the construction sector such as electrical installation, roofing etc. Since the minimum wage regulations treat only parts of the workforce during specific periods of time, they can be analysed with a difference in differences setup (see also König and Möller, 2008). Unfortunately, we only have access to highly aggregated business sector level information and therefore cannot distinguish between the relevant business sub sector on firm level. However, we interacted the sub sector minimum wage regulation periods by the profession of the workers (roofer, painter,...) to proxy for the specific business sub sectors. Our resulting difference in differences estimates are mainly insignificant. Therefore, similar to König and Möller (2008) we do not obtain empirical evidence for strong effects of the introduction of minimum wages on employment stability. The increase in unemployment risks for low paid workers therefore has to be explained by other reasons such as a shift of low paid employment subject to social security contributions towards other forms of employment. However, more detailed analysis using less aggregated data would be required to analyse this question in greater detail.

6 Conclusion

Given the general lack of experience rating components in their unemployment insurance systems, a number of European countries have adopted different forms of employment subsidies to avoid temporary layoffs in the construction sector. However, to the best of our knowledge, there has been no attempt to assess the effectiveness of such measures in preventing seasonal layoffs so far. In Germany, recent years have seen several reforms that shifted the financial burden of a seasonal labour slack back and forth between employers, workers and the unemployment insurance fund. In particular, there has been a major shift from a system based on mainly publicly funding a weather allowance to a system that promotes the additional use of working hours accounts. For two of the main approaches of promoting all-season employment in the European construction sector, the regime shifts in Germany thus constitute a prime opportunity for comparing the effectiveness of such measures in preventing seasonal layoffs. Based on an extensive daily panel of individual employment histories, this paper examined the impact of the changing legal setup on individual layoff probabilities conditional on information concerning the regional business cycle as well as
local weather conditions. Our analysis thus disentangled the main determinants of a seasonal layoff that due to a lack of profound microeconometric research have often been confused in the public debate.

Our results confirm the general belief that unemployment risks are lower in case of a favourable business environment. However, layoff risks are higher during winters that follow a boom year, thus indicating the previous hiring of additional workers that do not belong to the core personnel. Our results also suggest, that the impact of weather conditions is significant, but less strong than usually thought as layoffs mainly take place at fixed calendar times. Our results therefore suggest that seasonal unemployment is systematically linked to planned capacity reduction before less productive time periods. Adverse weather conditions, however, significantly increase seasonal layoffs, but do so only in case of a prolonged period of adverse weather conditions.

As expected, the higher the subsidies to a firm’s employment costs in case of a weather-induced shortfall of work, the higher is the layoff probability. In particular, the longstanding bad weather allowance (SWG) significantly increases layoffs compared to the introduction of a winter allowance in addition to the use of working hours accounts (WAG III). Moreover, WAG III reduces layoff risks in the absence as well as presence of (prolonged) adverse weather conditions. In fact, WAG III appears to make the construction sector less weather-dependent since prolonged periods of adverse weather conditions no longer affect unemployment transitions under this legal regime. At the same time, the fiscal burden on the part of the Federal Employment Agency of promoting all-season employment has been lower under the WAG III than under the SWG regime. The combination of working hours accounts for the first shortfall hours with a winter allowance that is paid by the employer and the unemployment insurance after the shortfall of working hours exceeds some threshold thus results in more stable employment relationships at lower public expenditures.

However, since workers are financially worse off when compensating hours by a working hours account, high ability workers may not be willing to accept these cutbacks in exchange for stable employment and may thus leave the construction sector permanently. This concern was among the reasons why WAG III was abolished in 2006 and replaced by the Saisonkurzarbeitergeld, a legal setup that is even more generous in publicly compensating for shortfall hours than the long-standing weather allowance, but that tries to promote the use of flexible working hours by additional economic incentives. Since we do not have access to post 2006 data, we are not able to evaluate the most recent reform. This is left to future research as well as an attempt to evaluate the cost efficiency of public employment subsidies. For this purpose, it would be advantageous to observe a winter period without any employment subsidy. While our findings
indicate that employment subsidies affect layoff probabilities and may thus partially explain why seasonal unemployment in Germany is no more pronounced than in the US despite not having a system of experience rating, the available data in Germany do not allow to tell to what extent employment subsidies prevent layoffs relative to a winter without any such subsidy.

Given this open question, we would like to encourage scholars from countries with equivalent policy schemes to perform a similar analysis. Moreover, the institutional setup might also have an effect on the hiring behaviour in the construction sector as well as the length of unemployment. Our work could thus also be extended by looking at these additional outcomes. In light of Burdett and Wright (1989), it would also be interesting to analyse whether such policy schemes encourage firms to make use of publicly subsidized short-term compensation on an inefficiently high level.
References


**Appendix**

32
Table 4: Effect of individual level variables on unemployment risks in the west German construction sector. Symbolic results derived from pooled logistic regression with 7,089,948 observations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>variable name</th>
<th>effect</th>
<th>variable name</th>
<th>effect</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>female</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>aged &lt;26</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>aged 51-55</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>aged &gt;55</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>aged 51-55 &amp; &gt;24 months employment</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>aged &gt;55 &amp; &gt;24 months employment</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ext UIB entitlements for aged 51-55 after 1997</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>ext UIB entitlements for aged &gt;55 after 1997</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>previous unemployment</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>previous unemployment and winter</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>same employer before previous unemployment</td>
<td>−</td>
<td>same employer before previous unemployment</td>
<td>++</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>foreign citizen</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>unknown citizenship</td>
<td>++</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>blue collar</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>blue collar and winter</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>previous employment 6-12 months</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>previous employment &gt;12 months</td>
<td>−</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>low wage</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>low wage after 1997</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>construction worker after 1997</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>roofer after 1997</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>electrician after 1997</td>
<td>−</td>
<td>painter after 2003</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>min wage construction</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>min wage roofer</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>min wage electrician</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>min wage painter</td>
<td>−</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Legend: ++ strong positive effect, + positive effect, 0 negligible effect, - negative effect, −− strong negative effect
Figure 9: Map of German counties - 28 western and 7 eastern German counties for which representative weather information is available are mapped in dark grey.