

**The Punishment Phase:
IGO Suspensions After Political Backsliding**

Inken von Borzyskowski
University of Wisconsin
vonborzyskow@wisc.edu

Felicity Vabulas
University of Chicago
fvabulas@uchicago.edu

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Abstract: Approximately one third of intergovernmental organization (IGO) charters include formal design mechanisms to suspend member states when they violate parts of their IGO agreement, but few scholars have addressed when and why IGOs actually suspend states. Our original dataset shows that most cases of IGO suspensions occur because of political backsliding — adverse regime changes, coup d'états, undemocratic elections, human rights violations, racial discrimination, government-sponsored violence, and government-invoked political states of emergency — rather than other reasons such as financial arrears, foreign military intervention, or other non-compliance. While incidents of political backsliding abound, IGO suspensions actually remain quite rare. This paper examines the factors that influence whether IGOs suspend states when political backsliding occurs. We argue that IGOs are more likely to suspend less powerful states and repeat offenders both because the IGO is less dependent on these states and also because they are more likely to respond to naming and shaming. We also argue that IGOs punish egregious violators more harshly than slight offenders. Our original, global dataset from 1980 to 2007 shows statistical support for these arguments.

Each society learns to live with a certain amount of [...] dysfunctional and or misbehavior; but lest the misbehavior feed on itself and lead to general decay, society must be able to marshal from within itself forces which will make as many of the faltering actors as possible revert to the behavior required for its proper functioning.¹

1. Introduction

In early July 2013, the 54 member-state African Union (AU) suspended Egypt from all activities following President Morsi's ouster in a military coup.² According to Admore Kambudzi, Secretary of the Peace and Security Council of the AU, this action was “mandated by the relevant AU instruments” and the suspension would remain “until the restoration of constitutional order.” The swift action by the African Union was noteworthy. First, the AU was the first international organization to suspend Egypt during the international indecision that lingered following Morsi's removal from power. In fact, the AU's position differed from much of the Arab World, where many leaders instead congratulated the new president. Second, the African Union has more than doubled its rate of suspension due to political backsliding in the last six years, a pattern that reflects a broader trends among IGOs. The AU suspended 10 countries between 2008-2013 as opposed to just four countries between 2000 and 2007.³

To be sure, not all countries that politically backslide like Egypt are punished with an even hand. So why did the AU discipline Egypt with suspension? And why did the AU – but not other IGOs of which it is a member – suspend voting privileges?

This paper addresses a simple puzzle. Many IGOs vouch to suspend politically backsliding states. Such backsliding abounds yet suspensions are rare. Why? More than four

¹ Hirschman 1970, 1.

² Available at <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2013/07/201375113557928109.html>. Accessed 19 August 2013.

³ Available at <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2013/07/20137518523285137.html> Accessed 19 August 2013.

decades after Hirschman's (1970) exploration of 'exit options' in response to misbehavior, the Egypt-AU example above highlights that we know little about how and when states exercise 'exit options' in the international realm. Specifically, under what conditions do intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) impose 'exit' on miscreant states? Henkin famously argues that "almost all [IGO] members observe almost all their obligations almost all of the time," but we know little about what happens to member states that *do* violate their IGO obligations.⁴

IGO suspensions due to political backsliding has become an emerging norm for IGOs that seek to maintain or increase their own reputations. While IGO suspensions are quite rare, the rate of IGO suspensions due to political backsliding has increased dramatically in recent years. Furthermore, our analysis of IGO charters shows that IGOs suspend states for political backsliding even if there is no mention of suspension, democracy, human rights, or rule of law in the official statute. This means that over time, IGOs have become more liberal in suspending states for political backsliding beyond the strict legal language included in official documents.

We thus ask the following question: **when political backsliding occurs, what factors influence *whether* IGOs suspend states?** In other words, which dynamics – domestic, international, and temporal – affect when and why an IGO might suspend a state after an adverse regime change, coup d'états, undemocratic elections, human rights violations, racial discrimination, government-sponsored violence, and government-invoked states of emergency? The fact that political backsliding is treated unevenly by IGOs is intricately connected to the fact that suspension is part of a larger menu of punishment tools available to the IGO. So, framed

Henkin 1979: 47.

differently, when are IGOs likely to use tools other than suspension to discipline a politically backsliding state?

1.1 The Argument

This paper seeks to explain under which conditions IGOs suspend states for political backsliding. We define an IGO suspension as occurring when a state temporarily loses some or all of its membership benefits as a result of political backsliding.⁵ Specifically, a state is not allowed to exercise the rights and privileges of membership (such as voting and attending meetings), though it may still be obliged to fulfill its financial and other duties.⁶ It is worth noting that it is not necessary for an IGO to include a specific suspension clause in its charter in order to suspend member states. Article 60 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties makes suspension in any IGO possible.⁷ In fact, Sohn (1964) states that “most international constitutions either had a large measure of flexibility from birth or, to the surprise of the original draftsmen, managed to acquire it quite quickly..... the interpreters of international constitutions will find new ways of wiggling out of tight situations and conservative restrictions.” In other words, if an IGO really wanted to suspend a state, abiding members can figure out a legal manner to do so. For example, UNCTAD established a special resolution to suspend South Africa even though it was not at the time empowered to suspend or expel.⁸

⁵ See Vabulas 2014 for a full detailing of suspensions as they are and can be used in IGOs.

⁶ For example, states suspended from the African Union are still “obliged to continue paying its budgetary contributions, to give effect and to comply with the mandatory decisions adopted by AU organs” (Magliveras 2011b, 10).

⁷ Article 60(2) says that the perpetration of material breaches entitles the other signatory parties to act collectively and decide by unanimous agreement to suspend the treaty’s operation in whole or in part.

⁸ Magliveras 1999.

We define political backsliding as including adverse regime changes, coup d'états, undemocratic elections, human rights violations, racial discrimination, government-sponsored violence, and government-invoked states of emergency.⁹

Why focus on IGO suspensions as a result of political backsliding? Vabulas (2014) shows that of the 95 IGO suspensions since WWII, 56 percent (53 suspensions) were in response to a member state violating political norms. In other words, just over half of IGO suspensions occur when states have politically retracted. Building on that finding, this paper examines the specific set of IGO suspensions that occur after political backsliding.

Second, about 13% of IGO charters contain a clause about maintaining political standards in the member state. For example, the United Nations (UN) retains a norm of electoral rights in its Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Even primarily economic organizations in less democratic regions – such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) – pay lip-service to democratic standards in their charters. The level of detail varies between IGOs, but it provides a common cross-IGO comparison.

