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Germany’s Changing Security Culture and Governance

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1. Introduction

The history of Germany's reluctant security policy – the aversion to exercise military power and the preference for multilateral diplomatic action – has often been told. And yet, twenty years after unification a paradox becomes apparent. The Federal Republic's security trajectory still features several characteristics of a 'civilian power' security culture: it has been a key protagonist of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), of several diplomatic conflict resolution initiatives (the Fischer Plan, the Bonn conference on Afghanistan, the E-3 initiative among others, the Berlin conference on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict) and one of the main opponents of the US-led intervention in Iraq. And Berlin even pursues security policies in some areas – e.g. the Iraq case or the question of Ballistic Missile Defence – where costs for its vital alliance with the United States are sizeable. At the same time, since 1990 German governments from the left and right have displayed a new robustness in security affairs both in word and deed. In particular, German armed forces have been deployed in ever more dangerous military campaigns despite 'Germany's security culture of reticence'. After the September 11 attacks, Germany's executive has also centralized its anti-terrorism policies and institutions thereby shedding basic principles of Germany's federalist and fragmented policy process, which emerged after the dramatic failure of the separation of powers during the Nazi period.

The resulting ambivalence in German security policy is widely criticized both at home and abroad. At home, pacifistic groups, the Left Party, 'Die Linke', and members of the liberal party assailed both CDU and SPD-led governments for militarizing Germany's

foreign policy and nurturing a police state domestically. Abroad, continuous US administrations and some European allies have pushed very hard, often in public, for a much stronger German military role and a less restrictive data exchange policy to detain terrorist suspects. Government officials therefore often maintain that Germany already carries a burden but will do more to live up to its increased international responsibility.[1]

What underlies this mixture of continuing reticence and increasing robustness? Why is Germany's cooperation in some areas of security governance almost a given but highly controversial in others? Do changes in German security behaviour reflect common patterns of convergence of compatibility among the ten countries under review in this book or do they correspond to the different modes of public goods production?

There are several competing explanations for Germany's ambivalent security trajectory. The most common realistic assertion holds that Germany's new robustness can be traced back to unification and an increase in material power that translates into a broader spectrum of policy choices ranging from autonomous external action to more coercive action within existing institutions.

However, this realistic explanation based on material factors only is both incomplete and misleading. To begin with, depicting Germany as a reemerging 'great power' does not tell us in which direction this 'great power' is heading and it may mislead us to generalize a trend in military deployment which may not be representative of the whole spectrum of security governance. Therefore, the comparative security policy perspective taken here and the conceptualization of security governance as consisting of different

production modes – i.e. assurance, prevention, protection and compellence – are introduced to overcome these deficiencies. Furthermore, this chapter will analyze the reasons for and implications of changes in Germany's security culture and assess the extent and scope for international security governance in light of those changes.

The chapter has a different take on Germany's security behaviour. The ambivalent security trajectory, we argue in the first section, is a function of two historic trends in German Foreign and Security Policy, none of which can be directly inferred from Germany's material capacities. We posit that German security governance is ambivalent because Germany is a parliamentarian democracy with both, a strong civil society and civilian domestic culture and a strong inclination towards European integration and cooperation with transatlantic partners. Therefore, to restate the claim of the realist argument, ambivalent support for more robust security policy action derives from an enduring domestic culture of reticence while increased military deployment can be explained through allied countries' perceptions and requests that a 'more powerful Germany' must shoulder a bigger share of the common burden. Our argument trades on the hypothesis that Germany's Post-Westphalian security accounts for the securitization of economic and social threats and the preference of non-military policy instruments while some changes in its security culture have mitigated collective action problems in certain policy areas. We posit that recent changes – Europeanization, increased robustness and domestication – do facilitate pooling security capabilities on a European and to a lesser degree on an international level while inhibiting delegation of competences due to domestic constitutional and societal constraints (for further details see the introductory chapter of this book).

In the next section, we develop out theoretical argument based on the distinct German security culture and institutional setting. In the third section, we show that German security governance exhibits some key characteristics that other nations lack. Brief histories of the domestic debates on compellence and protection will uncover direct evidence of the importance of cross-cutting domestic and external expectations in Germany's post-Cold War security policy. In the final section, we conclude that recent changes in Germany's security culture and governance have increased the country's ability to contribute to international security governance although this contribution is limited due to several enduring key characteristics. We assert that Germany's contribution could be even stronger if international security governance would be more 'Europeanized' and thereby more readily acceptable to the German public.

2. Germany Security Culture and recent trends in security governance: the argument

A plausible realist interpretation of Germany's post World War II security policy holds that the conquered and occupied state had no other choice than to bandwagon with the United States against the conventional threat of the Soviet Union. In classical realist alliance theory, the benefits of enhanced deterrence through US and allied forces on German territory outweighed the costs of sacrificing autonomy and unilateral or bilateral policy options. While sovereignty costs may not have been a major consideration for the semi-sovereign German state in the 1950s, relative gains in power and status in the aftermath of German unification set the stage for a more muscular and

unilateral security policy (O'Brian 1992). Two prominent variants of realist interpretations can be identified: a structural realist argument, which posits, that a moderate improvement of Germany's power position will result in intensified autonomy-seeking policies; and a modified neorealistic argument, which stipulates that the moderate power increase will induce influence-maximizing behaviour (Baumann, Rittberger and Wagner 2001).

