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Economics and Politics of International Economic Organizations

Winter Term 2014/2015

Bachelor Semiar "Economics and Politics of International Economic Organizations"


Prof. Dr. Axel Dreher
Phone: 54-2921    
Fax: 54 -3649
Office hour: please arrange via email (office: 01.019c+d)
Email: axel.dreher@awi.uni-heidelberg.de

 

 

First Meeting:

Tuesday, October 14, 2014, 4.15 – 6 p.m., AWI Bibliotheks-Seminarraum 1st floor (access from AWI 1st floor)

 

This is where topics will be allocated.

   
Seminar: Friday, January 16, 9 a.m. - 6 p.m., Library seminar room, 1st floor (AWI)
  Saturday, January 17, 10 a.m.-6 p.m., Library seminar room, 1st floor (AWI)
   
Deadline for enrollment: Friday, October 24, 2014, per e-mail to katharina.richert@awi.uni-heidelberg.de
   
Deadline for papers: Friday, December 19, 2014, 23:59
 

Please send an electronic version of your seminar paper (in pdf) to katharina.richert@awi.uni-heidelberg.de

 

If you fail to meet this deadline, you fail the course!

 

After the deadline you will receive one of the papers written by another student as a paper for discussion. Please prepare a short critical review of this paper for the seminar meeting. 

       

Grading will be based on: Your seminar paper (60 percent)
  Your presentation and Q&A session (15+10 minutes, 30 percent)
  Your discussion of another paper (5 minutes, 10 percent)
  Your participation during discussions (at the margin)
  (You will only be graded when present during all presentations!)
   
Language:    Papers have to be written in German or English.
  Seminar meetings and all presentations will take place in English.
   
   

 

 

Evaluation (pdf)

 

 

Topics

I. Theory of International Organizations
 

1. Do we need international organizations to ensure coopertion among states?

Abbott, Kenneth W. and Duncan Snidal, 1998, Why States Act through Formal International Organizations, Journal of Conflict Resolution 42(1): 3-32.

Oudiz, Gilles, 1988, Macroeconomic Policy Coordination: Where should we stand? In: Giersch, H. (Ed.), Macro and Micro Policies for more Growth and Employment, Tübingen: 278-291.

Joyce, Joseph P. and Todd Sandler, 2008, IMF retrospective and prospective: A public goods viewpoint, Review of International Organizations 3, 3: 221-238.

Vaubel, Roland, 1986, A Public Choice Approach to International Organizations, Public Choice 51: 39-57.

 

2. Why do states delegate part of their sovereignty to international organizations?

Abbott, Kenneth W. and Duncan Snidal, 1998, Why States Act through Formal International Organizations, Journal of Conflict Resolution 42(1): 3-32.

Frattianni, Michele and John Pattison, 1982, The Economics of International Organisations, Kyklos 35: 244-261.

Frey, Bruno S., 1997, The Public Choice of International Organizations, in: Dennis C. Mueller (ed.), Perspectives on Public Choice, New York: Cambridge University Press: 106-123.

Mearsheimer, John, 1994, The False Promise of International Institutions, International Security winter 1994/95: 5-49 (+5 rejoinders to Mearsheimer by Keohane & Martin, Kupchan & Kupchan, Ruggie, Wendt, and Mearsheimer).

Putnam, Robert D., 1988, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games, International Organization 42, 3: 427-460.

Vaubel, Roland, 2006, Principal-Agent Problems in International Organizations, Review of International Organizations 1(2): 125-138.

Voigt, Stefan and Eli M. Salzberger, 2002, Choosing Not to Choose: When Politicians Choose to Delegate Powers, Kyklos 55, 2: 289-310.

 

3. Do International Organizations really matter in international politics?

Castro, Paula, Lena Hörnlein and Katharina Michaelowa, 2014, Constructed peer groups and path dependence in international organizations: The case of the international climate change negotiations, Global Environmental Change, forthcoming.

Dreher, Axel, Heiner Mikosch and Stefan Voigt, 2014, Membership has its Privileges – The Effect of Membership in International Organizations on FDI, World Development, forthcoming.

Dreher, Axel and Stefan Voigt, 2011, Does Membership in International Organizations Increase Governments’ Credibility? A Test on the Effects of Delegating Powers, Journal of Comparative Economics 39: 326-348.