We argue that IGO suspensions are more likely to occur after political backsliding than other issues—such as financial arrears, breaking alliances, or other forms of non-compliance—for three reasons. First, IGO suspension acts as a form of ‘naming and shaming’ which has shown to be effective in domestic issue areas such as human rights and election violations. Second, IGOs are less likely to suspend states that violate economic or security issues because these violations often involve bilateral or multilateral concerns that often cannot be unilaterally handled by domestic change. Instead, economic and security disputes require interstate

⁹ The narrowest interpretation of political backsliding would limit the universe of cases to adverse regime changes. However, we seek to cast a broader net to align with the literature on democracy and political backsliding.

mediation, negotiation, and arbitration which is more likely to be handled by IGO dispute resolution mechanisms than an IGO suspension. Third, political backsliding such as coups or rigged elections represent a *specific point in time* that IGOs can use as focal point references to compel states to change behavior. The specific weeks and months surrounding the political *backslide* offer a unique opportunity when IGOs can try to squash a permanent regression.¹⁰

We also argue that IGOs are selective in which states they suspend after political backsliding. Our original dataset shows that IGOs unevenly and rarely discipline political regression with suspension. From a game theoretic standpoint, this makes sense: if the (implicit) threat of IGO suspension works to keep member states toeing the line, then actual suspensions are ‘off the equilibrium path’ behavior and we should rarely see their occurrence. This also makes individual instances all the more interesting.

This paper presents several main findings. First, we argue that IGOs are punish egregious violators more harshly than slight offenders. States that have politically backslid in a significant way are more likely to be punished than after small digressions because imposing suspensions involves transaction and collective action costs for IGOs. Second, we show that IGOs are more likely to suspend repeat offenders – states that have been suspended in the past, changed their domestic politics and been readmitted – because a useful historical tool is more likely to be successful in the future too.

We also find some indication that states that gain the most from membership benefits in the first place are more likely to be suspended because it is more likely to be effective. IGOs are

¹⁰ These moments stand in contrast to the situation when a country arranges yet another flawed election or has violated basic human rights for years. In these ‘permanent’ states of undemocratic behavior, a country is unfortunately operating under a ‘business as normal’ mode, and the reason that the IGO might suspend a state shifts from trying to prevent a political backslide from becoming permanent to using suspension to shift the country from an authoritarian regime to a democratic regime (arguably a much more difficult—or at least theoretically distinct—task). We thank Michael Wahman for helping to clarify this point.

therefore more likely to suspend less powerful states because their reputations stand to suffer from the reprimand. On the other hand, more powerful states gain the least relative benefits from IGO membership because they often have go-it-alone or unilateral options or can forum shop to alternative IGOs if they are suspended.¹¹ Furthermore, IGOs that suspend powerful states stand to lose more from suspending a state (i.e. large amounts of funding) than they could gain so IGOs rarely suspend them in the first place.

One might also suspect that violators allied with the U.S. are more insulated from IGO pressures and less likely to be suspended when the backsliding is related to human rights issues (but not other types of political backsliding). This is because the U.S. often carries a disproportional voting capacity in IGOs¹² and may not vote to suspend an ally which may prevent the IGO from taking action. Second, the U.S. may be more likely to work unilaterally (through economic sanctions or other diplomatic means) with its allies rather than rely on multilateral efforts to chastise a backslider. While this relationship seems consistent in our analysis, it is not statistically significant.

Our findings have implications for the literature on institutional design. IGO scholarship is rather mum on the topic of suspension while implicitly suggesting that membership suspension can be the ultimate “stick” to ensure that member states comply with their international agreements. The literature hints that if members fail to uphold their IGO commitments in a grave enough manner, they can lose membership privileges through suspension which may shatter their reputations and create spillover effects that extend beyond the scope of specific grievances.¹³

¹¹ Gruber 2000.

¹² See Stone (2011) for ways in which powerful states can even control institutions through ‘informal’ means.

¹³ See Abbott and Snidal 1998; and Pevehouse 2002a and 2002b.

Rather than relying on theoretical assertions, we show in a detailed manner how often and when this “stick” is actually employed. IGO suspensions are more likely for to be used as a “stick” for domestic (unilateral) violations like political backsliding rather than bilateral or multilateral issues like economic or security issues. IGO suspensions due to political backsliding are also more useful for upholding the behavior of *certain kinds of states*. Second, the increasing rate of IGO suspensions due to political backsliding—even though this mechanism is only specified in 6% of IGO charters¹⁴—may be one more example of informal governance playing a large role in IGO operations. IGOs still suspend states for political backsliding when this “stick” has not been formally documented in the Charter, showing the importance of norms in how IGOs operate.

Our paper also makes important connections to the democratic consolidation literature. A wide body of work recognizes that international actors can play a large part in helping democratizing countries transition and consolidate.¹⁵ But this consolidation literature focuses on the triggers that help countries ‘move forward’ without examining the techniques that might aid in moving a country forward again when it has temporarily gotten off-course.

1.2 Motivating Examples

The Egypt-AU suspension – while a rare occurrence – is hardly an outlier. Many other IGO suspensions have occurred in the wake of political backsliding on other continents as well. For example, the Caribbean Community (Caricom) suspended Haiti on 29 February 2004.¹⁶ Democratically elected President Jean-Bertrand Aristide informed 14 Caricom heads of state that

¹⁴ See data appendix for a detailed explanation.

¹⁵ See Pevehouse 2005; Mansfield and Pevehouse 2006 and 2008; and Poast and Urpelainen 2013.

¹⁶ Available at http://www.trinidadandtobagonews.com/forum/webbbs_config.pl/noframes/read/1721. Accessed 10 January 2014.

he was kidnapped and removed from the country. Caricom leaders insisted that no democratically elected government in Caricom should have its leader deposed. The Caricom heads voted to suspend recognition of the unelected interim Prime Minister, Gerard Latortue (before he could vote on withdrawing Haiti from Caricom). Haiti was readmitted into Caricom following the democratic election of President Rene Preval who gave the opening address at the organization's Council of Ministers meeting in July 2006.

This case presents important questions: why weren't all countries that politically backslid in 2004 also removed from their respective international organizations? Table 7 shows a list of other political backsliding events in 2004. And why did Caricom suspend Haiti while other international organizations such as the OAS remained silent on the subject?