Indeed, unilateralism and utilitarian considerations towards military action seem to pervade several German security policy decisions in the 1990s:

- the unilateral recognition of Slovenia and Croatia (1991) (Layne 1993: 37);
- the participation in the NATO-led Kosovo-intervention without proper United Nations Security Council mandate (1998); and
- opposition towards the US-led Iraq intervention (2002)

are the most cited incidents of a new German assertiveness (Schöllgen 2004; Hedstück andHellmann 2003).

While the desire to maintain discretion and influence in security affairs certainly contributes to Germany's ambivalence toward full scope multilateral action and international law, the realist explanation does not tell the whole story. It fails to account for the decision making process and the resulting policy change of each decision. A more plausible explanation of these episodes includes tracing the domestic debate that led up to the decision and the subsequent German behaviour. In the case of the Kohl government's recognition of Croatia and Slovenia fourteendays ahead of the other EU

countries domestic pressure by conservative newspapers as well as Germany's low-key Balkan policy after the intense external criticism of its decision by its partners do present a more convincing account. In the case of the Kosovo intervention, domestic political factors have played a considerable role: first, with regard to the question of more migration by war refugees from Kosovo to Germany; secondly, with regard to the moral obligation to prevent genocide even if that meant to break with the principle of 'nie wieder Krieg' (Harnisch and Longhurst 2006: 52). In the case of the opposition to the Iraq war, Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, who was in the middle of a close re-election campaign, responded to widespread popular sentiments which opposed the US-administrations war-prone foreign policy.

Henceforth, we hold that Germany's security governance can be understood best when taking both institutional and ideational factors into account. Germany was shaped as a liberal parliamentarian democracy with an intense commitment to domestic civil rights and a strong inclination to international law and integration due to the catastrophe of the Third Reich (Pradetto 2006). The founding fathers and mothers of the Grundgesetz, the German Constitution, took the view that the young German democracy had to be anchored, or locked-in as liberal theoreticians may call it (Moravcsik 2000), both domestically and externally so that a democratic political culture could gain ground in a society still haunted by its totalitarian past. Furthermore, post-war German elites actively pursued a foreign policy based on two fundamental principles: 'Never again war' and 'never again alone' (Dalgaard-Nielsen 2006). During the East-West Conflict this institutional and ideational framework held the German ship of state, if necessary, on a steady course of a very close alignment with Western liberal democracies. As a

consequence, clear commitment to international integration as well as skepticism towards robust means of foreign policy became pillars of German security culture stabilized and reinforced by a strong institutional setting. Every major foreign policy change thus led to an intense domestic debate when domestic and foreign expectations diverged. In most cases, the opposition appealed to the Federal Constitutional Court, challenging the constitutionality of the government's course (reintegration into Western Europe; rearmament; executive emergency powers, Ostpolitik; NATO-Doppelbeschluss) (Harnisch 2006).

From this perspective, Germany's ambivalent security trajectory in the 1990s is an effort to balance two elements of its embedded security culture which increasingly mismatch. On the one hand Germany tries to live up to external expectations for policy change as part of its commitment to international cooperation. On the other hand, it strives to maintain its institutional integrity as well as reluctance towards robust means deeply rooted in society and parts of the elite. Thus, international expectations for 'normalization' are constrained by domestic expectations and institutions to keep its distinct post-World War II security policy (Longhurst 2004; Harnisch *et al.* 2004; Maull 2006). The most prevalent trends in security governance in the 1990s and beyond do reflect this pattern: First, German openness vis-à-vis international law has been particularly strong in the European Union. In the context of unification, further integration became a primary instrument of German policymakers to calm anxieties by its neighbours and to coin the EU economic and currency union as well as the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) according to German needs (Miskimmon 2007). Secondly, while integration tends to beget integration, the formation of a common

currency and political union triggered a substantial domestic response by the legislative and judiciary to limit the executive's gains of autonomous action on the European level. Europeanization, i.e. 'a set of processes through which the political, social and economic dynamics of European Integration become part of the logic of domestic discourses, identities, public structures and public policies' (Irondelle 2003: 211) and domestication, 'the limitation of executive prerogatives in foreign policy through normative and procedural restrictions that tie back further integration to the preservation of domestic norms and separation of powers' (Harnisch 2006) are now two common characteristics of Germany's security policy. Thirdly, Germany's new robustness in security governance can hardly be linked to a new great-power status as a realistic interpretation would have it. German military means lag behind its potential, firmly embedded in multilateral frameworks and mostly assigned to humanitarian tasks. In addition, many security efforts are tightly constrained by constitutional oversight. When looking at parliamentarian debates and executive actions, immaterial factors, i.e. ethnic and legal considerations, more than power purposes affect decisions on force projection and criminal prosecution.

