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German Culture, Politics, and Literature into the Twenty-First Century

Beyond Normalization

Edited by
Stuart Taberner and Paul Cooke

CAMDEN HOUSE

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S. J. T.
P. A. C.
Leeds, May 2006

3: Understanding Germany: The Limits of "Normalization" and the Prevalence of Strategic Culture

Sebastian Harnisch and Kerry Longhurst

THE CONCEPT OF "NORMALIZATION" continues to have great resonance in discussions of Germany's post-Cold War development, especially in the field of German foreign and security policy.[1] The notion that Germany's foreign and security policies have or should become more "normal" also remains a potent theme in official discourse among policy makers in the pursuit of defining Germany's international role. The purpose of this chapter is to appraise the notion of normalization in the context of developments in Germany's post-1990 security policy and to consider its limitations and weaknesses in the face of what we call Germany's prevailing strategic culture — a variable that tends to work against a "complete" normalization of German foreign and security policy.

In the early 1990s a forceful argument, pursued mainly by American academics, suggested that a profound change in German foreign and security policy after the end of the Cold War was inevitable. This line of thinking articulated the notion that a normalization would occur by which the policies and preferences of the post-1945 "Bonn Republic" would give way to a less institutionally bound, more powerful and self-interested new Germany prone to maximizing its autonomy outside of the post-Second World War institutional milieu. The normalization of German security policy would result, the argument ran, from change in the international balance of power after the implosion of the Soviet bloc, twinned with the relative growth in terms of territory, population, and resources of the unified Federal Republic. These factors would empower German elites and set the course for less multilateralism and more power politics, coupled with a strong proclivity to lead.

By the end of the 1990s, a decade that certainly witnessed a broad sweep of changes in German security policy, an assumption prevailed that German foreign and security policy had become (or was becoming) more normal and therefore "less singular." Although the highly pessimistic

prognoses of Waltz and Mearsheimer did not materialize, a consensus did emerge among commentators and policy makers alike that a significant amount of change, a greater degree of normalcy, and thus less continuity was now apparent in German security policy compared to the period before 1990. Although normalization was not a policy dictum or goal during the Kohl government, the CDU-led governing coalition certainly engaged in a reappraisal of existing policies and expanded the role of the German armed forces in substantial ways — moves that certainly led German foreign policy to be perceived externally as being more normal. The tenor and style of foreign policy in the early years of the Schröder government after 1998 seemed to confirm and even accentuate the normalization thesis. The SPD-led government's decision to deploy troops in Kosovo, the self-confidence apparent in Schröder's foreign policy discourse, coupled with a willingness to sacrifice transatlantic ties over Iraq, appeared to signify that the path to normalization was being taken up a notch with a greater emphasis on the national self-interest and Germany's right to strike out on its own.[2]

These points notwithstanding, this chapter takes issue with the concept of normalization as has been applied in the context of Germany's post-Cold War security policy. In doing this, the chapter aims to deliver a more nuanced interpretation of the path of change that German security policy underwent after 1989. Our chief argument is that although the security policies of unified Germany have transformed and in many ways departed from previous modes and practices, this post-Cold War recalibration does not equate neatly or convincingly with the notion of normalization. The concept of normalization does not capture the complex and sometimes contradictory paths that German policy took during the 1990s and beyond. In short, we argue that normalization is a useful concept with which to explore the development of German security policy, although it remains a rather blunt instrument if used to explain the multifaceted nature and dynamics of that change. To get a better grip on the nature of change we employ the concept of German strategic culture, which we argue provides a more effective way of explaining the balance and interplay between continuity and change that have been apparent in German security policy since the end of the Cold War. To provide focus to our discussion we home in on one particular and highly visible aspect of security policy, namely the use of military force. German debates on the use of force over the past fifteen years have proven sensational and divisive as the remit of the German armed forces (the *Bundeswehr*) has steadily broadened. We will argue that the evolution in the German perspective on the use of force and the subsequent changes in the role of the *Bundeswehr* have been heavily shaped by the prevailing strategic culture, which has acted as both a driver of change, in the case of the Kosovo war, and as a restraining factor, as in the case of the Iraq war in 2003.