<< TABLE 7 about here >>

Other examples extend the paper's motivation. In April 2012, Guinea-Bissau was suspended from the African Union in response to a military coup that cut short a presidential election and detained the front-runner, former Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Jr., and the interim president, Raimundo Pereira.¹⁷ Coups d'états and coup attempts have been common in Guinea-Bissau since it won independence from Portugal in 1974, and to date, no democratically elected president of the country has served a full five-year term. Why then did the African Union choose to suspend Guinea-Bissau in 2012 when it had not done so in previous episodes of political backsliding?

¹⁷ "Guinea Bissau Is Suspended by African Union," *New York Times*, 17 April 2012. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/18/world/africa/guinea-bissau-is-suspended-by-african-union.html?_r=0. Accessed 5 December 2012.

Similarly, the Commonwealth of Nations has suspended states that are struggling to uphold their democratic norms. For example, it suspended Nigeria in 1995 for executing ten human rights activists under military rule but then re-admitted Nigeria in 1999 when it returned to civilian rule. The Commonwealth suspended Pakistan in 1999 after a military coup but then re-admitted it when elections were held in 2004, only to suspend it again in 2007 when it invoked a state of emergency. The Commonwealth also suspended Fiji after a coup in 2000 (then re-admitted it in 2001) and again suspended it following a coup in 2006 but has yet to extend membership privileges since.¹⁸ The Commonwealth thereby “has a record not only of ostracizing miscreants... but also of readmitting repentant sinners.”¹⁹

1.3 Suspension and Political Backsliding in IGO Charters

Before examining the actual occurrence of IGO suspensions due to political backsliding, it is worth noting how often IGO charters formally declare that (a) states can be suspended for violating part of the IGO agreement (b) norms of democracy/ human rights/ rule of law should be upheld in the IGO (three terms that we use to operationalize political backsliding) and (c) how often both of these factors occur together.

We thoroughly reviewed the text in each of the Charters in the set of IGOs in the Correlates of War International Organization (COW) dataset.²⁰ We used search terms for suspension, democracy, human rights, and rule of law.²¹ Table 1 shows that of the 229 IGOs in the COW with Charters, 77 (34%) include a specific provision about *suspension*, 30 (13%)

¹⁸ “Commonwealth praises Fiji but ban remains.” Available at <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-11-18/an-fiji-commonwealth/5099788>. Accessed 9 January 2014.

¹⁹ “Global Clubs. When your only Weapon is Shame,” *The Economist*, 22 November 2007 (online edition). Available at <http://www.economist.com/node/10180893>. Accessed 16 November 2012.

²⁰ The full dataset of IGOs in the Correlates of War includes 310 IGOs with active websites (our universe of cases). Of these 310 IGOs, 229 have Charters that are available to the public.

²¹ The codebook is available upon request.

specifically refer to *democracy*, 37 (16%) specifically refer to *human rights*, and 24 (10%) specifically refer to *rule of law*. There is also wide variation in terms of the voting rules required for a suspension decision, as shown in Table 2.

<< TABLES 1 and 2 about here >>

The emerging norm of suspensions has gone beyond the strict the legal letter of IGO charters. Table 3 shows the overlap of suspension and political backsliding. There are only 18 IGOs (8% of the total) that include both protocols about suspension and political backsliding (democracy, human rights, and/or rule of law.) Of these 18 IGOs, only 5 have historically suspended states for political backsliding. It is important to note, though, that even IGOs that do *not* have suspension or political backsliding clauses still suspended states for political backsliding. We argue that IGOs are often liberal in applying suspensions beyond the strict legal language that they have included in official documents indicating that a norm is emerging whereby certain IGOs seek to uphold democratic values in principle, and not just because of legal text.

<< TABLE 3 about here >>

1.4 Actual occurrences of IGO Suspension due to Political Backsliding

Figure 2 builds from the specific case of the African Union shown in Figure 1 and shows that while IGO suspensions due to political backsliding are rare, they have become overall more frequent in recent years.

<< **FIGURE 2 about here** >>

The recent uptick in IGO suspensions has several explanations. First, more states are in a “transitional” political phase in the post-Cold War era which has probably increased the supply of states that have the opportunity to backslide and get suspended. Second, states have increasingly encouraged other member states to uphold democratic polities using a wide array of tools, including passing explicit amendments to IGO charters to permit member suspension for political reversion. In fact, the Organization of American States (OAS) passed the Washington Protocol in 1998, which made it the first *regional* political body to permit a member’s suspension if its democratic government is overthrown.²² In February 2006, the St. Lucian Prime Minister, Dr. Kenny Anthony, called for changes to the Caribbean Community (Caricom) Charter on Civil Society to avoid repeating the troublesome presidential and legislative elections in Haiti.²³ Anthony argued “We need to include provisions that would make it absolutely clear that any member state that breaches the fundamental principles of the charter will become eligible to be withdrawn from the corridors of the institutions of Caricom.”²⁴

Another view of our empirical puzzle is shown in Figure 4. This plots the rate of backsliding and the rate of suspensions from 1980 to 2007. While there were about 55 to 105 instances of backsliding each year, only 2 of these cases each year were punished with IGO

²² U.S. Department of State Dispatch, “The OAS and the road to Santiago: building a hemispheric community in the Americas: Secretary of State Madeleine Albright”, Transcript, 1 March 1998, Vol. 9, No. 2, ISSN: 1051-7693

²³ “St. Lucian premier urges Caricom Charter reform to avoid repeat of Haiti row”, BBC Monitoring Americas, 8 February 2006.

²⁴ These changes, however, have not yet been formalized.

suspensions. Why does the rate of suspension lag behind the rate of backsliding by such a high degree? Why are IGOs so in-active in disciplining miscreant states?

<< **FIGURE 4 about here** >>

1.5 Alternatives to IGO Suspension after Backsliding

It is important to realize that suspension is not the only punishment in an IGO's toolbox when member states fail to uphold the community's democratic norms and rules. Instead, suspension is just one tool in the "punishment menu."²⁵ This introduces an important selection question: the *threat* of an IGO suspension – short of the actual suspension – may also be an effective tool to prompt domestic policy change. If our reputational arguments are true, it is likely that a suspension threat could alone influence state behavior. These 'threats of suspension' are more difficult to systematically observe and trace, but IGOs are incentivized to widely publicize even a mere threat of suspension, making data collection easier.