3. 1. Assurance

Our first policy area of concern is assurance. A simple realist account may assume that Germany contributes either almost no or plenty of resources to international missions. A realist influence maximization logic suggests that Germany would send no or very few personnel in UN missions, because sovereignty costs are higher than in the EU, where Germany's relative weight is higher to secure influence over the missions goal and

overall policy direction. Instead, most liberal interpretations of foreign policy stress that liberal democracies spread their domestic conflict resolution pattern outward for two reasons: first, because they believe in their superior effectiveness due to domestic experience; secondly, because foreign policy can be legitimized more efficiently when they resonate with domestic norms (Hawkins *et al.* 2006; Gurowitz 2006). Thus, a simple liberal explanation would hold that Germany would pool or even delegate assets wherever domestic norms are served. If German security governance is ambivalent here, this may seem puzzling, because post-conflict reconstruction and attending confidence-building measures are believed to be preferred instruments of a 'civilian power' (Maull 1990-91; Harnisch and Maull 2001). And yet, in the German case the relationship between liberal and civilized democracy and assurance behaviour is more complex than both assumptions suggest. In our reading, Germany's ambivalent assurance pattern derives from the interplay of both ideational and institutional factors.

With regard to international policing missions, Germany plays an active role, at least rhetorically. Berlin has pledged 910 officers for the 5.000 officer police component in the context of its leading role in institutionalizing a civilian component of the ESDP (Bund-Länder-Arbeitsgruppe Internationale Polizeimissionen 2007). Yet, there is an almost equal spread of German participation between EU and UN policing missions[2] (see Tables 3.1 and 3.2). Furthermore, Germany's geographic force projection pattern reveals a strong European bias, lending credence to the ideational liberal argument. This regional bias changed only recently. In contrast to its strong multilateral military projection pattern, German police officers do not participate in the integrated European Police Units or the French-led European Gendarmerie Force, the reason being that

German constitutional law separates police and military functions, thereby banning paramilitary forces.

Table 3.1:UN assurance missions with German civilian and police personnel contributions in 2008 (Zentrum für Internationale Friedenseinsätze 2008)

Mission (location)	**Est.**[3]	**Major aspects of mandates**[4]	**German personnel**[5]
MINURSO (Western Sahara)	1991	Monitoring ceasefire and organizing / conducting a referendum	1
UNOMIG (Georgia)	1993	Supervise the implementation of the agreement and monitor ceasefire	15
MONUC (DR Congo)	1999	Support the implementation of peace agreement and monitoring cease fire	12
UNMIK (Kosovo)	1999	Monitoring and institutional built-up and support	143
UNAMI (Iraq)	2000	Support peace process and political development	8
UNAMA (Afghanistan)	2002	Promote peace and stability	4
UNMIL (Liberia)	2003	Supporting the implementation of peace agreement and cease fire	5
UNOCI (Côte d'Ivoire)	2004	Monitoring ceasefire and disarmament	3
UNMIT (Timor-Leste)	2006	Consolidating stability and support institutional built-up	6
BINUB (Burundi)	2006	Support peace process	1
UNMIN (Nepal)	2007	Monitoring peace agreement	3
MINURCAT (CAR/Chad)	2007	Consolidating stability, protecting return of refugees	2
UNAMID (Darfur)	2007	Support the implementation of peace agreement	2

German constitutional law also requires UN mandates (or mandates by other systems of collective security) and German forces have been actively participating in deployments by other regional institutions (percentage shares ranging from 5 to15 per cent of all contributions) since the early 1990s.[6] However, in recent years German contributions to

the ESDP missions have been growing stronger than others, i.e. thereby setting an 'Europeanization trend in Germany's assurance policy'.

Table 3.2: German contribution to EU-led assurance missions 2003-2007 (SIPRI Database 2004-2007, Council of the EU 2008)[7]

Mission	German Contribution by year (Number / % of mission total)					Aver. year-Span
	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	
EU Proxima (Macedonia)		25 (15.5%)	21 (14.9%)			15.2%
EUJUST Themis (Georgia)		N/A	N/A			
EUPAT (Macedonia)			4 (13.8%)	4 (12.5%)		13.2%
AMM (Aceh)			9 (7.6%)	4 (14.8%)		11.2%
EU support to AMIS II (Darfur)			5 (17.9%)	6 (22.2%)	6 (12%)	17.4%
EUPM (Bosnia & Herzegovina)	85 (18.1%)		29 (15.4%)	19 (11.4%)	23 (12.9%)	15%
EUSEC (DR Congo)				1 (3.1%)	1 (2.6%)	2.9%
EUJUST LEX (Iraq)			1 (8.3%)	1 (4.5%)	1 (5%)	5.9%
PAMECA (Albania)			4 (25%)		3 (20%)	22.5%
EU BAM (Rafah)			6 (8.5%)	5 (7%)	4 (5.1%)	6.9%
EUSR (Georgia)				1 (11.1%)	1 (10%)	10.6%
EU Border Assistance (Moldova/ Ukraine)[8]					7 (10%)	
EUPT (Kosovo)				3 (10.3%)	5 (13.9%)	12.1%
EUPOL (Kinshasa)			N/A	N/A	N/A	
EUPOL (Congo)					N/A	
EUPOL COPPS (Palestinian Territories)				N/A	N/A	
EUPOL					N/A	

(Afghanistan)						

A realist interpretation of this data may conclude that Germany prefers regional institutions where it retains a disproportionate influence. Our findings suggest otherwise. First, while the creation of ESDP goes back to European frustration with US military preponderance during the Kosovo intervention, an autonomous, but limited, European military capacity is a collective goal of most EU member states, both weak and strong. Second, Germany has not been eager to play a leadership role in ESDP in general or its missions in particular, e.g. the Congo mission where the Grand Coalition was reluctant to participate at all due to domestic opposition, in the end participating with a minor contribution (Mölling 2007: 10). Thirdly and most importantly, Berlin's preference for ESDP derives from the 'civilian profile' of those missions which are almost all post-conflict and therefore subsequent to NATO and or US-led deployments. Hence, Germany's assurance policy has become Europeanized because of the 'civilian character' of those missions and of the European Security Strategy in general which fits the German security culture more closely (Berenskoetter and Giegerich 2006).

