Byzantinism, Philhellenism and Greek Nationalism

1. It does not seem to be the case that "politics" and "academics"
are distinct spheres. Each informs the other. Within our field,
the very broad tilt of Enlightenment politics effected Gibbon's
assessments of Byzantium; while the ecclesiastical politics of
Anglo-Catholicism contributed to a somewhat more positive Õbut
anti-Romanþ approach in the later 19th and early 20th century. Without
Marxism perhaps half the interesting disputes about Byzantine
social history would not have developed.  And so far I am
only referring to English language scholarship. The problem
is not so much bringing, or even involving, one's political
positions, but that one allows such positions to suppress
contrary information or arguements.

2. In an odd manner Greek and Turkish studies have a peculiar
feature. For much of the 19th century, the local nationalisms
in both Greece and Turkey focused on *ancient* glories. Whereas
there can be little doubt that the actual realities of day to day
life for both Greek and Turks were largely creations of, on
the one hand Late Byzantium and Turkish rule, on the other ot
the Ottoman period - Greek nationalism focused on the
claim to be the heir of Ancient Greece, while Turkish
nationalism, tryiing to find someway to escape the
intertwining of Turkish and Muslim identity, focused on
the life of the Turks on the Steppes.  ÕTha actual co-mingling
of peoples, so common, and yet so upsetting to the Nationalits
mindset, could then be overlooked. The actual population of
much of modern Western Turkey is - apparently - made up
of converts from Orthodox communities, something unsettling
for all sides.þ

For historians this left a very odd situation: the longest
lasting, and by almost any standard, most successful Muslim
state - the Ottoman Empire - was basically open to free investigation,
the only hinderance being that three, perhaps four, difficult
languages are required to study it properly. And the longest
lasting of all Christian states was similarly fairly free
of nationalist historiography.  This was a very different
situation from the situation in England, France, Germany and
Italy, all of which were found, by more or less nationalist
historians, to have Medieval origins.

3. In more recent years, I think, the Ottoman and Byzantine eras have
been reclaimed by the historical scholarship of their
respective inheritor cultures. The result is that Greek and
Turkish historians are now among the most important of modern
interpreters, something I *think* that was not true in the not
too distant past.  Less happily, I think, there may be now more
willingness by those of a nationalist bent to appropriate the
medieval and early modern histories in a way that was not
done before.

4. But, while I think concern over the preservation of monuments
is an issue Õalthough not a major issue for me: I think "history"
has only a lsight connection to "historic" buildings - in Britain
the countary is awash with "historic" buildings with little bearing
on history - far better to read Macbeth than visit Anne Hathaway's
cottage!þ, I am less sure that an interest in Byzantine history commits
one to philhellenism, and even less Greek nationalist positions.
Although personally I have philhellenic tendancies, I think it
qould be quite possible to be a devoted student of Byzantium in
particular and to conclude that, as a culture, it was failry
narrow and non-diverse. In fact I know that this is the position of
at least one major British-based Byzantinist, a psoition shared by
some of his students I have had contact with in the US. Even
less does an interest in Byzantine studies mean that one will support
the interests of modern Greece. Eric Hobsbawm once remarked that
a nationalist cannot write the histroty of his or her own country,
a remark which shows some insight, I think. In fact a number of
notable scholars of Byzantium and/or Orthodoxy - for instance
Alexander Schmemann and John Meyendorff - were virulently and
vocally opposed to nationalism ÕMeyendorff used to rail against
what he considered the heresy of "phyletism" {sp?}þ.  Indeed it
would be possible to read the history of the East Roman, as indeed the
Ottoman Empire, as a brief for the benefits of a universal anti-ethnic
state.

5. So, while I hardly object to political commentary on a list devoted
to Byzantine studies, and even less to infomration about monument
destruction Õas long as such information is both reliable and not
some unreliable compendia of nationalist proof textsþ, I do not
accept the presumption that just because one studies Byzantium.
one will support particualr political positions.


Paul Halsall