Second, while some political miscreants are suspended (or threatened) by IGOs, others never receive formal reprimands. Sometimes IGOs try other means to reverse political backsliding before, instead of, or in addition to suspending a member state. For example, on 24 March 2008, the African Union sent in 1,300 troops to the island of Anjouan in the Indian Ocean

²⁵ There are several other areas of international relations where the notion of a "menu of alternatives" is instructive. In particular, Snidal and Vabulas (2012) discuss how states choose from a menu of formality among institutional alternatives that can help solve collective action problems. The literature on forum-shopping, overlapping institutions, and regime complexes is also noteworthy in that it implicitly addresses the notion of a menu of institutional choices for solving particular cooperation problems (e.g. Busch 2007, Kelley 2009). The Foreign Policy substitutability literature is also instructive in this regard because it highlights that when states choose foreign policies in response to international transgressions, they inherently face a menu of options (i.e. states do not just choose to go to war or not, but instead, they consider lesser alternatives such as economic sanctions, withholding foreign assistance, and diplomatic isolation to name a few.)

archipelago of Comoros to topple Mohamed Bacar, a French-trained former gendarme who took power in 2001 and clung on after an illegal election in 2007. While the Comoros has suffered around 20 coups or attempted coups since independence, analysts claimed that in this instance, the AU was hoping for a relatively easy victory and that could earn it some international prestige to offset its problematic peacekeeping missions in Sudan and Somalia. The Comoros was a relatively low-profile conflict for the AU, and this might have been the IGO's strategy to discipline a less powerful state.²⁶

Other examples of political backsliding without IGO suspension include Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo acting unilaterally to discipline Sao Tome in June 2003 rather than relying on the AU to suspend the state. Obasanjo directly called on rebel soldiers to return power to the toppled government in Sao Tome. Similarly, the African Union deplored the coup in Togo in 2005 but did not formally threaten to suspend them.²⁷

Lest these two examples give the impression that Africa is the only continent that variably uses the tools of suspensions and threats to "sanction" member countries, it is worth noting that the Council of Europe has also used the tool of suspension unevenly. Why didn't the Council of Europe threaten to kick Azerbaijan out in June 2013 due to its flagrant violations of human rights?²⁸ Why did the European Union not suspend Hungary after its crackdown on independent media in 2012? While IGO complexity and issue linkage are probably part of the story, it remains puzzling that the IGO arguably most committed to democracy does so little to use its powers to bring member states back on track.

²⁶ Available at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/mar/26/1>

²⁷ "Sao Tome Civilians Seek Normalcy as Mediators Try to End Coup", Voice of America Press Releases and Documents, 17 July 2003.

²⁸ <http://www.civicsolidarity.org/article/721/azerbaijan-violates-human-rights-despite-its-council-europe-commitments>

This highlights another interesting variation concerning IGO suspensions after political backsliding. Some IGOs – including the OSCE and EU – *never* suspend IGO member states for brazenly flouting political standards despite the fact that their charters contain formal institutional commitments to uphold these values in practice. This is quite likely because there are far fewer instances of backsliding in the EU (because most countries tend to be consolidated rather than transitional democracies when they join the EU due to the tight accession criteria). Still, backsliding has occurred in the EU, and this paper starts addressing these important questions.

2.1 Theory: Linking IGO Suspension to the Benefits of Belonging

Why is the intersection of IGO suspension and political backsliding so important?

Scholars of international organizations have been prolific in addressing when and why states *join* IGOs²⁹, particularly in the role that IGOs can play in helping states democratize.³⁰ Regional IGOs, for example, can put diplomatic and economic pressure on states which (in combination with internal forces) can compel autocratic regimes to liberalize. Membership in regional IGOs can also push elite groups to accept political liberalization by tying their hands to the IGO or socializing them to IGO norms and lowering the risk that these groups face during the democratization process. In particular, IGOs may not be able to prevent autocratic reversals in non-consolidated democracies but they can increase the likelihood that a transitional democracy consolidates through capacity building.³¹

While we have gained a formidable collective understanding of when and why states join IGOs (and how this is intertwined with levels of democratization), we still know little about the

²⁹ Abbott and Snidal 1998.

³⁰ See Pevehouse 2002 and 2005; Pevehouse and Mansfield 2006 and 2008.

³¹ Poast and Urpelainen 2013

opposite pathway: when will IGOs forcibly require states to exit international institutions as a result of *violating* the democratic standards they agreed to? Pevehouse (2002) asserts that “regional IOs can apply pressure in a variety of ways ranging from overt de-legitimization of the regime by IO members through diplomatic pressure to direct economic sanctions against the regime or even expulsion from the organization.” Similarly, Snidal (1985) argues that the “threat of exclusion, if credible, may be an important device for ensuring that states behave cooperatively.” Surprisingly, international relations scholarship is heretofore silent on the role of IGOs in punishing domestic political reversion.³² In many regards, this is analogous to Fazal’s (2007) contribution in comparative politics which brought attention to state death in addition to the ubiquitous focus on state birth; we focus on state “death” from an IGO when democratic standards are at stake.

2.2 Theory: IGOs and Naming and Shaming

The literature on IGOs and their role in naming and shaming campaigns is also instructive because we view IGO suspension after political backsliding as a form of naming and shaming. IGOs can certainly denounce violator states in their meetings and even issue formal condemnations to the news media, but suspension represents the most severe or last-ditch attempt to corral member states back to good behavior. IGO suspension is an attempt to tie reputational considerations to a state’s malevolent actions. IGO suspension creates a forum whereby other states can employ reciprocal or retaliatory sanctions on the violator state.

³² A recent exception is Kartal (2013), who finds that political backsliding (in terms of anti-corruption reforms) occurs in CEE countries after EU accession.

No literature has directly examined IGO naming and shaming campaigns in response to political backsliding, but several scholars have evaluated IGO pressure in the area of human rights. For example, Murdie and Davis (2012) and Meernik et al. (2012) show that states who violate human rights norms face a greater risk of being punished when they are simultaneously condemned in the media by IGOs such as the UN.³³ In other words, NGOs can name and shame violator states by publishing reports and findings in leading news media outlets, but these non-state actor attempts at public ostracizing are bolstered when an IGO jumps on the naming and shaming bandwagon.

Similarly, Hafner-Burton (2005) shows that IGO naming-and-shaming campaigns against human rights violators are more effective when the non-compliant state participates in a Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA) that contains binding human rights clauses. She argues that these international institutions are most successful in naming and shaming crusades because they attach tangible, material benefits to the potential loss of membership (the loss of market access). But Hafner-Burton (2008) also finds that human rights' naming and shaming by international institutions can be a double-edged sword: in certain scenarios, naming and shaming exacerbates domestic violations even while reducing others.