Gray, Julia and Jonathan B. Slapin, 2012, How effective are preferential trade agreements? Ask the experts, Review of International Organizations 7, 3: 309-333.

Johnson, Tana, 2011, Guilt by Association – The Link between States’ Influence and the Legitimacy of Intergovernmental Organizations, Review of International Organizations 6, 1: 57-84.

 

 

II. International Monetary Fund

 

4. Why do governments and the IMF enter into agreements?

Barro, Robert J. and Jong-Wha Lee, 2005, IMF-Programs: Who Is Chosen and What are the Effects? Journal of Monetary Economics 52: 1245-1269.

Dreher, Axel, 2004, The Influence of IMF Programs on the Re-election of Debtor Governments, Economics & Politics 16, 1: 53-75.

Knight, Malcolm and Julio A. Santaella, 1997, Economic Determinants of Fund Financial Arrangements, Journal of Development Economics 54: 405-36.

Moser, Christoph and Jan-Egbert Sturm, 2011, Explaining IMF lending decisions after the Cold War, Review of International Organizations 6, 3-4: 307-340.

Sturm, Jan-Egbert, Helge Berger and Jakob de Haan, 2005, Which Variables Explain Decisions on IMF Credit? An Extreme Bounds Analysis, Economics & Politics 17, 2: 177-213.

Vreeland, James, 2000, The IMF: Lender of Last Resort or Scapegoat? mimeo.

 

5. Who controls the IMF?

Aldenhoff, Frank-O., 2007, Are economic forecasts of the International Monetary Fund politically biased? A public choice analysis, Review of International Organizations 2, 3: 239-260.

Copelovitch, Mark, 2010, Master or Servant? Agency Slack and the Politics of IMF Lending, International Studies Quarterly 54, 1: 49-77.

Dreher, Axel and Nathan M. Jensen, 2007, Independent Actor or Agent? An Empirical Analysis of the Impact of US Interests on IMF Conditions, Journal of Law & Economics 50, 1: 105-124.

Dreher, Axel; Silvia Marchesi and James Vreeland, 2008, The Politics of IMF Forecasts, Public Choice 137, 1-2: 145-171.

Dreher, Axel, Jan-Egbert Sturm and James Vreeland, 2009, Global Horse Trading: IMF loans for votes in the United Nations Security Council, European Economic Review 53: 742-757.

Dreher, Axel and James Vreeland, 2011, Buying Votes and International Organizations, cege Discussion Paper 123.

Fratzscher Marcel und Julien Reynaud, 2011, IMF Surveillance and Financial Markets – A Political Economy Analysis, European Journal of Political Economy 27, 3: 405-422.

Thacker, Strom, 1999, The High Politics of IMF Lending, World Politics 52: 38-75.

Vreeland, James, 2007, The International Monetary Fund: Politics of Conditional Lending, Routledge, Chapter 2.

 

6. A critical assessment of IMF Conditionality

Calvo-Gonzales, Oscar, 2007, Ownership and conditionality in IMF-supported programs: Back to Per Jacobsson’s time, Review of International Organizations 2, 4: 329-342.

Copelovitch, Mark, 2010, Master or Servant? Agency Slack and the Politics of IMF Lending, International Studies Quarterly 54, 1: 49-77.

Dreher, Axel, 2009, IMF Conditionality: Theory and Evidence, Public Choice 141, 1-2: 233-267.

Dreher, Axel and Nathan M. Jensen, 2007, Independent Actor or Agent? An Empirical Analysis of the Impact of US Interests on IMF Conditions, Journal of Law & Economics 50, 1: 105-124.

Dreher, Axel, Jan-Egbert Sturm and James Vreeland, 2014, Does membership on the UN Security Council influence IMF conditionality? Journal of Conflict Resolution, forthcoming.

Dreher, Axel and Roland Vaubel, 2004, The Causes and Consequences of IMF Conditionality, Emerging Markets Finance and Trade 40, 3: 26-54.

Marchesi, Silvia, Laura Sabani and Axel Dreher, 2011, Read my lips: the role of information transmission in multilateral reform design, Journal of International Economics 84: 86-98.

Mayer Wolfgang and Alex Mourmouras, 2007, IMF conditionality: An approach based on the theory of special interest politics, Review of International Organizations 3, 2: 105-121.