The Case for Strategic Culture

Our conceptualization of German strategic culture draws from a body of work in the security studies field that attempts to address the perceived deficiencies of the prevailing neorealist paradigm by bringing onto center stage historically determined national identities, beliefs, and norms and by assessing the roles these factors play in shaping national security policies.[3] German strategic culture is a particularly remarkable and widely researched case. The extremities of German national history and the defining role played therein of military force, conflict, and war provide ample scope and substance for strategic culture analysis.[4] Our argument rests on the notion that subsequent to the Second World War a fresh (West) German strategic culture was constructed in response both to the recent past and to meet the challenges of the future, concerning specifically the role that the new Federal Republic was to play on the side of the West and as a member of NATO in the emerging Cold War. This entailed the creation of new laws, institutions, and practices with a view to ensuring the end of militarism and the creation of a democratically accountable armed force and decision-making infrastructure ultimately wedded to multilateral as opposed to national interests and governed by international law. Central features of this new framework were the establishment of constitutionally guarded provisions relating to the tightly legally defined and highly restrictive circumstances under which the Federal Republic could use its armed forces. Space does not permit further elaboration of the makeup of West German strategic culture here,[5] but it suffices to say that over time the new institutions, practices, and laws aimed at creating a more benign, responsible, and predictable set of foreign and security policies did succeed in nurturing new beliefs and norms about the need for a controlled and legally sanctioned use of force and about the value of multilateralism, beliefs and norms that endured and were widely accepted across the political spectrum at both elite and societal levels. The key elements of this strategic culture not only persisted during the Cold War, but, crucially, lived on beyond 1990 in such a way that the security policies of the unified Germany were still heavily shaped by post-1945 ideas, norms, and beliefs.

This has implications when thinking about the normalization of post-Cold War German security policy. In the rest of this chapter, we engage with the idea of normalization, but challenge it by proposing the notion that although German security policy and perspectives towards the use of armed force have become more normal, in the sense that in the 1990s German policy became less at variance with European partners as it moved away from its previously rigidly prohibitive approach to using military force, the persistence of the post-1945 strategic culture stymies and complicates this process of normalization. Moreover, we proffer an understanding of normalization that has less to do with Germany relinquishing all previous

policy styles and preferences, including its institutional embeddedness, but is rather a more nuanced re-alignment or adjustment of existing modes and practices based on a reappraisal, or more accurately a reformulation, of norms and beliefs in response to external and internal changes and stimuli.[6] The following two case studies will attempt to illustrate our point.

Case Study One: The War in Kosovo

Prior to 9/11 there had been a clear trajectory of change apparent in German security policy, which was seen most vividly in the use of the *Bundeswehr* and the incremental, yet decisive extension of its remit, which as mentioned above led to the notion of normality becoming associated with German security policy. This process of change began in the wake of the first Gulf War (1990–91), when Germany was still in the midst of unification. At this juncture Bonn wanted to avoid any role in the conflict, and thus Germany played its traditional role of paymaster, but after the end of the conflict adjusted this stance by deploying minesweepers in the Gulf, not least to appease the leadership of the United States, which expected the newly sovereign German state to step up its commitment to international security. This episode was significant insofar as it exposed the inconsistencies that had begun to emerge between the rising expectations placed upon the new Germany by allies and partners to play a greater international role in military security and what German elites and society were able and prepared to offer. The way in which German policy managed the challenge thrown up by the first Gulf War was incrementally to adjust security policy through enhanced *Bundeswehr* "out-of-area" deployments to Cambodia, Somalia, and then Bosnia, which, although largely kept within the legal frameworks of the armed forces remit, in that they were humanitarian and sanctioned by international law, stretched the existing accepted interpretation. A critical point in this evolution was reached in July 1994, when the Constitutional Court — the guardian of the Basic Law — ruled that an enlarged role for the German armed forces in out-of-area crisis management activities was indeed legal, but that every case would have to be individually sanctioned by Parliament. This clarification of what the German constitution did and did not allow the *Bundeswehr* to do provided a green light for the CDU-led government to proceed with its policy of extending the role of the armed forces, and this fueled the prospect that a further and fuller normalization would occur, an expectation that seemed confirmed by the Kosovo War in 1999.