In addition to soft-power based naming and shaming campaigns, some IGOs reprimand political backsliding by applying material-based punishments. For example, Lebovic and Voeten (2009) show the "cost of shame": IGOs are more apt to cut foreign aid and loan commitments following human rights violations. Donno (2011) argues that IGOs are likely to suggest formal mediation and threaten sanctions after flawed elections. We build on Donno's foundations in several ways: first we look at the role of IGOs following a broader set of events (political

³³ These authors also show that states that violate human rights norms are more likely to be punished when they have a greater domestic NGO presence. We regard this finding as important, but not directly connected to our research question at hand.

backsliding, which includes not only rigged elections but also coup d'états and government-sponsored states of emergency for example); second, our analysis is global rather than focused on two regions; and third, we examine the “most extreme” form of public chastisement: formal suspensions.

The literature on multilateral sanctions is also instructive because we could consider IGO suspension as a kind of sanction.³⁴ The results of much of the literature on economic sanctions have shown them to be ineffective, but recent research suggests that sanctions can induce states to change their policies under certain circumstances. Interestingly, policymakers continue to believe that multilateral sanctions are more effective than when they are imposed by a single state even though the evidence points otherwise.

Last, recent work on the withdrawal of foreign aid when a country has fraudulent elections, political violence, military coups, or a reduction in civil liberties aligns with our research. Boulding and Hyde (2013) show that aid withdrawal particularly occurs after political violence, and also after fraudulent elections and military coups, though less so. Even though formal theories of deterrence show that if deterrence is effective, it is not observable³⁵, Boulding and Hyde show that withdrawing foreign aid in response to political backsliding is a “stick” that may actually “work”.

2.3 Hypotheses

We advance several hypotheses tied to the research question detailed above.

³⁴ See Martin 1993; Drezner 2000; Bapat and Clifton Morgan 2009; Miers and Morgan 2002; and Nossal 1989.

³⁵ For extensive coverage and debate on the logic of deterrence in IR, see the nuclear deterrence debate between Huth and Russett vs. Lebow and Stein. For a more recent review of the rational deterrence debate, see Huth 1999.

H1a: Worst Offenders – IGOs are more likely to suspend states after egregious charter violations rather than small offenses. States that have politically backslid in a significant way are more likely to be punished than after small digressions because imposing suspensions involves transaction and collective action costs for IGOs. When offenses are negligible, IGOs are less willing to resort to this punishment.

H1b: Useful Tool / Repeat Offender – IGOs are more likely to suspend states after political backsliding if they are repeat offenders. States that have been previously suspended for backsliding and been re-admitted are more likely to be suspended again for backsliding because IGO member states have (1) shown their ability to overcome collective action challenges to punish the particular state and (2) the tool has been proven useful.

H1c: Temporal Patterns - IGOs are more likely to suspend states for violating political standards after the Cold War. While many of the IGO charters were written prior to the Cold War, the end of the Cold War represents a distinct turning point for international actors viewing democratic norms as something that should be upheld and promoted.³⁶

H1d: State Power - IGOs are more likely to suspend lower- and middle-power states after political backsliding. Lower- and middle-power countries are more likely to be suspended for two reasons. First, suspension hurts weak states more because both reputational and material stakes associated with IGO membership are relatively more important. On the flipside, IGOs are less likely to suspend powerful states because the material loss will not affect these countries as much, and because powerful states may be able to convince other member states not to vote for

³⁶ See Hyde 2011; and Kelley 2012.

suspension. Second, powerful countries are members in more IGOs than weak countries, so the weak states are more affected by exclusion in terms of reputation and forum shopping.

H1e: Insulation – IGOs are less likely to suspend the global hegemon or its allies.

Suspension requires some level of collective action and it is possible to spoil such action by wielding power in the form of agenda setting, log-rolling, or simple veto. States that have friends in high places are less likely to be suspended for backsliding because their friends can help prevent that action.

3. Research Design

We examine hypotheses 1a through 1e with a statistical analysis of an original dataset of IGO suspensions and suspension threats that are connected to political backsliding. For each IGO suspension or threat, we documented which country was suspended, whether the country was suspended from the entire IGO or just a specific body, when the suspension occurred (and when it ended if applicable), the reason for suspension, and any reinstatement details (if appropriate).³⁷ The dependent variable is a binary measure of *IGO suspension* or *IGO suspension threat*; it is coded 1 when either occurred and 0 otherwise.

We merge the IGO suspension data with an original compilation of political backsliding between 1981 and 2007 and restrict our dataset to these occurrences. To capture this phenomenon, we include data on adverse regime changes and successful coup d'états from Marshall and Marshall (2012).³⁸ We obtain data on election issues, including overall election

³⁷ The codebook is available upon request.

³⁸ This is a dummy variable coded 1 if a successful coup occurred and 0 otherwise. Marshall and Marshall (2012: 1) define a coup d'état as “a forceful seizure of executive authority and office by a dissident/opposition faction within the country’s ruling or political elites that results in a substantial change in the executive leadership and the policies

quality, the extent of election problems from Kelley (2010),³⁹ and government harassment of the opposition (Hyde and Marinov 2012, Nelda15). We use data on human rights violations from CIRI and PTS, indicating backsliding when a country experiences a negative change in these scores. We source data on national political, government-backed states of emergency from Hafner-Burton, Helfer, and Fariss (2011).⁴⁰ This data covers a shorter timeframe (1980-2007) than the rest of our dataset, which limits the timeframe of our analysis. Although our IGO suspension data encompasses five more decades (1934-2013), data availability on predictors prevent us from using the full dataset.

Using this method, we identify 2,395 state-years experiencing political backsliding between 1981 and 2007. Figure 5 visualizes the distribution of types of political backsliding contained in this dataset. Note that some country-years experience multiple forms of backsliding at once, so that some types overlap. Almost half of the backsliding instances are related to human rights violations and another half to national political states of emergency. The remaining violations occur due to election issues, coups, and adverse regime changes.

<< **FIGURE 5 about here** >>

of the prior regime (although not necessarily in the nature of regime authority or mode of governance). Social revolutions, victories by oppositional forces in civil wars, and popular uprisings, while they may lead to substantial changes in central authority, are not considered coups d'état. Voluntary transfers of executive authority or transfers of office due to the death or incapacitation of a ruling executive are, likewise, not considered coups d'état. The forcible ouster of a regime accomplished by, or with the crucial support of, invading foreign forces is not here considered a coup d'état."

