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Research

Fiwebori4
 

Prof. Christoph Vanberg Ph. D.

AREAS OF INTEREST

Political Economics

Behavioral Economics

Experimental Economics

PUBLICATIONS

Who never tells a lie? Experimental Economics (forthcoming) (working paper version)

The dynamics of coalition formation - a multilateral bargaining experiment with free timing of moves (with J. Tremewan), Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 130 (2016), 33-46.

Experimental Evidence that Quorum Rules Discourage Turnout and Promote Election Boycotts (with L. Conraria and P. Magalhaes), Experimental Economics, 19 (2016), 886-909.

Group size and decision rules in legislative bargaining (with L. Miller), European Journal of Political Economy, 37 (2015): 288-302.

An experimental study on the incentives of the probabilistic serial mechanism (with M. Kurino and D. Hugh-Jones), Games and Economic Behavior, 87 (2014), 367-380.

Adaptive Preferences, Normative Individualism, and Individual Liberty: Comment, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 170 (2014), 43-48.

Playing hard to get: an economic rationale for crowding out of intrinsically motivated behavior (with W. Schnedler), European Economic Review, 68 (2014), 106-115.

Decision costs in legislative bargaining: An experimental analysis (with Luis Miller), Public Choice, 155 (2013), 373-394.

Voting on a sharing norm in a dictator game, Journal of Economic Psychology, 31 (2010), 285-292.

Why do people keep their promises? An experimental test of two explanations, Econometrica, 76 (2008), 1467-1480.

“One Man, One Dollar?” Campaign contribution limits, equal influence, and political communication, Journal of Public Economics, 92 (2008), 514-531.

WORKING PAPERS

Legislative bargaining with heterogeneous disagreement values: theory and experiments (with L. Miller and M. Montero)

DATA SETS

Data for several of my experiments, as well as other experiments conducted at our Department, are available for download at the AWI Experimental Economics data repository.

 


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Latest Revision: 2017-05-02
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