Stone, Randall, 2008, The Scope of IMF Conditionality, International Organization 62: 589-620.

 

7. What are the effects of IMF programs?

Abouharb, Rodwan and David Cingranelli, 2009, IMF programs and human rights, 1981–2003, Review of International Organizations 4: 47-72.

Atoyan, Rouben and Patrick Conway, 2006, Evaluating the impact of IMF programs: A comparison of matching and instrumental-variable estimators, Review of International Organizations 1: 99-124.

Barro, Robert J. and Jong-Wha Lee, 2005, IMF-Programs: Who Is Chosen and What are the Effects? Journal of Monetary Economics 52: 1245-1269.

Boockmann, Bernhard and Axel Dreher, 2003, The Contribution of the IMF and the World Bank to Economic Freedom, European Journal of Political Economy 19, 3: 633-649.

Conway, Patrick, 1994, IMF Lending Programs: Participation and Impact, Journal of Development Economics 45: 365-91.

Dreher, Axel, 2004, The Influence of IMF Programs on the Re-election of Debtor Governments, Economics & Politics 16, 1: 53-76.

Dreher, Axel, 2006, IMF and Economic Growth: The Effects of Programs, Loans, and Compliance with Conditionality, World Development, 34, 5: 769-788.

Dreher, Axel and Martin Gassebner, 2012, Do IMF and World Bank programs induce government crises? An empirical analysis, International Organization 66, 2: 329-358.

Dreher, Axel and Stefanie Walter, 2010, Does the IMF Help or Hurt? The Effect of IMF programs on the likelihood and outcome of currency crises, World Development 38, 1: 1-18.

Goldstein, Morris and Peter J. Montiel, 1986, Evaluating Fund Stabilization Programs with Multicountry Data: Some Methodological Pitfalls, IMF Staff Papers 33: 304-344.

Przeworski, Adam and James Vreeland, 2000, The Effect of IMF Programs on Economic Growth, Journal of Development Economics 62: 385-421.

Smith, Alastair and James R. Vreeland, 2006, The Survival of Political Leaders and IMF Programs, in Gustav Ranis, James Vreeland, and Stephen Kosack (eds.), Globalization and the Nation State: The Impact of the IMF and the World Bank, New York: Routledge.

Vreeland, James, 2003, The IMF and Economic Development, New York: Cambridge University Press, chapter 5.

Vreeland, James, 2007, The International Monetary Fund: Politics of Conditional Lending, Routledge, Chapter 4.

 

8. Does the IMF’s “seal of approval” catalyze capital flows?

 

Bauer, Molly, Cesi Cruz and Benjamin Graham, 2012, Democracies only: When do IMF agreements serve as a seal of approval? Review of International Organizations 7, 1: 33-58.

Bird, Graham and Dane Rowlands, 2004, Financing Balance of Payments Adjustment: Options in the Light of the Illusory Catalytic Effect of IMF Lending, Comparative Economic Studies 46, 3.

Javier Díaz-Cassou; Alicia García-Herrero and Luis Molina, 2006, What Kind of Capital Flows does the IMF Catalyze and When? Banco de Espana Research Paper No. WP-0617

Ashoka Mody and Diego Saravia, 2006, Catalyzing Capital Flows: Do IMF Programs Work as Commitment Devices? Economic Journal 116: 1-26.

 

9. Compliance with IMF conditionality. Measurement, Evidence, Reforms

Arpaca, Ozlem; Graham Bird and Alex Mandilarasa, 2008, Stop Interrupting: An Empirical Analysis of the Implementation of IMF Programs, World Development 36, 9: 1493-1513.

Bird, Graham, 2007, The implementation of IMF programs: A conceptual framework, Review of International Organizations 3, 1: 41-64.

Bird, Graham, Mumtaz Hussain and Joseph P. Joyce, 2004, Many Happy Returns? Recidivism and the IMF, Journal of International Money and Finance 23, 2: 231-251.

Bird, Graham and Thomas Willett, 2004, IMF Conditionality, Implementation and the New Political Economy of Ownership, Comparative Economic Studies 46, 3: 423-450.

Dreher, Axel, 2003, The Influence of Elections on IMF Program Interruptions, Journal of Development Studies 39, 6: 101-120.

