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Empirische Public Choice

Sommersemester 2014

 
Vorlesung

Prof. Dr. Axel Dreher
Tel: 06221-54-2921    
Fax: 06221-54 -3649
Sprechstunde nach Vereinbarung (Büro: 01.019c+d)
Email: axel.dreher@awi.uni-heidelberg.de
 
Übung:
 
Sarah Langlotz, Dipl.-Vw.
Tel: 06221-54-3172
Fax: 06221-54-3649
Sprechstunde nach Vereinbarung (Büro: 01.019a+b)
 
 
Vorlesungszeit: Mittwochs, 10.00-12.15, AWI Raum 00.024
erste Vorlesung:  Mittwoch, 16.04.2014
   
Übung:   zweiwöchentlich, Mittwochs 16.15-17.45, AWI Raum 00.010
erste Übung: Mittwoch, 23.04.2014
   
Prüfungsleistung: 120-minütige Klausur
Klausurtermin:
zum Ende der Vorlesungszeit,
Termin wird noch bekannt gegeben

 

 

 

Hinweis: Die Vorlesung basiert in großen Teilen auf der Vorlesung „Ökonomische Theorie der Finanz- und Wirtschaftspolitik“ von Prof. Dr. Alois Stutzer, Universität Basel, und in kleinen Teilen auf der Vorlesung „Ökonomische Theorie der Politik“ von Prof. Dr. Helge Berger, Freie Universität Berlin.

 

Der Syllabus ist vorläufig und wird sich noch ändern.

Syllabus (pdf)

Alte Klausuren (pdf, pdf)

 

I. Inhalt

Der Ansatz der Neuen Politischen Ökonomie verhilft zu einem besseren Verständnis der Finanz- und Wirtschaftspolitik. Im Zentrum der Veranstaltung stehen die wissenschaftliche Diskussion theoretischer Überlegungen und empirischer Forschungsresultate, sowie der Möglichkeiten und Grenzen der politischen Ökonomie.

 

II. Literatur

Die meisten Themen werden durch das Standardwerk Public Choice III von Dennis Mueller abgedeckt.

Monographie:

Mueller, Dennis C., 2003, Public Choice III, Cambridge, New York and Melbourne: Cambridge University Press.

 

III. Ablauf

 

Teil 1               Politik aus der Perspektive der Politischen Ökonomie

                       

                        1. Einführung: Public Finance und Public Choice

                            Frey (1982), Külp (1982), Mueller (2003): Kap. 1

                        2. Weshalb gibt es einen Staat?

                            Gächter (2007), Ostrom (1998), Mueller (2003): Kap. 2-3

                        3. Modelle des Regierungsverhaltens

                            Dreher et al. (2009a), Mueller (2003): Kap. 11-12, Pommerehne (1978)

                        4. Popularitätsfunktionen und politische Konjunkturzyklen

                            Alt und Lassen (2006), Brender und Drazen (2008), Jordahl (2006), Reynolds (2011),

                            Mueller (2003): Kap. 19

 

Teil 2               Grundlegende politische Institutionen

                               

                        5. Ökonomische Theorie der repräsentativen Demokratie

                             Mueller (2003): S. 264-278, Persson und Tabellini (2004), Persson,

                             Tabellini and Trebbi (2003)

                        6. Ökonomische Theorie der direkten Demokratie

                            Benz und Stutzer (2004), Frey und Stutzer (2000, 2006), Matsusaka (2005)

                        7. Ökonomische Theorie des Föderalismus

                            Frey und Eichenberger (2001), Mueller (2003): Kap. 9-10, Oates (2005)

 

Teil 3               Wichtige Akteure im politischen Prozess

 

                        8. Lobbies und Interessengruppen

                            Luechinger und Moser (2012), Mueller (2003): Kap. 15, 20

                        9. Bürokratie

                            Mueller (2003): Kap. 16

 

Teil 4               Ausgewählte Aspekte der politischen Ökonomie

 

                        10. Korruption

                              Dreher und Gassebner (2013), Dreher und Rudolph (2011), Rose-Ackerman (2004)

                        11. Internationale Organisationen

                              Dreher et al. (2009a,b, 2013), Schneider (2013)

                        12. Entwicklungshilfe

                              Alesina und Dollar (2000), Kuziemko und Werker (2006), Dreher et al. (2013)


 

IV. Literaturverzeichnis

 

Elektronische Dateien der meisten Arbeiten können aus Moodle heruntergeladen werden. Weitere Literatur wird während der Vorlesung bekannt gegeben.

 

 

Acemoglu, Daron, 2005, Constitutions, Politics, and Economics: A Review Essay on Persson and Tabellini's the Economic Effects of Constitutions, Journal of Economic Literature 43, 4: 1025-1048.

Alesina, Alberto and David Dollar, 2000, Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why? Journal of Economic Growth 5, 1: 33-63.