Germany's engagement in the Kosovo War represented the *Bundeswehr*'s first combat mission since its creation in the early 1950s. This seeming qualitative change in the role of the German armed forces was heralded as a "defining moment in the politics of the new Germany,"[7] a "*Zäsur*" for German foreign policy[8] and a move that would lead Germany to arrive at NATO's fiftieth anniversary celebrations as "a full partner with a new attitude."[9] Germany's involvement in the war certainly *was* qualitatively different from any other previous deployment, principally because this time the *Bundeswehr* was engaged in an offensive military operation against a sovereign state without a clear mandate from the UN.[10] The significance of Kosovo for German security policy as well as for the discussion of normalization is profound. First, as already mentioned, the deployment was explicitly a combat mission — a profound change from all other previous deployments in the 1990s. Second, the deployment broke with a taboo that had stressed the notion that the *Bundeswehr* should never be deployed where the *Wehrmacht* had been in the Second World War. Third, the allied campaign was devoid of a UN mandate and as such seemed to question Germany's adherence to the primacy of international law and the role of the United Nations. Despite these factors, Germany's involvement in Kosovo received widespread cross-party and societal support, predominantly because it had an overtly humanitarian objective. After almost a decade of bloody conflict in Yugoslavia, the measured use of armed force was seen as the best way of ending and precluding further humanitarian disasters in the region.

When commenting on why Germany had to commit to the NATO operation, Chancellor Gerhard Schröder stated that Germany had a "moral obligation"[11] to be fully involved and that there was no other option open but to end the murdering in Kosovo."[12] Schröder argued that the principle of "nie wieder Krieg," inherent in German security policy, *had* to be superseded by a far higher principle, namely to stop the killings and deportations of Albanian-Kosovans.[13] Defense Minister Rudolf Scharping made similar comments when explaining the rationale behind Germany's involvement. Scharping expressed the view that, akin to the way in which the massacre in Srebrinica in 1995 forced an about-face in German thinking on the use of force in Bosnia, the nature of the conflict in Kosovo made Germans see things differently: namely, that it was Germany's responsibility to end the war.[14] A key characteristic of Germany's behavior was its ongoing emphasis on diplomacy. Given that at the time Germany had possession of the EU and WEU presidencies, the new government played a defining role in the diplomatic activity aimed at resolving the conflict. In this sense, the German Government pursued a "dual-track" approach, combining a firm commitment to NATO's aerial bombardment with intensive diplomatic efforts aimed at averting the need for military action.[15]

Inherent within Germany's diplomatic behavior were strong traits of multilateralism, exemplified by the use of international institutions and bodies (i.e. G8, EU, Quint) as a means to move towards a solution. In its role as holder of the presidency of the EU, and specifically through the EU special summit on Kosovo in Cologne in April, Germany took forward the

idea of a broad stability pact for Southeast Europe, promoting the need to bring the countries of the region into closer cooperation with the EU. In this pursuit German leaders sought to forge a broad international consensus on the necessary course of action to help legitimize new policy initiatives. This was especially evident in Germany's success in bringing the UN into the equation by inviting General Secretary Annan to the EU Kosovo summit in Cologne. Lastly, Germany pursued an inclusive strategy of seeking to incorporate both China and Russia into the process towards the resolution of the conflict. A peace plan proposed by foreign minister Joschka Fischer in early April encapsulated the whole sentiment of Germany's approach to the conflict. The plan proposed a twenty-four hour break in NATO bombing on the condition that Slobodan Milošević began the withdrawal of Serbian troops from Kosovo. It also promoted a cooperative approach to solving the conflict, with the aim of internationally isolating Serbia. Inherent within the plan was a desire to garner international legitimacy for the alliance's mission and to stabilize the region as a whole through the introduction of measures that would improve the socio-economic situation.