Ivanova, Anna, Wolfgang Mayer, Alex Mourmouras and George Anayiotos, 2005, What Determines the Implementation of IMF-Supported Programs? In: Ashoka Mody and Alessandro Rebucci (eds.), IMF-Supported Programs: Assessing Program Design, Implementation, and Effectiveness, Chapter 10, 160-186, Washington DC: International Monetary Fund.

Mercer-Blackman, Valerie and Anna Unigovskaya, 2004, Compliance with IMF Program Indicators and Growth in Transition Economies, Emerging Markets Finance and Trade 40, 3: 55-83.

Nsouli, Saleh M., Rouben Atoian and Alexandros Mourmouras, 2005, Institutions, Program Implementation, and Macroeconomic Performance, Chap. 9. In A. Mody & A. Rebucci (Eds.), IMF-supported programs: Assessing program design, implementation, and effectiveness. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund.

Vreeland, James, 2006, IMF Programs Compliance: Aggregate Index versus Policy Specific Research Strategies, Review of International Organizations 1, 4: 359-378.

 

10. Should the IMF be reformed?

Bordo, Michael and Harold James, 2009, The Past and Future of IMF Reform, mimeo.

International Financial Institution Advisory Commission, IFIAC, 2000, Report of the International Financial Institution Advisory Commission. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.

Krueger, Anne O., 1997, Wither the World Bank and the IMF? Journal of Economic Literature 36(4): 1983-2020.

Krueger, Anne O., 2006, A response to Allan Meltzer, Review of International Organizations 1, 1: 61-64.

Linn, Johannes F. , Ralph C. Bryant und Colin I. Bradford, 2008, Experts Critique Proposal for International Monetary Fund Quota Reform, Brookings Institution.

Lombardi, Domenico und Jim O’Neill, 2008, How Europe Can Shape the International Monetary Fund, Brookings Institution.

Meltzer, Allan H., 2006a, Reviving the Bank and the Fund, Review of International Organizations 1, 1: 49-59.

Meltzer, Allan H., 2006b, Reply to Anne Krueger, Review of International Organizations 1, 1: 65-67.

Momani, Bessma, 2007, IMF staff: Missing link in fund reform proposals, Review of International Organizations 2, 1: 39-57.

Subramanian, Arvind, 2009, Presentation: IMF Reform, Anew, London, Feb. 9, 2009, http://www.l20.org/publications/42_Ul_Subramanian-IMF-Reform-Anew.pdf

Vreeland, James, 2003, The IMF and Economic Development, New York: Cambridge University Press, chapter 7.

Vreeland, James, 2006, Self Reform: The IMF Strategy, Yale University, Prepared for the Reinventing Bretton Woods Committee and World Economic Forum conference, “The International Monetary Fund in Transition: Rediscovering its monetary role?” Cape Town, 29-30 May 2006.

Vreeland, James, 2007, The International Monetary Fund: Politics of Conditional Lending, Routledge, Chapter 6.

 

 

III. World Trade Organization

 

11. Who joins the WTO?

Bagwell, Kyle and Robert Staiger, 1999, An economic theory of the GATT, American Economy Review 89, 1: 215-248.

Copelovitch, Mark and David Ohls, 2012, Trade, institutions, and the timing of GATT/WTO accession in post-colonial states, Review of International Organizations 7(1): 81-107.

Evenett, Simon, J. Gage and M. Kennett, 2004, WTO membership and market access: Evidence from the accessions of Bulgaria and Ecuador. Unpublished Manuscript.

Evenett, Simon and C. Primo Braga, 2005, WTO accession: Lessons from experience. In R. Newfarmer (Ed.), Trade, Doha, and development: Windows into the issues. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Trumm, S. (ed.), 2005, Accession to the WTO: Country experiences and technical assistance.

Yu, M. and K.-F. Wong, 2008, Democracy and the GATT/WTO accession duration. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=982032.

 

12. What are the economic consequences of the WTO?

Antkiewicz, Agata and John Whalley, 2006, BRICSAM and the Non-WTO, Review of International Organizations 1, 3: 237-262.

Busch, Marc and Edward Mansfield, 2003, Multilateral Determinants of Regionalism: The Effects of GATT/WTO on the Formation of Preferential Trading Arrangements, International Organization 57, 4: 829-862.

Rose, Andrew K., 2004, Do We Really Know That the WTO Increases Trade? American Economic Review 94, 1: 98-114.