3.2. Prevention Policies

Germany's prevention policy trajectory since unification is (broadly defined) consistent with its traditional security culture in the three areas of rhetoric, institutions and funding. Under the Red-Green coalition (1998-2003), Germany has developed a comprehensive concept for conflict prevention to be implemented through national, European and other fora. The 2004 Action Plan is the main national policy document. Institutionally, German governments, responding to emerging crisis in Europe, Africa

and Asia, have also set up several new agencies: the Center for International Peace Operations (2002) and several specific interministerial working groups and NGO liaison committees (Fincke and Hatakoy 2004: 71). Furthermore, Germany has actively supported the establishment of the new EU agency to coordinate border security operations (FRONTEX) in Warsaw. It has also been one of the leading protagonists for setting up the International Criminal Court (ICC), which serves both a deterrent and pacifying function in cases of massive human rights abuses.

Germany's strong support for Official Development Assistance (ODA) appears to confirm the importance of the 'civilian' tradition: While the percentage share of economic and reconstruction aid has been somewhat lower (approx. 0.33 per cent) than for the post-colonial powers France and the UK over the 1990s (approx. 0.40 per cent), it still tops that of the United States and Japan (approx. 0.25 per cent). More consistently with the multilateral tradition and the Europeanizing trend, Germany spends more and more aid through multilateral channels, especially the EU.[9] Similarly, German ODA focuses on social infrastructure and services.[10] However, when looking at the top recipients of German aid it becomes clear that commercial interests also do play a strong role in assurance policies.[11]

Figure 3a: German ODA (OECD 2008a)



Moreover, in the past decade Germany's prevention policy has had a functional and geographical focus. Functionally, one of the most important initiatives has been a Common EU Action against Small Arms proliferation. Berlin has also funded Demilitarization and Demobilization programmes in Niger, Sierra Leone, Mozambique and South Africa as well as in the Caucasus, Balkan and Central Asian region. At the same time, several coalition crisis over the past decade about arms exports to sensitive regions indicate that commercial interests also do figure prominently in crisis prevention policies (GKKE 2003: 40ff.)

Geographically, Southeastern Europe has been a key region for German prevention efforts, but Afghanistan has also drawn much attention since 2001. In 1999, the Red-Green coalition launched the so called 'Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe', to coordinate international aid and promote cooperation among former enemies. Consequently, Berlin contributed 650 million Euro to the Pact (2000-2003) and another

240 million Euro in bilateral aid to the participating countries. In Afghanistan, again the Red-Green government launched a major post-conflict prevention initiative with the so called Petersberg Conference, which started the political process to form a government and draft a constitution through a *loya jirga* (national assembly). Following up on the diplomatic engagement Berlin spent 511 million USD of its ODA in Afghanistan (2001-2006) and plans to further increase its spending from 2008 on (Weiss 2008). By far the largest German aid contribution has gone into Serbia and Kosovo, e.g. German ODA for Serbia (1999-2006) alone amounted to 1,308 Mio. USD (OECD 2008b).

More recently, Berlin has been engaged in the so called EU3+3 Process, in which the UNSC-5 and Germany use diplomatic mediation and some sanctions to persuade Iran to cease sensitive nuclear activities and clear up its safeguards record. The initiative itself and Germany's involvement is consistent with the Europeanizing trend in prevention policies, because the E3 (UK, France and Germany) started the mediation in April 2003 – right after the transatlantic and European dispute on Iraq – to ensure that diplomacy can run its course before coercive measures are applied (Harnisch 2007).

But make no mistake! When looking at Germany's performance in specific cases, the findings are less impressive. In Afghanistan, German police officers led the international efforts to establish an Afghanistan National Police (ANP). In fact, the programme trained some 5,000 officers (middle and upper ranks) and drilled some 15,000 officers in short-term courses. And yet, the programme failed in providing enough plain police officers so that Germany had to ask the EU to take over the mission in 2007 (Kempin 2008).

We find that the most important changes in Germany's prevention policy have occurred in regulating the flow of inward and outward migration (see Table 3.3). To begin with, Germany featured one of the most liberal and permissive asylum laws because of its totalitarian past. At the same time, it has one of the most restrictive citizenship laws in the European Union. Substantial changes occurred after unification when a very large number of East Europeans of German descent – the so called *Aussiedler* and *Übersiedler* – immigrated, a period during which a very significant number of war refugees from former Yugoslavia also arrived (Green 2006).