The Kosovo deployment brought to a climax the path of change in German security policy after the end of the Cold War. The nature of this change seemed to equate with the notion of normalization insofar as Germany's views on the use of force were now less at variance with other allies and partners; the use of force had become part of the Federal Republic's security policy repertoire. Consequently, at the close of the twentieth century, in contrast to during the first Gulf War, there was more or less a balance in the expectations placed upon Germany by its allies and partners and what Germany was able and willing to deliver. Germany was becoming less singular in many ways, a move seemingly welcomed by her allies.

However, upon closer inspection and certainly in the light of 9/11 and its aftermath, it is clear that this route to normalization was anything but immutable.[16] First, the national consensus on the enlarged role for the *Bundeswehr* was actually far from robust and remained highly contingent upon certain factors — Kosovo was to prove exceptional, an overtly humanitarian mission with clear objectives and an overwhelming moral obligation, which from a German point of view necessitated the use of military force. Second, those who had assumed that Germany would follow an uncomplicated normalization trajectory had failed to anticipate the drain on resources precipitated by German unity — there was simply neither the financial resources nor the political will to expand Germany's international role. Third, German society remained closely wedded to a strong preference for non-military solutions and multilateralism. Finally, the new Red-Green government was constructing a foreign policy based upon inconsistencies and a flawed reading of Germany's role in international security.

Case Study Two: The Iraq Crisis

The Iraq crisis of 2001 to 2003 presented a number of challenges to German thinking about security and the use of force. As stated above, it exposed the fragility of the postunification consensus on the *Bundeswehr's* new role, which seemed to have reached its zenith in Kosovo. It also revealed the stark divergences in US and German views on the use of military force, and ultimately prompted the German Government to choose between its postwar mentor (the United States) and its key European partner (France), thus contributing to the intra-European divide on how to deal with Saddam Hussein's regime. Iraq also brought into focus the changing mood and tone of foreign policy views within Germany and of Schröder's conception of German interests, towards a more assertive and self-confident position.

After the September 11th attacks in the United States, Chancellor Gerhard Schröder promised "unconditional solidarity" with the United States and announced Germany's willingness to participate in "Operation Enduring Freedom" to fight terrorist groups in Afghanistan and elsewhere. In doing this, close transatlantic cooperation was seen as paramount, and this, in a similar fashion to the situation in Kosovo, meant that Germany's traditional preference for non-military solutions was superseded. The terrorist attacks of 11 September considerably shifted the Red-Green government's perception of a threat, but, crucially, did not lead to a convergence of German and American threat assessments with regard to Iraq and what needed to be done. As Chancellor Schröder had already pointed out in an address to the Bundestag on 19 September 2001, Germany would not participate in what he termed any "foreign adventures" and any military action within the framework of the North Atlantic alliance required advance consultation, a stance that was to receive widespread backing from both German elites and German society as a whole.[17]

When the Red-Green government brought the necessary mandate for German military participation in Afghanistan in "Operation Enduring Freedom" to a vote in the *Bundestag*, the coalition fell short by several votes, when 28 members of the Social Democratic and the Green parties threatened to vote against the bill. Subsequently, the chancellor invoked the vote of confidence procedure. In order to gain as much support as possible from the parliamentary party, the government's bill proposal included a clear restriction of the geographic scope of the mandate for German forces in the operation: "German forces will participate in missions against international terrorism outside Afghanistan only with the consent of the Governments concerned."[18] By a very narrow margin the vote succeeded, thus saving the government and sanctioning Germany's military participation in Afghanistan.