Rose, Andrew K., 2004, Do WTO Members have More Liberal Trade Policy? Journal of International Economics 63, 2: 209-235.

Subramanian, Arvind and Shang-Jin Wei, 2007, The WTO Promotes Trade, Strongly But Unevenly, Journal of International Economics 72, 1: 151-175.

 

13. Should the WTO be reformed?

Glania, Guido, 2004, Various Approaches for Institutional Reforms within the WTO, Außenwirtschaft 59: 7-28.

Hoekman, Bernard and Michael Kostecki, 1995, The Political Economy of the World Trading System: From GATT to WTO, Oxford: 9-46.

Irwin, Douglas, 1995, The GATT in Historical Perspective, American Economic Review 85: 323-328.

Jackson, John, 1994, Managing the World Trading System: The World Trade Organization and the Post-Uruguay Round GATT Agenda, in: Peter Kenen (Ed.), Managing the World Economy, Fifty Years after Bretton Woods, Washington.

Krueger, Anne, 1998, The WTO as an International Organisation, Chicago.

Pauwelyn, Joost, 2005, The Sutherland Report: A Missed Opportunity for Genuine Debate on Trade, Globalization and Reforming the WTO, School of Law Duke Law School Legal Studies Paper No. 68.

Sally, Razeen, 2004, The End of the Road for the WTO? A Snapshot of International Trade Policy after Cancún, World Economics 5, 1: 1-14.

Winters, Alan, 1990, The Road to Uruguay, Economic Journal 100: 1288-1303.

 

 

IV. The World Bank Group (IBRD, IDA, IFC, MIGA)

 

14. Why do governments and the World Bank enter into agreements?

Abouharb, M. Rodwan and David L. Cingranelli, 2007, The Human Rights Effects of World Bank Structural Adjustment, 1981–2000, International Studies Quarterly 50, 2: 233-262.

Frey, Bruno S. and Friedrich Schneider, 1986, Competing Models of International Lending Activity, Journal of Development Economics 20, 3: 225-245.

Heckelman, Jac, Stephen Knack and Halsey Rogers, 2011, Crossing the Threshold: A Positive Analysis of IBRD Graduation Policy, Policy Research Working Paper Series 5531, The World Bank.

Knack, Stephen, F. Halsey Rogers and Jac C. Heckelman, 2012, Crossing the threshold: A positive analysis of IBRD graduation policy, Review of International Organizations, 7(2): 145-176.

Morrison, Kevin M., 2004, The Determinants of World Bank Flows to Africa, 1977-1998, Presented at 2004 International Studies Association.

Ratha, Dilip, 2005, Demand for World Bank Lending, Economic Systems 29, 4: 408-421.

Schneider, Friedrich; Bruno S. Frey; Henrik Horn and Torsten Persson, 1985, A Formulation and Test of a Simple Model of World Bank Behavior, Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 121, 3: 438-447.

 

15. Who controls the World Bank?

Andersen, Thomas B., Henrik Hansen and Thomas Markussen 2006, US politics and World Bank IDA-lending, Journal of Development Studies, 42, 5: 772-794.

Dreher, Axel and Jan-Egbert Sturm, 2012, Do the IMF and the World Bank Influence Voting in the UN General Assembly? Public Choice, 151, 1: 363-397.

Dreher, Axel, Stephan Klasen, James Vreeland and Eric Werker, 2013, The costs of favoritism: Is politically-driven aid less effective? Economic Development and Cultural Change 62: 157-191.

Dreher, Axel, Jan-Egbert Sturm and James Vreeland, 2009, Development Aid and International Politics: Does membership on the UN Security Council influence World Bank decisions? Journal of Development Economics, 88: 1-18.

Fleck, R.K., and Christopher Kilby, 2006, World Bank Independence: A Model and Statistical Analysis of U.S. Influence, Review of Development Economics 10, 2: 210-223.

Kaja, Ashwin and Eric Werker, 2010, Corporate Governance at the World Bank and the Dilemma of Global Governance, World Bank Economic Review 24, 2: 171-198.

Kilby, Christopher, 2009, The Political Economy of Conditionality: an Empirical Analysis of World Bank Loan Disbursements, Journal of Development Economics 89, 1:51-61.

Kilby, Christopher, 2013, An empirical assessment of informal influence in the World Bank, Economic Development and Cultural Change 61, 2: 431-464.