Alt, James E. and David Dreyer Lassen, 2006, Transparency, Political Polarization, and Political Budget Cycles in OECD Countries, American Journal of Political Science 50, 3: 530-550.

Becker, Gary S., 1976, The Economic Approach to Human Behavior, Chicago: Chicago University Press.

Benz, Matthias and Alois Stutzer, 2004, Are voters better informed when they have a larger say in politics? Evidence for the European Union and Switzerland, Public Choice 119, 1-2: 31-59.

Berggren, Niclas, Henrik Jordahl and Panu Poutvaara, 2010, The Looks of a Winner: Beauty, Gender, and Electoral Success, Journal of Public Economics 94, 1-2: 8-15.

Besley, Timothy, 2006, Principled Agents? The Political Economy of Good Government, Oxford: Oxford University Press: Kapitel 1.

Besley, Timothy and Marta Reynal-Querol, 2011, Do Democracies Select More Educated Leaders? American Political Science Review 105, 3: 552-566.

Best, Heinrich and Maurizio Cotta, 2000, Parliamentary representatives in Europe 1848-2000, Legislative recruitment and careers in eleven European countries, London: Oxford University Press.

Brender, Adi and Allan Drazen, 2005, Political Budget Cycles in New Versus Established Democracies, Journal of Monetary Economics 52, 7: 1271-1295.

Brender, Adi and Allan Drazen, 2008, How Do Budget Deficits and Economic Growth Affect Reelection Prospects? Evidence from a Large Panel of Countries, American Economic Review 98, 5: 2203-2220.

Buchanan, James und Gordon Tullock, 1965, Calculus of Consent, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Djankov, Simeon et al., 2003, Who Owns the Media? Journal of Law and Economics 46, 2: 341-81.

Dreher, Axel, Pierre-Guillaume Méon and Friedrich Schneider, 2014, The devil is in the shadow. Do institutions affect income and productivity or only official income and official productivity? Public Choice 158: 121-141.

Dreher, Axel, Vera Eichenauer and Kai Gehring, 2013, Geopolitics, Aid and Growth, CESifo Working Paper No. 4299.

Dreher, Axel and Martin Gassebner, 2013, Greasing the wheels of entrepreneurship? The impact of regulations and corruption on firm entry, Public Choice 155: 413-432.

Dreher, Axel, Stephan Klasen, James Vreeland and Eric Werker, 2013, The costs of favoritism: Is politically-driven aid less effective? Economic Development and Cultural Change 62: 157-191.

Dreher, Axel and Alexandra Rudolph, 2011, Korruption und Schattenwirtschaft: die Bedeutung guter Regeln, in T. Theurl (ed.), Gute Regeln oder Wirtschaftslenkung? Europas neue Herausforderungen, pp. 181-212, Berlin: Duncker & Humblot.

Dreher, Axel and Justina A.V. Fischer, 2010, Government decentralization as a disincentive for transnational terror? An empirical analysis, International Economic Review 51, 4: 981-1002.

Dreher, Axel and Friedrich Schneider, 2010, Corruption and the Shadow Economy: An Empirical Analysis, Public Choice 144: 215-238.

Dreher, Axel, Michael Lamla, Sarah Lein and Frank Somogyi, 2009a, The impact of political leaders’ profession and education on reforms, Journal of Comparative Economics 37, 1: 169-193.

Dreher, Axel, Jan-Egbert Sturm and James Vreeland, 2009b, Global Horse Trading: IMF loans for votes in the United Nations Security Council, European Economic Review 53: 742-757.

Dreher, Axel, Jan-Egbert Sturm and James Vreeland, 2009c, Development Aid and International Politics: Does membership on the UN Security Council influence World Bank decisions? Journal of Development Economics 88: 1-18.

Dreher, Axel, 2004, The Influence of IMF Programs on the Re-election of Debtor Governments, Economics & Politics 16, 1: 53-75.

Dreher, Axel and Roland Vaubel, 2004, Do IMF and IBRD cause moral hazard and political business cycles? Evidence from panel data, Open Economies Review 15, 1: 5-22.

Frey, Bruno S., 1982, Wohlfahrtsökonomik III: Wahlverfahren, in: Willi Albers et al. (Hg.), Handwörterbuch der Wirtschaftswissenschaft, Band 9, Fischer u.a.: Stuttgart, S. 494-502.

Frey, Bruno S., 1990, Ökonomie ist Sozialwissenschaft. München: Vahlen.

Frey, Bruno S., 2001, A Utopia? Government without Territorial Monopoly, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 157(1): 162-75.

Frey, Bruno S., Matthias Benz and Alois Stutzer, 2004, Introducing Procedural Utility: Not Only What, but Also How Matters, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 160, 3: 377-401.

Frey, Bruno S. and Reiner Eichenberger, 2001, A Proposal for a Dynamic Federalism: FOCJ. In: Ram Mudambi, Pietro Navarra and Giuseppe Sobbrio (eds), Rules and Reason, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 237-257.