This rigidly defined German approach and skepticism towards US policy as it was unfolding persisted into 2002, when Germany (together with other partners) opposed a pre-emptive strike to protect Turkey without a UN Security Council mandate. Then, after President Bush's 2002 State of the Union address in which he named Iraq as a part of an "axis of evil," the transatlantic divide broadened and Germany's resolute position stiffened. In May 2002, when President Bush met Schröder in Berlin, the two could only agree on keeping the issue out of the headlines in the run-up to the elections in Germany and the United States, a campaign period in which, as we shall now see, foreign policy was to play a crucial role.

Waging Peace and Winning Elections

It is a commonly held misconception that the Red-Green coalition started opposing military action against Iraq in order to win the election. However, it started its opposition in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. That said, domestic politics did play an important role in consolidating this skepticism towards military intervention. Only in this broader context can the Red-Green government's opposition towards the United States during the Iraq crisis be fully understood. Following Germany's policy of "quiet opposition" and "slight cooperation," Chancellor Schröder and his party used the existing critical position vis-à-vis Washington to shore up the vast potential of German voters who were skeptical about the Bush administration in general and about its predilection for military action against Iraq in particular. On August 1, when asked during a television interview about how the SPD would try to improve their reelection chances, Schröder responded, as one might expect, with the central points of the SPD election manifesto. However, he added ominously: "We have alarming news from the Middle East. There is talk of a war." Using language that he would later repeat elsewhere, he claimed that while Germany would act in solidarity with its allies, "it would not participate in any adventures." Moreover, he also made the point that this would certainly be an important topic in the election campaign.[19] In the following weeks Franz Müntefering spoke of the German opposition to military action against Saddam Hussein as part of a new "German Way," a notion to which Schröder also seemed to adhere to when he proclaimed that Germany foreign policy would be decided in Berlin and not Washington.[20]

In September, the SPD distanced itself further from the US position, when Chancellor Schröder, after a speech by Vice President Dick Cheney, criticized the Bush administration for shifting its policy goals on Iraq from disarmament to regime change.[21] In an interview, Schröder elaborated on his position by saying that under his leadership Germany would not participate in a military intervention in Iraq and that the coming election would

not change his stance. During the election campaign the other German parties more or less mirrored the skeptical position of the chancellor. All major parties during the election campaign shared a skeptical view towards military intervention in Iraq, a stance that was based on deeply held antimilitaristic sentiment in the German electorate, twinned with widespread doubts about the acuteness of the Iraqi threat.

After the successful elections, the Red-Green coalition became more conciliatory towards the Bush administration. It tried to heal the transatlantic wounds resulting from Justice Minister Däubler-Gmehlin's suggestion that President Bush had used the Iraq crisis to divert attention from domestic problems in the same way Adolf Hitler had done in the 1930s. For example, the Red-Green coalition decided to send Fuchs NBC reconnaissance vehicles to Kuwait in February 2002. The chancellor also noted in private that he would not rule out any political or military support for military action against Iraq if there was a clear UN Security Council mandate. Nonetheless, Berlin did not change its staunch opposition to the US-led military intervention. Under immense domestic and foreign pressure, the government stuck to its course. In February 2003 it went as far as temporarily rejecting NATO planning for defense against an attack on Turkey (Germany's NATO ally) by Iraq, because its approval of Patriot missile batteries and personnel for Turkey would have required parliamentary approval, which did not seem likely.[22] In order to gain legitimacy for its stance, the government also initiated a last-minute plan for an enhanced inspection regime, "Operation Mirage," but the Chancellery did not even consult its own foreign ministry (let alone the United States), and the French Government distanced itself from the plan when it was leaked to the press prematurely. Thus, ultimately the German opposition not only failed to prevent the outbreak of hostilities on March 20, 2003, but it also left the impression that the Red-Green coalition's strategy had not really presented a credible alternative course of action.