Table 3.3: Migration flows, Germany 1991-2006 (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge 2007: 16, 89, 95)

Year	**Migration**[12]			**Asylum**	
	Immigration	Emigration	Balance	Total applications	Rejected applications[13]
1991	925,345	497,540	+ 427,805	256,112	128,820
1992	1,211,348	614,956	+ 596,392	438,191	163,637
1993	989,847	710,659	+ 279,188	322,599	347,991
1994	777,516	629,275	+ 148,241	127,210	238,386
1995	792,701	567,441	+ 225,260	127,937	117,939
1996	707,954	559,064	+ 148,890	116,367	126,652
1997	615,298	637,066	- 21,768	104,353	101,886
1998	605,500	638,955	- 33,455	98,644	91,700
1999	673,873	555,638	+ 118,235	95,113	80,231
2000	649,249	562,794	+ 86,455	78,564	61,840
2001	685,259	496,987	+ 188,272	88,278	55,402
2002	658,341	505,572	+ 152,769	71,124	78,845
2003	601,759	499,063	+ 102,696	50,563	63,002
2004	602,182	546,965	+ 55,217	35,607	38,599
2005	579,301	483,584	+ 95,717	28,914	27,452
2006	558,467	483,774	+ 74,693	21,029	17,781
Total	**11,633,940**	**8,989,333**	**+ 2,644,607**	**2,060,605**	**1,740,163**

During this period, the conservative Kohl government pressed to further integrate migration policies in the EU to share the burden. However, when the effort failed and the government succeeded to limit the permissive constitutional asylum provision, Germany grew more hesitant to delegate migration policy competences. In 2000, the Red-Green coalition tried – and first failed – to change the very restrictive German citizenship law, but finally succeeded in getting a watered-down version adopted (Kruse *et al.* 2003). The latest immigration law reform, passed by the Grand Coalition in 2007, adjusted to EU guidelines and set further restrictions by limiting subsequent immigration of dependents. In the public debate, language abilities as well as general knowledge of the German political system are increasingly considered as preconditions for migration, indicating increased societal pressure for an activist integration policy.

In sum, when looking at the balance of asylum requests, the number of individuals granted asylum and the number of deported, Germany's policy has become more restrictive and more europeanized.

To explain Germany's recent ambivalence towards international cooperation, insights can be drawn again from a liberal approach that takes both ideational and institutional factors into account. From this perspective, Germany's permissive asylum law came under tremendous pressure through the Yugoslav wars, aggravated by societal concerns about massive inflows of East European migrants of German descent. The government failed to adequately share the refugee burden within the EU by uploading migration policy competences to the EU level. Domestic actors, most prominently the second

German chamber, the Bundesrat, then blocked the executive from shedding national competences. The Bundesrat, i.e., the conservative opposition to the Red-Green government, also played a crucial role in vetoing the modernization of Germany's citizenship law. In a nutshell, domestic opposition played a crucial role in Germany's parliamentarian democracy in shaping preventive policies and resulting international cooperation.

3.3 Protection

Germany's multilateral efforts to fulfil the traditional function of protecting society from external threats arguably mirrors best the ambivalent nature of its current security policy. While recognizing the need for international cooperation to tackle health threats, environmental problems and terrorism as well as organized crime, Germany's contribution to security governance differs significantly over the issue areas, because domestic veto players domesticate the executive's thrust for enhanced competences.

Germany is a forerunner and strong advocate of environmental protection measures in the European Union as well as international organizations (Sprinz 2006; Jänicke 2006). The commitment to environmental protection is a continuous feature of German post-Cold War policy but became even stronger under the Schröder and Merkel governments.[14] The efforts are in accordance with the firm securitization of the environment issue by successive governments since the 1980s and public opinion which strongly supports environmental engagement. Internationally, Berlin took an active role in promoting and framing the UN agreements from Rio de Janeiro 1992, it fervently

supported the Convention on Biological Diversity as well as the global climate policy resulting in the Kyoto Protocol 1997 and self-confidently challenged the US resistance to a successor agreement in Bali 2008 (Fuller andRosenthal 2007). Furthermore, the Merkel government made environmental issues one of their top priorities during the EU and G8 presidencies in 2007 (BMU 2008; Harnisch 2009).

While the rhetoric and negotiation stance are highly supportive of environmental protection measures, two flaws mark the German environment policy. Firstly, Berlin's compliance with international agreements is mixed. Germany shows a strong performance on the global climate policy where it lived up to its agreed cuts in greenhouse gas emissions which are the largest by any EU member state. Between 1990 and 2005, the emission was reduced by 18.7 per cent and the agreed reduction of 21 per cent seems to be attainable by 2010 (Umweltbundesamt 2007; EEA 2007). However, the adoptions of the Convention on Biological Diversity as well as some European agreements fell short of the ambitious rhetoric (Wurzel 2002). Reluctance by various industries and complex decision-making procedures made implementation difficult (Sprinz 2006). Secondly, since environmental policies are strongly Europeanized, German positions are subject to finding extensive consensus within the EU which reduced their consistency and ambition. In sum, however, Germany's contribution to international environmental protection is remarkable.

In comparison, the findings in the fight against organized crime and terrorism are more mixed. Organized crime ranks low in terms of its securitization and received little public attention in the past. When the risk of international organized crime grew substantially

with deeper European integration and successive reduction of border controls, Germany participated in the creation of Europol as European law enforcement agency and central information pool for cross-border criminality in 1992. The fight against organized crime has also been the subject of several bilateral agreements with states outside the EU recently, such as Turkey (2003) or Vietnam (2006). Furthermore, annual reports on organized crime by the Federal Criminal Police Office indicate that the measures taken are successful, since reported incidences of organized crime have declined since 2000 (see Table 3. 4).