Frey, Bruno S. and Friedrich Schneider, 1986, Competing Models of International Lending Activity, Journal of Development Economics 20, 3: 225-245.

Frey, Bruno S. and Alois Stutzer, 2000, Happiness, Economy and Institutions, Economic Journal 110, 466: 918-938.

Frey, Bruno S. and Alois Stutzer, 2006, Direct Democracy: Designing a Living Constitution. In: Roger D. Congleton and Birgitta Swedenborg (eds), Democratic Constitutional Design and Public Policy, Analysis and Evidence. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Gächter, Simon, 2007, Conditional Cooperation: Behavioral Regularities from the Lab and the Field and Their Policy Implications, In: Bruno S. Frey and Alois Stutzer (eds), Economics and Psychology. A Promising New Cross-Disciplinary Field, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press: 19-50.

Jordahl, Henrik, 2006, An Economic Analysis of Voting in Sweden, Public Choice 127, 3-4: 251-273.

Külp, Bernhard, 1982, Wohlfahrtsökonomik I: Grundlagen, in: Willi Albers et al. (Hg.), Handwörterbuch der Wirtschaftswissenschaft, Band 9, Fischer u.a.: Stuttgart, S. 469-486.

Kunicova, Jana and Susan Rose-Ackerman, 2005, Electoral Rules and Constitutional Structures as Constraints on Corruption, British Journal of Political Science 35: 573-606.

Kuziemko, Ilyana and Eric Werker, 2006, How much is a Seat on the Security Council Worth? Foreign Aid and Bribery at the United Nations, Journal of Political Economy 114, 5: 905-930.

Levitt, Steven D. und John A. List, 2007, What Do Laboratory Experiments Tell Us About the Real World? Journal of Economic Perspectives 21, 2: 153-174.

Lewis-Beck, Michael S. and Martin Paldam, 2000, Economic Voting: An Introduction, Electoral Studies 19, 2-3: 113-121.

Luechinger, Simon and Christoph Moser, 2012, The Value of the Revolving Door: Political Appointees and the Stock Market, KOF Working Papers No. 310 and CESifo Working Paper No. 3921.

Luhmann, Niklas and Renate Mayntz, 1973, Personal im öffentlichen Dienst – Eintritt und Karrieren, Baden-Baden: Nomos.

Matsusaka, John G., 2005, Direct Democracy Works, Journal of Economic Perspectives 19, 2: 185-206.

McMillan, John and Pablo Zoido, 2004, How to Subvert Democracy: Montesinos in Peru, Journal of Economic Perspectives 18, 4: 69-92.

Mulligan, Casey B. et al., 2004, Do Democracies Have Different Public Policies than Nondemocracies? Journal of Economic Perspectives 18, 1: 51-74.

New York Times, Trading Votes for Pork Across the House Aisle, October 2, 2006.

Niskanen, William A., 1971, Bureaucracy and Representative Government, Chicago: Aldine-Atherton.

Nordhaus, William D., 1975, The Political Business Cycle, Review of Economic Studies 42: 169-190.

Norris, Pippa, 1997, Passages to power, Legislative recruitment in advanced democracies, Cambridge  University Press.

Oates, Wallace E., 2005, Toward a Second-Generation Theory of Fiscal Federalism, International Tax and Public Finance 12, 4: 349-373.

Olson, Mancur, 1965, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Ostrom, Elinor, 1990, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action, 2nd print. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ostrom, Elinor, 1998, A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action, American Political Science Review 92, 1: 1-22.

Persson, Torsten and Guido Tabellini, 2000, Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Persson, Torsten and Guido Tabellini, 2003, The Economic Effects of Constitutions, London: MIT Press.

Persson, Torsten and Guido Tabellini, 2004, Constitutions and Economic Policy, Journal of Economic Perspectives 18, 1: 75-98.

Persson, Torsten, Guido Tabellini and Francesco Trebbi, 2003, Electoral Rules and Corruption, Journal of the European Economic Association 1, 4: 958-989.

Pommerehne, Werner W., 1978, Institutional approaches to public expenditure: Empirical evidence from Swiss municipalities, Journal of Public Economics 9, 2: 255-280.

Reynolds, C. Lockwood, 2013, State Politics, Tuition and the Dynamics of a Political Budget Cycle, Empirical Economics.

Rogoff, Kenneth and Anne Sibert, 1988, Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles, Review of Economic Studies 55, 1: 1-16.

Rose-Ackerman, Susan, 2004, Governance and Corruption, In: Bjørn Lomborg (ed.), Global Crises, Global Solutions. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press: 301-362.

Schneider, Christina J., 2009, Globalizing Domestic Politics: International Political Budget Cycles in Western Europe, World Politics, forthcoming.

Stutzer, Alois und Lukas Kienast, 2005, Demokratische Beteiligung und Staatsausgaben: Die Auswirkungen des Frauenstimmrechts, Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Volkswirtschaft und Statistik 141, 4: 617-650.

 

 

 

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