Complex Normalization and the Prevalence of Strategic Culture

In many ways German security policy has evolved at a breathtaking speed since the end of the Cold War, and this change, as evidenced by the evolving perspective on the use of force, does connect in many ways with the normalization thesis. During the 1990s Germany came to grips with the use of force through various deployments of the *Bundeswehr*, and seemingly broke a number of previous taboos. Especially after Kosovo, this seemed to signify that German policy had now synchronized with allies and partners and that the country was en route to becoming a normal international actor.

This assumption, however, was based upon a misreading of the domestic politics and circumstances that underwrote this change, and, crucially, did not pay due attention to the reasons behind both Kohl and Schröder's decisions to deploy German troops in a wider variety of missions. We argue that the evolution of German perspectives on the use of force and changes to the role of the *Bundeswehr* in the 1990s did not represent what might be termed an "emancipation from history" or disavowal of post-1945 institutions and practices, but was actually facilitated by the prevailing strategic culture. As argued at the start of this chapter, change in policy has not so much been a sign of normalization as it has been a re-alignment of existing modes and practices present in German strategic culture, based on a reformulation of norms and beliefs in response to external and internal stimuli. For example, the form and substance of Germany's Kosovo policy was in line with the postulates of German strategic culture. Berlin's policy, which may have seemed at odds with Germany's professed amilitarism and status as a civilian power, was actually consonant with its strategic culture. Crucially, Germany did not seek to follow a unilateral policy line; indeed multilateral options were furthered through German actions. Furthermore, Bonn/Berlin's decision to deploy forces was guided as much by a commitment to NATO as a desire to end the war through a contribution to the air campaign. In sum, the *Bundeswehr* deployment, viewed together with Germany's diplomatic efforts towards conflict resolution in Kosovo, represented a force for continuity rather than a symbol of change and a normalization of security policy. This argument also finds currency in the example of Germany's rigidly prohibitive and highly vocal opposition towards US policy in Iraq. Again, it was the prevailing strategic culture that shaped Berlin's policy, this time actively preventing a German military contribution to the Iraq war. Kosovo and Iraq were fundamentally different cases in the German context. Germany's strategic culture thus precluded German participation in a US-led wider war on terror that used preemptive military force. The US policy simply did not fit with the postulates of German strategic culture, which not only had to be convinced that there was a purpose for the use of force, but for which such use of force had to be a tool of last resort, and had to be multilateral in nature with clear objectives and an endgame planned. From a German perspective, Iraq did not qualify.

In essence, this chapter proposes that the concept of normalization alone is insufficient at capturing the changes in German security policy since the end of the Cold War. Normalization has to be linked to, if not supplanted by, the concept of strategic culture, which, as we have argued, ensures a more nuanced account of developments and is able to explain seeming contradictions and complexities. This important point notwithstanding, the tenor and language of German security policy has become and will continue to become more normal, a result of Berlin's greater self-confidence, which was inspired by a reinterpretation of German history.[23]

Crucially, this type of normalization is not the same as that espoused by neo-realism, since Germany lacks both the political will and economic capacity to become more powerful. Thus this type of normalization has more to do with language and style than actual substance.

In conclusion, then, it is important to reiterate that during the Cold War (West) Germany was highly dependent on the US in particular and other Western allies more generally for its security, and that this was an extraordinary relationship. This began to change after the end of the Cold War, as Germany became less dependent on other states for its security and as a result embarked throughout the 1990s upon a path that saw Bonn/Berlin's security policy become less unique — a transformation generally welcomed by her allies. However, the key assumption of the normalization thesis, namely that the leaders of a unified Germany would possess more resources and have a greater political will to pursue a more unilateral and proactive security policy, turned out to be flawed. The picture is actually more complex and will, of course, continue to evolve. Germany is certainly more self-confident, but it does not follow that Germany is actually more powerful, nor that it is a normal power.