Table 3.4: Number of procedures against organized crime (BKA2007, 7; BMI 2006, 455)[15]



The terrorist attacks in New York in 2001, Madrid in 2004 and London in 2005 and the coordinated fight against terrorism pushed organized crime to a back seat. The terrorist attacks in 2001 with three of the attackers living and plotting in Germany, marked a watershed in German threat perception and caused significant domestic and international measures to meet the challenge (Rau 2004; Lange 2006). Almost

immediately after the attack, German officials expressed solidarity with the USA and willingness to take the necessary steps. The parliament approved two substantial anti-terror packages which aimed at strengthening air and border security as well as reducing limitations on terrorist prosecution. Public opinion shifted significantly towards more robust measures, but a majority favours domestic measures, such as poverty reduction, over increased defence spending (Bulmahn 2008: 35). The second package also significantly improved the communication between federal and state levels as well as between intelligence and enforcement agencies. In 2004 the 'Gemeinsame Terrorabwehrzentrum' was established, which coordinates various enforcement agencies, thereby breaking with Germany's long-held principle of a separation of police and intelligence services (Knelangen 2007). Additionally, the terrorist threat fostered personnel growth in the federal law enforcement agencies, Federal Crime Agency and Federal Police, which had already been underway since the early 1990s (Möllers and van Ooyen 2008).[16]

The 9/11 attacks also boosted German participation in international cooperation on criminal and security issues. Accordingly, Berlin drives EU efforts to prosecute international terrorists and dry up their international financial flows. The US and Germany established close bilateral and multilateral cooperation to fight terrorism more effectively, e.g. through intelligence sharing.

However, cooperation with the United States faces major obstacles, because of institutional limits and societal concerns about US violations of Germany's tough personal data protection laws (Miko and Froehlich 2004). Domestic resistance vis-à-vis

executive autonomy-seeking in protection policies is considerable. Cases in point are the failed attempt of the federal government to enact a law allowing for the forceful downing of hijacked airplanes as well as the intense debate on phone and internet tapping. Hence, the domestication of the executive's security policies results in conflicts over Germany's full-fledged participation in international anti-terrorism cooperation. This trend continues under the Grand Coalition, although the Merkel government holds a two-third majority in the Bundestag (Harnisch 2009).

Germany's efforts on health protection remained by and large national over recent decades. Starting with 9/11 and fuelled by subsequent acts of terror using anthrax as well as recent incidences of animal epidemics, e.g. BSE and SARS, Germany's government and society became more sensitive to health risks due to epidemics or biological attacks. Hence, the federal government decided to store vaccines and to prepare concepts for a timely and structured vaccination in case of a potential epidemic (BBK 2005, 25). And yet, preparations are limited to domestic adjustments and international agreements while overall policy planning is absent. A 2005 simulation of a biological terrorist attack with decision makers from ten Western states clearly showed the deficiencies of cooperation in cases of epidemics: it soon became a case of 'dog eat dog' (Kleine-Brockhoff 2005).

In sum, German contributions to protective policies are mixed. While the commitment to environmental issues puts Berlin in a leading role, policies on terrorism and biological attacks clearly display an ambivalent pattern between domestic constraints and allied expectations.

3.4 Compellence

It is often argued that increasing participation in military operations since unification proves that Germany has become a normal country and some pundits (even) suggest that Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, who opposed the US intervention in Iraq, deliberately sought to demystify the military during his tenure (Baumann/Hellmann 2001; Geis 2005; Hellmann 2004; Wagener 2006). Indeed, as Baumann and Hellmann (2001: 78) argue: 'German policy makers did not just respond to a changing nature of the international system and to conflicting international and societal expectations… They also managed to shape the public discourse in Germany and to establish new facts by slowly raising the scope of German military deployments, repeatedly moving beyond the established domestic consensus.'

Table 3.5: UN compellence missions with German military personnel contributions in 2008 (Zentrum für Internationale Friedenseinsätze 2008)

Mission (location)	**Est.**	**Major aspects of mandates**	**German personnel**
UNIFIL (Lebanon)	1978	Confirming Israeli withdrawal, restoring peace and security; since 2006 maintaining ceasefire	905
UNMEE (Ethiopia/Eritrea)	2000	Monitoring ceasefire	2
UNMIS (Sudan)	2005	Supervise and support the implementation of peace agreement	46

Source: SIPRI 2008; Zentrum für Internationale Friedenseinsätze 2008.