³⁹ From Kelley (2010, 4-5), we use two variables. "SA1 Election Quality" captures overall election quality and is coded 0 for acceptable, 1 for ambiguous and 2 unacceptable. "SA2 Election Problems" captures the extent of the problems where 0 indicates no problems, 1 minor, 2 moderate and 3 major problems.

⁴⁰ This variable is coded 1 when a national political state of emergency occurs and 0 otherwise. We filter out states of emergency due to natural disasters or extraterritorial events since these do not relate to political backsliding.

We run rare event logit analyses because IGO suspensions occur in less than 1 percent of observations of political backsliding in this sample.⁴¹ In each of the statistical analyses, we use robust standard errors clustered by state to account for unobserved heterogeneity. We analyze the data at the state-year level. In order to test hypothesis 1a about the backsliding intensity triggering suspension, we include *degree of backsliding*, a categorical variable measuring yearly changes in regime type based on Polity IV. We expect that the more a country backslides, the more likely it is to be suspended. For this variable, more negative (smaller) numbers indicate more backsliding. On the other hand, we expect that more positive changes (democratization) result in a lower likelihood of suspension. Thus the effect should be negative.

Hypothesis 1b is tested with *repeat offender*. This is a dummy variable indicating whether or not the country has been suspended for political backsliding in the past, reformed, and been readmitted. We expect repeat offenders to be more likely to be suspended again because the tool “worked” in the past. In this sample, two countries are repeat offenders, varying between two and three total suspensions.

We test Hypothesis 1c (temporal patterns) with a dummy variable, *post-Cold War*, which indicates an increased willingness of IGOs to engage in democracy promotion and punish backsliding after 1990. In line with Figure 2, we expect more suspensions after 1990.

To test Hypothesis 1d about state power, we include two variables: *GDP per capita* and *population size* (both in millions \$ and logged from Penn World Tables and EUGene, respectively). We expect that more powerful states are associated with a smaller likelihood of suspension.

The importance of alliance relations with the U.S. in hypothesis 1e is tested with voting similarity in the UN General Assembly between a given country and the US, ranging from 0 to 1

⁴¹ King and Zeng 2001.

(Voeten 2012). Greater values indicate greater similarity. We expect that greater voting similarity with the U.S. is associated with a decreased risk of suspension for backsliding.

We control for the level of democracy with *polity IV scores* (Marshall and Jaggers 2010), as well as *military leadership*, and *leader tenure (DPI)*. Descriptive statistics for all variables are in Table 4. From the original sample experiencing political backsliding, we use 1,673 observations because of missing data on the independent variables (mostly due to *polity* and *DPI measures*). We do not limit our sample to the set of IGOs whose charters contain suspension and “political backsliding” clauses because of the high predominance of IGOs that suspend states even when no formal documentation exists.

<< **TABLE 4 about here** >>

4. Results and Discussion

When political backsliding occurs, what factors influence *whether* IGOs suspend states? Regression results from the rare events logit are shown in Table 5; here we include all types of political backsliding. Table 6 shows results from the same model estimation but disaggregates the universe of cases from all types of political backsliding into those related to coups, adverse regime changes (ARC), states of emergency, election issues, and human rights.

The empirical analysis strongly supports two of our hypotheses: *degree of backsliding* and *useful tool / repeat offender*. Both of these are highly statistically significant ($p < 0.001$). IGO suspension becomes *more* likely as the degree of backsliding worsens. This result provides strong evidence in favor of Hypothesis 1a. However, the substantive effect is rather small: a

change of +/- one standard deviation around the mean (from 2 point democratization to a 2 point backsliding in *polity*) increases the likelihood of suspension by only 0.4 percentage points.

The second Hypothesis (1b) is also supported: Those backsliding states with a history, i.e. past experience of suspension after backsliding followed by reform and re-admission, are *more* likely to be suspended again. We argue that this is the case because IGOs interpret such past experience as evidence that suspensions contribute to reform in the particular country, so IGOs are *more* likely to use the same punishment against the same offender again in the future. The substantive effect is sizeable. A country that was successfully suspended before and backslides again is 29 percentage points more likely to be suspended than a country that has not been suspended before.⁴² This suggests that once suspension proves to be a useful tool for a particular country, it is more likely to be applied in the future.

The remaining Hypotheses receive weak support; all coefficient estimates are in the hypothesized direction but the effects fall short of statistical significance. In other words, there is weak evidence that suspensions have been used more frequently in the post-Cold War era, that smaller and economically weaker countries are more likely to be suspended for similar behavior than stronger countries, and that friends of the U.S. enjoy a certain level of insulation from this type of political pressure.

<< TABLES 5 and 6 about here >>

Table 6 shows results from the same models but disaggregates the different types of backsliding into its components: coups, adverse regime changes, states of emergency, election

⁴² This is predicted from model 2 in table 2 with all continuous predictors set at their mean, post-Cold War.

issues, and human rights. Note that models related to coups and adverse regime changes should be treated with caution because of the small number of observations. This empirical analysis shows that *repeat offender* is an important predictor for suspensions after *all* types of backsliding behavior. It is highly significant ($p < 0.05$, model 2). In other models, it was dropped from the model because of high collinearity with or perfect prediction of IGO suspension.

Similarly, the *degree of backsliding* is an important correlate of suspension in the cases of human rights violations and states of emergency, but less so for other types of backsliding. Given that these two areas comprise most of the sample, the main results in Table 1 are likely driven by this relationship.

The remaining estimates reveal some interesting nuances, although all these effect estimates are *insignificant*. First, while US alliances seem to insulate offending states, this is not true for election issues. US allies are somewhat *more* likely to be suspended for manipulated elections, whereas they are less likely to be suspended for all other types of political regression. Second, while more powerful states (in terms of economic wealth and population size) are generally less likely to be suspended, human rights violations present an exception. Given that this backsliding type makes up about half the sample, it may explain why the effect estimates for *GDP pc* and *population size* remain insignificant in the main analysis: because they have opposite effects. State power correlates positively with suspension for human rights violations but negatively for states of emergency. Finally, backsliding in the *post-Cold War* era is more likely to trigger IGO suspension than before 1990.