Notes

[1] See, for example, Philip H. Gordon, "The Normalization of German Foreign Policy," *Orbis* 38 (1994): 225–43; Rainer Baumann and Gunther Hellmann, "Germany and The Use of Force: 'Total War,' the 'Culture of Restraint' and the Quest for Normality," *German Politics* (Special Issue: *New Europe, New Germany, Old Foreign Policy? German Foreign Policy Since Unification*, edited by Douglas Webber), 10 (2001): 61–82; Ulf Hedetoft, "Germany's National and European Identity: Normalization by Other Means," in Carl Lankowsky, ed., *Break Out, Break Down or Break In? Germany and The European Union after Amsterdam* (AICGS Research report No. 8, 2004), http://www.aicgs.org/Publications/PDF/breakout.pdf

[2] Piotr Buras and Kerry Longhurst, "The Berlin Republic, Iraq and The Use of Force," in Kerry Longhurst and Marcin Zaborowski, eds., *Old Europe, New Europe and the Transatlantic Security Agenda* (Basingstoke, Routledge, 2005), 29–60.

[3] We assume an understanding of neorealism as a parsimonious approach to international relations that negates national histories and the internal makeup and institutional decision-making arrangements within states. Instead, neorealism views states as unitary actors driven by national interests, the central objectives of which are to maximize their power in the international system.

[4] See Kerry Longhurst, *Germany, The Use of Force and Strategic Culture* (Manchester: Manchester UP, 2004); John S. Duffield, *World Power Forsaken: Political Culture, International Institutions and German Security Policy After Unification* (Stanford: Stanford UP, 1998); Thomas Berger, *Cultures of Anti-Militarism: National Security in Germany and Japan* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1998).

[5] For further discussion see Longhurst, *Germany, The Use of Force.*

[6] Adrian Hyde-Price and Charlie Jeffery, "Germany in the European Union: Constructing Normality," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 4/39 (2001): 689–717.

[7] Adrian Hyde-Price, "Berlin Republic Takes to Arms," *The World Today*, June 1999, 30–32.

[8] "Alle Serben im Krieg," *Spiegel* 13, 29 March 1999, 196.

[9] "Stopping the Catastrophe," *Newsweek*, 26 April 1999, 29.

[10] Subsequent to the air campaign, Germany committed around 8,000 troops to the United Nations Kosovo Force, or KFOR.

[11] "Stopping the Catastrophe," 32.

[12] "Alle Serben im Krieg," 196.

[13] "Stopping the Catastrophe," 32.

[14] "Alle hatten Skrupel," 219.

[15] Hyde-Price, "Berlin Republic Takes to Arms," 14.

[16] Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen, "Gulf War: The German Resistance," *Survival* 1/45 (2003): 99–116.

[17] "Regierungserklärung von Bundeskanzler Gerhard Schröder vor dem Deutschen Bundestag zu den Anschlägen in den USA, am 19. September 2001," *Stichworte zur Sicherheitspolitik*, September 2001, http://www.bundesregierung.de, 16.

[18] "Einsatz bewaffneter deutscher Streitkräfte bei der Unterstützung der gemeinsamen Reaktion auf terroristische Angriffe gegen die USA auf Grundlage des Art. 51 der Satzung der Vereinten Nationen und des Art. 5 des Nordatlantikvertrags sowie der Resolutionen 1368 (2001) und 1373 (2001) des Sicherheitsrats der Vereinten Nationen," in *Stichworte zur Sicherheitspolitik*, November 2001, http://www.bundesregierung.de, 2–6 (5).

[19] Quoted in Joachim Rieker, "Schröder und der Irakkrieg," *Neue Gesellschaft/Frankfurter Hefte* 12:49 (2002): 717–19.

[20] Longhurst, *Germany, The Use of Force*, 88.

[21] Steven Erlanger, "Schröder Cautions Bush on Big Mistake Over Iraq," *International Herald Tribune*, 5 September 2002.

[22] Annalise Monaco, "16-to-3: The Allies at Loggerheads Over Iraq," *NATO Notes* 2:5 (2003): 1; Stephan Haselberger, "Verheerende Entscheidung," *Die Welt*, 23 February 2003, http://www.welt.de

[23] See Buras and Longhurst, "The Berlin Republic, Iraq and The Use of Force."