 

16. What are the effects of World Bank involvement?

Abouharb, M. Rodwan and David L. Cingranelli, 2006, The Human Rights Effects of World Bank Structural Adjustment, 1981–2000, International Studies Quarterly 50, 2: 233-262.

Boockmann, Bernhard and Axel Dreher, 2003, The Contribution of the IMF and the World Bank to Economic Freedom, European Journal of Political Economy 19, 3: 633-649.

Dollar, David and Jakob Svensson, 2000, What Explains the Success or Failure of Structural Adjustment Programs? Economic Journal 110, 466: 894-917.

Dreher, Axel and Martin Gassebner, 2012, Do IMF and World Bank programs induce government crises? An empirical analysis, International Organization 66, 2: 329-358.

Dreher, Axel and Roland Vaubel, 2004, Do IMF and IBRD cause moral hazard and political business cycles? Evidence from panel data, Open Economies Review 15, 1: 5-22.

Easterly, William, 2005, What did structural adjustment adjust? The association of policies and growth with repeated IMF and World Bank adjustment loans, Journal of Development Economics 76, 1-22.

Flores, Thomas Edward and Irfan Nooruddin, 2009, Financing the peace: Evaluating World Bank post-conflict assistance programs, Review of International Organizations 4:1-27.

Nielson, Daniel and Tierney, Michael, 2003, Delegation to International Organizations: Agency Theory and World Bank Environmental Reform, International Organization 57, 2: 241-276.

 

17. Should the World Bank be reformed and, if so, how?

 

Einhorn, Jessica, 2006, Reforming the World Bank, Foreign Affairs, January/February.

International Financial Institution Advisory Commission, IFIAC, 2000, Report of the International Financial Institution Advisory Commission. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.

Krueger, Anne O., 1997, Wither the World Bank and the IMF? Journal of Economic Literature 36(4): 1983-2020.

Meltzer, Allan H., 2006a, Reviving the Bank and the Fund, The Review of International Organizations 1, 1: 49-59.

Stiglitz, Joseph E., 1999, The World Bank at the Millennium, Economic Journal 109: 577-597.

Williamson, John, 1999, What Should the Bank Think About the Washington Consensus? Institute for International Economics, July.

 

V. The European Union

 

18. Who has the power in the EU?

Barr, Jason and Francesco Passarelli, 2009, Who has the power in the EU? Mathematical Social Sciences 57, 3: 339-366.

Schneider, Christina J., 2013, Domestic Elections and Distributional Bargaining in the European Union, World Politics 65, 3: 452-490.

Vaubel, Roland, 1994, The Public Choice Analysis of European Integration: A Survey, European Journal of Political Economy 10: 227-249.

Vaubel, Roland, 2006, Principal-Agent Problems in International Organizations, Review of International Organizations 1: 125-138.

 

19. The Political Economy of the European Constitution

 

Benedetto, Giacomo  and  Simon Hix, 2007, Explaining the European Parliament’s Gains in the EU Constitution, Review of International Organizations 2, 2: 115-129.

Hug, Simon and Tobias Schulz, 2007, Referendums in the EU's Constitution Building Process, Review of International Organizations 2, 2: 105-113.

König, Thomas and Daniel Finke, 2007, Reforming the Equilibrium? Veto Players and Policy Change in the European Constitution-building Process, Review of International Organizations 2, 2: 153-176.

Lenz, Hartmut; Han Dorussen and Hugh Ward, 2007, Public Commitment Strategies in Intergovernmental Negotiations on the EU Constitutional Treaty, Review of International Organizations 2, 2: 131-152.

Tsebelis, George, 2006, Agenda Setting in the EU Constitution: From the Giscard Plan to the Pros Ratification(?) Document, mimeo.

Vaubel, Roland, 1997, The Constitutional Reform of the European Union, European Economic Review 41: 443-450.

 

20. What are the macroeconomic consequences of the EMU?

 

Egger, Peter and Michael Pfaffermayr, 2013, The Pure Effects of European Integration on Intra-EU Trade, World Economy 36, 6: 701-712.

Becker, Sascha O., Egger, Peter and Maximilian von Ehrlich, 2012, Too much of a good thing? On the growth effects of the EU's regional policy, European Economic Review 56(4): 648-668.