And yet, there is little evidence that Germany's discourse formations (ideational structure) or parliamentary system (institutional structure) have supported or will support power politics in terms of autonomy-seeking or influence-maximising behaviour (Harnisch 2005, 2009; Overhaus 2007; Meiers 2007). While the Bundeswehr

has been deployed in some fifteen countries, deployments have regularly addressed humanitarian crises and/or clear breaches of international law rather than strategic interests in resources or to counterbalance upcoming competitors, e.g. Russia. In our view, deployment has often been motivated by civilian power norms – as problematic as this may be – and constrained by institutional factors. Indeed, when analyzing the patterns of deployment, we find that Bundeswehr missions have become ever more robust over time while the contingents remained multilaterally embedded. More recently, the Bundestag has strengthened its mandating power – through the *Parlamentsbeteiligungsgesetz* – and attached an increasing number of operational and financial caveats (Mair 2007; Wiefelspütz 2008; Harnisch 2009). One might argue that some deployments have been driven by more mundane 'national interests', such as limiting the flow of refugees from Kosovo or signalling cooperation to the US after the Iraq dispute through sending (additional) troops to Afghanistan. But in-depth studies of Germany's domestic deployment debates clearly indicate that mandates reaped large parliamentarian support because of their close fit with the civilian power tradition and drew substantial opposition when these where in doubt (Meiers 2007: 636). In sum, German force projection patterns broadly followed an international trend towards more and more dangerous contingencies during the 1990s, but domestic legitimization and deployment patterns do not support the realist's argument.

Table 3.6: German contribution to EU-led compellence missions 2003-2007 (SIPRI Database 2004-2007, Council of the EU 2008)[17]

Mission	German Contribution by year (Number / % of mission total)					Aver. year-Span
	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	

EU Concordia (Macedonia)	26 (7.65%)					
EU Artemis (DR Congo)	N/A					
EUFOR Althea (Bosnia & Herzegovina)		1227 (21.1%)	1014 (17.9%)	861 (16.2%)	235 (10.9%)	16.5%
EUFOR (DR Congo)				745 (33%)		

Explanations stressing institutional constraints and ideational parameters enjoy more success, especially when explaining the idiosyncrasies of the German compellence policies. Thus, the Grand Coalition has repeatedly withstood allies' calls for an increase in defence expenditures. Instead, the military budgets are steadily declining since 1990 and thus capping the Bundeswehr's capacity to transform into an intervention force with additional assets in long-distance deployment, armoured vehicles etc. Although defence budgets of most Western European states dropped after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, German spending is remarkably lower than the budgets of France or Britain. While it may be argued that the gap in expenditure is caused solely by additional burdens for states with nuclear arsenals, it seems more plausible that this gap reveals a continuous German reluctance to robust military means based on its distinct security culture (Harnisch 2009). The impact of security culture is furthermore evident in the government's decade-old commitment to the Bundeswehr as a conscription army, rejecting an all-volunteer force because it may disconnect from the society at large (BMVG 2006: 14, 81, 83).

Table 3.7: German defence expenditure (NATO 2007b)

	1990-94	1995-99	2000-04	2005	2006	2007
Share of GDP	2.1	1.6	1.4	1.4	1.3	1.3

Rate of change in defence spending	-7.2	-0.7	-0.8	-0.6	-1.0	-0.6
Distribution of defence expenditure:						
personnel	57.4%	61.5%	60.0%	58.3%	57.1%	56.6%
equipment	13.5%	11.8%	14.0%	14.2%	15.0%	15.3%
infrastructure	4.9%	4.8%	4.3%	3.7%	3.6%	3.7%
other	23.9%	21.9%	21.7%	23.9%	24.3%	24.3%
Defence spending per capita[18]	609	344	343	325	322	320

Source: Data provided by NRC nations compiled by Data Analysis Section, Force Planning Directorate, Defence Policy and Planning Division, NATO International Staff 2007

Or take force structure: Simply put, German armed forces are either too big to be adequately funded or their force structure is too narrow to be projected substantially as critical assets such as logistics are missing (IISS 2008: 97). Lastly, the Grand Coalition of CDU/CSU and Social Democrats has rejected such pointed criticism as 'the Germans must learn to kill' by keeping clear limits to German participation in frontline missions (Spiegel cover November 20, 2006). Even as NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoff Scheffer has called national caveats 'poison' which threaten NATO's operational effectiveness, Germany has insisted on setting tight limits to its deployments, especially in Afghanistan. Hence, repeated demands for increased German support by NATO-officials and allies left the German position by and large unchanged (Cooper/Kulish 2008). The German contribution to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) is limited in number (currently up to 3,500 to be upgraded to up to 4,500), confined to Kabul and the northern region and only German special forces participate in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) combat missions against Taleban insurgents. But even these forces may not engage in combating the poppy industry in the north.

In sum, in comparison with other leading NATO/EU nations, Germany's armed forces are much less deployable, projectable and sustainable. In fact, it will not meet NATO usability standards that 40 per cent of each land force should be structured, prepared and equipped for deployed operations and 8 per cent for sustained operations at any one time in the foreseeable future (Meiers 2007: 627).

4. Conclusion

The most plausible explanation for Germany's continued ambivalent security governance between robustness and reticence rests on the liberal-institutionalist argument which stresses the distinct security culture strongly institutionalized at home and abroad. This is hardly surprising, since Germany's parliamentary democracy was consciously anchored in a unique constitutional framework and deliberately opened vis-à-vis international law (Katzenstein 2005: 305). The findings of this analysis of German participation in security governance can be summarized as follows:

1. Germany's culture of reticence is changing slowly but considerably across different issues and therefore also across modes of public goods production. The causal pathway can be described as interaction between the domestic learning processes and institutional or bilateral socialization.