While these models generate the first systematic insights about what drives IGO suspensions and provide a first cut at the phenomenon, we plan to refine the empirical analysis in several ways. Chief among them is changing the universe of cases from those country-years

experiencing backsliding to *all* country-years while including predictions for the likelihood of backsliding. Similar to state failure models used by the political instability task force, we plan to predict the propensity of state *i* to backslide in year *j* conditional on a number of standard covariates, and then include this (i.e. control for this) propensity in the model of suspension. We also plan to run an explicit selection model where the first stage predicts backsliding and the second stage predicts IGO suspensions.

5. Conclusion

This paper has shown that while IGO suspensions after political backsliding are rare (as deterrence theory would suggest), they do occur. Our results point to the willingness of IGO member states to intervene in the politics of other member countries in order to prevent political backsliding, as well as to keep their commitment to democracy, human rights, and rule of law credible.

The paper also shows that IGO member states do not see a black and white line defining exactly when a violator should be suspended. Determining when a state's violation is worthy of suspension is difficult for definitional reasons and further complicated by political and collective action concerns. First, IGO charters often outline that states must "grossly and persistently violated the provisions" in a charter to be suspended.⁴³ What determines "gross and persistent?" It is even more difficult to decide when a state has violated the charter of an IGO that covers a wide array of issue areas or is universal in membership (such as the United Nations). Member states must evaluate which principles are more egregious to breach or if all principles are held to the same violation standards. This paper has uncovered several reasons why political

⁴³ See for example the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the African Economic Community (AEC) charters.

backsliding might be more likely to cause a member state to be suspended from an IGO rather than because of other violations. Political backsliding represents a domestic issue that is more responsive to naming and shaming from IGO suspensions, whereas bilateral and multilateral (economic and security) disputes may lean on mediation, negotiation, and arbitration guidelines outlined in the dispute settlement clauses of the Charter. And last, because of discrete events like elections, IGOs can more easily hone in on political backsliding because of the narrower focal point these events provide. Perhaps unsurprisingly, IGO member states also take politics and their interests into account rather than treating suspension as a hard-and-fast scientific standard. Several legal scholars (e.g. Magliveras 1999) argue that this is unfortunate because ‘IGO violations *are* black and white’, and ‘clearly defined in international law’. But as with most areas of international relations, the empirical record of IGO suspensions shows that politics often trumps “legal” standards.

5.1 Future Research

While this paper looks at the fundamental question of when and why IGOs are more likely to suspend states after political backsliding, it also opens up a plethora of further research questions. In a follow-on paper, we examine **which IGOs are more likely to suspend states after political backsliding**. As previously mentioned, several IGO charters contain clauses about upholding democratic norms but a quick review of the data show that certain IGOs (like the African Union, Organization of American States, and Commonwealth of Nations) appear to use this tool often. It is interesting that these IGOs also happen to be IGOs that provide “patronage appointments” to member state politicians (Gray 2012). In these IGOs, politicians can squeeze private benefits from the bureaucracy by rewarding their cronies with posts,

securing lavish per diems at conferences, and obtaining diplomatic passports. In other words, suspension in these IGOs may not just hurt the state but also stand to hurt the well-being of individual politicians, making suspension more common because it is likely to be more successful. Other IGOs (like the OSCE and European Union, which arguably have even stronger democratic standards) have rarely if ever suspended states for undemocratic practices.⁴⁴

Even more important, future research should examine whether **IGO suspensions have any effect on subsequent behavior of the non-compliant member state?** In other words, all things equal, are previously suspended countries more likely to change their behavior than countries that are not “punished” by the naming and shaming efforts of an IGO? Relatedly, under which conditions are IGO suspensions more powerful in changing state-level behavior? To be sure, this question is complicated by the difficulty in observing the counterfactual and also that many diplomatic efforts tend to work simultaneously but future research should evaluate the independent effect of an IGO suspension on domestic political liberalization.

The paper has also not tested the distinct possibility that member states may suspend states in order to ensure that the IGO remains legitimate. The question is, if all IGOs want to remain legitimate, when are suspensions particularly important for IGO legitimacy? Perhaps when an IGO relies on funding from other IGOs (like the EU), member states use suspension as a costly signal that they care about democratization and want to keep their funding. Future research should uncover mechanisms to test these ideas on IGO legitimacy.

Further research should evaluate whether the markets take cues from IGO suspensions with the notion that this signal is an important distiller of information in a world of uncertainty (Gray 2012). Countries that have politically backslid and are suspended from IGOs should have

⁴⁴ See Levitz and Pop-Eleches (2010) for detailed coverage on why there has been limited backsliding in the EU.

a marked impact on market signals (i.e. sovereign debt, bond markets, foreign direct investment, and exchange rates). Including market data that reacts more quickly than GDP from economic sanctions and foreign aid would allow us to better test the granularity of the IGO signal at a day, week, or month level rather than being restricted to yearly data aggregation.

There are also several opportunities to evaluate the duration of IGO and member state behavior using hazard models with the data. First, we could examine whether there is ‘herd behavior’ amongst IGOs; specifically, do multiple IGOs suspend the same states, and if so, how long does it take for IGOs to ‘copy’ each other? Second, how long does it take for a violator state to react or change behavior after being suspended (if at all)?

These questions hint at the dearth of information we have on IGO suspensions and the rich opportunities for future examination of the punishment phase of international cooperative agreements.

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Tables and Figures

Table 1: IGO Charters with Suspension, Democracy, Human Rights, Rule of Law Clauses

(Total number of IGO Charters is 229)

	Suspension clause	Democracy clause	Human rights clause	Rule of law clause
Number of IGO Charters	78	30	37	24
Percent of IGO Charters	34%	13%	16%	10%

Table 2: IGO Voting Rules to Suspend a Member State

Votes Necessary for Suspension	Number	Percent
Consensus	4	5%
Consensus minus one	1	1%
0.75	6	8%
0.70	1	1%
0.67	13	17%
Special vote	9	12%
Qualified majority	2	3%
Majority	7	9%
Automatic/ unclear	35	44%
Grand Total	78	100%

Table 3: IGOs with both Suspension and Political Backsliding Clauses

1.	ACP/EU Joint Assembly (ACPEU)
2.	African Union (AU)
3.	Central European Initiative (CEI)
4.	The Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPSC)
5.	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA)
6.	Council of Europe (CofE)
7.	Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)
8.	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)
9.	European Union (EU)
10.	Institute of Nutrition of Central America & Panama (INCAP)
11.	Inter-American Defense Board (IADefB)
12.	International Criminal Court (ICC)
13.	Intl Committee on Civil Status (ICCS)
14.	Organization of American States
15.	Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS)
16.	Southern African Development Community (SADC)
17.	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)
18.	World Tourism Organization (WTO)