Becker, Sascha O., Egger, Peter  and Maximilian von Ehrlich, 2010, Going NUTS: The Effect of EU Structural Funds on Regional Performance, Journal of Public Economics 94, 9-10: 578-590.

 

21. Does EU conditionality work?

 

Anastasakis, Othon and Dimitar Bechev, 2003, EU Conditionality in South East Europe: Bringing Commitment to the Process, South East European Studies Programme, University of Oxford, Journal of European Area Studies, 9, 1: 79-103.

Grabbe, Heather, 1999, A Partnership for Accession? The Implications of EU Conditionality for the Central and East European Applicants, Robert Schuman Centre Working Paper 12/99, San Domenico di Fiesole (FI): European University Institute.

Ralchev, Plamen, 2004, The EU Conditional Assistance as a Policy Tool Towards Southeastern Europe, University for National and World Economy, Sofia, mimeo.

 

22. Who is in favor of enlarging the European Union?

 

Egger, Peter, Mario Larch, Michael Pfaffermayr, and Janette Walde, 2008, The EU’s Attitude Towards Eastern Enlargement in Space, Journal of Comparative Economics 36, 1: 142-156.

Gabel, Matthew, 1998, Public Support for European Integration: An Empirical Test of Five Theories, Journal of Politics 60: 333-354.

 

Guideline for Seminar Papers

 

 

Editing

You may use any word processing software that you feel comfortable with. Preferentially make use of LaTeX in case you decide to use a lot of formulas in your paper. Papers have to be submitted by Email in PDF format.

 

Style

  • Font Size: 12 pt
  • Line Spread: 1.5pt
  • Alignment: justified
  • border: 2.5cm

 

Length

The seminar papers should not exceed 12 pages excluding references, tables and title page.

 

Organization

  • Cover (Include name, student number, title)
  • Table of Contents: Number headings in the table of contents and the text identically.
  • Table of Figures: List all figures (if any) with number and heading.
  • List of Tables: List all tables with number and heading.
  • (Table of Symbols: List all symbols and variables (if any) with their definitions.)
  • Content: The introduction leads to and defines the subject, the body deals with the subject and the summary sums up the results in a critical manner. Number content, table of contents, table of figures, the list of tables, and the table of symbols. Reduce the number of footnotes to a minimum. Abbreviations have to be explained. Number only important equations that you refer to. Within the text argue in economic terms and not with variables. Orthography, grammar, and style are taken into account. Refrain from excessive bulleting and numbering.
  • References
  • (Appendix)

 

Quotations, References and Plagiarism

 

Quotations: use Harvard style, i.e. quote within the text and not in footnotes (e.g., as has been shown by Sturm (2006)…).

 

References: all studies that you have quoted in the text have to appear in the reference list. Anything that you have only read, but that is not quoted in the text, must NOT appear in the list of references. There are no restrictions on the reference style. However, consistency is required.

 

Plagiarism: any text parts (of more than two words) or ideas that are not strictly your own have to be marked. That means that the text has to be phrased in a way that makes unambiguously clear which parts are your own thoughts and which part repeats ideas from other persons. Failure to do so will result in the rejection of your paper, i.e., you fail the course, and possible further disciplinary measures by the Ruprecht-Karl University of Heidelberg. Don’t even think about copy/pasting your paper from the internet. Each paper will be tested in that respect.

 

 

Finding Literature

 

The references that you get from us are only a starting point (and we will not provide these articles). You are supposed to do your own literature research. The first step in the search for relevant literature is to check the reference lists of the literature that we gave you. Good sources for economic literature, among others, are:

 

-http://ideas.repec.org

-http://www.jstor.org

-Business Source Premier and EconLit (via the university library website)

-http://www.nber.org

-http://www.cepr.org

 

A rule of thumb is that the list of references should have about as many entries as there are pages in the seminar paper, e.g., 20 pages, 15-25 references. Be prepared to read about the double amount of papers that finally make it into the list of references. Wikipedia is not a scientific source.

 

Deadlines

 

Make sure that you hand in your paper exactly on time. If you miss the deadline, the rules are strict and you will not pass the course.

Interaction with your supervisor

It is recommended that you meet your supervisor (at least once, but better twice) in order to discuss the progress of your paper. The first meeting should happen within about two weeks after you started working on the paper.

 

 

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