2. Changes to German contribution patterns started to Europeanize after the Kosovo intervention and substantially increased after 9/11 and most notably after the US-led intervention in Iraq. We argue that Germany's security culture

clearly fits better the emerging European security culture – not least because Berlin can shape it too – than the perceived US security culture as interpreted during the George W. Bush administrations.

3. Europeanization has become the preferred strategy to overcome domestication in Germany's security policy, but absolute limits – as defined by the Bundestag and the Federal Constitutional Court – are clearly identifiable.

4. Reflecting upon our hypothesis linking security culture and international security governance, the German case presents a paradox: on the causal claim that security culture accounts for securitization and instrumental preferences, we find that cultural changes – Europeanization – have driven regional security governance, which often figures as a building block for global security governance. On the causal claim that Post-Westphalian security cultures produce specific forms of security governance, however, the German case shows that changes in culture – and their societal underpinnings – may bring about different governance structures and even block some. Notably, more European security governance has come together with more pooling and less delegation of German competences and capacities.

While these theoretical and empirical claims deserve more rigorous testing across issue areas and countries, our analysis suggests that the recent financial meltdown may well boost the Europeanization trend as the US's global financial stewardship is waning. In addition, current rescue schemes and secondary effects in the material

economy will certainly hurt Germany's export-oriented economy and limit resources that may be spend on security governance beyond financial markets. Germany's pressure to water down the European agreement on carbon dioxide reduction efforts during the EU summit in Poznan (November 2008) may already point at a decreasing willingness to contribute to costly international security governance in the face of a struggling economy.

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[1] With regard to Afghanistan, among others, Chancellor Merkel has argued that Germany is providing security for 40 per cent of the Afghan population sustaining over 250 civilian reconstruction projects (Merkel 2006). In addition, the 2008 Afghanistan Concept of the Federal Government promotes a comprehensive approach, focusing on civil-military cooperation in reconstruction effort (Bundesregierung 2008).

[2] Since 1989 German police forces participated in 9 UN-missions (totalling 4,184 officers), 9 EU and 3 WEU missions (totalling 949 officers) (Bund-/Länder-Arbeitsgruppe Internationale Polizeimissionen 2008).

[3] Based on UN 2008.

[4] Based on UNRIC 1999, UN Information Service 2008 and mission fact sheets.

[5] German personnel between end of 2007 and August 2008, based on SIPRI 2008; Zentrum für Internationale Friedenseinsätze 2008. The numbers cover predominantly civilian or police personnel, but may also include military personnel.

[6] Germany contributes significantly to NATO-led KFOR (Kosovo) and ISAF (Afghanistan). By the end of 2007 the Federal Republic contributed 2374 personnel to KFOR and 3210 personnel to ISAF. Additionally, Germany supports OSCE missions in Macedonia, Georgia, Moldova, Tajikistan, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Albania, Kosovo, Serbia Montenegro (OSCE 2008; NATO 2007a; 2008).

[7] The table does not include EULEX Kosovo which was launched in 2008. Additional sources are Missiroli 2003; information from mission websites and reports 2005, 2007, 2008, 2009; information received from the General Secretariat of the Council of the EU, 2005, 2006, 2007; information received from the Chief of Press and Public Information Office, AMM, 2006, 2007; information received from EUFOR ALTHEA Spokesperson, 2006; information received from Deputy Press and Public Information Officer, EU BAM Rafah, 2007.

[8] Seconded personnel only.

[9] Germany has devoted an annual average approx. 56 per cent of its multilateral ODA to the EC/EU since 1990. The share ranges from 42.59 per cent (1990) to 83.66 per cent (2005). Furthermore, Germany is the largest contributor to European aid funding in absolute terms. (OECD 2008a; OECD 2006: 42)

[10] For the purpose of social infrastructure and services Germany spent 33 per cent of its overall ODA in 1993/1994, 39 per cent in 1998/1999 and 40 per cent in 2003/2004 (all based on two-year averages). Although the importance of Economic Infrastructure and Services is slowly declining, it ranked second of the major purposes during most of the observed years with a share of 22 per cent in 1993/1994, 19 per cent in 1998/1999 and 16 per cent in 2003/2004 (OECD 2006, 91).

[11] The major recipient of German ODA from 1990-2006 was China; Nigeria ranks third, India eighth and Indonesia tenth (OECD 2008b).

[12] Migration data do not include cross-border movements by German citizens and illegal migration. Although there are no reliable estimates of illegal migration flows, some indicators point to a significant increase of illegal migration during the early 1990s (Lederer and Nickel 1997: 35-42).

[13] A direct comparison with total asylum applications is misleading, since not all applications are resolved in the year of application and time lags must be taken into consideration.

[14] The active role of Germany owes much to steps taken during the 1980s. These measures resulted in comparative technological and structural advantages on environmental issues (Wurzel 2002).

[15] The first annual report on organized crime was prepared in 1991 and thus no follow-up cases are reported for this year.

[16] The Federal Crime Agency gained more than 1,000 additional personnel and employed a total of 4,840 in 2008. The Federal Police included 39,000 personnel in 2008, 6,000 more than in 1992 (Möllers/van Ooyen 2008, 30).

[17] The table does not include the bridging mission EUFOR Tchad/RCA from 2008 to 2009 which included four German personnel (Council of the EU 2008).

[18] In USD (2000 prices and exchange rates).