Table 4: Summary Statistics conditional on Backsliding

Variable	Mean	SD	Min	Max	N
Cowcode	472	221	20	950	1907
Year	1994	8	1980	2007	1907
Backsliding	1	0	1	1	1907
Suspension Only	0.006	0.079	0	1	1907
Suspension and Threat	0.008	0.088	0	1	1907
Threat Only	0.003	0.051	0	1	1907
Degree of Backsliding	0.190	2.098	-15	16	1683
Repeat Offender	0.003	0.056	0	1	1907
post Cold War	0.640	0.480	0	1	1907
GDP pc	8.038	1.145	5.03	11.58	1907
Population Size	9.324	1.512	5.67	14.09	1907
Similarity	0.264	0.180	0	1	1907
Polity	0.493	6.998	-10	10	1907
Tenure	13.307	14.534	1	77	1897
Military Leadership	0.272	0.445	0	1	1895
Africa	0.352	0.478	0	1	1907
Asia	0.168	0.374	0	1	1907
Americas	0.161	0.368	0	1	1907
Middle East	0.149	0.357	0	1	1907
Europe	0.169	0.375	0	1	1907

Figure 2. IGO Suspensions due to Political Backsliding, by year




Figure 3: IGO Suspensions due to Political Backsliding, by IGO




Figure 4. Rates of Backsliding and IGO Suspension, 1981-2007




Figure 5. Backsliding by Type (some types overlap)




Figure 6. Predicted Probability of Backsliding and Actual Suspensions




Table 5: Determinants of IGO Suspensions and Threats (Rare Events Logit)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Suspension Only (1)	Suspension and Threat (2)	Threat Only (3)
Degree of Backsliding	-0.356*** (0.093)	-0.326*** (0.086)	0.257 (0.200)
Repeat Offender	4.349*** (1.366)	4.654*** (1.137)	4.005*** (1.346)
post Cold War	1.429 (1.198)	1.412 (1.124)	
GDP pc	-0.064 (0.467)	-0.131 (0.405)	0.306 (0.566)
Population Size	-0.022 (0.247)	-0.063 (0.215)	0.001 (0.288)
Similarity	-4.558 (3.864)	-2.943 (3.000)	-2.129 (3.819)
Polity	0.033 (0.081)	0.048 (0.069)	0.013 (0.085)
Tenure	0.002 (0.058)	-0.008 (0.050)	-0.008 (0.067)
Military Leadership	0.178 (0.976)	-0.196 (0.958)	
Constant	-4.794 (4.484)	-3.954 (3.870)	
N	1,673	1,673	1,673
LL	-36.365	-47.791	-25.919
AIC	92.730	115.581	71.838

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Terms dropped when collinear / perfectly predicting DV.

Table 6: Determinants of IGO Suspensions, by Backsliding Type

	Human Rights rare events (1)	States of Emergency rare events (2)	Election Issues rare events (3)	Coups logit (4)	Adverse Regime Changes, logit (5)
Degree of Backsliding	-0.370*** (0.119)	-0.322*** (0.103)	0.041 (0.533)	-1.526 (1.522)	-0.273 (0.236)
Repeat Offender		3.721** (1.490)			
post Cold War	1.192 (1.319)	1.179 (1.265)		9.281 (9.046)	0.705 (1.748)
GDP pc	0.395 (0.636)	-0.120 (0.632)	-2.158 (1.752)	1.471 (1.965)	-0.419 (0.952)
Population Size	0.052 (0.287)	-0.008 (0.271)	-2.147 (1.752)	-0.595 (0.561)	-0.365 (0.465)
Similarity	-6.972 (5.581)	-2.569 (4.295)	171.337 (117.406)	-3.866 (7.811)	-7.209 (6.116)
Polity	0.007 (0.090)	0.063 (0.099)	-0.467 (0.455)	2.303 (2.282)	0.150 (0.280)
Tenure	0.037 (0.053)	-0.015 (0.076)	-0.579 (0.387)	0.277 (0.300)	0.104 (0.152)
Military Leadership		0.387 (1.040)			-17.489 (3,323.713)
Constant	-7.794 (6.241)	-3.621 (5.446)		-21.799 (25.240)	3.066 (7.586)
N	1,138	969	274	47	52
LL	-20.598	-29.125	-3.622	-6.312	-10.218
AIC	61.197	78.249	23.243	28.623	38.436

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Terms dropped when collinear / perfectly predicting DV.

Table 7: Backsliders in 2004

Region	Human Rights Violations N=48	States of Emergency N=56	Election Issues N=11	Adverse Regime Changes N=2
Americas	Haiti , Venezuela, Argentina, Honduras, Costa Rica, Suriname, Jamaica, Barbados, Grenada, St. Lucia, Belize, Paraguay, St. Vincent, US	Haiti , Ecuador, Peru		
Africa	<i>Chad, Swaziland, Nigeria, Eq. Guinea, Togo, Zambia, Guinea, Burkina Faso, CAR, Tanzania, Seychelles, Mauritius, Mozambique</i>	<i>Chad, Swaziland, Nigeria, Zimbabwe, Algeria, Sudan, Guinea-Bissau, Ghana, Uganda, Burundi, Rwanda, Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Gambia, Senegal, Dem. Rep. of the Congo, Angola, Ivory Coast</i>	<i>Eq. Guinea, Cameroon, Tunisia</i>	
Middle East	<i>Egypt, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, Jordan,</i>	<i>Egypt, Yemen, Israel, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon</i>	<i>Iran</i>	<i>Iran</i>
Asia	<i>India, Taiwan, Maldives, Nepal, Uzbekistan, Philippines, Vietnam, Singapore, Malaysia, Mongolia, Bhutan</i>	<i>India, Taiwan, Maldives, Nepal, Burma, Afghanistan, China, North Korea, Nauru, Thailand, Indonesia, Laos, Brunei Darussalam</i>	<i>Burma, Uzbekistan, Philippines, Kazakhstan</i>	<i>Burma</i>
Europe	<i>Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Hungary, Romania, Latvia, Belgium, Poland, Czech Rep, Slovak Rep,</i>	<i>Russia, Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Spain, United Kingdom</i>	<i>Russia, Belarus, Ukraine</i>	

Note: Countries in *italics* experienced multiple types of backsliding; only **bold** was suspended. No coups in 2004.